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Abstract 
 
Civil wars involving non-state armed groups in Burma have been driven by 
a complex mix of historical socio-political grievances and economic 
factors. The central government and its armed forces have conducted 
counterinsurgency campaigns against myriad rebel groups in ethnic areas 
virtually since independence in 1948. Civilian populations caught in these 
conflicts have suffered immensely as a consequence. The government 
and army have never completely controlled all the territory and people of 
the internationally recognised state as it exists on the map. Instead, in 
some areas it has been armed groups and welfare actors associated with 
them that have been responsible for limited administration and service 
provision to conflict-affected populations. Despite tolerance or support for 
this non-state governance in some areas, armed groups still present 
threats to the security of the constituencies they also claim to represent.  
This thesis assesses the factors that have facilitated or obstructed armed 
groups’ actions and the extent of their compliance (or not) in response to 
the norms against landmine use and the recruitment of children. While 
studies in other regions on armed groups and humanitarian norms have 
tended to consider policies of violence deliberately directed against 
civilians, the present study considers these less deliberate threats that 
armed groups in Burma present to the security of their own constituencies. 
It explores a set of theoretical propositions drawn from literature that has 
addressed armed groups from the perspectives of humanitarian 
engagement, sociology and political economy analysis of armed conflict. 
These contrasting approaches offer a more inclusive framework for 
analysis, considering the social, economic and coercive military and 
political structures influencing armed groups, affected populations and 
humanitarian actors engaging with them in relation to these issues.  
This thesis contends that perceived legitimacy and the role of armed group 
associated welfare and civil society actors have been significant influences 
on attempts to ameliorate the impact of these issues. The perspectives 
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and influences of legitimacy diverge, however, between international 
support for the prohibition of landmine use and under age recruitment, and 
local perceptions, from armed group constituencies and the government, 
of the groups as credible armed actors.  Localised economic agendas 
combined with geographical dispersion and weak organisational cohesion 
have also been factors leading to less compliance with these protection 
norms. The findings indicate that there is also considerable divergence in 
the extent of compliance between the two norms. Whereas landmine use 
remains perceived as militarily necessary to most armed groups in Burma 
and related to their maintenance of local legitimacy, children involved with 
armed groups are seen as less vital militarily, and external engagement 
with armed groups to address this issue has met with more acceptance 
over time. In the light of bilateral ceasefires and ongoing negotiations 
since 2012, the willingness and capacity of the armed groups and their 
welfare wings to address these concerns for conflict-affected populations 
will be important for their future support and for lasting political 
settlements. 
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Notes on names of places and ethnic groups 
English language spelling of place names and of names of ethnic 
nationality groups in Burma vary due to informal differences adopted by 
different authors over time, and also due to official government policy 
which changed the country’s official name from Burma to Myanmar in 
1989. The table below presents the most frequently used names and 
spelling for places and ethnic groups in the pre- and post -1989 versions. 
Pre-1989 Post-1989  
Union of Burma Union of Myanmar The official name of the 
country was changed from the 
Union of Burma to the Union 
of Myanmar by the military 
government in 1989 
Rangoon Yangon Largest city and former capital 
until 2006 
Burman Bamar Largest ethnic group in 
Burma/Myanmar 
Karen Kayin An ethnic national group and 
name of a state located in the 
southeast bordering Thailand 
Karenni Kayah An ethnic national group and 
name of a state located in the 
east bordering Thailand 
Moulmein Mawlamyine State capital of Mon state in 
the southeast located on the 
Andaman sea coast 
Paan Hpa-an State capital of Karen/Kayin 
state  
Tenasserim Tanintharyi Administrative division in the 
southeast bordering the 
Andaman sea 
Irrawaddy Ayerwaddy Administrative division, river 
and river delta in the south 
 
The choice of names for places and ethnic groups is also a political issue. 
As they have maintained opposition to the central government, especially 
in its post -1989 form, ethnic non-state armed groups and other 
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organisations opposed to the government have frequently retained the 
Union of Burma names. Even then, however, there is variation in spelling 
and usage.  
Another objection ethnic armed groups hold to the official post -1989 
government names is that they associate them with a form of internal 
colonialism or ‘Burmanisation,’ and with attempts by the government to 
deny their respective linguistic, social, cultural and political differences and 
claims for autonomy. With tentative developments towards peace and 
reconciliation in the country, especially over the last five years, this 
division has started to reduce. Those working with the ethnic opposition 
are also starting to use official government names as well for pragmatic 
reasons due to increasing opportunities to operate openly inside the 
country. 
As this study’s focus is on ethnic and pro-democracy non-state armed 
groups and organisations associated with them, it has adopted the pre-
1989 name of Burma that is more often used by those organisations in 
referring to the country as a whole. It also refers to ethnic nationalities and 
regions using the names preferred by the ethnic armed groups, for 
example, Karen or Karenni rather than the government names of Kayin 
and Kayah. The table above includes the most commonly occurring 
variations of these names that appear in secondary sources, maps or 
interviews. Another, more practical, reason for choosing one version of a 
name within this author’s own writing is for brevity without constant need, 
for example, to use Burma/Myanmar, Yangon/Rangoon, or Karen/Kayin. 
Inevitably, given the mix of primary and secondary sources and interviews, 
both versions of these terms have occurred at some stage in this 
dissertation. 
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
In civil war situations, especially where there has been protracted low 
intensity armed conflict, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have, in some 
instances, been willing to develop policies and practical measures for the 
protection of civilian populations. This is especially significant where the 
internationally recognised state is acting, or has acted, in gross violation of 
humanitarian norms. There have been many high profile instances globally 
where NSAGs, as well as the armed forces of states, have been 
responsible for a host of atrocities committed against civilians.1 There are, 
however, other instances where NSAGs have established welfare 
functions, provided assistance to constituent populations, and attempted 
to demonstrate varying levels of compliance with humanitarian norms.  
Influences that direct NSAG behaviour towards or away from such 
protective roles reside in the specific social, economic and political 
contexts within which the NSAGs and populations are embedded. Added 
to these influences has been the input of local and international 
humanitarian actors who have engaged with NSAGs on humanitarian and 
protection issues. This dissertation examines these circumstances, and 
the actors and processes involved, in the context of NSAGs in 
Burma/Myanmar.2  
The aim of this thesis is to identify which factors have facilitated or 
obstructed compliance and/or action towards compliance with 
humanitarian norms against landmine use and the recruitment of children 
by NSAGs in Burma. Furthermore, it seeks to understand how the NSAGs 
have been influenced regarding those two issues and why. This thesis 
contends there are social, economic and military factors that have shaped 
the policies and practices of NSAGs in Burma regarding landmine use and 
recruitment of children. The most significant social factors have been 
                                            
1 Recent examples globally would include the actions of armed groups in Syria, Iraq, 
South Sudan, Nigeria, the Ukraine, and the southern Philippines. 
2 From here on the name Burma will be used to refer to the country (also known as 
Myanmar) in this study. See the notes on the name of the country, states and ethnic 
nationalities pp xix-xx. 
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legitimacy, identity and the role of civil society; the principal economic 
factors are the source and allocation of material resources and the extent 
of geographic dispersion and organisational fragmentation of NSAGs; and 
the last factor is the claimed military and political necessity in the actions 
of NSAGs. The influence of external actors engaging with NSAGs on 
humanitarian issues is also considered in this study. Their input and 
influence overlaps, particularly, with the role of local civil society and local 
and international perceptions of NSAG legitimacy. 
Social factors: Legitimacy, identity and civil society 
Perceptions of legitimacy, while difficult to measure, are significant due to 
the real actions taken by both state and non-state actors in response to 
them.3 Concerns about legitimacy are evident in frequent opposition by 
recognised states to engagement with NSAGs on humanitarian issues by 
external actors. They are also present in NSAG statements, policies and 
actions that are intended to increase their local or international legitimacy. 
Perceptions of NSAG legitimacy vary, however. International humanitarian 
organisations, local civil society, external governments and businesses, 
the host government and armed forces, and the NSAGs’ own (claimed) 
civilian constituencies may all interpret what constitutes that legitimacy 
very differently.  
Compliance with international norms may lead to some small 
improvements for a NSAG’s international legitimacy, but little tangible 
external support to implement them. Local legitimacy, though, may be 
predicated on the NSAG being perceived by constituent populations as a 
credible protector, or by government opponents as a credible conflict 
actor, rather than being primarily based on compliance with external 
international norms. Consequently, there may be some acceptance locally 
for actions that are at odds with international humanitarian norms, such as 
the use of landmines or recruitment of those under 18 years of age. 
                                            
3 See, for example, Sukanya Podder, "Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: 
Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion," Contemporary Security Policy 34, no. 1 (2013); 
David Steinberg, "Legitimacy in Burma/ Myanmar: Concepts and Implications," in 
Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, ed. N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007). 
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Perceived legitimacy, it is argued here, has been one of the most 
significant motivating factors for NSAGs in Burma wishing to demonstrate 
adherence to humanitarian norms. This is based on the research 
conducted for the present study, as well as the work of researchers who 
have examined NSAG relations with civilian populations and compliance 
with humanitarian norms in other contexts.  
The members of welfare and civil society organisations (CSOs) that are 
involved with the provision of welfare or advocacy on rights-based issues 
are often exposed to risks themselves in undertaking this work. Many of 
these local organisations in the present study, especially those that have 
worked cross-border from Thailand, have an association with NSAGs. 
Local and faith-based CSOs have also developed acceptance with NSAGs 
in some ceasefire areas inside Burma. These groups have been involved 
with assistance work in response to armed conflicts between the 
government armed forces (Tatmadaw) and ethnic NSAGs. The counter-
insurgency strategies of the Tatmadaw have resulted in extensive 
displacement of people and a host of human rights violations.  
The role of identity, especially when ethnically or religiously inspired, has 
tended to be associated with exclusion of outsiders, nationalism, and 
violence.4 However, these local civil society actors’ sense of shared 
identity and cause with those they are assisting and working alongside, 
and in some instances through a genuine belief in the norms they 
promote, has led them to advocate for, or assist, NSAGs to ameliorate 
some of the threats they pose to their own populations. Furthermore, 
NSAG-associated welfare and civil society actors have also been valuable 
in working as partners with international organisations to implement these 
measures and to promote compliance with humanitarian norms by 
NSAGs. 
                                            
4 See, for example, Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars," 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002); Michael Ignatieff, Blood and 
belonging: Journeys into the new nationalism (London, UK: Chatto and Windus, 1993). 
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Material resources and funding 
The sources of funding and material support available to an NSAG and 
how that is allocated will influence the nature of its relations with civilians. 
These factors may influence the NSAG towards protective or predatory 
behaviour and, therefore, greater or lesser interest in compliance with 
humanitarian norms. This perspective is drawn from the political economy 
of armed conflict literature.5 Economic factors have frequently been 
identified as motivating NSAGs (and state armed forces) towards abusive 
and predatory behaviour towards civilians.6 In the cases examined here, 
resources and funds have sometimes also been directed into the 
administrative and welfare functions of NSAGs and associated welfare 
actors. The NSAGs considered in this study do, however, engage in both 
protective and predatory behaviours to varying extents. The factors 
influencing this have depended significantly on the extent of NSAG 
organisational fragmentation and geographical dispersion and the related 
consequences for their relations with host populations. 
While the ethnic conflicts in Burma have deep-seated social and political 
roots, economic factors have, over time, exerted an increasing set of 
influences on the nature of NSAG behaviour and relations with their 
constituencies. Access to resources and funding external to, or 
independent of, local populations, has led some NSAGs, or sections of 
them, to engage in activities that endanger civilians since they are less 
dependent on local people for support. Furthermore, funds raised from 
resources within areas controlled by NSAGs have sometimes only 
increased the wealth and power of NSAG elites and not greatly benefitted 
communities. In both these cases, there is little improvement in welfare for 
the general population and, equally, less NSAG interest in compliance with 
humanitarian norms. In other examples, sources of funding such as local 
resources or taxation of cross-border trade that are controlled by NSAGs 
                                            
5 See, for example, Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: 
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000); Karen Ballentine 
and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and 
Grievance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2003). 
6 See, for example, David Keen, The economic functions of violence in civil wars, Adelphi 
Paper 320 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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have been used to support the provision of administration and welfare to 
constituent populations. In those situations, there has been more NSAG 
interest in engagement from humanitarian actors and in demonstrating 
support for humanitarian norms. 
Military and political necessity 
Practitioners who engage with NSAGs about compliance with 
humanitarian norms, while identifying the social and economic factors 
outlined above, have also drawn attention to NSAG rationales for the 
military necessity of actions that violate humanitarian norms.7 These 
claims are made by NSAGs and those associated with them, including 
sometimes their own constituencies, for why they continue to present 
threats to those populations. Landmine use, for example, is argued as 
necessary for the militarily weaker and smaller NSAGs to defend 
themselves and those they claim to represent from the state’s armed 
forces. In a similar way, children may be recruited, permitted to reside in 
NSAG camps, or attend NSAG associated schools or institutions, due to 
pressure on the NSAGS to maintain numbers or find potential future 
recruits.  
Military and political factors, however, may also have a positive influence 
on NSAG behaviour. Taking action to reduce harm to their own 
populations is significant for local and international legitimacy as outlined 
above. This, in turn, matters politically for inclusion within ceasefires and 
peace processes inside the country and in attracting international support 
to do so. Furthermore, trained and disciplined soldiers that take and treat 
prisoners well may thereby encourage defection or surrender of soldiers 
from the more abusive armed forces of opponents.  
Humanitarian engagement with NSAGs 
One other significant factor that is considered by this study is the influence 
of external organisations that have engaged with NSAGs to improve their 
role in civilian protection and compliance with humanitarian norms. 
                                            
7 Olivier Bangerter, "Reasons why armed groups choose to respect international 
humanitarian law or not," International Review of the Red Cross 93, no. 882 (2011). 
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Effective engagement with NSAGs by local and international actors 
depends on the willingness of the NSAG, especially of leaders and 
associated welfare organisations, to enter into dialogue and to take 
action.8 Local and international humanitarian and human rights NGOs in 
Burma have been influential, in some instances, through appeals to NSAG 
concerns about their legitimacy, their claims to uphold democratic and 
rights-based values, and to their sense of shared identity with their 
constituencies. They have also worked with local NSAG-associated and 
other independent civil society actors in advocacy, training, and 
implementation of practical measures such as mine risk education. At a 
broader level, international humanitarian organisations have promoted 
these norms to some NSAGs that have sought international support and 
advice through their interaction with the humanitarian aid sector. 
Contribution to literature and theory 
This study seeks to contribute to some under researched areas within 
existing literature and theory addressing NSAGs and humanitarian norms. 
These gaps in the literature include the geographical focus; the type of 
NSAGs involved; the nature of the threats to security of civilians the 
NSAGs present, and; a theoretical approach that considers the influence 
of social and economic context and agency of the NSAGs and associated 
civil society actors, as well as the role of external international 
humanitarian actors.  
It has been pointed out that research into humanitarian engagement with 
NSAGs globally has not received much attention in academic studies.9 
While there has been some research into factors influencing NSAG 
behaviour towards civilians and humanitarian engagement with them in 
other regions (especially Africa and Latin America), there has not been a 
study specifically considering the case of NSAGs and humanitarian norms 
                                            
8 See, for example, David Petrasek, Ends and Means: Human Rights Approaches to 
Armed Groups (Versoix, Switzerland: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 
2000); Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, Rules of Engagement: Protecting 
Civlians through Dialogue with Armed Non-State Actors (Geneva, Switzerland: ADH 
Geneva, 2011). 
9 Ann-Kristin Sjoberg, "Dealing With the Devil?: Humanitarian Engagement with Non-
State Actors: The Case of the National Liberation Army, Colombia" (paper presented at 
the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, 2008), 1. 
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in Burma.10 However, NSAGs active in and on the borders of Burma have 
received attention on related issues to the present one which provide 
useful context for this study. These studies have included, for example, 
the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW),11 and the 
development of civil society associated with resistance movements on 
Burma’s borders.12 The social and political histories of Burma’s ethnic 
conflicts and NSAGs have also received attention, as has the 
humanitarian situation more generally inside Burma and along its 
borders.13  
The type of NSAGs examined in the present study also differ to those 
considered in many other studies, not just from a humanitarian 
perspective, but also from the theoretical approach to the political 
economy and sociology of NSAGs. NSAGs in Burma for the most part 
have not sought to take power at the centre of the recognised state, but 
have either sought to secede, and more recently, have sought greater 
autonomy within a federal union. This has significant implications for the 
nature of their behaviour towards civilians. Many NSAGs in other regions 
that have been assessed in terms of their methods of formation, 
organisation and politics and how those factors, in turn, impact on their 
behaviour towards civilians, have been groups focused on taking over 
power from the government of an existing state.14  
                                            
10 For case studies in Africa and Latin America respectively, see, Carine Kaneza, 
"Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups 
in the Great Lakes Region of Africa (unpublished thesis)" (University of Western Cape, 
2006); Sjoberg, "Dealing With the Devil?: Humanitarian Engagement with Non-State 
Actors: The Case of the National Liberation Army, Colombia". 
11 Stephanie Koorey, "Orphans and Icons: Small Arms Control and Armed Groups in 
Southeast Asia (unpublished thesis)" (Canberra, ACT: Australian National University, 
2008). Sections on Burma NSAGs pp.118-123; 128-133; 141-143; 155-159; 172-173; 
180-183; 185-187; 296-305; and 318-319. 
12 Ashley South, "Ceasefires and Civil Society: The Case of the Mon," in Exploring Ethnic 
Diversity in Burma, ed. Mikael Gravers (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian 
Studies, 2007). Nicholas Henry, "Civil Society amid Civil War: Political Violence and Non-
violence in the Burmese Democracy Movement," Global Society 25, no. 1 (2011). 
13 See, for example, Ashley South, Malin Perhult, and Nils Carstensen, "Asia Programme 
Paper: ASP PP 2010/04: Conflict and Survival: Self-protection in South-east Burma," 
(London, UK: Chatham House, 2010). Mark Duffield, "On the Edge of 'No Man's Land': 
Chronic Emergency in Myanmar," (Bristol, UK: School of Sociology, Politics, and 
International Studies, University of Bristol, 2008). 
14 For example, all four rebel groups considered by Jeremy Weinstein’s study of the 
social and material resources contributing to rebel group formation and to the 
consequences for violence towards civilians, were NSAGs that sought to become the 
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The type of threats, landmine use and recruitment of children, the NSAGs 
in the present study pose to the communities they claim to represent or 
protect are not deliberate policies of violence directed towards civilian 
populations. Neither are they situations of widespread asymmetric 
violence occurring between and/or within civilian communities. Other 
studies considering NSAG-civilian relations have tended to consider 
situations where violence towards civilians has been intentional and 
targeted, whether at a group or individual level.15 
This thesis also contributes a point of difference in theory and 
methodology to existing studies on the humanitarian aspects of NSAG-
civilian relations. The approach to this study is informed by a need to 
develop a practical, holistic and inclusive understanding of the NSAGs and 
the issues of landmine use and children affected by armed conflict.16 It 
does not view NSAGs as passive recipients of international norms, nor the 
populations they are involved with as passive recipients of humanitarian 
aid. Consequently, this study not only considers the role of external 
international humanitarian engagement actors with NSAGs,17 but also the 
actions of the NSAGs themselves and associated civil society in 
ameliorating (or not) threats they present to their populations, and the 
social and economic factors influencing them in that regard. 
                                            
government of an existing state. They were RENAMO in Mozambique, the National 
Resistance Army in Uganda, and two factions of the Shining Path in Peru. Jeremy M. 
Weinstein, Inside Rebellion:The Politics of Insurgent Rebellion (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
15 See, for example, Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Ann-Kristin Sjoberg, "Challengers without 
responsibility ?: Exploring reasons for armed non-state actor use and restraint on the use 
of violence against civilians (Unpublished thesis)" (Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies, 2010). 
16 Elisabeth Decrey-Warner, "Characteristics and Motivations of Organised Armed 
Groups," in Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Law: Organized Armed 
Groups: A Challenge for the 21st Century, ed. Marco Odello and Gian Luca Beruto 
(Milan, Italy: FrancoAngeli, 2010), 61. 
17 For example, Jo and Bryant’s study of the extent of compliance with international 
humanitarian law by three NSAGs in Sudan, used the number of International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits that were permitted by the NSAGs to detainees as a 
measure of the extent of each NSAG’s compliance. Hyeran Jo and Katherine Bryant, 
"Taming of the Warlords: Commitment and Compliance by Armed Opposition Groups in 
Civil Wars," in The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance, 
ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
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Significance 
Demonstrating an ability to represent and provide services for their 
associated civilian populations will become increasingly significant for 
ethnic NSAGs in Burma. There have been bilateral ceasefires agreed 
between the government and most NSAGs in Burma since 2012, and a 
claimed ‘nationwide’ ceasefire agreement joined by a smaller sub-group of 
these NSAGs in 2015 has opened up the potential for future political 
dialogue towards lasting political settlements. These developments will 
also impact on welfare or civil society organisations associated with, or 
working alongside, these NSAGs. If the NSAGs are to have a future role in 
administration, or as political parties in their respective areas of influence 
or control, the issues of landmine use and under age recruitment 
addressed by this study will be significant. In post-ceasefire situations, if 
they are to remain relevant to their constituencies they will need to 
maintain, or win, genuine popular support. A significant precondition for 
this support will be that they consult with, and are responsive to, the needs 
and interests of the populations they claim to represent. Demonstrating 
that they can protect constituent populations from security threats they 
themselves are implicated with will be an important step for the NSAGs 
increasing their legitimacy, and for improving the conditions of people 
living in former conflict-affected areas. The present study seeks to 
contribute to the research on engagement with NSAGs in Burma and 
factors influencing them in regard to humanitarian norms. It also intends to 
be of practical relevance for international actors and local civil society 
organisations working with NSAGs and/or addressing these issues.  
The author acknowledges that lasting and equitable political settlements to 
the conflicts in Burma are ultimately the best solution to ending the threats 
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NSAGs as well as government forces present to their communities.18 
Given the slow progress of any such developments, though, there is value 
in deepening the understanding of how those issues are influenced in the 
protracted situations of not quite war or peace that typify the situation in 
many ethnic NSAG areas of Burma.19 While the issues addressed by this 
study might be thought of as secondary or “proximate” to the central 
concern of ending armed conflict through lasting peace settlements,20 
those settlements are still likely to take many years to be set in place. 
Meanwhile, there are a range of actions and policies that are, or can be, 
undertaken by NSAGs and organisations engaging with them to 
ameliorate the threats that emanate from the NSAGs. For example, short 
of a complete end to landmine use, mine risk education, mapping, 
surveys, warnings and fencing of mined areas, or humanitarian mine 
clearance from non-strategic areas are measures that can be, or have 
been, taken.  
Scope 
This study does not view the NSAGs or these issues through an 
anthropological lens, or from the perspective of security studies or 
counter-insurgency. Studies of the many, varied and contested ethnic 
groupings in Burma have been undertaken by authors qualified to do so, 
and that is well beyond the scope of the present study. It is not a study of 
the security of states in relation to threats from NSAGs or an examination 
of counterinsurgency strategies to combat them. It is also not primarily 
                                            
18 The researcher has had a long-standing interest (although at a distance until 2012) in 
Burma’s politics and history. This has also been deepened by several personal friends 
who have worked, or are still working, with local and international education and 
assistance organisations on the Thai-Burma border and inside the country. Initial 
discussions with them indicated the complexity of the long-running armed conflicts and of 
the relationships between ethnic armed groups, local civil society and international 
organisations. An opportunity to volunteer with the resettlement programme of New 
Zealand Refugee Services in early 2012, working with and meeting people from Burma, 
some newly arrived and others who have been resident for some time, further developed 
the author’s focus on the country and its issues.  
19 Mary Callahan, Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, 
Occupation, and Coexistence (Washington, DC: East-West Centre, 2007), 3. 
20 For example, moves to ban or restrict landmine use by NSAGs or government forces in 
Burma have been described as a distraction from addressing the primary structural 
causes of the underlying armed conflicts. See, for example, South, Perhult, and 
Carstensen, "Asia Programme Paper: ASP PP 2010/04: Conflict and Survival: Self-
protection in South-east Burma," 50. 
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concerned with the strategies and violations of humanitarian norms by the 
Tatmadaw, although they do present a backdrop to the central focus on 
the NSAGs. 
The focus is on pragmatic humanitarian concerns for the welfare of those 
living in areas controlled or contested by NSAGs. In parts of Burma’s 
ethnic areas, the recognised state has neglected the welfare of sections of 
its own population, or even deliberately targeted them within its own 
recognised borders. NSAGs have consequently become de facto 
authorities over territory and people in these circumstances and taken on 
a variety of governance and welfare functions. Those situations also place 
this study outside the standard understanding within the field of 
international relations of the sovereignty of recognised states enforced by 
the state’s monopoly over the use of armed force. Furthermore, 
humanitarian actors have needed to work with non-state authorities and 
associated welfare and civil society actors for access to communities 
needing assistance and as partners in administration and delivery of that 
aid. This study, therefore, takes an approach that is well summarised in 
what Pablo Policzer has described as “humanitarian realism.” 
The recognition that we do not live in a world of completely sovereign 
states with effective coercive monopolies; that for much of the world, non-
state armed groups are de facto their prime authorities; and that from the 
perspectives of the victims of violence it does not matter whether the 
perpetrators are states or non-state groups.21 
International humanitarian norms  
Humanitarian norms are understood in the context of this study as 
referring collectively to the combined standards contained within 
international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law 
(IHRL) that are applicable to NSAGs. Using the term ‘armed non-state 
actor’ in reference to NSAGs, the international NGO Geneva Call that 
specialises in engagement with NSAGs on issues including landmine use 
and children affected by armed conflict, defines humanitarian norms as 
                                            
21 Pablo Policzer, "Democracy and Non-State Armed Groups," in State of Corruption, 
State of Chaos, ed. Michaelene D. Cox (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 39. 
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“IHL and those IHRL standards relevant to ANSAs.”22  This is the term 
used by the present study as it reflects practitioner usage and 
encompasses the wider range of international legal obligations applying to 
NSAGs. The term ‘norms’ is applied in this study rather than laws, since 
the research considers a range of actions along a continuum of behaviour. 
From the perspective of sociology a norm can be understood as “a course 
of action that is directed towards an end.”23 To reflect the reality of the 
situation this study examines, it is the actions (or not) by NSAGs towards 
the end of compliance and the factors influencing them that is the focus of 
the study rather than a dichotomy between complete compliance and non-
compliance.  
The humanitarian norms applying to landmine use and recruitment of 
children and their basis in international law 
Landmine use and recruitment of children are both addressed by 
international humanitarian norms prohibiting their use. In the last twenty 
years they have also been the subject of specific international treaties that 
can be joined by recognised states, but not by NSAGs. The norm against 
anti-personnel landmine use is reflected in international and customary 
law which promotes the banning (in the case of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty) 
or restrictions in their use (in the case of the 1996 Convention Weapons 
Treaty). There is both a moral and now legal opposition to the 
indiscriminate effects and extreme harm and suffering caused by 
landmines. The 1997 Ottawa landmine ban treaty prohibited the 
production, use, stockpiling or transfer of anti-personnel landmines by 
signatory states. Not all states, including major powers such as the United 
States and the People’s Republic of China have joined the Ottawa treaty. 
In the case of NSAGs, it is restrictions to landmine use rather than an 
outright ban that can apply to them in international law. These restrictions 
are set out via Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) in 1996 applying to landmine use. The Protocol was 
                                            
22 Elisabeth Decrey Warner, Jonathan Somer, and Pascal Bongard, "Armed Non-State 
Actors and Humanitarian Norms: Lesons from the Geneva Call Experience," in Modern 
Warfare: Armed Groups, Private Militaries, Humanitarian Organisations, and the Law, ed. 
Benjamin Perrin (Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press, 2012), 83. 
23 John K. Rhoads, Critical Issues in Social Theory (University Park, Penn: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1991), 173. 
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extended to non-international armed conflicts, and therefore to NSAGs 
within signatory states, in 2001. The Protocol II to the CCW restricts 
indiscriminate use of landmines and their use against civilians. It also 
requires recording of landmine placement, signage of mined areas, and 
removal at the end of hostilities.24 Additionally, the restrictions to access to 
fields, crops, waterways, and general movement for civilians caused by 
landmines are reflected in parts of other international treaties addressing 
the “protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population.”25 However, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma) is 
not a signatory to either the Ottawa Treaty or the CCW and its Protocol II. 
Consequently, for NSAGs, it is the norm based on international law and in 
the moral objection to the excessive and indiscriminate harm the weapon 
causes that calls for prohibition of its use. 
The norm against the recruitment of children as combatants in armed 
conflict is more clearly reflected in several international instruments, most 
specifically by the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.26 As with the 
Ottawa Treaty and the CCW regarding landmines, NSAGs cannot join 
these state-based treaties applying to protection of children. However, the 
prohibition of child recruitment is also included in the Additional Protocol II 
(1977) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions applying to non-international 
armed conflicts, and therefore to NSAGs regardless of their agreement to 
comply with it or not. 
Because NSAGs cannot join formal state-based treaties or contribute to 
those parts of those treaties that do apply to them, it is the accepted 
standards, the international humanitarian norms of behaviour, which can 
be applied to them. In both instances full compliance with the norms is 
                                            
24 Protocol II as amended on the 3rd of May 1996 to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons applying to Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices. 
25 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (1977) (Article 14); The Rome Statute 
of the ICC Article 8.b (xx). 
26 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (2000); See also, Additional Protocol II (1977) to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, Part II Article 4.3; The Rome Statute of the ICC, Article 8. b (xxvi), 
and UNSC Resolution 1612 in 2005. 
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understood as complete prohibition of the actions. The reality for many of 
the NSAGs in the present study is unlikely to be full compliance, even in 
instances where those NSAGs have made commitments to do so.27 
However, recognition and awareness of the norms applying to landmines 
and children and their basis in international law, as outlined above, also 
encourages NSAGs to cooperate with or facilitate activities that can 
ameliorate those issues even if the NSAGs themselves currently fall short 
of full compliance with the norms. 
Landmine use and recruitment of children as indicators of 
compliance with humanitarian norms 
Landmine use and recruitment of children are deployed in this thesis as 
indicators of broader compliance, and more realistically, the extent of 
actions towards compliance, with humanitarian norms by NSAGs in 
Burma. The rationale for this involves three main elements. First, 
prohibition of landmine use and recruitment of children in international law 
as it applies to states, and to a lesser extent as it applies to NSAGs, reflect 
wider principles recognised in IHL and IHRL and in customary 
international humanitarian law. These principles include the importance of 
distinction between civilians and combatants;28 proportionality in the use of 
force;29 prohibition of actions and weapons that cause indiscriminate and 
excessive harm and suffering;30 protection of particular groups of persons 
such as children, the elderly, or disabled from the effects of armed 
conflict,31 and; the prohibition of actions that deny the civilian population 
                                            
27 This is in a situation internationally where powerful states and other states with ongoing 
internal armed conflict have not joined these treaties. There is also disagreement with the 
child recruitment issue about acceptable minimum ages of recruitment and differences in 
treaties regarding minimum ages of recruitment between NSAGs and states. See chapter 
three for further discussion of applicability of IHL and IHRL to NSAGs. 
28 Common Article Three of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949; Additional Protocol II 
(1977) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Article 8, 2 (a) and (b). 
29 “Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is 
prohibited.” See, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), Chapter 4, Rule 14, 46-50. 
30 “The use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited.” Ibid., Chapter 20, Rule 70 and 71, 237-50.  
31 Ibid., Chapter 39, Rules 134-38, 475-91. 
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access to the necessities of life.32 Second, similar criteria including 
landmine use, child soldiers, killing of civilians, and treatment of detainees 
have been identified in other studies as indicators for the level of 
compliance more generally with humanitarian norms by NSAGs.33 Third, 
the two issues of landmine use and underage recruitment by NSAGs, as 
indicated above, are mentioned within the disparate parts of many 
international humanitarian and human rights treaties, the Geneva 
Conventions, customary international law, UN resolutions, and the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court. Consequently, the term humanitarian 
norms is used for brevity within the text of this thesis in referring to the 
prohibition of actions that are addressed across many different parts of 
international treaties and customary law. 
 
NSAGs in Burma: A brief introduction 
Conflicts between rebel ethnic NSAGs and the central government in 
Burma have continued sporadically since independence in 1948.34 
Unresolved political tensions at independence between the new 
government and a host of other ethnically and politically based 
organisations rapidly escalated into armed conflict as the new government 
attempted to consolidate itself, establish a unitary state and suppress 
opposition. Consequently, the prevention of the disintegration of the 
unitary state became the driving force for the Tatmadaw since Burma’s 
independence in 1948, leading to its direct control of the state from 1962 
up to 2011. While the ethnic NSAG challengers have now been pushed to 
the margins, decades of military and political struggle have also forged the 
                                            
32 “Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to 
attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population, such as food stuffs, agricultural areas for the production 
of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 
works.” Additional Protocol II (1977) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Part IV, Article 
14.  
33 Jo and Bryant, "Taming of the Warlords: Commitment and Compliance by Armed 
Opposition Groups in Civil Wars," 241; Sjoberg, "Dealing With the Devil?: Humanitarian 
Engagement with Non-State Actors: The Case of the National Liberation Army, 
Colombia", 42-44. 
34 See Chapter Six ‘Burma Background and Context’ for a more detailed treatment of the 
ethnic conflicts in Burma. 
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development of parallel state-like (and sometimes overlapping with the 
state) administrative and welfare systems within the ethnic NSAG areas. 
These conflicts have been long-running, sporadic and usually low-
intensity, fought in the jungle and mountain terrain of the ethnic border 
regions of Myanmar, and generally outside the focus of international 
political or media attention. There is a wide spectrum of armed groups in 
Burma that range from large and long-standing ethnic armed 
organisations, with state-like structures, political wings and administrative 
functions, regular armies and territorial control, through to government-
aligned-militias and small splinter factions from larger NSAGs. The NSAGs 
examined in this study mostly have government-like departments with 
differentiated political and military wings and provide varying levels of 
services such as health and education to the parts of the constituent 
populations they can access and claim to represent. These NSAGs have 
not engaged in deliberate policies of violence directed towards civilians on 
any widespread or systematic level. Use of landmines and recruitment of 
children are, however, two issues in contravention of humanitarian norms, 
that these NSAGs have been involved with, and which present threats to 
the security of the people they claim to represent. 
Research questions 
To discover why some NSAGs have taken action in relation to the 
humanitarian norms against landmine use and recruitment of children, 
while others have not, or have done so in relation to one norm but not 
another, requires consideration of the potential factors that contribute to or 
impede this.   
A case study is conducted across a set of NSAGs in Burma in relation to 
these two issues that affect immediate and long-term civilian security. 
1) The use, production, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines. 
2) The effects of armed conflict on children, including the recruitment 
and involvement of children in NSAGs. 
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The focus of this research, therefore, is on the threats NSAGs pose to the 
security of civilian populations in Burma through landmine use and 
involvement of children in armed conflict; the actions they have taken (if 
any) to ameliorate these issues; and the roles of other actors that have 
engaged with them to this end.   
The central research question is: 
Which factors have facilitated or obstructed compliance and/or action 
towards compliance with humanitarian norms against landmine use and 
the recruitment of children by NSAGs in Burma? 
From this central research question four secondary questions follow:  
a) What are the actions NSAGs have themselves taken (if any) to 
ameliorate the issues of landmine use and children affected by 
armed conflict?  
 
b) How have these been carried out? 
 
c) What are the roles and processes of humanitarian actors that 
have engaged with NSAGs to this end?  
 
d) How effective have they been and why? 
 
Organisation of the thesis 
The following chapter introduces the type of NSAGs operating in Burma 
that are the focus of the study. It also introduces the two central theoretical 
approaches, the political economy of armed conflict and social 
constructivism, relevant to the analysis of NSAG behaviour deployed in 
this study. Chapter three then outlines the literature from a humanitarian 
perspective on engagement with NSAGs and the IHL and IHRL applicable 
to them. It also examines writing from humanitarian practitioners regarding 
the reasons for NSAG compliance with, or violation of, these laws. 
Chapter four reviews the literature from the political economy of armed 
conflict and from sociology-based research into NSAGs. A focus within 
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these two bodies of literature is on the factors influencing NSAG-civilian 
relations. It then presents a set of eight theoretical propositions derived 
from relevant theory and literature from chapters two through to four. They 
are deployed in this study to assist in answering the central and secondary 
research questions above. The research design, rationale for a case study 
approach, the choice of NSAGs, fieldwork and interviews, and methods for 
analysis of data are set out in chapter five. The historical and political 
context of Burma’s ethnic conflicts is outlined in chapter six. The 
circumstances within which many NSAGs developed in Burma and have 
operated for decades is presented therein. It also details recent 
developments that have been influential on the NSAGs, especially 
ceasefires between the government and NSAGs and increasing 
international engagement with Burma since 2011/12.  
 
Chapters seven through to nine present the empirical component of this 
research and include relevant excerpts from the interviews conducted 
during the fieldwork. Landmines and children affected by armed conflict, 
the two issues that are deployed as measures of NSAG compliance with 
humanitarian norms, are detailed in chapter seven. These issues are 
examined first at an international level, and then with specific reference to 
the practices of state and non-state forces in Burma. Four NSAGs 
operating in southeast Burma are analysed as case studies in chapter 
eight.35 Attention is paid to their development, social, economic and 
political contexts, and their trajectory since formation. In seeking to answer 
the secondary questions a) and b) above, these NSAGs’ policies, and their 
practices, both positive and negative, in response to the humanitarian 
norm issues of landmine use and involvement of children, are examined. 
Following the line of enquiry suggested by the secondary questions c) and 
d) the roles, processes and effectiveness of local and international actors 
that have engaged with NSAGs in Burma are examined in chapter nine. 
The forms of direct and indirect engagement activity with NSAGs to 
                                            
35 These NSAGs are the Karenni National Progressive Party/ Karenni Army (KNPP/ KA), 
the New Mon State Party/ Mon National Liberation Army (NMSP/MNLA), the All Burma 
Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), and the Democratic Karen Buddhist/Benevolent 
Army (DKBA). 
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encourage or improve measures by them on the two protection issues are 
detailed. 
 
The theoretical propositions are revisited in the findings and conclusion 
chapter (ten), and are assessed in the light of the issues, NSAG policies 
and practices, and the work of external engagement actors that have been 
outlined across chapters seven through nine. It also examines some 
themes raised during the study that are not accounted for by the existing 
propositions. Lastly, consideration is given to some implications for theory 
addressing NSAGs, and to practical policy arising from this research, and 
to some areas for potential future research that have been raised through 
the course of the study.
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Chapter Two 
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and theory 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) acknowledges the role of “organised 
armed groups” as parties to conflicts.36 This emphasis on armed groups as 
organised state-like entities, is partly due to the assumption, in 
humanitarian terms, that effective command and control in such groups 
will reduce unintended harm to civilians and encourage better compliance 
with IHL.37  Organised armed groups are also more likely to have political 
wings, and associated welfare or social organisations, as well as fighting 
forces. The significance of this aspect of organised armed groups has 
been acknowledged by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) in terms of determining who is considered a combatant or not in 
such groups. “This distinction has important consequences for the 
determination of membership in an organized armed group as opposed to 
other forms of affiliation with, or support for, a non-State party to the 
conflict.” 38  For the more organised groups, their role as political entities 
and de facto governments with control over people and/or territory provide 
significant reasons for external humanitarian organisations to engage with 
them.39 Humanitarian engagement with NSAGs may be for access to 
populations under NSAG control, or to influence the NSAG itself regarding 
humanitarian issues. 
                                            
36 See, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 
Article 1 (1). The applicability of IHL to NSAGs is discussed further in chapter three. 
37 Lack of effective command and control due to geographic dispersion and autonomous 
actions by lower level commanders have been highlighted as organisational factors 
leading to increased predation by armed groups. See, for example, Patrick Johnston, 
"The Geography of Insurgent Organization and its Consequences for Civil Wars: 
Evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone," Security Studies 17, no. 1 (2008). 
38 International Committee of the Red Cross, "Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law " International 
Review of the Red Cross 90, no. 872 (2008): 1006. 
39 Claude Bruderlein, The Role of Non-State Actors in Building Human Security: The 
Case of Armed Groups in Intra-State Wars (Geneva, Switzerland: HD Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue, 2000), 7. 
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NSAGs operating in Burma: definitions and 
terminology  
The Burma NSAGs considered by this study have been motivated by 
deep-seated ethnic or political grievances that can be traced back through 
the post-independence, colonial, and even pre-colonial era. The formation 
of most NSAGs in Burma has been as a reaction to central state 
repression and/or neglect in peripheral areas of the country and these 
groups have frequently been in existence for decades. Apart from the 
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) up to 1989, and for a brief moment, the 
Karen National Union (KNU) in 1949, NSAGs have not sought to seize 
control at the centre of the state but, instead, have sought secession from 
Burma, or more recently, greater autonomy within it.40 Economic 
motivations have increased over the decades of conflict, both individually 
for some NSAG elites, and in the access to and extraction of resources 
more broadly to maintain or further the NSAGs’ causes. Most established 
ethnic NSAGs operate some system of taxation upon constituencies, but 
they also attempt to provide varying degrees of welfare and protection. To 
this end, they claim to be the legitimate representatives of their constituent 
populations and their grievances.  
While the term NSAG is used in discussing armed groups in the literature 
and theoretical perspectives for this study, other terms are employed in 
referring specifically to armed groups in the context of Burma. In particular, 
the ‘non-state’ aspect of the label is not always appropriate for armed 
groups that seek to behave and represent themselves as state-like 
entities. To complicate the state aspect further, in Burma, many armed 
groups are located in ‘ethnic states,’ which are demarcated and 
administered by the central state government. Those who have worked 
alongside, engaged with or studied armed groups in Burma, and the 
armed groups themselves, often use the label ethnic armed groups 
(EAGs) or ethnic armed organisations (EAOs).  
                                            
40 Many of the ethnic armed groups examined in this study have sought change in the 
central government through participation in ethnic armed group alliances. The pro-
democracy focused ABSDF also sought to bring about democratic change at the centre 
through participation in alliances with ethnic armed groups. 
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The significance of this terminology was demonstrated during negotiations 
in 2014 towards a potential nationwide ceasefire agreement with the 
government. Leaders from a coalition of ethnic NSAGs in Myanmar, the 
United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), wanted to use the label 
‘ethnic revolution armed group’ rather than just ‘armed group’ preferred by 
the government in the wording of the draft nationwide ceasefire document. 
We want to include the word ‘revolution’ because we engage in military 
means for a political purpose. We use armed struggle to demand our 
rights. ‘Armed groups’ could be any groups who hold arms for looting. They 
could be terrorists or pirates.41  
However, groups such as the ABSDF or the former CPB, have/had 
primarily political rather than ethno-nationalist motivations, so NSAG 
remains applicable to them. While most NSAGs examined in this study fit 
the organised type defined above, there is still a considerable range in 
terms of size, motivation, and political alignment. For example, NSAGs are 
often referred to in terms of the status of their relations with the central 
government and its armed forces as ‘ceasefire’ or ‘non-ceasefire.’ Other 
armed groups include village–level militias (some are aligned with the 
government, others with ethnic NSAGs), splinter groups from larger 
NSAGs, and Border-Guard Forces (BGF) which are former ‘ceasefire’ 
NSAGs that have been brought under direct control of the state armed 
forces.42 These other types of armed group are usually small and 
localised, in the case of village militias, or larger but under direct 
government control, as in the case of the BGF. While they are mentioned 
in this thesis within the wider context of ethnic armed conflicts in Burma, 
these other forms of armed group are not the direct focus of this study.  
The armed groups that are considered in the present study have pursued 
ethnic and/or political objectives and generally have political as well as 
military wings. They have also been responsible for varying levels of 
                                            
41 Nai Hong Sar, General Secretary of the UNFC, quoted by Saw Yan Naing, "A Word 
Could Delay Burma’s Peace Process: Ethnic Leaders," The Irrawaddy January 21, 2014. 
42 See, for an extensive typology of armed groups active in Burma/Myanmar, Kim Jolliffe, 
Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions (Yangon, Myanmar: 
Asia Foundation, 2014), 11-14. Paul Keenan, By Force of Arms: Armed Ethnic Groups in 
Burma (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2012). 
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welfare activity as well as presenting threats to the security of civilian 
populations exposed to their control or influence. Most of these groups are 
perceived as being significant enough politically and militarily to be 
formally approached for ceasefires by the government. There remain 
approximately 20 NSAGs in Burma that fit within these parameters. 
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43 Information for this table is drawn from, Burma News International, Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2015 (Chiang Mai, Thailand: 
Burma News International, 2015); Keenan, By Force of Arms: Armed Ethnic Groups in Burma. Government controlled BGF and militias are not included in this 
table. Groups with negligible numbers (less than 100), for example the Arakan National Council (ANC), Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), or Wa National 
Organisation (WNO), are also not included. This raises the issue of military strength for NSAG credibility and perceived legitimacy. The three small groups (ANC, 
LDU and WNO) were not invited to sign the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) in October 2015 for the reason that the government stated they lacked any (or 
sufficient) armed forces to be included. 
Significant organised ethnic/political non-state armed groups in Burma/Myanmar as of 201543  
 Numbers 
(estimated) 
Founded Ceasefire Areas 
Arakan Army (AA) 2,000 2009 -------- Kachin, Arakan  
Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) 100 1968 2012 Arakan, Chin, Karen 
All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) 400 1988 2013 Karen, Kachin 
Chin National Front/ Army (CNF/A) 200 1988 2012 Chin 
Democratic Karen Benevolent Army/ Kalo Htoo Baw Karen Organisation (DKBA/KKO) 1,500 1994/2010 2011 Karen, Mon 
Karen National Union/ Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) 5,000 1947 2012 Karen, Mon, Bago, Tanintharyi 
Karen National Union/ Karen National Liberation Army –Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC) 150 2007 2007 Karen 
Karenni National Progressive Party/ Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) 600 1957 2012 Karenni 
Kachin Independence Organisation/ Army (KIO/A) 10,000 1961 1994-2011___ Kachin, N Shan 
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) 3,000 1989 -------- Kokang, N Shan 
National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) 4,500 1989 1989 Mongla, N Shan 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland –Kaplang faction (NSCN-K) 500 1980 2012 Burma/India border 
New Mon State Party/ Mon National Liberation Army (NMSP/MNLA) 2000 1958 1995/2012 Mon, Karen 
Pa’o National Liberation Organisation/ Army (PNLO/PNLA) 400 2009 2012 Shan 
Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) 7,000 1964 2011 Shan 
Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N) 8,000 1964/1989 2012 Shan 
Palaung State Liberation Front /Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) 4,500 1992/2011 ------------- Shan 
United Wa State Party/ Army (UWSP/A) 20,000 1989 1989 Shan 
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The rationale for the use of political economy and 
sociology-based theoretical approaches 
No one specific theory can address the range of perspectives on NSAGs. 
As Veronique Dudouet has stated, this is due to the “complexity of intra-
national conflicts and the necessity of adopting an inclusive understanding 
of conflict actors.”44 Keith Krause and Jennifer Milliken, for example, 
acknowledge the range of disciplines and approaches to research into 
NSAGs that include micro-level analysis and modelling, ethnographic 
fieldwork, sociology, political economy, and historical perspectives.45  
The two central reasons for why political economy analysis of armed 
conflict and sociology-based theoretical perspectives are combined in the 
present study are, first, the increasingly important role of economic factors 
in addition to the social and political grievances that underlie Burma’s civil 
wars and, second, the role of resources and funding for building legitimacy 
for NSAGs. Burma-focused scholars like Mary Callahan, Martin Smith, 
Jake Sherman and others have all made the point that the conflicts in 
Burma, while having a basis in long-standing ethnic, social and political 
grievances, have over decades increasingly taken on economic 
dynamics.46 This has been due to internal and external state demands for 
resources from within the conflict areas, the need for NSAGs and 
government forces to be self-funding, and increasing fragmentation of 
NSAGs and competition over control of resources. All of these factors 
affect the civilian population. Examples of these effects, explored later in 
                                            
44 Veronique Dudouet, "From War to Politics: Resistance/Liberation Movements in 
Transition," (Berlin, Germany: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict 
Management, 2009), 5. 
45 Keith Krause and Jennifer Milliken, "Introduction: The Challenge of Non-State Armed 
Groups," Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 2 (2009): 202. 
46 See, for example, Callahan, Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: 
Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence, 3-4 & 20-21; Martin Smith, State of Strife: The 
Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma (Washington, DC: East-West Centre, 2007); Jake 
Sherman, "Burma: Lessons from the Cease-Fires," in The Political Economy of Armed 
Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, ed. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Catherine Brown, "Burma: The political economy of 
violence," Disasters 23, no. 3 (1999); Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and 
Insurgency since 1948 (Silkworm Books: Chiang Mai, Thailand, 1999). 
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this thesis, include the localised use of landmines to protect resources for 
business interests, and economic pressures on children to join NSAGs. 
Humanitarian assistance has itself been identified as an economic variable 
in armed conflicts. For example, Fiona Terry identified how, in the case of 
refugee camps, NSAGs have made claims to legitimacy and control of 
populations through their control over and involvement with humanitarian 
assistance.47 Authors looking at the role of NSAG rebel administrations 
have also pointed to the combination of material and socially constructed 
factors where rebel groups seek to build legitimacy. Zachariah Mampilly 
makes the point that it is “by replicating some of the functions and forms of 
the nation-state” that an NSAG can “derive support for its political authority 
and achieve some form of legitimacy.”48 Sukanya Podder, in a similar vein, 
identifies NSAG legitimacy as being predicated on the “ability to meet 
every day needs of civilians.”49 In such instances, as Podder indicates, 
rather than co-opting aid, “insurgents may use aid to support local 
services, thereby enhancing their legitimacy and support base.”50 The 
logical progression that follows from NSAG concerns with building 
legitimacy, is that they will need access to funding and resources to build 
the administrations and welfare services on which they attempt to base 
that legitimacy. These are significant features in the case of the NSAGs in 
Burma considered by the present study. Consequently, the increasing role 
of economic factors in Burma’s ethnic conflicts and the relationship, as 
outlined above, between the socially constructed concept of legitimacy 
and the material resources and funding NSAGs need to build it, strongly 
suggest the combination of social constructivist and political economy 
approaches. Combined, they raise a more representative and inter-related 
set of factors influencing NSAG-civilian relations and the consequent 
extent of NSAG compliance with humanitarian norms.  
                                            
47 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Cornell 
University Press: Ithaca, NY, 2002), 10. 
48 Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, Rebel Rulers (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 
9. 
49 Podder, "Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and 
Inclusion," 20. 
50 Ibid., 26. 
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The political economy of armed conflict                   
Political economy analysis as applied to modern armed conflicts was 
initially concerned with making causal connections between economic 
factors, especially the presence of natural resources, and the incidence of 
civil wars.51  The focus of the political economy of civil wars has since 
broadened to recognise the role of sub-state, shadow, trans-border, or 
globalised, economies and how these perpetuate and maintain armed 
conflict. Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitshke describe it as the study of 
“how the economic agendas of armed factions sustain violent conflict and 
inhibit durable peace,” and for understanding “the role of globalization in 
creating new opportunities for combatants to finance their military 
operations.”52  
Many contemporary civil wars and areas of ongoing instability and 
sporadic conflict involve a host of armed state and non-state actors, and 
also business interests. These have developed into complex systems with 
their own local conflict and economic dynamics that are connected across 
borders to regional and global economies. Mark Duffield has 
conceptualised the understanding of these systems, not as “complex 
political emergencies,” but rather as “emerging political complexes.”53 
Political economy analysis of armed conflicts has consequently made 
connections between economic factors and NSAG behaviour towards 
civilian populations.54 Achim Wennmann, for example, has highlighted how 
“economic factors can structure the context in which armed groups fight, 
mobilize support, and build relationships with local populations.”55 Duffield, 
also draws connections from the economy of armed conflicts and 
                                            
51 See, for example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War: 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2355 " (2001); Michael T. Klare, "The 
New Geography of Conflict," Foreign Affairs 80, no. 3 (2001). 
52 Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons 
from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict (International Peace Academy 
Report, 2003), 2. 
53 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London, UK: Zed Books, 2001), 
14.  
54 See, for example, Christopher Cramer, Civil war is not a stupid thing: Accounting for 
violence in developing countries (London, UK: Hurst and Company, 2006); Weinstein, 
Inside Rebellion:The Politics of Insurgent Rebellion.  
55 Achim Wennmann, "Economic dimensions of armed groups: profiling the financing, 
costs, and agendas and their implications for mediated engagements," International 
Review of the Red Cross 882, no. 93 (2011): 334. 
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emerging political complexes to the impacts on the people caught in them. 
“In today’s network wars the traditional distinctions –‘military/civilian,’ 
‘combatant/non-combatant,’ etc. - that a neutral humanitarianism ideally 
would base itself on, no longer properly exist.”  Both Wennmann and 
Duffield demonstrate the link, relevant to the present study, between the 
political economy of armed conflicts and its direct, and often negative, 
consequences on civilian protection. This point highlights the rationale for 
considering economic influences in the present study. They are significant 
not only in understanding the causes and perpetuation of conflicts, but for 
how they may contribute negatively and/or positively to relations between 
NSAGs and civilians, and therefore to the extent of NSAG compliance with 
humanitarian norms.  
While the role of resources and economic incentives provides some 
explanatory traction on the actions of NSAGs, other researchers and 
theorists have pointed to the inescapable social context of armed conflicts, 
and of NSAG-civilian relations.56 Understanding of the social construction 
of identity and legitimacy, and of the influence of norms, concepts relevant 
to the study of NSAGs and to humanitarianism, have come from the 
discipline of sociology.57  Social constructivism is a social theory that has 
been adapted from sociology to IR. An example of social constructivism in 
IR, with considerable relevance to NSAGs, has been discussion about 
sovereignty and its role in the “construction of state identity.” 58 The norm 
of sovereignty “determines what the basic political units of the system are,” 
and furthermore what constitute “deviant” units within the state system.59   
                                            
56 See, for example, Christoper Clapham, ed. African Guerrillas (Oxford, UK: James 
Currey,1998), 11-15; Paul Richards, ed. No War, No Peace: An Anthropology of 
Contemporary Armed Conflicts (Oxford, UK: James Currey,2005), 5 & 12-13. 
57 Structure and agency, social constructionism, identity, authority and legitimacy, and 
civil society, are all considered as central concepts in the study of sociology. See, 
Anthony Giddens and Philip W. Sutton, Essential Concepts in Sociology (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 2014). 
58 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, 
and Culture in National Security," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity 
in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1996), 45-46. 
59 Ibid. 
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Social constructivism 
Social constructivism claims “human interaction is shaped primarily by 
ideational factors, not simply material ones.”60 It emphasises the socially 
constructed nature of interests and identities. Constructivism views these 
as able to change over time, whereas realist IR theory tends to view state 
interests (usually power and security) as fixed and unchanging. Alexander 
Wendt outlined the ontological differences between realism and 
constructivism by highlighting realism’s focus on rational individualism 
extrapolated to the behaviour of states, while arguing that identities and 
interests, which are taken as fixed by realists, are viewed as being in a 
constant process of change by constructivists.61  Topics considered by 
constructivist research have included the use and control of weapons, the 
role of humanitarianism, and the influence of identity politics. Margaret 
Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink contend that constructivist research into 
these topics has “demonstrated how social structures of different kinds 
reshape actors’ interests, self-understandings, and behaviour.”62 This has 
placed constructivism as the main theoretical approach applied to 
understanding humanitarianism, humanitarian norms, and non-state actors 
involved with their promotion.63  
International treaties and NGO campaigns to address issues including 
landmine use and child soldiers provide examples, often cited by 
constructivists, of the influence of norms in IR. A coalition of NGOs, the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), campaigned for the 
                                            
60 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research 
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," Annual Review of Political 
Science 4, no. 1 (2001): 393. 
61 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
62 Finnemore and Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics," 471. 
63 See, for example, Michael N. Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarianism 
Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011). Michael N. 
Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global 
Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,, 2004); Margaret E. Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink, "Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional 
Politics," International Social Science Journal 51, no. 1 (1999). 
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1997 Ottawa treaty banning the use of antipersonnel landmines.64 A 
similar campaign involving another coalition of NGOs, the Coalition to Stop 
the Use of Child Soldiers (CSCS), now Child Soldiers International (CSI), 
was also conducted internationally to promote norms to end the use of 
child soldiers. This contributed to the 2002 Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in 
armed conflict (OPAC).65 The ICBL and CSCS promotion of norms leading 
to development of treaties prohibiting the use of landmines and child 
soldiers, in the case of states, is relevant for the parallel situation of the 
same issues and norms applied to NSAGs. Norms in constructivist 
theories of IR are understood to be accepted standards of behaviour 
adhered to by states or other actors in the international system. Peter J. 
Katzenstein defines them as “collective expectations for the proper 
behaviour of actors with a given identity.”66   
Norms and socialisation 
The role of ideas, and the potential of some in the form of norms, to 
establish accepted standards of behaviour, raises the question of the 
processes by which they are accepted. Theorists within the constructivist 
tradition have pointed to the central role of socialisation in states accepting 
new norms.67 In considering the role of socialisation on the acceptance by 
states of norms within international institutions, Alastair Iain Johnston 
identified two central processes; persuasion and social influence. 
Persuasion is when the actor changes their mind or opinion about an issue 
                                            
64 R. Thakur and W. Maley, "The Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A Landmark 
Humanitarian Treaty in Arms Control?," Global Governance 5, no. 3 (1999); Kenneth 
Rutherford, "The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in 
Banning Antipersonnel Landmines," World Politics 53, no. 1 (2000). 
65 Child Soldiers International, "Our History,"  http://www.child-
soldiers.org/our_history.php; Peter Singer, Children at war (Toronto, Canada: Random 
House, 2005), 140-43, & 213-20. 
66 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press,1996), 5.  
67 Finnemore and Sikkink present a model wherein norms at first emerge, then cascade 
(spread), and eventually are internalised (accepted by the recipient). They identify 
socialisation as a mechanism by which norms are spread, and habit and 
institutionalisation by which they are internalised. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 
"International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 
(1998): 898. 
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without any “overtly material or mental coercion.”68 Johnston lists three 
main ways an actor may be persuaded to adhere to a norm. These are 
through the actor being presented with new information and counter 
attitudinal arguments, through the actor being influenced by their 
relationship with those attempting to persuade them, and through the 
characteristics of the particular actor that is being persuaded.69 Social 
influence, on the other hand, according to Johnston, elicits “pro-norm 
behaviour through the distribution of social rewards and punishments.”70 
Social rewards include status and positive self-worth, while shame, 
exclusion or cognitive dissonance through not conforming with group 
expectations are viewed as social punishments. However, with social 
influence there can be outward demonstration of compliance with a norm 
even if there is not internal acceptance. Reputation through improved 
status, in this instance, can gain improved trust from other actors leading 
them to engage on other issues with an entity that is demonstrating 
compliance with a norm. This instrumental interest in compliance with 
norms is a significant feature within the role of social influence in 
socialisation with potential relevance to NSAGs and humanitarian norms. 
Jeffrey Checkel, has also outlined the role of norm socialisation in 
international institutions. He summarises the work of scholars looking at 
socialisation in international institutions and identifies three stages of 
socialisation in the acceptance of norms. These are initial “strategic 
calculation” which is incentive based; “role playing” where the actors follow 
or adapt to a role because it is appropriate without deeper reflection upon 
it; and finally, “normative suasion”, where actors “actively and reflectively 
internalize new understandings of appropriateness.”71 Significantly, 
Checkel acknowledges a role for both social and material incentives within 
the initial strategic calculation phase. What starts out as instrumentally 
                                            
68 Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," 
International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001): 496. 
69 Ibid., 496-99. 
70 Ibid., 499. 
71 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction 
and Framework," International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 808-13. 
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based behaviour change, he points out, can lead to “sustained compliance 
that is strongly suggestive of internalization and preference change.”72 
Johnston and Checkel both identify contexts within which socialisation of 
actors into new norms is more likely to occur. These ‘scope conditions’ 
include, in the case of persuasion (normative suasion for Checkel), when 
the environment is outside of the regular one for the actors being 
persuaded; when the target actor does not hold strong pre-existing 
opposition to the norm being promoted; when the persuader is an 
authoritative member of an in-group with the target actor, and; when there 
is sustained contact between them.73 For Checkel’s strategic calculation 
model, the actor’s calculation that rewards of compliance are greater than 
costs, and again, the importance of sustained contact are highlighted.74 
Johnston sees status, and thereby the importance of the audience or 
institution – the group by whom the actor wishes to be seen as legitimate – 
as an important context for social influence, as well as the more 
instrumental element of encouraging engagement from actors on other 
issues, as mentioned above.75 
While the constructivist research agenda has focused mostly on states, 
some writers have considered the influence of international norms and 
socialisation applied to NSAGs. In relation to NSAG involvement in post-
conflict settlements and state-building, Sukanya Podder, for example, 
acknowledges the role of “socialization aimed at normative or contextual 
change in NSAG behaviour.”76  David Capie has raised the possibilities of 
norm socialisation with reference to encouraging the compliance of armed 
groups with humanitarian norms. Drawing on the work of Johnston, 
Checkel and others, he suggests the application of the processes of 
                                            
72 Ibid., 809. 
73 Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," 498-99; Checkel, 
"International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework," 813. 
74 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," 809-11. 
75 Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," 500-02. 
76 Podder, "Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and 
Inclusion," 17. 
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“persuasion” and “social influence”77 to assessment of the acceptance of 
humanitarian norms by NSAGs. Furthermore, Capie points to the need for 
those “who will be influential and seen as authoritative” to be involved in 
the engagement processes to achieve persuasion of NSAG leadership. 
This could involve “former or even current combatants who have some 
shared worldview or common sense of purpose with the target group.”78 
This echoes the importance of persuaders being seen as authoritative or 
from an in-group as highlighted by Johnston and Checkel, but moving the 
frame of reference from international institutions to NSAGs and those 
actors engaging with them to improve compliance with humanitarian 
norms. 
This approach is significant both in terms of practical application, and for 
theorising about the potential factors and processes that may influence 
NSAGs, especially the leadership who drive policy and those who may 
have influence on the leadership such as associated civil society or 
religious leaders. It takes into account both the potential for actors to 
internalise and be persuaded by the norm, or to give it greater prominence 
in their calculations if they already hold it as a valid belief. It also 
recognises the pressure to conform, or to be seen to adhere to the norm, 
regardless of personal belief. This is relevant for NSAG leadership in 
terms of concerns about local or international legitimacy.79  It is also 
significant in the role and influence of actors who have internalised or 
been persuaded by such norms, and who are involved with welfare or civil 
society activities associated with, or accepted by, NSAGs. One significant 
difference, however, is that non-states usually have less incentive, 
opportunity, or capacity, to comply with international norms. This is the 
case regardless of whether they have internalised it, or merely see 
advantage in compliance with it, for instrumental reasons. 
                                            
77 David Capie, "Influencing Armed Groups: Are there Lessons to Be Drawn from 
Socialization Literature?," in Exploring Criteria and Conditions for Engaging Armed Non-
State Actors to Respect Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Conference Report, 
June 4-5 2007 (Geneva, Switzerland: PSIO, UNDIR, Geneva Call, 2007), 87-89. 
78 Ibid., 93. 
79 Legitimacy concerns of NSAGs are explored further in the sociology-based literature on 
NSAGs in chapter five. 
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Armed groups are more likely to maintain their influence or de facto 
sovereignty with the people they claim to represent if they not only wield 
armed force, but also present themselves as legitimate or credible 
representatives. This can engender support from constituent populations 
and increase their legitimacy locally and/or internationally.80  This concern 
with legitimacy by NSAGs has been outlined in the work of writers 
considering the role of NSAG governance.81 That some NSAGs have a 
social component beyond just the use of military force demonstrates the 
value of social constructivism in analysis of them. An NSAG’s image, 
identity, support base, and legitimacy with those it claims to represent, or 
wishes to influence, fit within the constructivist framework of ideas, 
interests and identity. Equally, actors wishing to influence NSAGs towards 
greater respect for humanitarian norms are likely to appeal to ideational 
aspects of the groups and their constituencies, such as identity and 
legitimacy.  
Regarding the work of constructivist scholars, however, Jeffrey Checkel 
asks why it is that international norms meet with more acceptance in some 
countries than in others. He further notes that "it would also be useful to 
consider cases when the ‘dog doesn't bark,’ that is, where state 
identity/interests, in the presence of a norm, do not change."82 This is also 
relevant to analysis of NSAGs that do not modify actions that contravene 
humanitarian norms, despite favourable circumstances or engagement 
efforts by external actors to that end. Variation in the policies, actions, or 
the extent of acceptance of engagement on humanitarian issues, is a 
central point of the present research. The cases of NSAGs in Burma 
present examples where one humanitarian norm has received more 
attention, acceptance, or action, than another, and where certain groups 
                                            
80 However, some authors argue that where NSAGs have access to economic 
endowments that do not require them to seek support and legitimacy from the local 
population they will be more abusive or predatory behaviour towards that population. 
See, for example, Weinstein, Inside Rebellion:The Politics of Insurgent Rebellion. See, 
further, the section on political economy of armed conflict in the literature review chapter. 
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have been more amenable overall to engagement on these matters than 
have others. 
Summary 
This chapter has introduced the type of organised ethnic political armed 
groups in Burma that are the focus of this study. Two contrasting 
theoretical perspectives applied to NSAGs and their behaviour as it relates 
to civilian protection and humanitarian norms were then outlined. These 
were the political economy of armed conflict, and social constructivism. 
Both theories are structural, but for the actors in the constructivist 
understanding applied to state behaviour and extrapolated to NSAGs in 
this study, “the structures within which they operate are defined by social 
norms and ideas rather than by objective or material conditions.”83  The 
political economy analysis of civil wars, most explicitly, takes into 
consideration the material and coercive structures within which NSAGs 
and affected populations are embedded and their actions enabled or 
constrained. This approach considers the sources of resources and 
funding for armed groups and how these influence the types of groups that 
develop, their motivations, and behaviour.  
This study takes the political economy approach further in considering how 
economic factors impact on NSAG-civilian relations and, consequently, on 
the extent of NSAG adherence (or not) to humanitarian norms. Economic 
factors have often been seen in the political economy literature as 
potentially negative influences on NSAG behaviour towards civilians. 
However, they may also contribute to ceasefires between warring parties, 
and potentially to improved conditions and even protection for civilians, 
depending on the NSAG’s motivations and use of resources. 
The constructivist perspective in IR, originally derived from sociology, was 
introduced and explored for where it intersects with NSAGs and 
humanitarian norms. The development and promotion of norms and the 
processes associated with socialisation were identified for their analysis 
of, and potential practical application to, NSAGs. This approach highlights 
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mechanisms that influence actors towards compliance with norms, 
whether through instrumental interests and incentives, or through 
internalisation and genuine acceptance. This, in particular, has 
implications for the influence of social factors such as identity and 
legitimacy on NSAGs. Based on the social constructivist approach, this 
study contends that perceptions of legitimacy play a major role in NSAG 
interest in civilian protection and the extent of their adherence to 
humanitarian norms. Perceived legitimacy of NSAGs from constituent 
populations will matter for the group’s continued material and social 
support. Equally, the leadership and members of NSAGs will value their 
perceived legitimacy. Thus, the socially constructed concept of legitimacy 
can be either instrumental for NSAGs to maintain local or international 
material support, and/or internalised in terms of self-image or identity with 
the populations they claim to represent. 
Writing from humanitarian practitioners and academics on the practical 
and legal implications of NSAGs, and especially NSAG-civilian relations, is 
explored in the following chapter three. The focus is on humanitarian 
engagement with NSAGs, international humanitarian and human rights 
law applicable to NSAGs, and the processes by which NSAGs can 
demonstrate adherence to those laws. The factors believed to influence 
NSAG compliance with humanitarian norms are then drawn on from the 
work of humanitarian academics and practitioners. Following the two 
principal theoretical approaches outlined in this chapter, literature relevant 
to these influences is then disaggregated between the frameworks of 
political economy of armed conflict and sociology in chapter four.  
 
 39 
 
Chapter Three 
Humanitarian perspectives on NSAGs 
Literature from a humanitarian perspective on NSAGs and engagement 
with them has been generated by both academic researchers and 
practitioners. These writers have produced much of the literature relevant 
to the present study where it considers NSAGs, influences on their 
behaviour towards civilians, and the actors and processes that have 
attempted to address them. The areas of focus have principally been on 
negotiation with NSAGs for access to populations in need; engagement 
with NSAGs to improve their adherence to humanitarian norms; and 
processes by which NSAGs can demonstrate this adherence. The overall 
objective of all these forms of activity as they relate to NSAGs is to 
improve the protection of the civilian populations that are exposed to them.  
This chapter outlines the literature on humanitarian engagement with 
NSAGs, and on international humanitarian law (IHL) and international 
human rights law (IHRL) that is applicable to them. It also assesses 
potential mechanisms that enable NSAGs’ to demonstrate adherence to 
humanitarian norms. It further draws out a set of factors identified in the 
humanitarian literature that are believed to influence NSAGs’ compliance 
with international norms, both positively and negatively.  
Humanitarian engagement with NSAGs 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has set a 
benchmark for modern humanitarianism. It defines itself as “an 
independent, neutral organization ensuring humanitarian protection and 
assistance for victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence.” It 
also “promotes respect for international humanitarian law and its 
implementation in national law.”84 Today, humanitarianism is a global 
enterprise, with large international NGOs (INGOs) and UN agencies 
dedicated to providing assistance and advocating respect for humanitarian 
                                            
84 International Committee of the Red Cross, "The mandate and mission of the ICRC,"  
http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/index.jsp. 
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norms in natural disaster and armed conflict situations.85 Michael Barnett, 
while acknowledging the western roots of large scale international 
humanitarianism, has pointed out that “we live in a world of 
humanitarianisms, not humanitarianism.”86 Barnett widens the scope of 
what can be considered humanitarianism in referring to it in its simplest 
form as “organised compassion.”87 Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss identify, 
beyond the European-centric perspective, how humanitarian concepts 
such as charity, volunteerism and selflessness are present in all major 
world cultures and religions.88 
Humanitarian concerns about NSAGs and civilian protection, and 
humanitarian engagement with NSAGs to improve that protection, have 
been the focus of entire issues of academic and practitioner journals in 
recent years.89 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) gives a broad definition of humanitarian engagement with NSAGs 
as including “advocacy, negotiation, mediation, and liaison interactions.”90  
Negotiation is central to providing protection and assistance to vulnerable 
populations and for advocating adherence to international law. As Max 
Glaser has stated, the purpose of these negotiations is “to obtain safe 
access to civilians for the provision of humanitarian aid in accordance with 
rules of International Humanitarian Law”.91  The difficulties facing such 
negotiations and those who undertake them are great. Humanitarian 
actors frequently have to negotiate the realpolitik concerns of states and 
NSAGs focused on their immediate military and political objectives.92  
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Defining humanitarian engagement with NSAGs 
Engagement by humanitarian actors with NSAGs has also been carried 
out to improve NSAG adherence with humanitarian norms. Short of the 
use of military force, there are a range of tools at the disposal of 
humanitarian agencies to encourage adherence to humanitarian norms 
and to dissuade or punish offending groups. They include the threat of 
prosecution,93 sanctions,94 and the public naming and shaming of groups 
that violate humanitarian norms.95 There has, however, been less attention 
paid to other more inclusive means of modifying NSAG actions, or in 
providing incentives for NSAGs that are, or could be, carrying out positive 
actions in terms of civilian protection.96 This is especially significant if 
those NSAGs are operating in a context where a recognised state is failing 
to meet its obligations according to international law and standards.  
Non-coercive forms of engagement with NSAGs have been undertaken by 
a subset of international and local NGOs. For the ICRC, dialogue with 
parties to a conflict, including with armed groups, also involves a focus on 
IHL in “reminding the party of its obligations and commitments, monitoring 
and reporting, as well as training and capacity-building”.97 For the 
humanitarian engagement INGO Geneva Call, this means “engaging 
armed non-state actors (ANSAs) towards compliance with the norms of 
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international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL)”.98 The 
NSAG engagement NGO, the South-South Network (SSN) also advocates 
constructive dialogue with NSAGs regarding IHL and IHRL as well as on a 
broad range of other issues.99 
The Geneva Academy of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights sums up 
the range of options included within humanitarian engagement with 
NSAGs. This is the definition for humanitarian engagement that is adopted 
in the present study. It is also useful as an outline of some of the main 
types of engagement activity. 
By engagement is meant efforts to enhance compliance with 
international norms by armed non-state actors through a variety of 
direct or indirect means, especially awareness-raising, information 
sharing, persuasion, technical support/capacity-building, mediation 
and dialogue, advocacy, and monitoring.100 
Processes and issues for humanitarian engagement with NSAGs 
Humanitarian engagement activity includes dialogue with NSAGs; 
advocacy and dissemination of IHL to NSAGs; capacity building and 
training to enable NSAGs to implement humanitarian policies; gaining their 
commitment to formal measures such as declarations or agreements to 
respect humanitarian norms; and reporting and monitoring of 
compliance.101 Specific issue areas addressed in humanitarian 
engagement with armed groups include the use and production of 
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landmines; children recruited and/or associated with armed groups; 
gender based violence; trafficking of small arms and light weapons 
(SALW); and, protection of internally displaced persons in areas of armed 
group control.102  
There are some central concerns for engagement actors, both in relation 
to their own actions and for the issues they address.  One concern is 
deciding which armed groups should be engaged. The ICRC attempts to 
enter into dialogue with all relevant parties to conflicts where that 
engagement will improve civilian protection and increase respect for 
IHL.103  Marco Sassoli argues that all armed groups, regardless of 
behaviour and tactics used, should be engaged with attempts to improve 
their compliance with international norms.104 Others, however, set 
boundaries around some groups such as criminal gangs that are less 
amenable to engagement, or set minimum standards that groups need to 
meet for engagement to be productive.105 As well as who or which NSAGs 
to engage, there is consideration of which international and/or local civil 
society actors are able to most effectively engage armed groups, or 
facilitate dialogue with them.106  
Claude Bruderlein states there are two main reasons for a lack of 
compliance with humanitarian norms by armed groups. These are the 
capacity of the group to actually implement humanitarian norms and the 
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willingness of the leadership to do so.107 Olivier Bangerter, a former 
negotiator with armed groups for the ICRC, also argues that the 
commitment of the NSAG leadership is the vital factor in gaining 
compliance with humanitarian norms.108  Nicholas Florquin, Pascal 
Bongard and Emilia Richard further point out that there are few legal 
incentives for NSAGs to comply.109 However, practical incentives that are 
identified include NSAGs bringing humanitarian assistance into their 
areas, claiming the moral high ground over opponents, and responding to 
their support base.110 Perhaps one of the most significant incentives is the 
perceived legitimacy and international recognition or support that may be 
forthcoming for NSAGs that do attempt to comply with international norms. 
The reasons for NSAG interest, or lack thereof, in compliance with 
humanitarian norms is a central issue in this study. This theme is 
discussed further in this chapter, and in the next. 
Strategies by which humanitarian actors attempt to improve NSAG 
behaviour include some that also address the group’s constituency, its 
welfare wings, or associated civil society. Understanding the group and its 
economic, social, and political context are therefore recognised as central 
to any attempts at engagement.111  An important interface for engagement 
activity is through local civil society that has acceptance or has built trust 
with the NSAG. David Petrasek suggests civil society actors that are close 
to armed groups may encourage improved behaviour by them as it is 
beneficial for the groups’ and their constituencies’ overall cause.112 
Mobilisation of the NSAG constituency and/or pressure from it on the 
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NSAG to change particular behaviours are also important.113 This implies 
NSAGs that have a more consultative approach with host constituencies 
and civil society, as opposed to those that are strictly authoritarian and 
elite driven, are more likely to be amenable to engagement on 
humanitarian issues. 
Assisting NSAGs to develop agreements with states, make unilateral 
declarations, or internal regulations inclusive of IHL, is another significant 
aspect of engagement. Such activities are carried out by the ICRC and 
Geneva Call.114 Sometimes, they are also carried out by smaller local 
organisations.115 Further actions undertaken for humanitarian engagement 
are training and capacity building in order to assist in the implementation 
of humanitarian norms that NSAGs have agreed to.116  The ability of 
NSAGs to implement measures they agree to and the extent (or lack) of 
international support to do so present further issues for humanitarian 
engagement. Bruderlein points out that “building the capacity of armed 
groups to respect international norms relies, of course, on the international 
community’s ability to help them do so… In this context, for example, the 
demobilization of child soldiers requires not only the withdrawing of their 
weapons, but also the provision of educational and nutritional programmes 
for years to come.”117 
A set of difficulties and barriers to effective engagement with NSAGs on 
these issues has been noted. Three of these are the fragmentation of 
NSAGs, the shifting control of territory, and opposition by affected states 
to engagement with NSAGs.118 When a large armed group splits, the new 
factions may disregard previous humanitarian agreements or policies and 
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disregard civilian protection concerns. Groups whose territorial control is 
shifting present difficulties for engagement, and for civilian populations that 
may be subject to a number of transitory and potentially abusive armed 
actors rather than one permanent presence. A related concern for external 
humanitarian actors is that their engagement actions may confer undue 
legitimacy on abusive groups.119  
The role of states in opposing engagement with NSAGs has been 
identified by many authors including Soliman Santos and Dawn Steinhoff, 
and this also relates to the social and political issue of perceived 
legitimacy.120 Steinhoff argues that opposition to improving NSAG 
compliance with IHL from the perspective of states has a political rather 
than legal basis. She points out how states refuse to recognise armed 
groups formally as belligerents even if the NSAGs meet the criteria set by 
IHL to do so. The state will claim such recognition compromises its 
domestic law because “granting a belligerent entity legal status will impair 
the state’s ability to prosecute and squash armed rebellions.”121 However, 
as she points out, “the political legitimacy that an insurgent group gains 
from legal recognition can be more harmful to a state than any loss in the 
state’s ability to apply domestic laws.”122 Steinhoff further argues that 
although civilians in non-international conflicts would likely benefit to some 
extent by NSAGs being able to formally adhere to IHL, or to be recognised 
as doing so, political concerns about the legitimacy this might grant them 
will continue to prevent it. These political concerns on the part of states 
are well founded. There are instances where the recognised state is failing 
to provide, or complicit in preventing, access to minimum standards of 
welfare or security to sections of its population. While, clearly, NSAGs will 
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seek legitimacy through claiming adherence to IHL, “removing avenues to 
gain legitimacy removes the incentive for groups to comply with IHL.”123 
This is central to the subject of engagement with NSAGs and their policies 
or practices regarding humanitarian norms. Perceptions of legitimacy as 
socially constructed factors influencing NSAGs are, therefore, explored 
further in the next chapter. 
The applicability of international law to NSAGs 
International humanitarian law (IHL) 
While IHL was originally intended to apply to the conduct of the military 
forces of states in relation to each other, since 1945 it has increasingly 
been concerned with the protection of civilians and the actions of NSAGs. 
The ICRC has attempted to provide guidance in distinguishing between 
those who are and are not participating in hostilities, with the clear 
humanitarian objective of the protection of non-combatants. It identifies 
Common Article Three to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocol II (1977) as the central treaty documents in IHL 
addressing NSAGs and civilian protection in non-international conflicts.124  
Article Three in all four 1949 conventions applies to “conflicts not of an 
international character” and to the protection of “persons taking no active 
part in the hostilities.” 125 Additional Protocol II (1977) sets standards for 
the protection of civilians in non-international armed conflicts. In particular, 
it considers “armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.”126 Two 
difficulties with the application of Protocol II in practice are the frequent 
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denial by states that the conflicts within their borders have reached the 
threshold to qualify as non-international armed conflicts, and the 
prerequisite for territorial control and sustained military operations on 
behalf of armed groups.127 Another problem is that, unlike Common Article 
Three, Additional Protocol II has not been universally ratified. The range of 
states that have not ratified Protocol II, for example, include the USA, 
China, Russia, India, Syria, and Myanmar.128  
 Article 8 (2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) also 
recognises the responsibility of armed groups to protect civilians via 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.129 It has a lower threshold 
for applicability that acknowledges the reality of most internal conflicts, 
referring to protracted conflicts involving armed groups. It does not make 
NSAG recognition as parties to the conflict contingent on territorial control 
and sustained operations.130 Regarding the accountability in international 
criminal law of individual leaders of NSAGs for violations committed on 
their orders, the ICC has been the most active forum since coming into 
existence in 2002.131  
Other IHL treaties on cluster munitions and conventional weapons have 
also acknowledged non-international conflicts and, by implication, NSAGs 
as parties to them. The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions includes a 
specific reference to armed groups.132 The Amended Protocol II on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices to the Certain Conventional Weapons treaty (CCW) 
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acknowledges Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions by 
specifically referring to conflicts not of an international character.133 This 
Protocol does not ban the use of landmines, as does the 1997 Ottawa 
Landmine treaty (to which only states can be parties), but it does stipulate 
restrictions on their use.134 Moreover, it states that “all feasible 
precautions” should be taken to reduce the risk to civilians posed by 
landmines such as “fencing, signs, warning and monitoring” of mined 
areas by the parties responsible for laying them.135  
A variety of shortcomings and gaps in the existing international legal 
framework as it applies to NSAGs have been identified.136 Jean-Marie 
Henkaerts identifies five main impediments to application of IHL to 
NSAGs. These are: a lack of ratification by states where NSAGs are 
active; NSAGs cannot ratify international treaties; the threshold of 
application; lack of rules within the applicable IHL; and, lack of combatant 
status for NSAG fighters.137 The difficulties in applying IHL to conflicts 
inside states and to NSAGs has received increasing academic and 
practitioner coverage in the last 15 years. These problems include a lack 
of non-combatant immunity, a lack of awareness among NSAGs of their 
IHL obligations, the deliberate denial of access to humanitarian 
organisations, and denial by states that conflicts in their territory qualify as 
non-international armed conflicts.138  While a few individual leaders or 
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members of armed groups may face prosecution through the ICC, armed 
groups as organisations have no legal personality. There are no 
established international legal forums within which armed groups as 
entities, rather than individual members or leaders, can be held 
accountable.139  
International Human Rights Law and relevance to NSAGs 
While IHL has some direct application to NSAGs, international human 
rights law (IHRL) as developed by states has also been assessed for its 
applicability to NSAGs. For example, the OPAC acknowledges “armed 
groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a state” on the issue of 
recruitment under the age of 18.140 The applicability of IHRL more 
generally to NSAGs is problematic given the assumption implicit in IHRL 
treaties that it only addresses the rights of citizens in relation to an 
established government of a recognised state. Again, there is also the 
concern that including NSAGs in IHRL may lend them undue legitimacy.141 
However, when some NSAGs do perform the role of de facto 
governments, express commitments to IHRL and/or agree to peace 
agreements that include IHRL, “it would seem strange not to welcome this 
simply because other states do not formally recognise their authority or 
because they cannot be admitted to the UN.”142   
The means of expressing adherence to humanitarian norms by 
NSAGs 
There are a variety of instruments through which NSAGs can be bound by, 
or express their adherence to, IHL/IHRL.143 They include: special or 
bilateral agreements between NSAGs and states; inclusion of IHL/IHRL in 
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ceasefire or peace agreements; unilateral declarations by NSAGs; action 
plans with UN agencies; and, inclusion of IHL in NSAG internal regulations 
or codes of conduct. 
There are existing provisions within Common Article Three to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions for armed groups and states to make bilateral 
agreements to comply with IHL. “The Parties to the conflict should further 
endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part 
of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the 
preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the 
conflict.”144 Michelle Mack and Jelena Pejic have outlined special 
agreements between armed groups and states which are “based on 
mutual consent and commitment, which clearly allots equal IHL obligations 
to all parties.”145  Such agreements, however, since they require 
acknowledgement by the concerned state of armed groups operating 
inside its borders, have not been invoked very often. Examples where 
special agreements have been made include Yemen in 1962, Nigeria in 
1967, and Chad in 1978.146   
Agreements between states and NSAGs that include IHL and IHRL have 
also been a part of wider ceasefire or peace negotiations. An example of 
this is the San Jose Agreement facilitated by the UN between the FMLN 
and the government of El Salvador in 1990. The agreement included 
specific reference to human rights law applicable to both parties and 
established an initial monitoring role for the UN.147 The 1998 agreement 
between the government of the Philippines and the National Democratic 
Front of the Philippines (including the Communist Party of the Philippines 
and the New People’s Army) presents another example. It explicitly 
recognised both IHL and IHRL.  
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It is understood that the universally applicable principles and standards of 
human rights and of international humanitarian law contemplated in this 
Agreement include those embodied in the instruments signed by the 
Philippines and deemed to be mutually applicable to and acceptable by 
both Parties.148 
NSAGs have also made agreements in some instances with humanitarian 
agencies. For example, between Operation Lifeline Sudan (UNICEF) and 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in 1995.149  
Many armed groups have issued unilateral declarations or statements 
regarding their adherence to IHL, or to some aspects of it. For example, 
The African National Congress, the Southwest African People’s 
Organisation, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and the Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional in Colombia have, in the past, all made unilateral declarations of 
adherence to the Geneva Conventions.150 In the last 15 years unilateral 
declarations have most often been made by NSAGs via the NGO Geneva 
Call in ‘deeds of commitment’ (DoC). Initially, these addressed NSAGs in a 
parallel document to the formal state-based Ottawa landmine ban treaty. 
Geneva Call has developed further DoCs in 2010 and 2012 applying to the 
protection of children from the effects of armed conflict and to prevention 
of sexual violence and gender-based discrimination.151 The deeds of 
commitment enable NSAGs to express commitment publicly to 
international humanitarian norms. They are then required to undertake 
action plans, such as destroying landmine stockpiles or releasing 
underage soldiers from their ranks, and allowing self and third-party 
reporting and monitoring of these actions. They also receive some 
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assistance with training and capacity building, usually through Geneva 
Call partnering with local civil society groups, to achieve this. 
The United Nations has developed action plans with some NSAGs in 
addressing the recruitment of children. This relates to the list of states and 
armed groups in the annex to the Secretary General’s reports identified as 
responsible for recruitment of children.152 
Where an ANSA is listed in such an Annex, the UN, especially through 
UNICEF and the support of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict, seeks to address the underlying 
causes by negotiation and adoption of so-called Action Plans. The ANSA can 
then be de-listed when the necessary action has been taken.153  
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, for example, 
entered into an action plan for the demobilisation of child soldiers from its 
ranks with the UN in 2009. The action plans also carry a potential threat of 
sanctions from the UN for listed groups that fail to enter into action plans, 
or fail to implement them once they have agreed to them.154   
The adoption of IHL into internal rules or codes of conduct is another way 
in which NSAGs can demonstrate adherence to, and practical 
implementation of, IHL. For NSAGs that have issued unilateral 
declarations, incorporating IHL into their internal regulations is a logical 
progression.155  Internal regulations range from extensive written 
documents through to verbal oaths. Olivier Bangerter has conducted a 
study of various means of internal control in NSAGs and compiled those 
that were accessible.156 While many NSAG regulations do not conform 
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strictly to IHL, and some do not acknowledge or comply with it at all,157 
they frequently address issues that are also included in formal IHL. For 
example, armed group standing orders in some instances have included 
who and what may be targeted, treatment of the population, treatment of 
prisoners, and who may be recruited.158 Two difficulties with NSAG 
internal regulations for practitioners and academics are that “written 
regulations do not exist for all armed groups” and “groups often consider 
them confidential and are not necessarily willing to discuss their content 
with outsiders.”159  
NSAGs in Burma and expressions of compliance with humanitarian 
norms  
The armed groups in Burma examined in the present study have been 
engaged with by humanitarian actors, both local and international. Some 
of these NSAGs have made declarations, agreements, or developed 
policies regarding landmine use, and/or recruitment or involvement of 
children with armed conflict.160 Humanitarian norms related to these issues 
have also been incorporated into versions of a ceasefire code of conduct 
accompanying the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) that has been 
negotiated between a coalition of NSAGs and the government.161 
The factors influencing NSAG compliance or violation 
of humanitarian norms 
Mack and Pejic,  Bangerter, Anyssa Bellal and Casey Maslen, among 
others, have considered which factors influence NSAGs to comply with or 
ignore IHL.162 The factors they consider are significant to the literature 
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reviewed in the next chapter and to the rest of the study that follows. 
Bangerter states that to get armed groups “to respect that law, or to 
respect it better, we need to understand the factors that influence their 
choices.”163 He draws on Michael Veuthey’s study of international law and 
guerrilla movements in pointing out the importance of non-legal factors on 
NSAG compliance with IHL and humanitarian norms. Veuthey identified 
“reciprocity, public opinion, military efficacy, the economy, the return of 
peace, and ethics” as “factors favouring respect for humanitarian law.”164  
Bangerter further identifies a set of rationales that can lead to compliance, 
or non-compliance, by NSAGs with IHL. These include self-image, public 
relations, military advantage, combatants’ morale, popular support, 
reciprocity, asymmetric conflicts, control of populations, and the quality of 
those recruited by NSAGs.165   
In particular, Bangerter identifies self-image and military advantage as the 
main reasons why NSAGs do comply with IHL. The self-image of NSAG 
members includes their perception of themselves as fighting a just cause; 
their moral, cultural, political or religious beliefs; and public relations. 
Military advantage in compliance comes from maintaining the morale of 
fighters, maintaining public support, the efficient use of resources, 
weakening the enemy by making surrender possible, and reducing long-
term problems or grievances following peace or victory.166 
However, military advantage, objectives, and the nature of IHL, are also 
put forward by Bangerter, as reasons for NSAG non-compliance with 
IHL.167 Military advantage, from this perspective, is thought to come from 
the use of tactics that violate IHL and also due to the nature of asymmetric 
conflicts.168 Consequently, as Bellal and Casey-Maslen point out, there is 
                                            
international humanitarian law or not."; Bellal and Casey-Maslen, Rules of Engagement: 
Protecting Civlians through Dialogue with Armed Non-State Actors, 5-7. 
163 Bangerter, "Reasons why armed groups choose to respect international humanitarian 
law or not," 354. 
164 Michel Veuthey, cited by Bangerter, Michel Veuthey, Guérilla et droit humanitaire 
(Geneva, Switzerland: ICRC, 1983), 339 & 73. 
165 Bangerter, "Reasons why armed groups choose to respect international humanitarian 
law or not," 358-82. 
166 Ibid., 358-67. 
167 Ibid., 368-83. 
168 Bassiouni, "The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed 
Conflict by Non-Sate Actors," 714-15. 
 56 
 
a perceived advantage in the use, for example, of banned weapons such 
as landmines, underage recruits, or hiding in and launching attacks from 
the civilian population.169 The groups may believe that their objectives 
justify non IHL-compliant actions.170 Lack of knowledge of, or objection to, 
the norms of IHL, may also contribute to violations.171 An objection that is 
often made to IHL is that it is seen as a ‘western’ creation and imposition, 
and that pre-existing religious or ideological beliefs over-ride it.172 Another 
point raised by some authors for the lack of NSAG compliance is the 
likelihood of prosecution. NSAG members may be prosecuted for 
membership of armed groups under domestic law since states do not 
recognise them as legitimate belligerents. On the other hand, overall, they 
are unlikely to face prosecution domestically or internationally for 
violations of IHL. These two factors combine to undermine incentives for 
compliance.173  
Literature that considers the impact on civilians of NSAG compliance 
or violation with humanitarian norms 
 The factors believed to influence NSAG compliance with humanitarian 
norms, identified above, and the literature addressing these, can be 
gathered within two broad categories. Economic, political and military 
factors related to control of populations and territory can be grouped within 
a political economy theoretical framework, and in literature applied to 
analysis of armed conflicts. Public support/opinion, identity, legitimacy, or 
self-image, are essentially socially constructed factors, understood within 
the field of sociology, and within a social constructivist theoretical 
framework. These are collectively significant influences on NSAGs’ 
relationships with, and treatment of, civilian populations. This contributes 
to the rationale for inclusion of literature from political economy analysis of 
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armed conflicts and from sociology based studies of NSAGs that is 
reviewed in the following chapter. In particular, this writing is explored 
where it intersects with NSAG-civilian relations as that is where NSAG 
compliance with humanitarian norms, and the influences on it, will be 
evident. 
Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the academic and practitioner literature on 
NSAGs from a humanitarian perspective. It defined humanitarian 
engagement with NSAGs and outlined the main methods by which 
humanitarian actors engage with armed groups and the reasons for doing 
so. The issue of perceived legitimacy for NSAGs was raised as a central 
concern for states and, indeed, for NSAGs. International humanitarian and 
human rights law and its applicability to NSAGs was then explored. 
Attention was given to gaps in the current legal framework and to the 
existing means by which NSAGs can demonstrate compliance with IHL. 
From this a variety of policy instruments and processes enabling NSAGs 
to demonstrate compliance to humanitarian norms were identified. These 
included bilateral agreements between states and NSAGs, unilateral 
declarations by NSAGs, action plans with the UN, and incorporation of IHL 
and IHRL into NSAG internal regulations and codes of conduct. These 
processes are explored in the case of Burma NSAGs in chapters eight and 
nine. 
A feature of the literature reviewed in this chapter is the recognition of 
NSAGs as a source of threats, and as actors with whom it is necessary to 
engage. This is due to the reality of NSAGs often being the most relevant 
authorities to reduce those threats. Writers and practitioners within the 
humanitarian and international law literature have also recognised the 
positive and negative incentives on NSAG behaviour in relation to 
compliance with humanitarian norms. They, therefore, consider both their 
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“destructive and protective potential”174 in recognising they “are not just 
part of the problem, but also part of the solution.”175  
 
The latter part of the chapter has considered the input of humanitarian 
practitioners and writers on the reasons for NSAG compliance with, or 
violation of, humanitarian norms. The literature reviewed in the next 
chapter develops these themes further. Material-based or coercive 
structures due to resources, military power, or funding, and that are 
believed to influence NSAG behaviour, are addressed within the political 
economy of armed conflict literature. Some factors related to physical 
geography and proximity to borders are also included within this. Social 
factors influencing NSAG behaviour, including identity and legitimacy, are 
placed within a broad category of writing from sociology, which also 
includes some studies of NSAGs from anthropology and political science 
perspectives. Themes drawn out from those works, and some from the 
writing from the humanitarian perspective in the present chapter, are then 
developed into a set of propositions that will be tested in the present case 
study.
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Chapter Four 
The political economy of armed conflict and 
sociology of NSAG-civilian relations 
Introduction 
The rationale for the literature reviewed in this chapter is based on the set 
of economic and social variables believed to influence NSAG compliance 
with the humanitarian norms that was identified in the previous chapter. 
The contrasting economic and social constructivist theoretical 
perspectives outlined in chapter two, recognising the interaction between 
material and socially based influences on NSAG behaviour, also 
contribute to this selection of literature. Following the logic of those two 
theoretical approaches, the range of influences on NSAGs can be divided 
between those that are material and/or coercive, and those that are 
socially constructed.  
This chapter examines the writing on NSAGs and NSAG-civilian relations 
from the perspective of political economy analysis of armed conflict and 
from sociology. Relevant literature on NSAG-civilian relations within these 
two main categories is included for its humanitarian implications, rather 
than for strict adherence to rigid disciplinary boundaries. Consequently, 
there is inclusion within the political economy analysis section of some 
aspects of physical geography as it relates to NSAGs and the nature of 
conflicts. In a similar vein, some studies of NSAG-civilian relations from 
political science or anthropology are incorporated within the sociology 
section. After each section, themes relevant to the present research are 
drawn out and briefly related to the Burma context. Theoretical 
propositions to be tested by the empirical research for this study are then 
presented. In particular, themes are considered for their intersection with 
NSAG-civilian relations and humanitarian engagement with NSAGs. 
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Literature on the political economy of armed 
conflict and NSAGs 
Some scholars have considered the relationships between resources, 
methods of NSAG formation and motivations of NSAG members, and how 
these, in turn, impact on the extent of NSAG violence towards civilians. 
Jeremy Weinstein’s study of NSAGs from Africa and Latin America 
approached the study of rebel groups from this perspective. He 
considered the initial conditions and resources available to NSAGs when 
they formed, and how that, in turn, shaped their behaviour towards civilian 
populations. According to his analysis, the use of violence towards 
civilians by NSAGs in some contexts and not in others, can be understood 
as “a result of a process of organisational formation.”176 
Factors that raise or lower the barriers to organization by insurgent leaders 
– in particular whether material resources to finance warfare can be easily 
mobilized without civilian consent – shape the types of individuals who 
elect to participate, the sorts of organizations that emerge to fight civil 
wars, and the strategies of violence that develop in practice.177 
It should be noted that all four armed groups examined in Weinstein’s 
study were, however, seeking to take power at the centre of an existing 
state.178  Weinstein acknowledges both material and social endowments 
as significant factors for an NSAG leadership in overcoming the difficulties 
of obtaining recruits, arms, and civilian support (including food, labour and 
intelligence), during NSAG formation. Weinstein also pointed to a 
dichotomy in the motivations of recruits to NSAGs. He identifies those 
motivated by political causes as “activists” and those joining out of 
economic incentives for self-enrichment as “opportunists.”179 This 
dichotomy of economic and social factors identified by Weinstein echoes 
the set of factors influencing NSAG compliance (or not) with humanitarian 
norms identified by Bangerter, Veuthey and others in the previous chapter. 
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It also broadly corresponds with the elements examined within the political 
economy and sociology literature reviewed in the present chapter. 
Rebel leaders may draw on two types of endowments: economic 
endowments, which come from diverse sources including natural resource  
extraction, taxation, criminal activity, or external patronage; and social 
endowments, including shared beliefs, expectations, and norms that may 
exist in (or be mobilized from within) certain ethnic, religious, cultural, or 
ideological groups.180 
The political economy of NSAG-civilian relations and sources of 
funding 
The political economy approach has been valuable in demonstrating how 
the means by which NSAGs are able to raise funds has an effect on the 
relationship they have with their host populations. This is instructive in 
understanding why some armed groups provide protection while others 
are largely predatory. For example, Zeljko Branovic and Sven Chojnacki 
have theorised about armed groups as competing in “security markets” 
within failed states. The number of competing armed groups and their size 
and strength due to resources, they argue, provides “rationales behind the 
decisions of armed groups either to use violence against the civilian 
population or to invest in the provision of security.”181  
External funding from an overseas diaspora, extraction of valuable 
resources, or external state support for an NSAG, it has been argued, will 
make it less reliant on local populations. Less reliance for support locally 
may then lead to more abusive practices directed towards civilians. This 
has been identified in cases of NSAGs that have been supported by 
funding from diaspora groups beyond the local population directly exposed 
to them. In turn, this can lead to the diaspora-supported NSAG becoming 
more abusive towards civilians if the local population’s support is not as 
necessary for the group’s survival. 182 For example, Kyle Beardsley and 
Brian McQuinn compared the effects of a catastrophic natural event, the 
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2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, on the outcome of conflicts in Sri Lanka and 
the Indonesian province of Aceh. They assessed the behaviour of the 
respective NSAGs, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri 
Lanka and the Gerekan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in Indonesia. Following this 
event, the Aceh conflict reached a negotiated settlement, while the Sri 
Lanka conflict was resumed. They claim “the availability of lucrative 
resources outside the country has made the LTTE leadership inimical to 
compromise, threatened by relief aid, and less reliant on the local 
population.”183  An important feature of the LTTE’s continued existence, 
and relative successes, until its final military defeat in 2009, was the role of 
external funding from the Tamil diaspora which has also been highlighted 
in other studies.184 Beardsley and McQuinn make the point that, in 
comparison, 
Lacking access to such high-return funding sources, the Free Aceh 
Movement (Gerekan Aceh Merdeka, GAM), on the other hand, was more 
closely linked to the needs of the local population and found greater value 
in both outside international aid and a comprehensive settlement.185  
Beardsley and McQuinn highlight the many abuses committed by the 
LTTE against its own population,186 but point out how the GAM was able 
to foster support among its own people without excessive resort to 
coercion.187  
Lucy Hovil and Eric Werker reached similar conclusions about “the impact 
of outside financing on violence against civilians”188 in the case of the 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Uganda in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. The difference to the LTTE example is that the ADF was in a 
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“financier-insurgent relationship” rather than receiving funds from an 
overseas diaspora. Hovil and Werker argue the ADF carried out atrocities 
against civilians to demonstrate commitment and thereby continue 
receiving funding from external backers including the state of Sudan and 
Al Qaeda.189  Beardsley and McQuinn, and Hovil and Werker, make a 
clear argument for a link between the sources of funding available to 
NSAGs and the nature of their relations with civilians.  
NSAG control and extraction of easily lootable natural resources such as 
diamonds or timber have also been identified in the case of some NSAGs 
as leading to more predatory or abusive behaviour towards local 
populations.190 Lasana Gberie’s account of the RUF in Sierra Leone 
epitomized this issue. Work by Gberie and others eventually led to 
attempts to control the international trade in so called ‘conflict diamonds’ 
that were believed to be motivating and funding the RUF’s civilian-directed 
atrocities.191 The civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia were influential in 
developing the resource-based view of armed conflicts and explanations 
for the atrocities committed by conflict actors on all sides. 
The political economy literature, therefore, makes a clear connection 
between resource availability and extraction by NSAGs and their 
relationships with civilian populations. Where an NSAG has access to 
resources or funding independent of host populations, there is a greater 
likelihood of violence by the group directed towards civilians. This 
economic dimension to NSAG-civilian relations has clear implications, both 
for external humanitarian engagement with NSAGs for civilian protection 
and for NSAG interests in the protection, or predation, of the local 
population. Little has been written from the political economy of armed 
conflict perspective about instances where NSAG access to resources has 
contributed to improved protection or welfare for constituent populations. 
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Studies into NSAG governance and legitimacy, from political science and 
sociology have, however, considered this aspect, and are explored later in 
this chapter. 
The geography of civil wars and NSAGs 
An important element in analysing civil wars and NSAGs is physical 
geography. Mountain and jungle terrain, location of natural resources and 
access to them, proximity to borders, and distance from centres of 
government all influence how a conflict is fought. Patrick B. Johnston has 
pointed out that “leaders of geographically concentrated insurgencies are 
better able to broadcast power directly over subordinates than leaders of 
geographically deconcentrated groups.”192 He further points to geographic 
dispersion, and the consequent  lack of monitoring or discipline of 
subordinates in the field, as central factors in explaining why some NSAGs 
became more preoccupied with looting and predation, while others 
succeed in controlling violence and establishing a basic administrative 
apparatus.193 Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates have also highlighted the 
significance of geography on insurgencies. 
From our analysis, we found that the scope of conflict is associated with 
such geographical factors as the total land area of the country, whether or 
not the conflict zone is adjacent to the border of a neighbouring country, 
and whether there are natural resources in the conflict zone.194 
The significance of proximity to the boundaries of recognised states has 
been raised by Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Johnathan Goodhand who 
have identified the role of border areas in the regional dynamics of conflict 
economies. These areas provide rear bases, supplies and recruits, and 
access to shadow cross-border economies.195 Areas just across borders in 
other states from conflict zones, therefore, provide sanctuaries “used by 
refugees and militias.”196 
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Proximity to borders, combined with the co-option of humanitarian 
assistance by NSAGs, has been identified as contributing to the political 
economy of conflicts and influencing NSAG-civilian relations. Fiona Terry 
considered the role of assistance delivered via refugee camps in 
neighbouring countries in perpetuating conflicts, and in maintaining NSAG 
claims to legitimacy and control over populations.197 She outlined 
examples of armed groups that benefitted from humanitarian assistance in 
refugee camps across the borders from conflict affected states. These 
included Hutu militias in refugee camps in Zaire bordering Rwanda in 
1994-6; Afghan Mujahedeen in Pakistan bordering Afghanistan in the 
1980s; and the Khmer Rouge in Thailand bordering Cambodia in the 
1980s. In these situations, armed groups based in refugee camps in 
neighbouring states diverted humanitarian aid to “refugee warriors”198 to 
continue the fighting across the border. Consequently, humanitarian aid 
itself has been identified as having an impact upon the political economy 
of armed conflicts.  
Themes from the political economy analysis of armed 
conflict and relevance to Burma NSAGs 
An important concept for this study drawn from political economy analysis 
is the idea that NSAG-civilian relations are influenced by the extent of 
reliance the groups have on host populations. Examples have been 
highlighted where external funding has increased NSAG violence towards 
civilians. A corollary of this perspective is that if financial and material 
support does come significantly from the local population rather than 
external sources, armed groups would be less abusive and more likely to 
provide welfare or governance. Related to this is the extent to which 
economic or ‘greed-based’ motivations of NSAG members and leaders 
may overshadow any longer-term political goals or provision of public 
goods to a constituency. A second relevant theme is the influence of 
geography. Geographic dispersion presents challenges for organisational 
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control over NSAG units by their central leadership. This attenuation leads 
to greater risks of predation for people exposed to geographically 
dispersed armed groups with weak command and control over locally 
autonomous units or leaders. Proximity to borders and distance from 
centres of military or government control also count in terms of NSAG 
ability to maintain territory and therefore control over populations and, 
potentially, access to cross-border material support. The role of 
humanitarian assistance co-opted by NSAGs combines the issues of 
external material support with geographic proximity to borders. It also 
raises questions about the use of these resources. Where NSAGs are 
facilitating or associated with delivery of assistance to local populations, 
there will be implications for the socially constructed concept of their 
perceived legitimacy.  
In the case of Burma and NSAGs operating there, economic factors have 
been identified as playing a significant role in the conflicts and ceasefires. 
Mark Duffield’s concept of emerging political complexes as a theoretical 
model for understanding the political economy of civil wars has been 
influential on the writing of scholars addressing Burma’s ethnic conflicts 
and NSAGs. Mary Callahan, Martin Smith, Ashley South and Duffield 
himself, have all deployed the emerging political complex model to 
understanding the economic dynamics of Burma’s civil wars, the 
overlapping nature of state and non-state governance, and ceasefires 
between the army and some NSAGs.199 In an earlier political economy 
assessment of the civil wars in Burma, Catherine Brown highlighted how 
the military government and leadership in some ethnic armed groups both 
benefited from ceasefire agreements. These agreements in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s tended to serve the economic interests of a few 
Tatmadaw and NSAG elites rather than leading to lasting political 
settlements.200 Other studies have also highlighted the mutually beneficial 
aspect of those ceasefires for the government and armed group 
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leaderships, especially in relation to the drugs trade.201 Regarding the 
impact on civilian populations, Brown mentions the continued abuses 
committed by all armed actors against the ethnic civilians in those areas 
despite the ceasefires.202 More recent assessments of the ceasefires of 
the 1990s have recognised the reduction in abuses committed against 
civilians and the development of civil society in those areas, although the 
lack of political settlements has meant the grievances remain.203   
While the political economy approach has much traction in the case of 
Burma, Martin Smith points out that economic ‘greed’ factors alone do not 
explain the longevity of the conflicts there. Instead, he points to “political 
grievance and denial of ethnic rights” as underlying causes, while 
economic factors have become “integral elements in the structures of 
conflict as the decades have passed.”204  
Another factor with a connection to political economy for armed groups in 
Burma has been geographical location in mountain and jungle border 
areas and proximity to, or control over, border crossings. This has been a 
significant element in maintaining resistance for some NSAGs.205 For 
NSAGs and associated welfare organisations on the Thai-Burma border, 
this has also included access to international humanitarian assistance.206  
The dynamics of geographical dispersion and the organisational cohesion 
of NSAGs in Burma have received attention from Paul Kenny. He points 
out that the KNU had more territorial control up to the mid-1990s, but 
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lacked cohesion due to the localised economic agendas of individual 
commanders. Following loss of territory after government offensives in the 
1990s, it then became more concentrated and this contributed to greater 
organisational cohesion, efficiency and less predatory behaviour. In 
contrast, the DKBA, which split from and fought against the KNU at this 
time, was geographically dispersed with weak centralised command and 
control and became associated with the predatory economic agendas of 
local commanders.207 
Sociological approaches to the study of NSAGs 
All conflicts and conflict actors are embedded within a social context. Paul 
Richards, introducing a compilation of studies of NSAGs and their 
relations with host populations, has pointed out that “war is inescapably 
sociological.”208  Mao Zedong’s water and fish analogy for the relationship 
between the people and guerrillas recognises this importance. 209 
Regarding these relations, Mao further pointed out that it is “undisciplined 
troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its 
native element, cannot live”.210   
Christopher Clapham, in writing about African rebel groups, recognised 
the vital importance of relations with civilian populations, especially 
constituencies they claim to represent. For him, “insurgencies are 
intensely dependent on their relations with host societies.”211 Whether 
through popular support, coercion or a combination of both, NSAGs rely 
on host populations and consequently those populations are threatened 
both by the resident NSAG and by state armed forces or other armed 
actors opposing it.  
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Identity and civil war violence 
Civil wars have often been noted for their exceptional savagery, and 
consequently attempts have been made to explain this. Marta Reynal-
Querol makes a “distinction between ethnic and revolutionary civil wars” in 
highlighting the role of ethnicity in the nature of such conflicts. 212  Michael 
Ignatieff has also highlighted the role of ethnic nationalism, in particular as 
a driving force in the civil wars of the post-Cold War 1990s.213 He makes a 
telling point about ethnic identity, nationalism, and war in reporting a 
conversation with a Serb militiaman during the Yugoslav wars in the 
1990s. He describes the man as “at the edge of recognizing his enemies 
as individuals, only to succumb to the nationalist fantasy of their radical 
otherness.”214 Ignatieff, recalling Freud, describes such ethnic nationalism 
as being driven by “the narcissism of minor differences” between 
competing ethnic groups.215  
The idea of ethnic, religious or political identity in belonging to a group and 
the violence directed towards members of groups different to one’s own, 
has been a feature of many civil wars. Daniel Rothbart and Karina 
Korostelina have explored this and define social identity as “an individual’s 
sense of connection to a social group and the social category, a 
connection that affects perceptions and behaviours.”216 According to them 
it is the social construction of outsiders, and “perceived identities of these 
others as infallible truths” that therefore provide “a basis for decisions, 
commands, and policies that endanger civilians.” 217 The population of the 
other as a whole is, therefore, seen as culpable for the actions of that 
other’s armed actors. In regard to this, Paul Gilbert notes, “it is exactly this 
presumption of inescapable complicity in the actions of the group that 
poses a threat to civilian immunity when those actions lead to war.”218  
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This goes some way towards explaining the frequent lack of distinction by 
armed actors between civilians and combatants in civil wars. 
Identity, therefore, is a socially constructed concept with deep historical 
roots that may provide a sense of belonging and empathy with fellow 
group members, an identification of those outside the group as others, 
often with a set of negative attributes attached to them. Writing about 
identity often assumes its influence on armed actors, whether state or non-
state, results in increased violence towards civilian ‘others.’ However, 
there is also the question of how armed groups build or maintain support 
with civilian populations (constituencies) that they do claim to represent 
and/or protect. Identity cannot be discounted as also providing motivation 
to protect or assist those one feels a common identity with. Such action 
may also result in varying degrees of perceived legitimacy for such actors. 
NSAGs and legitimacy 
A feature of some studies of NSAGs has been an examination of attempts 
by them to build legitimacy with constituent populations. Regarding the 
role of Hamas in Gaza, Sara Roy makes the claim that “it was from the 
social sphere primarily - not the ideological one - that Hamas derived its 
legitimacy and constructed a broad popular base.”219  This issue is also 
echoed by other authors in assessing the nature of NSAG-civilian 
relations. For example, Podder recommends considering how to “relate 
the criteria for inclusion in peace agreements with the existence of local 
socio-political legitimacy.”220  According to Podder, “popular support, 
internal cohesion of the organization, and international legitimacy” are 
factors “likely to influence the group’s willingness to cooperate in state-
building activities.”221  
Legitimacy considerations, the present study argues, will also influence a 
NSAG’s willingness to demonstrate adherence to humanitarian norms. 
Soliman Santos from the South-South Network has made the observation 
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that international legitimacy is “a major consideration for armed groups.”222 
Furthermore, he notes, “it is probably politics (the political nature and 
function) of international law, rather than international law per se which 
attracts the adherence of such groups which are invariably highly political 
rather than legal.”223 Writers that address the issue of humanitarian norms 
with NSAGs have frequently raised NSAG concerns about legitimacy as a 
factor encouraging positive actions or expressions of compliance.224 How 
legitimacy is perceived, though, can differ between international and local 
perspectives. David Petrasek, for example, points out that although 
“resistance can be legitimate does not mean of course that abuses 
committed are justified. As a practical matter, however, tolerance for 
abuse (especially among the armed group’s constituency) will be related 
to this question of legitimacy.”225   
NSAG governance and welfare provision 
Related to the question of legitimacy is the governance role of NSAGs. 
Prior to their final military defeat in 2009, the LTTE in Sri Lanka were the 
subject of a number of studies that considered their role in administration 
and welfare provision. Kristian Stokke identified the authoritarian and 
centralised nature of the LTTE administration focused on “guaranteeing 
external and internal security in the context of protracted warfare,” but also 
noted its role in the “welfare and development of the Tamil community.”226 
Janine Lilja claims that dependency on constituent support and territorial 
control over civilian populations influenced the LTTE’s behaviour towards 
those they claimed to represent.  She suggested these factors reduced the 
group’s use of violent and coercive means for recruitment and support.227 
                                            
222 Santos, "A Critical Reflection on the Geneva Call Instrument and Approach in 
Engaging Armed Groups on Humanitarian Norms: A Southern Perspective," 7. 
223 Ibid. 
224 See, for example, Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, NGOs and Nonstate 
Armed Actors: Improving Compliance with International Norms (Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace, 2011), 3, 10 & 11; Whitfield, "Engaging with Armed Groups:  
Dilemmas and Options for Negotiators," 5 & 25. Bruderlein, The Role of Non-State Actors 
in Building Human Security: The Case of Armed Groups in Intra-State Wars, 9 & 11. 
225 Petrasek, Ends and Means: Human Rights Approaches to Armed Groups, 35. 
226 Kristian Stokke, "Building the Tamil Eelam State: emerging state institutions and forms 
of governance in LTTE-controlled areas in Sri Lanka," Third World Quarterly 27, no. 6 
(2006): 1024. 
227 Janine Lilja, "Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? Rebel Strategies to 
Attain Constituent Support in Sri Lanka," Terrorism & Political Violence 21(2009). 
 72 
 
Elisabeth Wood identified the LTTE’s strict discipline and control as a 
significant factor in preventing incidents of rape by its fighters, despite 
cases occurring on the government side.228 “The organization prohibits 
sexual violence and effectively enforces that decision through a tightly 
controlled military hierarchy in which punishment is swift and severe.”229  
Another factor to consider in regard to this issue, was that in the later 
stages of the Tamil conflict the LTTE also recruited significant numbers of 
women fighters.230 
Stokke, Lilja and Wood’s perspectives on the governance of the LTTE 
diverge from the political economy approach applied by Beardsley and 
McQuinn highlighted earlier. Beardsley and McQuinn found the LTTE was 
not responsive to the local population’s needs due to external diaspora 
funding. Stokke argues that the LTTE provided “administrative efficiency” 
but prevented “democratic accountability.” 231 Considering both economic 
and social perspectives would indicate that little autonomy or dissent was 
tolerated within the relatively efficient governance and welfare structures 
the LTTE did develop with the aid of external funding. They achieved 
efficiency, but without democratic input from the constituent population. 
Yet, as Neil DeVotta identifies, despite the potential support it could have 
gained, the LTTE’s recruitment of children, targeted assassinations and 
lack of concern for civilian casualties “guaranteed it eventual pariah status 
among the international community and even many Tamils.”232  
Mampilly identifies secessionist and/or ethno-nationalist armed groups as 
being more interested in developing “an effective system of governance 
than groups that seek to capture power at the centre.”233 Co-option of 
humanitarian assistance is another significant factor that he suggests 
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correlates with the administrative roles of armed groups. 234 If NSAGs are 
able to provide some administration and welfare in areas they control to 
enhance their legitimacy, it then follows that those groups may be more 
willing to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
There are at least three possible motivations for NSAGs doing so. The 
group may simply want the material aid for its own troops, or to sell to 
raise funds for its continued armed action. The group may also wish to 
increase its perceived legitimacy by association with the provision of 
welfare to civilians. Lastly, the group, especially members of associated 
welfare wings, may intrinsically wish to provide for the needs of the 
assumed constituencies with whom they themselves identify. The 
significance here is that there may be both instrumental motivations and/ 
or internalised and genuinely held beliefs at work for such actors. 
Therefore, in contrast to the mostly negative view of the political economy 
of armed conflict towards the use of humanitarian assistance by NSAGs, 
there is a potential for NSAGs to use it, or facilitate it, to the benefit of 
constituent populations. 
Terry, however, points out how NSAG involvement with humanitarian aid 
via refugee camps in neighbouring countries helps NSAGs to control 
populations and enhance legitimacy, even if it is not deserved.235  Interest 
from NSAGs to facilitate humanitarian assistance, nonetheless, presents 
an opening for engagement with them on humanitarian norms by external 
actors. Claude Bruderlein makes this argument in relation to engagement 
with armed groups and their development of humanitarian, health and 
social services. Such “humanitarian wings” can then help “promote a 
stricter compliance to international standards within the ranks of the 
group.”236 In discussing the potential inclusion of NSAGs in processes to 
improve protection of civilians, he also highlighted the issue of NSAG 
capacity to undertake such activity. 237  Capacity for NSAGs and their 
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welfare or governance organs to actually implement actions that protect 
civilians is often lacking, and international assistance to increase this is 
frequently resisted by concerned states. For the NSAG, this is also a 
question of the available resources, abilities and education of those that 
may undertake such activity. Another issue with both economic and social 
implications, pointed out by Mampilly, is the choice made by an NSAG 
leadership regarding use of resources.238 Whether they are directed 
towards improving the group’s governance capacity or towards personal 
accumulation, will in turn, influence the extent of the group’s ability to 
implement more protective, humanitarian-focused policies.  
NSAG legitimacy questioned 
The concepts of popular support and legitimacy for rebel movements and 
how that can be potentially measured, if at all, have been problematized. 
Stathis Kalyvas, in his study of violence in civil wars, has explored the idea 
of popular support that is often claimed by armed actors from constituent 
populations. Although frequently cited as a significant variable in studies of 
NSAGs, and by the groups themselves for their claimed legitimacy, 
Kalyvas points out that popular support, at the best of times, is difficult to 
measure. Rebel groups will claim the population supports them because 
they are fighting to redress alleged wrongs committed against the people. 
Equally, government or other armed actors opposing the rebels will argue 
civilians only show support or collaborate with the rebel side due to 
coercion. Kalyvas here identifies that the relationship is more complex, 
and that it is not as if civilians actually have a choice in the matter.239 In 
situations of contested territorial control there is pressure for civilians to 
collaborate with armed actors, or outwardly show support, to avoid being 
perceived as supporting the other side. This, in turn, leads to questioning 
claims of legitimacy made by those armed actors. “The absence of 
alternatives often produces collaboration irrespective of the level of 
popular satisfaction or lack thereof, which may be wrongly interpreted as a 
reflection of legitimacy.”240 Drawing on a host of empirical studies, Kalyvas 
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makes the point that actually few members of a host population where a 
rebel group is present are committed supporters, while the majority 
generally demonstrate malleability in terms of displaying support. This is 
due to a mix of sympathy for the rebel cause and fear of them on the part 
of the population, and persuasion and coercion of the civilian population 
on the part of the rebels.241 This is an important caveat in relation to the 
present study, in understanding legitimacy and the extent to which it is 
present. Nonetheless, legitimacy is an important aspect of NSAG-civilian 
relations. Some, though not all, NSAGs demonstrate concern with 
demonstrating they have it, or that they deserve it. It influences their 
policies and practices towards civilians and, therefore, towards 
humanitarian norms. 
Themes from the sociology of NSAGs and relevance to 
Burma NSAGs 
The overall themes raised by the work of authors that have studied 
NSAGs from a social perspective are the importance of understanding 
NSAGs within their social context, the role of identity, the functions of 
NSAG governance and civil society, and perceptions of legitimacy in 
NSAG-civilian relations. Ethnic identity has been a central and 
complicated element of the civil wars in Burma.242 Armed groups claiming 
to represent the many ethnic nationalities such as Karen, Karenni, Mon, 
Shan or Kachin, have been in conflict with the ethnically Burman 
dominated central state, in some instances, since independence.243 
Mampilly’s point about ethno-nationalist or separatist groups being more 
concerned with establishing governance structures in areas they control, 
compared to groups that wish to take control of the central state, is 
significant for the Burma context. Many of the major ethnic armed groups 
have established rudimentary state-like administrations and various, 
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though often limited, services for constituent populations over many 
decades.244  
Burma NSAGs and civil society 
The influences of identity, perceived legitimacy and non-state governance 
in Burma, the present study contends, have contributed to the 
development of welfare and civil society actors, some who are close to, 
and others more independent from, NSAGs. The relationships between 
local civil society and Burma NSAGs identified in this study can be seen 
as parallel to the relationships that have been described between civil 
society and recognised states. The term civil society has been applied 
very broadly and has evolved in meaning over time and across cultures.245 
The World Health Organisation, for example, refers to civil society as a 
“social sphere,” and civil society organisations (CSOs) as “non-state, not-
for-profit, voluntary organisations formed by people in that social sphere,” 
but sometimes “state involvement in the funding and establishment of 
CSOs /NGOs may blur the borders between state and non-state 
bodies.’”246 In much the same way, the influence of state-like politically 
motivated actors in the form of non-state armed groups on CSOs may also 
blur this distinction. Here, civil society refers collectively to non-profit, 
voluntary, service delivery or advocacy focused organisations. Theories 
about civil society usually assume it has a relationship with the state that 
enables it to be “working outside of the state, perhaps parallel to it, 
sometimes in opposition to it.”247 In the context of this thesis, that is 
extrapolated onto local CSOs and their relationships often encompassing 
both NSAGs and INGOs. CSOs stretch across a broad range of actors in 
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Burma including rights and faith-based groups and local community based 
organisations (CBOs). 
Some local welfare and assistance focused organisations with a close 
relationship to NSAGs are also the local partners to INGOs. For example, 
the internal functioning of refugee camps has been, in some instances, 
devolved to the administrative apparatus of an NSAG, such as in the case 
of the Karen National Union (KNU)-connected Karen Refugee Committee 
(KRC) administration in seven of the refugee camps along the Thai-Burma 
border.248 Other CSOs, however, are more independent organisations that 
also receive some donor funding from INGOs. These organisations pursue 
cross-border (usually from Thailand) assistance or advocacy activities that 
might otherwise compromise sovereignty-respecting INGOs. The issue of 
international support and funding for these groups has been a sensitive 
issue, especially with changes in donor  funding priorities following the 
start of reforms inside Burma since 2011.249 
Burma NSAGs and perceived legitimacy 
The concept of legitimacy and different perceptions of it are significant in 
the case of NSAGs in Burma. What is perceived as legitimate will vary 
from the perspective of western states and international agencies 
promoting democracy, human rights or free markets, to the Burma Army’s 
claims to be preventing the disintegration of the Union and being seen as 
a credible military and governing force. For NSAGs in Burma, legitimacy 
often involves presenting themselves as representative of all of the above 
concerns depending on the audience and the issue. This may involve 
advocating democratic rights-based policies internationally, showing 
interest in economic development to external business interests, 
demonstrating to local populations and to the central government their 
ability to resist its armed forces, and upholding ethnic political causes for 
constituent populations while also being seen as a provider of welfare and 
protection for them. These activities involve the NSAGs’ military, political 
                                            
248 Kirsten McConnachie, "Rethinking the ‘Refugee Warrior’: The Karen National Union 
and Refugee Protection on the Thai–Burma Border," Journal of Human Rights Practice 4, 
no. 1 (2012). 
249 See further discussion of the roles of these organisations and issues involving them in 
chapter nine. 
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and welfare arms as well as other more independent CSOs and, 
sometimes, international actors. As David Steinberg has commented, 
legitimacy in Burma “not only involves a government and its political 
opposition, but a virtual myriad of minorities, each of whom may have their 
own assessment of what constitutes  legitimacy for their own or central 
government administrations.”250  
External perspectives on NSAG legitimacy vary, however, and this is 
complicated by the myriad splinter factions from larger NSAGs and state-
aligned militias operating in ethnic areas. As Ashley South has observed 
regarding the decades of conflict and the role of Burma NSAGs, “for many 
insurgent groups, identity and the claim to legitimacy have come to reside 
in the act of rebellion itself.”251 In his detailed study of Burma’s long-
running civil wars, Martin Smith referred to the case of NSAGs in Burma 
as “insurgency as a way of life.”252  
Theoretical propositions drawn from the literature 
Propositions developed from the literature reviewed in the present and 
previous chapter are presented here. They address relevant aspects, 
identified in the literature, for their effect on NSAGs, and on NSAG-civilian 
relations. These factors, therefore, are seen as having an impact on the 
extent of compliance, or non-compliance, with humanitarian norms by 
NSAGs. 
The first proposition is largely based on the writing of humanitarian 
practitioners and international legal scholars that was outlined in chapter 
three. For many NSAGs, military necessity, driven by political and 
economic imperatives, may result in their resorting to actions that threaten 
constituent populations. Deliberate use of methods, weapons or tactics, 
such as landmines, and underage or forced recruitment, are likely to be 
claimed as necessary by the NSAG to maintain its position, protect 
constituencies, and even for its survival. These elements of intentional 
NSAG policy pose both direct and indirect threats to civilian populations, 
                                            
250 Steinberg, "Legitimacy in Burma/ Myanmar: Concepts and Implications," 109. 
251 South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 32. 
252 Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 88-101. 
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even if the NSAG claims to represent and protect them. Based on 
Bangerter, Veuthey, Mack and Pejic, and Bellal and Casey Maslen 
(discussed in chapter three), regarding military factors influencing 
compliance or violation of humanitarian norms, the following proposition 
will be examined. 
1. NSAGs will carry out actions that threaten the security of the 
populations they claim to represent or protect, in violation of 
humanitarian norms, out of claimed military and/or political 
necessity. 
The political economy of armed conflict approach considers sources of 
funding, resources, and economic support available to NSAGs as central 
influences on their formation, tactics and membership. These factors, in 
turn, are believed to influence how NSAGs treat civilians. This study 
contends, therefore, that these factors will also affect the extent of their 
compliance with humanitarian norms. This was evident in Weinstein’s idea 
of the initial material and social endowments of rebel groups influencing 
the types of organisations that they became and, consequently, the 
amount of violence directed at civilians. This is incorporated into the 
following proposition. 
2. The extent and nature of material and social resources for an 
NSAG at formation will significantly influence the nature of the 
groups’ future relations with civilian populations and, therefore, the 
extent of NSAG conformity with humanitarian norms. 
Beardsley and McQuinn’s, and Hovil and Werker’s research points to the 
role of external funding and support for NSAGs as contributing to less 
concern for populations in their areas and more abusive or predatory 
behaviour. This leads to the following proposition regarding the role of 
external funding and support for NSAGs, and the consequences for 
relations with civilian populations. 
3. Where an NSAG has substantial funding and/or access to 
resources independent of its constituent population, its policies and 
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practices will be more abusive towards civilians, and therefore less 
conforming with humanitarian norms. 
Geographical dispersion and organisational fragmentation are also 
considered relevant to NSAG treatment of people in their areas of control. 
As indicated by Johnston, and Buhaug and Gates, resource availability 
extraction and use, distance and terrain impact on NSAG command and 
control. Location of resources will influence NSAG dependence or 
autonomy from local populations. Furthermore, as indicated by Kenny in 
relation to NSAGs in Burma, distance and dispersion of NSAG units will 
influence whether those units act more autonomously from the central 
command and engage in predatory activity locally.  Abuses against 
civilians, in this case, may remain unreported or unpunished by the central 
NSAG command. This brings forward the following proposition. 
4. Where an NSAG is dispersed over territory, is fragmented, and/or 
has weak command and control over individual units, their 
practices (even if there is policy) will be more abusive or predatory 
towards civilians and therefore less congruent with humanitarian 
norms. 
Proximity to borders, as indicated by Pugh et al, and Buhaug and Gates, 
presents opportunities for taxation of border trade and a rear base for 
insurgents. Access to refuge across borders enables contact with external 
influences, including humanitarian actors. Diversion of assistance, as 
highlighted by Terry, is also a significant factor in NSAG survival and their 
relations with host populations. The next proposition acknowledges this 
factor in relation to its consequences for NSAG-civilian relations and 
NSAG compliance with humanitarian norms. 
5. NSAGs that control or cross international borders can access or 
co-opt material, financial and/or humanitarian assistance enabling 
less reliance on constituent populations. Therefore, they are more 
likely to be abusive towards civilians and less congruent with 
humanitarian norms. 
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Themes raised by sociological perspectives on NSAGs, for example in 
case studies of NSAGs compiled by Richards and by Clapham, have 
emphasised the social and political context and centrality of NSAG-civilian 
relations.  Ethnic and religious identity, in particular, has been identified by 
writers such as Ignatieff, Ryenal-Querol, and Rothbart and Korostelina as 
a force that binds a sense of belonging to a group. This then potentially, 
also, leads to a stereotyped and negative view of the ‘other’ promoting 
violence towards outside groups.  
Identity with fellow members of an ethnic or religious group, however, may 
also engender more concern for their welfare or protection from 
persecution or suffering. This is a factor not well explained by the rational 
actor economic model, yet it is present in local forms of “organised 
compassion” as alluded to by Barnett’s summation of humanitarian 
action.253 The present study argues that it is a relevant factor that 
influences NSAG policies or practices. This may be directly through the 
leadership, or indirectly through the role of NSAG-associated welfare, or 
civil society organisations. These actors are in a position to have influence 
to varying degrees on the NSAG’s relations with civilians, and compliance 
with humanitarian norms. They are also a potential partner or point of 
entry for international humanitarian engagement actors attempting to 
influence NSAGs towards greater compliance. This leads to the following 
proposition based on Smilie, Petrasek, and Florquin et al (in chapter 
three), and Roy, Mampilly and Bruderlien (in the present chapter), 
regarding the role of local civil society actors working with, or that have 
access to, NSAGs. 
6. NSAGs that have developed, work alongside, or are amenable to, 
local welfare, advocacy, or service provision organisations, are 
more likely to take action to conform to humanitarian norms. 
Establishing systems of government and welfare services for constituent 
populations are central means as identified by Podder, Mampilly, Stokke, 
and DeVotta that NSAGs have used to gain legitimacy with local 
                                            
253 See Barnett, The Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, 15. 
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populations. NSAG attention to relations with their constituent populations, 
and with external actors, is related to their perceived legitimacy, locally 
and internationally. Legitimacy is likely to have a consequent influence on 
the degree of NSAG interest in demonstrating compliance with 
humanitarian norms. This suggests the following proposition regarding 
NSAG interests in legitimacy. 
7. NSAGs will pursue policies that contribute to civilian protection, 
and therefore conform more closely to humanitarian norms, out of 
concerns with local and/or international legitimacy. 
Lastly, consideration needs to be given to the dynamics of situations 
where NSAGs do attempt to undertake actions that increase compliance 
with humanitarian norms. This may be motivated by a need for material 
support, legitimacy and/or by identification with constituent populations, as 
outlined in the literature and propositions above. This raises the issue of 
NSAG capacity, identified by Bruderlein, Petrasek, and Mampilly (in the 
present chapter) and by the ICRC, Geneva Call, and Mack and Pejic (in 
chapter three), to actually implement such actions in terms of human and 
material resources.  
8. NSAG action to reduce threats to their constituencies may 
contribute to local support and legitimacy. However, even when 
willing to do so, NSAGs are constrained by their capacity in terms 
of the material and human resources available to effect such 
action. 
In summary, the propositions set forth above address the following 
influences on NSAGs, and NSAG-civilian relations. Each factor, it is 
proposed, has a flow on effect that can further increase, or decrease, the 
extent of NSAG compliance with humanitarian norms. These factors are: 
 Claimed military and political necessity 
 Material and social resources at formation  
 External funding and/or access to resources, independent of a 
constituent or host population 
 Geographic dispersion/ fragmentation of the NSAG 
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 Proximity to borders and external assistance 
 Civil society/ welfare organisations associated with NSAGs 
 Perceptions of local and international legitimacy  
 Capacity to implement policies leading to improved protection 
Summary 
The literature outlined in this chapter on NSAGs and their relations with 
host populations, has addressed those relationships through the 
theoretical lenses of the political economy of armed conflict, and 
sociology. The former brings economic agendas and the sources of NSAG 
funding to the fore in attempting to understand armed group behaviour. 
Resources have been widely understood as motivations for predatory or 
abusive behaviour. Yet, as is the case with the use of resources by the 
governments of formally recognised states, this study contends they also 
present opportunities, in the case of NSAGs, to improve conditions for 
those they claim to represent, and strengthen their legitimacy and role in 
governance. This, in turn, can potentially lead to situations where NSAGs 
have the motivation to improve compliance with humanitarian norms.   
The importance of the social context for NSAGs, and of socially 
constructed ideas, such as identity and legitimacy, have been explained 
within the writing from a sociological perspective. While the politicisation of 
identity provides motivations for violence directed at those outside one’s 
own group, this study argues it can also provide incentives for improving 
the conditions of those that are identified with. Equally, perceptions of 
legitimacy are also a significant element in NSAG concerns with provision 
of governance, welfare, and compliance with humanitarian norms. The 
motivations to be seen to adhere to international norms may be 
instrumental or they may be more genuinely internalised. Either way, if 
they influence the actions and policies of NSAGs they are worth 
considering. The themes raised in the literature have been developed into 
a set of propositions, set out above, to be tested against the findings from 
the empirical case studies of NSAGs in Burma and humanitarian 
engagement with them in later chapters. The following chapter presents 
the research design and the methodology that is employed in this study. 
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Chapter Five 
Research design and methodology 
Introduction 
Having outlined the relevant literature in the previous two chapters, and 
established a set of propositions drawn from it for testing, this chapter now 
presents the research design and methodology for this study. The 
rationale for the choice of an overall qualitative approach and a case study 
research design is first established. The sources of primary and secondary 
data are then outlined. In particular, the fieldwork, procedure for obtaining 
interview subjects, conduct of interviews, obtaining consent, offers of 
anonymity, and uses of translation, are explained. The topic prompts for 
the semi-structured interviews are then set forth. The logic for the choice 
of issues, the actors chosen as units of analysis, and the range of 
organisations from which interview respondents were drawn, is discussed. 
Then, the process for analysis of the interview transcripts and relating of 
themes identified by this back to the research topic, literature and 
propositions is outlined. The limitations of this study and potential biases 
that may be present in the research and data are also acknowledged. 
Finally, the research context and, in particular, ethical considerations 
around conducting research in Burma, are assessed. 
It is important to “understand how a particular view of the world affects the 
whole research process”254  Protection for conflict affected populations 
from threats posed by NSAG landmine use and recruitment of children is a 
core value that drives this research enquiry. The present study deals with 
real world events, and although they are interpreted in different ways by 
different actors, they do occur, and have very real effects on the lives of 
people affected by them. However, regarding the means by which these 
issues can be known about and understood, the epistemological position 
                                            
254 Johnathan Grix, The Foundations of Research (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2004), 66. 
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in this study is that of interpretivism.255 It accepts that there will be multiple 
perspectives on these issues that need to be understood within their 
relevant contexts. It is concerned with an understanding of human 
behaviour as influenced by both social and material/coercive structures as 
outlined in the literature and theory informing the propositions. These 
‘structures,’ however, are socially constructed concepts and understood 
through the subjective meanings that actors attach to them. Therefore, a 
social constructivist research approach will best fit this study as events 
and processes can be given “thick description” through “interpretations of 
the people most knowledgeable about the case”.256 A qualitative case 
study research design is the most appropriate strategy for collection of 
data, and for analysis, that can respond to the research questions, and to 
relating this study’s findings back to the theoretical propositions. 
Qualitative research 
Qualitative research is concerned with an “understanding of the social 
world through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its 
participants.”257 Katherine Hakim points out that a qualitative approach is 
appropriate where explanations of social phenomena, the motivations of 
actors, and of connections between factors are being considered.258 This 
is the case in the present study. What can be known about NSAG 
behaviour in relation to humanitarian norms, and the factors influencing 
them, in the case of Burma, will depend on the input into the study of the 
subjective experiences of those involved. Therefore, it draws on the 
perspectives of humanitarian NGOs, IGOs, local civil society 
                                            
255  Bryman states that interpretivism is “predicated upon the view that a strategy is 
required that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural 
sciences and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of 
social action.” Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (4th Ed) (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 30. 
256 Robert E. Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
1995), 102. 
257 Bryman, Social Research Methods (4th Ed), 380. 
258 See, Katherine Hakim, Research Design: Strategies and Design in the Design of 
Social Research (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), 28; David E. McNabb, Research 
Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods (New York, NY: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2004), 344. 
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organisations, civilians, NSAG leadership and members, and other 
observers such as academics and the media.   
 Qualitative researchers interact directly with people they study and their 
interpretations of their social environment use mostly non-statistical 
sources of data collection, acknowledge their own subjectivity, and focus 
on the “understanding of social interactions and processes”.259  The 
present study, therefore, involved fieldwork in and on the borders of 
Burma using in-depth semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, 
and observations, as well as analysis of other primary and secondary 
documents and audio-visual sources. While acknowledging the qualitative 
nature of social research, this study approaches the research design, 
research questions and theoretical propositions for testing in a systematic 
manner. A case study research design is considered the most suitable 
approach for this study given the complex nature of the phenomenon that 
is being studied (factors influencing NSAG compliance with humanitarian 
norms), and the importance of the context (social, political, and economic). 
Research design 
A case study 
McNabb argues that in designing case study research it is necessary to 
frame the case. Framing requires a rationale for why the case study 
method is deployed, why this specific case has been chosen, and why the 
behaviours or phenomenon under consideration are selected for 
research.260 
Why the case study method?   
The case of NSAGs in Burma, their relationship with civilians, and the 
extent of compliance with humanitarian norms (or not) requires 
consideration of military, political, historical, economic and social contexts. 
These are features Creswell points out as most amenable to exploration 
through case study analysis.261  As Robert Yin summarises, “a case study 
                                            
259 McNabb, Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Methods, 341-43. 
260 Ibid., 362. 
261 John Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Reserach Design: Choosing among Five 
Traditions (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), 61. 
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is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.262  The complexity of 
the context and the issues under examination in this study make a strong 
argument for application of a case study approach. 
In Burma there has been a dearth of reliable statistical data for most 
aspects of the country, its people, and economy.  This is due both to 
deliberate bias or distortion of numbers on the part of government and/or 
its opponents, and to a simple lack of reliable record keeping.263 This is 
even more so in the ethnic borderland regions where the relative size of 
populations of ethnic minority groups is disputed between the central 
government and those minorities.264  These issues serve to illustrate “how 
dark a statistical shadow was cast by the country’s half-century under a 
military dictatorship.”265 As well as the lack of data, there is the question 
for the present study of how much detail or context any analysis of 
statistical data would provide. For example, reported landmine incidents 
are documented by some organisations.266 While recording the incident 
and details about a victim the data will generally not reveal if it was a state 
or non-state actor who placed the mine, or if the incident resulted in further 
actions such as mapping, non-technical surveys, demining, fencing, 
signage, mine risk education, or which actors undertook such actions. 
However, while the present study is not quantitative, when numerical 
sources of information are available, they have been incorporated into the 
study to illustrate certain points, or the extent to which a particular 
phenomenon has been observed. 
                                            
262 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage, 2003), 13.  
263 As an example, in 2014, the government of Burma/Myanmar conducted its first census 
since 1983. The results revealed a population of only 51.4 million, over 8 million below 
the projected 60 million, it had expected to find.  
264 David Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Second Edition) 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), xxiv-xxvii.  
265 The Economist, "Myanmar's missing millions: The leftovers,"  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/09/myanmars-missing-millions. 
266 See, for example, Karen Human Rights Group, "Landmine injuries in Mone Township, 
Nyaunglebin District since January 2013," (Thailand: KHRG, July 8, 2013). 
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The type of case study 
The present study is an embedded single case study design, wherein a 
single case study consists of a set of sub-units of analysis.267  Yin uses as 
an example of this type of research design, a case study of a public 
program that contains funded projects, where the funded projects are the 
embedded units of analysis. In the present study, Burma is the country-
specific case study context. 268  The NSAGs are the embedded sub-units 
of analysis within the case study, or the “cases within the case.”269  
Material and social factors, as outlined in the propositions, are examined 
as potential contributory factors to the extent of NSAG compliance or 
divergence from humanitarian norms. Beyond identification of which 
factors have the greatest impact, the research questions also seek to 
understand how and why any identified elements do influence the extent 
of compliance with norms by NSAGs. That is, understanding the 
processes by which they occur. Hakim makes the point that case studies 
“focus on analytical social units and social processes.”270 In this study, the 
practices and policies of NSAGs, and of actors engaging with them on 
humanitarian norms, are the social processes being explored across a 
range of NSAGs, the sub-units of analysis.   
A case study is considered to be either intrinsic, in that the case is focused 
on for its own particular uniqueness, “or it may be on an issue or issues, 
with the case used instrumentally to illustrate the issue.”271 The present 
study has both intrinsic and instrumental relevance. It is of intrinsic interest 
in terms of its specific Burma focus. That is its practical interest for the 
range of CSOs, NSAGs, NGOs and civilian communities in Burma, as well 
as international actors addressing humanitarian and conflict issues in the 
country. However, it is also of wider theoretical interest for what it can 
                                            
267 Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 42-43. 
268 King, Keohane and Verba, include “a person, country, year, or political party” as 
examples of the types of elements that can potentially be units of observation and 
analysis within a case study. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing 
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 76-77.  
269 Robert E. Stake, "Case Studies," in Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry ed. Norman K. 
Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 153. 
270 Hakim, Research Design: Strategies and Design in the Design of Social Research, 32. 
271 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Reserach Design: Choosing among Five Traditions, 
62. 
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contribute to the literature addressing NSAG compliance with 
humanitarian norms, which is this study’s instrumental significance. Robert 
Stake acknowledges that case studies can be both instrumental and 
intrinsic and that there is frequently no clear boundary delineating the two 
types, but instead “a zone of combined purpose separates them.”272 
A major criticism of the case study method is the lack of generalisability of 
a case to other cases. However, as Yin points out, case studies are 
“generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or 
universes.”273 This study has developed a set of theoretical propositions 
drawn from literature on NSAGs and issues in other regional contexts in 
chapter four, and these are examined against the empirical evidence 
gathered in the case study of NSAGs in Burma. 
The research process 
To begin, relevant literature pertaining to NSAGs was assessed for the 
issues that helped shape the rest of the case study.274 Scholarly and 
practitioner material was considered that addressed NSAGs, NSAG-
civilian relations, and NSAG compliance with humanitarian norms. The 
researcher was able to check constantly the theoretical propositions and 
empirical data from fieldwork against recent developments in scholarly 
literature, and reports and media emerging from the Burma case study 
context. 
Next, initial contacts were established and preliminary interviews 
conducted in early 2012 with members of local and international 
humanitarian organisations. Some had experience in other regional 
contexts as well as experience in Burma regarding the role of NSAGs and 
NGO relations with them on humanitarian matters. Members of the Burma 
refugee community in New Zealand contributed valuable perspectives, 
and further contacts for fieldwork were developed during May to July 
                                            
272 Stake, "Case Studies," 137. 
273 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th ed) (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage, 2014), 20. 
274 Stake advocates conceptually structuring of a case study around thematic issues, 
Stake, "Case Studies," 142-43. 
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2012.275  Interviews during periods of fieldwork, approximately four to five 
months at a time, were undertaken on the Thai-Burma border and inside 
Burma during 2012, 2013, and 2014.276 A set of thematic prompts were 
developed for the semi-structured interviews and these were further 
refined after the first interviews in the field in August and September 2012. 
Interview subjects were accessed from across the range of actors involved 
with the issues in this study. This included NSAG leadership and 
members, members of INGOs, local NGOs, CSOs, academics, journalists, 
and other informed observers.277 
Sources of data 
Both primary and secondary data has been collected and assessed for 
this study. The secondary sources include books, journal articles, NGO, 
CSO, UN, and state government reports and websites, news media, and a 
variety of other grey literature (unpublished reports and policy 
documents).278 News media reports, audio-visual material such as 
documentaries and other images and footage of civilians, NGOs and 
NSAGs in the region that were available were also examined to provide 
extra input that increased the available information and some 
corroboration of other sources.  
To reduce the inevitable gaps in the available information, the issues, 
were assessed in detail across four NSAGs as units of analysis, (mini case 
studies within the case). The chapter dealing with humanitarian 
engagement actors and processes also included information on three 
further Burma NSAGs besides the four examined in the detailed case 
studies. The extra groups, however, reflected many of the same attributes 
of those that were included in the detailed case studies. This helped 
deepen the understanding of the engagement processes, in particular. 
While there was similarity across the NSAGs, they also differed on some 
                                            
275 The author worked as a volunteer with NZ Refugee services at this time, working with 
new Burmese refugees to NZ and the existing Burmese refugee community. 
276 See, below regarding details of the field work and interview processes. 
277 See further below in this chapter, regarding the process of selection of interview 
respondents. 
278 Lena Dahlberg and Colin McCaig, eds., Practical Research and Evaluation: A Start to 
Finish Guide for Practitioners (London, UK: Sage,2010), 83-84. 
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vital issues such as ceasefire status, geographic dispersion, or economic 
support base.  
Obtaining the perspectives of affected civilian populations in rural ethnic 
areas of NSAG control or influence was problematic. This was due to the 
difficulties presented by official denial of access to conflict-affected ethnic 
areas inside Burma, the range of different ethnic languages spoken in 
these areas, and the limitations for a researcher who was a western 
foreigner. While it was possible to access a couple of NSAG controlled 
areas, with NSAG permission, from across the Thai-Burma border, access 
to ethnic NSAG controlled civilian areas within Burma more generally was 
less practical. However, a valuable dataset of video interviews of villagers 
from rural township areas where NSAGs were active in Karen, Mon and 
Karenni states was collated in 2013 by a grouping of Thailand-based 
INGOs, The Border Consortium (TBC).279  Local CSOs working with the 
TBC, and often working cross-border from Thailand, were able to ask a set 
of questions of villagers in these areas. The ‘What Villagers Say’ interview 
videos were conducted in the appropriate local languages, and most were 
then translated with Burmese subtitles.280 A trusted local translator who 
spoke and read Burmese and Karen was enlisted by the researcher to 
further translate and transcribe these videos (available online from the 
TBC YouTube channel) into English. This data set was useful as it 
enabled perspectives from the affected populations to be considered. 
Questions that were asked of the villagers in the videos included their 
opinions on the ceasefires between the government and ethnic armed 
groups since 2012, their protection and security concerns, the potential 
return of refugees, and basic living conditions in their areas.281 
Most of the primary data for this study was collected through 
approximately 65 formal semi-structured interviews, as well as four focus 
group discussions, and numerous personal communications and 
observations. Interviews were conducted with the range of actors involved 
                                            
279 The Border Consortium, "The Border Consortium (TBC),"  
http://www.theborderconsortium.org/.  
280 There was one short 10-minute summary that already had English subtitles. 
281 See, for example, TBC, “What Villagers from Kyaukgyi Township in Southeast 
Myanmar Say…” https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCRy4VF4tReMOuOPG_ahhdwg 
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with the NSAGs and with the issues under consideration. The author also 
kept a research journal during fieldwork recording thoughts and 
impressions of situations and developing ideas as they came. Any relevant 
personal communication that occurred in day to day conversations, work, 
or other situations in the field that provided further insight into the topic 
was also noted in the journal. In some instances, these have been called 
upon when they add depth, or another perspective, to a particular issue. 
As Lisa Brooten and Rosalie Metro point out, in discussing the ethics of 
research in Burma “it is wise not to leave the scene of your research 
without contributing something to it — at the very least your time, and 
financial support or labor may be appropriate.”282 As part of the fieldwork 
process the author undertook periods of volunteer work with some local, 
mostly education-focused, organisations on the Thai-Burma border and 
inside Burma. These activities included teaching, working on project 
funding proposals, and drafting and editing documents and material for 
locally developed text books. This was a way to contribute a little to the 
communities and organisations in which the author was involved and 
improve understanding of the local context. It also produced further 
contacts in the course of these activities leading to further interviews. 
Working with local education organisations known to other local 
organisations, and to some NSAGs, and sometimes having an introduction 
from respected individuals from some of these, was often recognised by 
interview subjects when making first contacts via email, phone or in 
person. It also assisted when making introductions and establishing 
rapport at the outset of interviews. 
Interviews 
The interviews were semi-structured so as to allow flexibility to follow other 
valuable directions instigated by the interviewee that may not have been 
initially anticipated by the researcher.283  Most interviews were from 45 
                                            
282 Lisa Brooten and Rosalie Metro, "Thinking about ethics in Burma Research," Journal 
of Burma Studies 18, no. 1 (2014). 
283 Dahlberg and McCaig, eds., Practical Research and Evaluation: A Start to Finish 
Guide for Practitioners, 130-32. 
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minutes to just over an hour depending on the circumstances of the 
respondents and what they could offer on these topics.  
The selection of participants was initially carried out by a purposive 
sampling strategy. This is where “those sampled are relevant to the 
research questions being posed,” and “differ from each other in terms of 
the key characteristics relevant to the research question.”284 The aim of 
this approach was, therefore, to gain multiple perspectives from relevant 
stakeholders involved with or affected by the issues under examination. 
Individuals drawn from organisations within three broad categories were 
approached for interviews. These categories were humanitarian 
engagement actors; observer groups; and NSAGs. 
Humanitarian engagement actors were from those organisations working 
directly with NSAGs on humanitarian issues. This included international, 
national and local organisations. Some of these organisations specifically 
worked with NSAGs on humanitarian norms, landmines or child protection. 
Other groups were engaged with NSAGs as part of work dealing with 
human rights, refugee or IDP protection, health, welfare, or education. The 
‘observer’ actors provided perspectives on the wider context of 
populations, NSAGs, economic and political conflict dynamics, and often 
on the role of the state itself in the conflicts and ceasefires. Some were 
from international agencies or local civil society, while others were long-
term academics, researchers or journalists, with considerable knowledge 
of Burma, its ethnic conflicts and NSAGs. The ‘NSAG’ actors provided 
perspectives specific to the NSAGs themselves, their view of the issues, 
their policies and practices, and of any agreements they have made or 
other action they have taken in relation to the issues. Further interview 
participants were able to be incorporated due to snowball sampling where 
other interview subjects with useful knowledge and or experience were 
suggested to the researcher by those that were initially interviewed. That 
is where “sampled participants propose other participants who have had 
the experience or characteristics relevant to the research.”285  
                                            
284 Bryman, Social Research Methods (4th Ed), 418. 
285 Ibid., 424. 
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An important aspect of this study is also to examine alternate viewpoints 
and explanations for changes (or not) observed in NSAG behaviour and 
the material and social factors believed to influence them. Triangulation of 
information from interviews was, therefore, sought from other sources 
including news media, journalists and other observers. This enabled some 
method triangulation, through using both interviews and analysis of local 
and international media, and data triangulation, by including interview data 
from interested stakeholders and from observers with more objective 
distance from the issues.286 This diversity of method and sources helped 
verification and also consideration of alternate viewpoints or explanations 
of the information gained from the NSAGs and humanitarian actors who 
were the principal focus of the study. 
Recruiting participants 
Contact emails and phone numbers of staff working for particular 
organisations of interest to this study were compiled and they were 
approached initially by email or phone. Many interview subjects came to 
the attention of the researcher or were recommended by others, once in 
the field. In some cases, potential participants were met during the course 
of day-to-day activities. The author also had some existing personal 
contacts with people working for local organisations in the Thai-Burma 
border area who were also able to provide further initial contacts.  
Information and consent for participants 
Information about the study was initially developed into a one-page 
document that was sent as an email attachment to prospective interview 
participants, or given to them in person as background prior to 
commencing the actual interview. As the process for generating interviews 
progressed, the most relevant details from the form were condensed to a 
shortened version that was sent as a part of the text of emails requesting 
interviews. Each email was customised to the organisation and individual 
wherever possible. The information outline and emails briefly introduced 
the researcher, explained the research focus, requested an interview, or 
                                            
286 See, regarding types of triangulation, Jonathan Grix, The Foundations of Research 
(Second Edition) (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 135-37. 
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recommendations for others known to the recipient who could give one. It 
also offered anonymity for the participant and for their organisation, and 
thanked them for their consideration of the request.  
A consent form to be signed by respondents was originally developed prior 
to fieldwork, and modified slightly during the process. While it was feasible 
in situations where the interview subjects could read in English to use this, 
in some situations where a translator was involved, it was easier to explain 
the nature of the form via the translator. In some more spontaneous 
situations, it was also not always feasible to interrupt the flow of 
conversations or group discussions for the purposes of signing a form. 
The decision to offer blanket anonymity to participants also made the main 
reason for the form largely redundant, since participants were no longer 
required (as was asked on the form) to choose whether to be anonymous 
or not; they all were. Nonetheless, where possible, the forms were still 
used and collected as they also presented proof of the interviews having 
been conducted. 
Anonymity and recording interviews 
All interview participants were offered anonymity for themselves and for 
their organisation. Some participants generously agreed to their names 
being used in the consent process. However, for the future security of 
participants the decision was made to not identify individuals. However, 
some organisations that people represented are acknowledged if that 
participant agreed to that organisation being named. In some instances, 
interview participants within the same interview, spoke ‘on the record’ as 
representatives of organisations, and ‘off the record,’ in providing more 
sensitive information they did not wish identified with themselves 
personally or their organisation. This information has, where feasible, been 
used without compromising either personal or organisational anonymity. 
The off-record input, where it is valuable to the study, is incorporated, but 
it is not attributed to any specific organisation and, if quoted, is assigned a 
second different designation, and different time and place. Most interviews 
were able to be voice recorded and transcribed as soon as possible 
afterwards. A few participants requested not to be recorded, and hand 
 97 
 
written notes were taken during those interviews. All identities and 
interview data are safely stored and remain in the possession of the 
author. 
For members of international or national humanitarian organisations, the 
offer of anonymity was mostly for protection of their positions or careers 
inside their organisation. This would be the case with most studies 
involving interviews of members of an organisation if, for example, they 
were critical of some aspect of that organisation. The sensitive and 
confidential nature of some engagement activity and negotiations 
conducted by NGOs and by NSAGs was another reason why anonymity 
for staff was maintained, and why anonymity for organisations was also 
required in some instances. Former or current members of NSAGs were 
offered anonymity expressly for their personal safety.  
Translation 
While most interview subjects spoke English to varying degrees of 
proficiency, in some instances an intermediary translator was required. In 
these situations, the translation was performed by someone known to and 
trusted by the participant. This was usually done by another person from 
the same, or an associated, organisation to that of the respondent. This 
helped the respondents to relax and reduced any potential concerns over 
security if unknown translators had been brought in from outside. 
Semi-structured interview prompts 
The interviews followed a short set of thematic areas and prompts based 
on the questions and central issues of concern to the study. These were: 
 Landmines, their use or non-use, NSAG policies, practices, or 
agreements regarding these; 
 Children affected by armed conflict and/or associated with NSAGs, 
NSAG practices, policies, or agreements regarding these; 
 Identification of wider political, social, economic or military factors 
respondents believed influenced the humanitarian situation and the 
role of the NSAGs regarding these issues; 
 98 
 
 The policies and practices of other actors that engage with armed 
groups on these matters; and, 
 Opinions, perspectives, or anecdotes of the respondents about the 
issues, NSAGs or actors engaging with NSAGs. 
Selection of organisations and groups 
Humanitarian engagement NGOs 
Organisations that undertake engagement with NSAGs on humanitarian 
norms, or on one of the issue areas (landmines and children), and 
contributed interviews for this study, included: the ICRC; Geneva Call; the 
International Labour Organisation; a number of INGOs such as Norwegian 
People’s Aid and DanChurch Aid involved with mine risk education and/or 
demining; INGOs involved with protection of children, UN agencies, and 
other independent and local or cross-border CSOs concerned with health, 
IDP welfare, human rights, or education. For ongoing security reasons, 
many of these organisations cannot be directly identified.287 These groups 
have a more specific focus on engagement with NSAGs than the general 
aid and development NGOs that have been included in the third grouping 
below.  
NSAGs 
The NSAGs of interest to this study are diverse in terms of their ethnicity, 
geographic location and distribution, size and strength, access to 
resources, interaction with external actors, and awareness of, or 
compliance with, humanitarian norms. They do share a similar historical 
and political context of protracted conflict with the central state, 
establishment of some systems of governance in their areas of control, 
and claims to represent and protect their respective constituencies. 
Significantly, for this study, they have all been involved to varying degrees 
in the past, or into the present, with the issue of landmines and of children 
affected by conflict. Also, ceasefires between the government and most 
major NSAGs have been agreed since 2012, and a coalition of ethnic 
                                            
287 It became evident during fieldwork that CSOs, some close to NSAGs, that were 
involved with human rights advocacy, reporting and documentation, have had a 
significant role, both direct and indirect, in engagement with some Burma NSAGs, and 
are included in this group 
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NSAGs have since been involved in negotiations with the government 
towards a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA). A ceasefire military 
code of conduct (CoC) that addresses landmine and recruitment issues 
(as well as disposition and movement of forces) is a part of this 
agreement. The NSAGs in this study have also been the subjects of 
various humanitarian engagement initiatives from external and local 
actors. 
A total of four NSAGs are examined in detailed case histories in chapter 
eight: the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA); 
the New Mon State Party/ Mon National Liberation Army (NMSP/MNLA); 
the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF); and the Democratic 
Karen Buddhist/Benevolent Army (DKBA). The ABSDF is a pro-
democracy, pan-ethnic, political armed group, ideologically opposed to the 
military junta in Burma. It was formed by students following the military 
crackdown on pro-democracy protests in 1988. The KNPP and NMSP 
ethno-nationalist armed organisations have been in conflict with the state 
of Myanmar/Burma periodically since the 1950s. The DKBA is an example 
of the factionalism that has occurred periodically among Burma NSAGs, in 
that it split from the KNU in 1994 and supported government offensives 
against the KNU up until 2010, when the DKBA itself split.  
As outlined earlier, choosing a range of four NSAGs provided more detail 
across the issues and the policies and practices of interest to the study. 
These four NSAGs are long-standing having been in existence for at least 
twenty years, and over fifty years in the case of the NMSP and KNPP. 
They have varied in the past in terms of their ceasefire status or lack of it 
with the government and participation in alliances with other NSAGs. They 
have all been involved to some extent in administrative activity in the 
areas they control or influence. Regarding landmine use and children 
involved with armed conflict, some groups have undertaken action on one 
issue and not another, while others have undertaken action, developed 
agreements or deeds of commitment through working with local 
organisations, and others have done so with international organisations. 
The choice of these groups, therefore, gives the best coverage of the 
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range of policies and practices generated by the groups, and by 
humanitarian actors that have engaged with them.  Apart from 
representing differing objectives (political change, democracy/ethnic 
autonomy, economic concerns, or reaction to intra-ethnic divisions), the 
NSAGs have also been chosen for practical reasons of accessibility to 
leadership and members, and to organisations that are close to, or 
involved with, them.  
In chapter nine’s assessment of the role of external actors (local and 
international) that have engaged with the NSAGs on humanitarian norms, 
three other NSAGs are also considered. These are the Karen National 
Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), the Kachin 
Independence Organisation /Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA) and 
the Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/ CNA). While not dealt 
with in the detailed case histories in chapter eight, these groups are 
included in discussion of humanitarian engagement processes and actors 
undertaking this in chapter nine. The rationale for their inclusion in that 
chapter is their frequent mention in interviews and other reports in regard 
to the issues discussed, and their similarity in terms of history, conflict with 
the central government and organisation with the four NSAGs covered in 
detail in chapter eight. The KNU is the longest-established NSAG in 
Burma and has received considerable attention from academics and 
journalists.288 While it is not presented as a distinct case history in chapter 
eight, its trajectory is comparable to that of the KNPP and NMSP which 
are dealt with there. The KNU helped to found the KNPP and NMSP with 
which it was allied and shares a long common history of resistance to the 
central state. The KIO is a large ethnic NSAG in Burma’s northern Kachin 
state.289 Like the NMSP in Burma’s southeast, it agreed to a ceasefire with 
                                            
288 See, for example, Ashley South, "Karen Nationalist Communities: The "Problem" of 
Diversity," Contemporary Southeast Asia 29, no. 1 (2007); Mikael Gravers, "Ethno-
nationalism in Burma/Myanmar: The long Karen struggle for autonomy," in 
Burma/Myanmar: Where Now?, ed. Mikael Gravers and Flemming Ytzen (Copenhagen, 
Denmark: NIAS Press, 2014); Fong, Revolution as Development: The Karen Self-
Determination Struggle against Ethnocracy. 
289 See, for discussion of the Kachin conflict and the KIO, Mandy Sadan, Being and 
becoming Kachin:  Histories beyond the state in the borderworlds of Burma (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2013); Wai Moe, "The struggle for peace in northern Myanmar," 
in Burma/Myanmar: Where Now?, ed. Mikael Gravers and Flemming Ytzen 
(Copenhagen, Denmark: NIAS Press, 2014). 
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the government in the mid-1990s after decades of conflict. The KIO’s 
ceasefire, however, collapsed in 2011, while the NMSP’s remains intact at 
present. The CNF is a relatively small NSAG compared to the others in 
this study.290 It is also unusual as its area of operation is on the Burma-
India border, rather than the border with Thailand or China. However, its 
leaders have been involved with external engagement actors in third party 
countries. Like the ABSDF, it was formed following the 1988 democracy 
uprising and is currently small, and, also like the KNU, KNO, KNPP and 
NMSP, it has been involved in ethnic NSAG coalitions. These three 
NSAGs are therefore relevant to the engagement processes discussed in 
chapter nine, which also include the four case study NSAGs from chapter 
eight. For the purposes of brevity, however, these additional three ethnic 
NSAGs have not received detailed biographies in chapter eight.  
‘Observer groups’ 
A third set of groups including aid and development NGOs, religious and 
civil society groups, UN agencies, and individual academics and 
journalists, were asked for their input into the study. They were able to 
provide different perspectives on the NSAGs and on humanitarian 
engagement with them. The interviews and data from these organisations 
enabled further verification of any causal claims made by interviewees 
from the other two groups. Organisations in this dataset included major 
international aid NGOs and UN agencies active in and around Burma, 
academics and journalists, as well as some local faith-based and 
independent civil society groups. 
Analysis 
Chapters seven and eight, and nine, in particular, draw heavily on the 
interview data. The interviews provided both specific information via key 
informants on particular policies and practices, as well as a broad set of 
themes raised in response to the interview question topic prompts. 
McNabb suggests a six step process for analysis of data in case study 
research. The steps are organisation of data; generation of categories and 
                                            
290 See, for overview of the CNF, Keenan, By Force of Arms: Armed Ethnic Groups in 
Burma, 240-53; Burma News International, Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A 
Reference Guide, 2014 (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Burma News International, 2014), 105-13. 
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themes; coding; application of themes and categories to the data; 
consideration of alternative explanations; and, writing up of the results.291 
Following initial transcription of interviews, analysis involved repeated 
reading of interview transcripts, and organisation of relevant excerpts from 
them into categories. The categories were initially informed by the central 
question and the topics raised in the semi-structured interviews regarding 
influences on NSAG behaviour. The practices and policies on the two 
issues chosen as indicators of adherence or otherwise with humanitarian 
norms (landmines and children affected by armed conflict), were 
developed as categories across which contributory factors (positive and 
negative) to NSAG behaviour and humanitarian engagement with them 
were able to be positioned. For example, attention was given to where 
respondents may have referred to economic or resource factors, to issues 
of legitimacy or identity, limitations to capacity, to the work of local civil 
society, or to military or political necessity, and so forth. Themes also 
included consideration of specific actions or processes, for example, mine 
risk education or demobilisation of child soldiers, as well as other aspects 
of these issues raised in the interviews that had not initially been 
considered. The categories were further disaggregated between those 
policies and practices of NSAGs that contributed to improved civilian 
protection and norm compliance, and those that did not, and the reasons 
for that. 
Coding was carried out within word documents using different colour 
highlighting for relevant excerpts. During the reading and re-reading for 
coding, key informant responses that provided particular insight into an 
issue or provided an effective summation or representative example about 
how that issue was perceived or understood were also noted. These 
excerpts were collated respectively in documents dedicated to significant 
themes or issues raised in the interviews. As Yin states regarding the use 
of theoretical propositions during analysis generated from the literature, 
they help to point to “relevant contextual conditions to be described as well 
                                            
291 McNabb, Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Methods, 367. 
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as explanations to be examined.”292 Therefore, attention was focused, not 
only on where respondents were in agreement on thematic issues, but 
also where they diverged, and where alternative explanations not foreseen 
by the original propositions were raised. This meets McNabb’s fifth step, of 
considering alternative explanations. It also helped with taking into 
account different perspectives on the issues being addressed. This 
triangulation from “multiple perspectives” provides not only verification, but 
also “serves to clarify meaning by identifying different ways the 
phenomenon is being seen.”293 The interview themes were also assessed 
against other data sources including from the academic and practitioner 
literature, UN and NGO reports, and local media. The findings were then 
summarised and assessed in terms of the Burma case study as a whole, 
and compared against the original theoretical propositions developed for 
the study. The interview responses were deployed in analysis of the 
landmine and child soldier issues in chapter seven, in the individual case 
studies of the NSAGs in chapter eight, and assessment of humanitarian 
engagement processes with them in chapter nine. 
Limitations and selection bias 
The focus of the study is engagement with, and action by, NSAGs to 
improve civilian protection in line with humanitarian norms. It was far 
beyond the scope or resource capacity of this research to conduct 
extensive surveys of the civilian populations in the ethnic areas of Burma 
affected by these issues and groups. However, some local organisations 
have produced over a long period, many very systematic and detailed 
reports on the issues faced by these populations.  Local organisations 
such as Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), the Human Rights 
Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), Back Pack Health Worker Team 
(BPHWT), and Free Burma Rangers (FBR), among others, have 
interviewed, recorded, documented and reported extensively on conditions 
for local people in areas affected by conflict between government forces 
and NSAGs. These groups by necessity for access and security often 
                                            
292 Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th ed), 136. 
293 Stake, "Case Studies," 148. 
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have a good relationship with some NSAGs and therefore the potential for 
bias in reporting is clearly acknowledged.  
As noted earlier, a dataset of video interviews with villagers in south 
eastern Burma about issues of interest to this study was also accessed, 
translated, and transcribed. This too, is liable to some degree of bias, 
given that CSOs undertaking the interviews would likely have been 
acceptable to the NSAGs in those areas. Likewise, the interview subjects 
may have been influenced in their responses due to support for, or 
concerns at consequences for not supporting, particular groups.294 As 
previously mentioned, alternative perspectives were also sought through 
interviews with third party observers and from sources presenting their 
views/observations. These were also assessed to provide a balance to 
potential bias from any one perspective being over represented.  
An obvious limitation in the present research due to lack of access and a 
dearth of information or any engagement on humanitarian issues, is some 
of the large NSAGs in Shan state. These successor NSAGs to the 
Communist Party of Burma after its collapse in 1989, are the United Wa 
State Army (UWSA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 
(MNDAA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). The 
UWSA, in particular, due to its size, weaponry, and close relationship with 
neighbouring China, has the most independent state-like area of all the 
NSAGs in Burma. The MNDAA has come into conflict with the government 
in 2009 and again in 2015, but the UWSA administered Wa state has 
remained closed and also free of any conflict with the government since 
1989. The UWSA has been identified as a significant recruiter of children 
in UN and NGO reports.295 
To be clear, this research is about influences on NSAGs in Burma in 
relation to issues addressed by humanitarian norms, and engagement with 
                                            
294 See, regarding the potential for selection bias on the part of cross-border CBO reports 
and interviews in NSAG areas of south east Burma, South, "The Politics of Protection in 
Burma," 186. 
295 See, for example, United Nations Security Council, A/68/878–S/2014/339 Children 
and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General (2014), 23. Human Rights Watch, 
Sold to be Soldiers:The Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in Burma (New York, NY: 
Human Rights Watch, 2007), 97-98. 
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them by humanitarian actors regarding those issues. While the role of the 
Burma armed forces are central to the conflicts, and they have been 
extensively documented for violations of these norms, it is the NSAGs’ 
behaviour as it affects their own constituent populations, rather than 
behaviour of government armed forces, that is the focus of this study. 
Ethical considerations 
Beyond concerns about security and anonymity for the respondents, the 
author recognises the value, and also possible problems, associated with 
the use or misuse of this research politically. There is a need to anticipate 
potential ways that research may be misconstrued or otherwise used in 
ways unintended by the researcher.296 This research does not intend to 
uncritically support, or demonise, the NSAGs in particular, or present a 
simplistic good/bad dichotomy between resistance organisations and the 
Burma Army, or on the issues addressed, as noted above. The focus is on 
the policies and practices of the NSAGs and NSAG relationships with 
constituent civilian populations and organisations that work with them, 
where that intersects with humanitarian norms. The range of political 
issues underlying the conflicts in Burma are, nonetheless, outlined and 
acknowledged. An equitable political settlement and peaceful conclusion 
to armed conflicts in Burma is to be supported, and this is potentially 
closer now than at any time since the creation of the Union of Burma in 
1948.   
The position of the researcher regarding the political situation in Burma 
was also of significance to those who participated in interviews. 
Respondents, local and international, were almost always generous with 
their time and knowledge. The researcher had been advised early in the 
field work that some individuals, armed groups, or civil society actors, 
especially operating along the Thai-Burma border, could be concerned 
about how the research might be used. In particular, this stemmed from 
some writing that was believed by local organisations to have influenced 
the international community in terms of reducing funding to the border, and 
                                            
296 See, regarding this issue in Burma research, Brooten and Metro, "Thinking about 
ethics in Burma Research," 19-20. 
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questioning the legitimacy of NSAGs and local civil society groups.297 
Despite the possibility of receiving the ‘party line’ from various CSOs or 
NSAGs, the range of responses on the issues raised in interviews was 
actually very broad. The researcher maintained an informed empathetic 
stance, while also avoiding overt statements of support for any particular 
group. It was found early in the interviewing process that demonstrating 
awareness of the political and humanitarian context and issues by the 
researcher often helped respondents to relax, and to go further in depth on 
particular issues. This had to be balanced with making sure that the more 
difficult questions were also asked. In a number of valuable instances, this 
approach produced a more critical appraisal from the interview subject 
towards their own organisations or about particular issues (sometimes in 
‘off the record’ statements). 
Another concern for researchers is to not “spoil the field” for future 
researchers through treating research participants as commodities.298  
Therefore, the research was not conducted in one rushed period of time, 
but over three periods of four to five months at a time. As indicated earlier, 
the researcher contributed volunteer work, where feasible, with local 
organisations while in the field. Those interviewed for this study were 
located in a wide range of locations along the Thai-Burma border and 
inside parts of Burma. Some relationships with contacts were able to be 
maintained on return visits as they were located in places the researcher 
regularly spent more time, such as Mae Sot or Yangon. However, it was 
also recognised in the case of others who were already very busy (in 
some cases negotiating ceasefires, or dealing with serious humanitarian 
emergencies), that although emails were sent to maintain contact, they 
were simply too busy to reply. Also some participants in Burma were 
located in places that were visited for shorter periods of time and email 
contact was not reliable, or they had been contacted in-country by phone 
or met in person via other contacts.  
                                            
297 See, for discussion of these issues in terms of cross-border aid, local CBOs and 
NSAGs, Anne Décobert, "Sitting on the Fence?: Politics and Ethics of Research into 
Cross-Border Aid on the Thailand-Myanmar/Burma Border," Journal of Burma Studies 18, 
no. 1 (2014): 44-47. 
298 Brooten and Metro, "Thinking about ethics in Burma Research," 16-17. 
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Summary  
In this chapter, the overall research design and methodology has been 
outlined. Rationales were given for the use of a case study approach, the 
choice of Burma as a case study context, and the choice of the landmine 
and children affected by armed conflict issues as observable indicators for 
the extent of compliance and engagement with humanitarian norms. The 
process for the gathering of data and its analysis in this case study were 
then set out. The sources of data and the rationale for the range of 
organisations from which interview respondents have been drawn were 
also outlined. Throughout this research, analysis is an ongoing and 
iterative process. Therefore, as well as categorising interview data and 
data from other sources within the thematic framework of the questions 
and propositions established at the outset, alternative explanations and 
themes that arise from the interviews and other data are also considered 
and incorporated. Lastly, the limitations, potential biases and ethical 
considerations that present challenges to this study in the context of 
Burma have been considered. A qualitative approach accepts that there 
will be multiple perspectives on any issue. That is also the case with the 
research presented here, which will inevitably also reflect the perspective 
of the researcher, and this is acknowledged. However, as has been 
outlined in this chapter, every effort is made to include all relevant view 
points, and to engage with difficult issues realistically, but with a view to 
the potential for positive action by all the actors concerned.  
In the following chapter, the country-specific, historical, geographic, and 
political context of Burma/Myanmar is presented. It is within that context 
that landmine use, children affected by armed conflict, and NSAG 
practices and policies in relation to those issues are then outlined in 
chapters seven and eight. 
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Chapter Six 
Burma: Background and context 
To illustrate the circumstances within which NSAGs have developed in 
Burma, this chapter briefly examines the modern historical context of the 
conflicts and the NSAGs involved in them. In particular, attention is given 
to the social and political basis of the ethnic conflicts and their evolving 
political economy. The counter-state governance roles of ethnic NSAGs, 
recent ceasefires since 2012, and the nation-wide ceasefire process since 
2013, are then outlined. 
The colonial era 
 Following the first and second Anglo-Burmese wars in 1824-26 and 1852 
respectively, the British removed and exiled the last King of Burma 
following the third Anglo-Burmese war in 1885.299 Burma was then 
administered as a province of British India up to 1937, but it was not all 
administered in the same manner.300 The British occupied and directly 
administered “Ministerial Burma” or “Burma Proper,”301 which developed 
as a major rice producing and exporting region in the British Empire, as 
well as a source of minerals and oil. In the highland “Frontier Areas,”302 the 
British “largely left intact the traditional political structures of the peripheral 
regions."303 This was for “reasons of economy and simplicity of 
administration.”304 Nonetheless, the era of British colonial rule reified the 
already existing divide between lowland Burmans and the upland ethnic 
groups via the systems of administration. This was further deepened by 
the recruitment of soldiers from ethnic minorities, especially Karen, Chin 
and Kachin, for the British colonial army that was used to suppress 
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Burman revolts.305 Missionaries also found ready converts among the 
animist frontier peoples compared to the resistance they faced from the 
Buddhist Burmans.306  As Mikael Gravers has described it “a double 
exclusion took place as a result of this policy of difference: the Christian 
from the Buddhist and the ethnic minorities from the majority.”307 
Alongside separate administration of the periphery regions, and 
administrative, religious and military differentiation from the Burman 
centre, some of the frontier ethnic groups, especially the Karen and the 
Kachin, were also involved in supporting the British against the Japanese 
invasion of Burma of 1941-45 during the Second World War. Whereas, 
initially, some Burmans supported the Japanese invasion as a means to 
end British colonial rule. This ethnic minority/Burman divide would have 
marked consequences for Burma’s independence after World War Two. 
The events of the Japanese invasion and its aftermath, are significant in 
that they “created political opportunities for the military and transformed 
the resistance movement itself into a legitimating factor for those aspiring 
to lead the post-independence state.”308 This helped to establish the 
central role played by the Burma Army (the Tatmadaw) in Burma’s future 
politics. 
Independence and the outbreak of insurgencies 
Within a year of independence in 1948, a Communist Party of Burma 
(CPB) insurgency as well as several ethnic rebellions had started. These 
included Karenni and Mon309 uprisings, an Islamic insurgency in northern 
Arakan,310 and ultimately, a Karen rebellion that broke out in January of 
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1949.311 Karen hopes for an independent state had been dashed with the 
creation of the unitary Burmese state and inter-ethnic tensions and 
escalating violence saw Karen units in the army and Karen National 
Defence Organisation (KNDO) militias rally around the Karen National 
Union (KNU) which had formed in 1947.312  
At this time, the KNU also helped develop other ethnic NSAGs waging 
insurgencies in Mon and Karenni areas and, in the wake of the Second 
World War, there were many armed and trained former soldiers who now 
joined the insurgencies.313 A number of leaders, and future leaders, of the 
developing ethnic NSAGs had previous military training and experience in 
the recent war. The KNPP’s original leader, Saw Maw Reh, was a veteran 
of the British Army as were the original brigade commanders of the KNU 
after 1948 and the later KNU leaders Bo Mya and Tamla Baw, while future 
KIA leader Zau Seng had trained as an intelligence officer with US forces 
in Kachin.314  
Military rule and insurgencies 1962-2010 
Following the 1962 military takeover led by General Ne Win, communist 
and ethnic insurgencies increased in number and intensity.315 New ethnic 
insurgent organisations such as the Kachin Independence Organisation 
(KIO), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Shan State Army (SSA) 
proliferated. A significant consequence of the failed economic policies of 
Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) during the 1960s and 
1970s was that ethnic NSAGs that operated on the borderlands of the 
Burmese state were able to exploit the extensive cross-border shadow 
economy. Taxation of cross-border trade routes with Thailand helped 
finance ethnic NSAGs who controlled the border crossings, while the 
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opium trade out of Shan state was controlled by various pro and anti-
government NSAGs.316   
Student-led pro-democracy protests in response to Burma’s dire economic 
situation and demonetization of its currency in 1988 led to Ne Win’s 
resignation, and another military-led takeover by a group of generals; the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).317 The military then 
supressed protests in major cities with considerable loss of life and 
thousands of students consequently fled to ethnic NSAG-held areas on 
Burma’s borders. Some of those students then formed the All Burma 
Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) to fight alongside ethnic NSAGs 
against the SLORC. 
SLORC Intelligence Chief, General Khin Nyunt, quickly seized an 
opportunity when the CPB collapsed in 1989 to negotiate ceasefires with 
the CPB’s successor ethnic NSAGs in north and northeast Burma.318 
These groups were permitted to retain their arms and administer their 
respective areas as virtual mini-states.319 These ceasefires allowed the 
Tatmadaw to then concentrate its forces against remaining resistance 
ethnic NSAGs, especially the KNU, KNPP, and NMSP, along the Thai 
border.320 Later ceasefire agreements were negotiated with other major 
NSAGs in the mid-1990s including the KIO in northern Burma in 1994,321 
and the NMSP in southeast Burma in 1995.322 These later ceasefire 
arrangements gave less autonomy to the KIO and NMSP compared to the 
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earlier ceasefires with post-CPB groups, and despite some limited 
development activity, long-term political settlements remained off the 
table. Three significant groups, the KNU, KNPP and Shan State Army-
South (SSA-S) remained outside of these agreements until another round 
of ceasefires in 2011-2012.323   
The USDP Government (2011- 2015) 
In 2010, a national election was held by the SPDC controlled government 
which was boycotted by the main opposition party, the National League for 
Democracy (NLD). Consequently, the military-backed but nominally civilian 
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) came to power with 
former General Thein Sein as President. The period of 2011-2015 saw the 
government establish ceasefires with most of the remaining NSAGs,324 the 
release from house arrest of the NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and 
her subsequent success along with many other NLD candidates in by-
elections in April 2012.325 This contributed to a relaxation of economic 
sanctions from western states,326 and the start of an apparent foreign 
investment boom.327 However, active armed conflict resumed in Kachin 
state in June 2011 between the Tatmadaw and the KIA, (who previously 
had a ceasefire with the government since 1994).328 Sporadic conflict has 
also continued, or reignited, with some other NSAGs.329  
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The situation of Burma until very recently was one of limited democratic 
reforms that facilitated the lifting of many western sanctions and 
encouraged foreign investment. On the other side of these developments 
was the continuance of political, ethnic, and economic grievances, and the 
military’s retention of its overall hold on power. An election, contested this 
time by the NLD, resulted in a comprehensive victory for the NLD in 
November 2015. However, the 2008 military-drafted constitution remains 
central to politics in Burma up to the present. It enshrines the role of the 
military in government, preserving 25 percent of the seats for serving 
members of the armed forces in both the People’s Assembly (Pyithu 
Hluttaw) and the Upper House (Amothya Hluttaw). The constitution 
requires a 75 percent majority to make changes to it, thereby effectively 
giving the military power of veto over any such changes.330 
Nationwide ceasefire negotiations  
Following the establishment of individual ceasefires with most NSAGs in 
2012, the government and the NSAGs started working towards a 
nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA). To this end, the government, with 
assistance from the EU, created the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) in 
2012. Members of the MPC acted as a technical team for chief 
government ceasefire negotiator, Aung Min. Most of the major ethnic 
NSAGs formed a renewed coalition in 2011, the United Nationalities 
Federal Council (UNFC)331 which negotiated the NCA from 2013 onwards 
through its nationwide ceasefire coordination team (NCCT). In October 
2015, eight NSAGs, including the KNU, SSA-S, ABSDF and DKBA, signed 
the NCA with the government, while the remaining NSAGs, including the 
                                            
outbreaks of fighting in Karen state, mostly between government forces, or government 
aligned Border Guard Forces (BGF), and splinter factions of the DKBA. 
330 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Second Edition), 143-45. 
The constitution also contains a specific article, 59 (f), preventing those with spouses or 
children who are foreign nationals from running for the office of President. This effectively 
prevents Aung San Suu Kyi, who was married to a UK national and whose children are 
UK nationals, from being able to run for the office of President. An attempt to have this 
changed in the 2008 Constitution in order to allow her to stand in the 2015 election was, 
predictably, prevented by the 25 percent military voting bloc in June 2015. Kyaw Phyo 
Tha, "Parliament Votes Against Constitution Reform, Reserves Military Veto," The 
Irrawaddy June 25, 2015.  
331 Various combinations of NSAGs have formed alliances throughout the post-
independence era. These have included the National Democratic Front (NDF) in the 
1970s, and the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) in the 1990s. 
 115 
 
KIO, NMSP and KNPP, decided against it.332 The NCA and an as yet 
unreleased code of conduct address military issues like the demarcation of 
areas of control and troop movements, and include references to 
humanitarian concerns including landmine use and recruitment.333 
The political economy of ethnic conflicts 
Most of the last fifty-three years since the 1962 coup in Burma have been 
dominated by military rule. Throughout this period, the military has played 
a central role in the state through decades of armed conflict with ethnic 
and communist rebels, and via military backed political parties such as the 
BSPP or USDP. The military has also been involved in economic and 
business interests at state, local and cross border levels.334 This has 
included Tatmadaw generals,335 local commanders, some ceasefire 
NSAGs336 (since 1990), foreign governments, private businesses, and 
even organised criminal interests.337 The period from 1962 to 1988 was 
also marked by an isolationist foreign policy and, since then, selective 
economic openness, such as with Thailand or China, focused on lucrative 
resource extraction deals with businesses from those states. With the 
recent moves towards democratic reform, many western governments and 
businesses, as well as Burma’s neighbours, are now keen to do business 
with resource rich Burma. This has caused further concerns in conflict-
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affected ethnic states where many of the resources and development 
projects are, or will be, located.338 
A consistent feature of the long period of military rule, whether under the 
BSPP or SLORC/SPDC, has been the regime’s reluctance towards long-
term political solutions to the ethnic conflicts. Moreover, it has paid little 
attention to improving the welfare and development of the ethnic regions, 
whose resources have usually been extracted for the benefit of the central 
state, or external states and business interests. The wealth from such 
deals has often accrued with the military and their business associates. 
The organisation and political economy of NSAGs 
It is within this context that the larger and longer established NSAGs such 
as the KNU, KNPP, NMSP and KIA, besides armed conflict with the 
central state for political independence or autonomy, have attempted to 
provide some form of government and administration in the remaining 
areas they control or contest. They have developed, to varying extents, 
political, governance, and welfare structures (such as health and 
education services).339 Over lengthy periods, the central state has often 
neglected, deliberately targeted, or actively withheld such support as part 
of counterinsurgency operations in ethnic areas. The gradual loss of 
control over resource rich areas and over taxation of border trade from the 
1980s onwards has increasingly limited the extent of the ethnic NSAGs’ 
ability to fund the running of their proto-state administrations.340 At the 
same time, their ability to resist Tatmadaw offensives has decreased and it 
has consequently been civilian villagers who have borne the brunt of the 
Tatmadaw’s counterinsurgency campaigns originally provoked by the 
NSAGs.341 
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Another influence on the political/military structure of the NSAGs was the 
development of military and political wings. This has been an 
organisational structure passed down from the CPB that has persisted 
among many of the ethnic NSAGs up to the present day. This involves 
“political and military wings reaching down to the village levels” that are 
“administered under central committee and central executive committee 
(or politburo) systems that operate as the effective governments of their 
movements.”342 These structures have often proved to be inflexible and 
intolerant of dissension. Internal disagreements in NSAGs along personal, 
religious, or ideological lines, have led to factionalism and the proliferation 
of further breakaway NSAGs. Furthermore, like the state and its armed 
forces that they oppose, the NSAGs have tended to be hierarchical and 
often centred on long-standing charismatic leaders. Just as the long period 
of Ne Win’s leadership was significant for the Burmese state, so too was 
the lengthy leaderships of General Bo Mya for the KNU,343 Saw Maw Reh 
for the KNPP, and Nai Shwe Kyin for the NMSP.344 It is likely that with age 
these leaders and their associated leadership structures within the NSAGs 
grew less flexible. The KNPP-KNPLF split in 1977, the KNU-DKBA split in 
1994, and NMSP-MRP split in 2001, occurred after decades with the same 
leaders.345 Bo Mya and other aging KNU leaders’ lack of attention to the 
developing dissatisfaction among frontline Buddhist soldiers in the KNLA, 
for example, has been identified as contributing to the development of the 
DKBA in 1994.346 
Mary Callahan, in analysing politics and conflict in Burma’s ethnic states in 
2007 developed a typology of the roles taken by armed ethnic 
organisations in these states in terms of their administration and relations 
with the central government. Callahan outlined three theoretical models, 
that of devolution, occupation, or coexistence.347  Accordingly, she places 
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ethnic NSAGs within one of these three categories; the UWSA and 
MNDAA in Shan state (both had early ceasefires with the government in 
1989, although the MNDAA ceasefire has broken down more recently) 
operate with a large degree of autonomy and the central state has 
devolved authority to local leaders of these groups; the KNU and KNPP 
until very recently were engaged in armed conflict in opposing the military 
occupation of Karen and Karenni states; and in the case of the KIO in 
Kachin state (from 1994 to 2011) Chin National Front (CNF) in Chin state, 
the NMSP in Mon state or the DKBA (from 1994 to 2010) in Karen state, 
there has been varying degrees of coexistence between central 
government and NSAG authority.348 To understand humanitarian policies 
and practices of, and engagement with, these NSAGs, this typology is 
useful as it situates them within their respective political economies, 
societal, and conflict/ceasefire contexts.  
This categorisation also informs the rationale for the inclusion of the KNU, 
KIO, and CNF in the discussion of humanitarian engagement policies and 
practices in chapter nine. NSAGs in situations of ‘devolution’ are not 
considered by the present study.  This is due to their long period of non-
conflict with the central government and lack of access or available 
information (in the case of the UWSA and MNDAA) on the issues. The 
KNPP and KNU have been in situations of conflict in resisting occupation 
by the Tatmadaw in their areas up to 2012. The coexistence model of the 
KIO, NMSP, CNF and DKBA have exhibited periods of conflict and periods 
of uneasy coexistence during ceasefires, with the KIO ceasefire breaking 
down completely in 2011. The KNPP, NMSP, and DKBA are dealt with in 
chapter eight while the KNU, KIO and CNF are also included in 
consideration of humanitarian engagement actors and processes in 
chapter nine. 
One NSAG not dealt with by Callahan’s typology, but considered in the 
next chapter, is the smaller, pro-democracy focused ABSDF. Originally 
made up of students who fled to ethnic NSAG controlled areas after the 
crackdown on pro-democracy protests in the cities in 1988, it has since 
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fought in solidarity alongside ethnic NSAGs, notably the KNU, KNPP and 
KIA. It has therefore become a part of the ethnic NSAG proto-state 
systems. Martin Smith has pointed to the arrival of fleeing student 
protesters in the ethnic borderlands following the 1988 crackdown, and 
their discovery of the pre-existing governance structures of the ethnic 
armed groups. "Arriving in small bedraggled groups at dozens of rebel 
camps across the country, many were shocked to find schools, hospitals 
and the machinery of well-run governments and armies functioning around 
most of the ethnic borderlands."349  
Summary 
Since the Second World War, and especially since the 1962 coup, the role 
of the military and the militarisation of society in Burma increased. This 
saw the military take a central role in running the state and its economy, 
and the corresponding counter-state role of ethnic NSAGs in 
administration and economic activity in areas they control. The long era of 
military rule witnessed a steady running down of basic services and 
infrastructure, such as health, education and transport, while spending on 
the military remained high.350 As well as armed resistance, in response to 
the central state’s neglect and/or offensives, NSAGs developed parallel 
administrations and taxed cross-border black market economic activity in 
areas they controlled to maintain them. 
Social and material resources at formation for NSAGs (proposition 2) 
As outlined in this chapter, recurring features of Burma’s ethnic conflicts 
and for many of the NSAGs involved in them is their basis in pre-
independence social movements and political grievances, differentiated 
political and military wings, CPB influenced organisational structures, and 
frequent lengthy periods under leaders with previous Second World War 
military experience. It is these social and human resource factors at 
formation that have been influential on the patterns of insurgency that 
have existed since. Another result of the longevity of the conflicts and their 
                                            
349 Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 385. 
350 Prior to 2011, spending on health was 2% of GDP, and spending on education, only 1-
2%. Marie Ditlevsen, "Social Issues," in Burma /Myanmar: Where Now?, ed. Mikael 
Gravers and Fleming Ytzen (Copenhagen, Denmark: NIAS Press, 2014), 126-32. 
 120 
 
social and political basis is the development of parallel NSAG 
administrations in areas they control.  
Access to funding and resources (proposition 3), and proximity to 
borders (proposition 5) for NSAGs 
Economic dimensions to the conflicts have steadily increased as a 
consequence of state economic policy especially during the 1960s to 
1980s, NSAG control and taxation of border crossings at that time, and the 
increasing demand for resources in ethnic areas from all conflict actors 
and external business interests since the 1980s and 1990s onwards. The 
consequences of this have included the ability for some established 
NSAGs to develop their administrations during the BSPP era of the 1960s 
to 1980s, and later the setbacks to their funding with the loss of control of 
border trade due to military setbacks or as part of ceasefire agreements. 
The localised humanitarian consequences for civilian populations due to 
the economic demands of armed actors are explored further in the 
following chapters. 
The nascent moves towards limited democracy since 2011 were also 
initiated by the military who assumed a civilian government role in 
administering “disciplined democracy.”351 Since 2011/12, the government 
has achieved bilateral ceasefires with most major NSAGs, many of whom 
have been in conflict with the government for decades. The ceasefires 
remain shaky, and progress towards a nationwide ceasefire and a lasting 
settlement encompassing all groups has been slow. Burma’s partial 
opening up has encouraged business interests from its neighbours and 
further afield that often have an interest in resource rich, but conflict 
affected, ethnic areas. The people living there have experienced decades 
of conflict and displacement as fighting has ebbed and flowed through 
their areas. A central theme of the armed conflicts in Burma, and the 
NSAGs engaged in them, is that the government has never completely 
controlled all of the territory and people of the unitary recognised state as 
it exists on the map. It is within this context, that the next chapter 
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considers landmine use, and children affected by armed conflict, and the 
involvement of Burma’s NSAGs with these two issues. 
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Chapter Seven 
Landmine use and children affected by armed 
conflict 
Introduction 
The NSAGs in Burma examined in this study have been involved with the 
use of landmines and children affected by armed conflict, both as 
perpetrators, and in some instances, with stated policies or practical 
measures to ameliorate these threats. These issues present both 
immediate and long-term security concerns for communities exposed to 
the sporadic and low intensity conflict situations that are “neither war, nor 
peace.”352 As outlined in the methodology in chapter five, these issues are 
deployed as indicators of the extent of compliance (or not) with 
humanitarian norms by the NSAGs examined in this study. This chapter 
first provides an introductory overview of each of the two issues, of 
landmine use and of children affected by armed conflict. It then outlines 
them in the context of Burma, considering government armed forces and 
NSAG involvement with these issues.  
Landmines  
The use of landmines in modern warfare can be traced back to the US 
Civil War. Extensive use of anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines did not, 
however, really emerge until the Second World War.353 Anti-personnel 
landmines have been a feature of most armed conflicts since that time.  
Not only were they used against armed opponents, but “mines were used 
to terrorise civilians and control their movements.”354 Clearly, such 
indiscriminate use of these weapons presents a chronic threat to those 
living in mine affected areas and brings into focus the reasons for the 
                                            
352 Tom Kramer, Neither War nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-fire Agreements in 
Burma (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Transnational Institute, 2009). 
353 Stuart Maslen, Anti-Personnel Mines under Humanitarian Law (Antwerp, Netherlands: 
Intersentia, 2001), 5-7. 
354 Ibid., 10. 
 124 
 
attention given to landmines by humanitarian actors and, more recently, by 
international treaties addressing the issue.  
Arriving at a definition of landmines is problematic as it depends on what 
types of explosive weapons are included. The 1996 Amended Protocol II 
to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Protocol II CCW) 
defines an anti-personnel landmine as “a mine primarily designed to be 
exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will 
incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” 355 The 1997 Ottawa 
treaty, which had been promoted by the advocacy campaign of the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) attempted to ban the 
use of landmines by states.356 However, the world’s most militarily 
powerful states have not joined the treaty. Those countries include the 
United States, Russia and China. Other landmine using or producing 
states that did not join the treaty also included Israel, Sri Lanka and 
Myanmar.357 Despite the claimed success of this treaty, it clearly has some 
major limitations. States that have had ongoing civil wars or insurgencies 
or that are major producers remain outside the ban, whereas for the states 
that have joined, these weapons were often seen as redundant anyway. 
Another problem with the treaty, and of most relevance to NSAGs, was 
that it applied to and could only be ratified by states.  
For NSAGs, the so called “poor man’s weapon,”358 the landmine, has 
remained an effective, cheap, indiscriminate, and frequently civilian-
harming option.  Landmine use by NSAGs in terms of the number of 
countries where it was occurring decreased in the first decade of the 21st 
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century.359 However, in some chronic conflict situations, such as that in 
Burma, both state and NSAG use of landmines has continued. 
Landmine use in Burma 
Landmines have been used extensively by all armed actors in Burma’s 
conflicts over many decades. The impacts on the civilian population in 
mined areas have been documented by international and local NGOs, and 
other researchers.360  A major problem with the use of landmines is that 
they remain a threat long after ceasefires have been agreed and fighting 
has stopped. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has estimated that 
in Burma/Myanmar “more than 450,000 refugees and internally displaced 
people can't return home because of land mines in northern and south-
eastern states.”361   
There are an estimated five million people living in mine contaminated 
areas in Burma.362 In those areas there have been 3,450 known casualties 
from landmines between 1999 and 2015.363 Despite ceasefires between 
the government and most NSAGs since 2012, there were still 106 
landmine casualties recorded in 2012, and 101 in 2013.364 
 Extensive reports on landmines in Burma, by Geneva Call and Dan 
Church Aid in 2011, and the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) in 2012, 
have documented the conditions for those living in landmine contaminated 
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areas.365 These reports make it clear how landmines contribute to an 
already serious humanitarian crisis situation in eastern Burma. As well as 
being responsible for fatalities and serious injuries, landmines also prevent 
or restrict the return of refugees or IDPs, prevent access to fields and 
sources of freshwater, and the ability for movement generally of villagers. 
The conflict zones, and now often recent ceasefire zones of the ethnic 
borderlands, are still heavily mined due to a lack of methodical mapping or 
demining by the various armed actors (both government and opposition) 
who originally laid them. There are however, some variations between 
government forces and NSAGs in production, deployment, mapping, 
warnings to civilians (if any), mine risk education (MRE), and demining 
activity.  
Landmine use by government forces 
The use of landmines by government forces and armed groups allied with 
them has been frequently cited as a major humanitarian issue by their 
opponents, NGOs, governments and the UN.366 The Burma Army 
(Tatmadaw) mostly uses professionally manufactured anti-personnel 
landmines. The source for most of these is China as well as now through 
manufacture in factories inside Burma.367  These sources of government 
landmines were also reiterated in interviews.368 
The government armed forces use locally manufactured copies of Russian 
PMN or American M 14 mines. These often don’t have much metal in the 
components and this makes them hard to detect.369 
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Landmines and counterinsurgency strategy 
The Tatmadaw is reported to have laid landmines as part of its 
counterinsurgency strategy to prevent support for NSAGs from local 
villagers. Landmines are laid in village pathways, in fields, and other 
locations that prevent any return to areas that the Tatmadaw believes it 
has cleared of insurgent activity.370 Indeed, landmines have been an 
integral part of the ‘four cuts’ counter-insurgency strategy of the 
Tatmadaw, as they provide an ever-vigilant potentially lethal form of 
coercion to separate insurgents from their supposed supporters. “In the 
Maoist parlance once favoured by the Tatmadaw, landmines are seen as 
a means by which the army can help deny the guerrilla fish a sea of 
peasants in which to swim.”371 The tactic of leaving landmines in areas to 
discourage return of villagers or insurgents was also confirmed in 
interviews. 
When Wei Kyi camp moved over the border to Burma it was briefly 
attacked and held by the Tatmadaw but they couldn’t maintain their hold 
for very long. They only stayed 3 or 4 days, and then when they left they 
left landmines behind. A few months later, a friend of mine, a medic, was 
walking down past the beach when he stepped on the landmine which 
blew his leg off.372  
We see a lot of Burma Army coming in and burning a village or coming and 
threatening to burn a village so the villagers all leave and they lay 
landmines in the village.373 
This explains at least part of the government’s unwillingness to allow or 
enter into dialogue about demining, MRE, mapping of mined areas, or to 
joining international treaties limiting or banning landmines. They are a 
relatively cheap and effective means of limiting, isolating and slowly 
strangling the many insurgencies it has faced since independence. Since 
2013, the government has facilitated MRE with INGOs and local NGOs. 
Permission for demining for INGOs in Burma from the government 
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remains dependent on the ongoing nationwide ceasefire negotiations (as 
of 2015) and any peace process following on from that.374 
 ‘Business’ and local ‘protection’ landmines 
The deployment of landmines to protect resources for business interests is 
another contributing factor to the landmine problem. The Tatmadaw and 
NSAGs (both government-aligned and anti-government) have been 
documented as using ‘business mines’ to protect valuable resources such 
as gold mines and forests: sometimes at the behest of external or 
connected business interests.375 This reveals the deep influence the 
control, access and extraction of resources has at the local level on 
conflict dynamics and consequently on the lives of local people. A CBO 
worker reported to the KHRG that “the mines laid in Karen/Kayin State in 
2009 were only for business purposes.”376 In some cases these landmines 
are deployed to secure resources for particular armed groups. 
Between 2009 to 2010, DKBA soldiers came to dig gold and took care of 
their security by planting landmines on the mountains, along the mountain 
ranges, and in the valleys along the west side of the Bu Loh River.377 
This issue of landmine use to protect land and resources was also 
acknowledged in interviews for the present study. “They may also have 
perceived benefits in landmines in terms of protecting resources, and 
obviously land allocation is a huge sticking point.”378 
Maybe there is a forest and they want to protect it, they don’t want people 
to do logging or anything like that, they go ‘oh we have planted the 
landmines’.379 
With the ceasefires since 2012, the significance of land grabbing, and 
demand for access to and extraction of resources in former conflict areas, 
has increased. Consequently, there has been a reported proliferation of 
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non-military landmine use by local communities and business interests 
aside from NSAGs and the Tatmadaw. This form of ‘self-protection’ also 
needs to be taken into account as some villagers themselves are also 
contributing to the landmine problem by deploying them.380  In some 
instances business people and local villagers have been given mines by 
armed groups. They have also been documented as using these for 
security to protect villages, land, timber, mining and other economic 
activities.381  
Landmine use by NSAGs 
Landmines have become integral to reducing the considerable numerical 
and technical disadvantages Burma NSAGs face in defending what 
territory they still hold. The civilian population living in contested areas are 
consequently also at risk from these weapons deployed by the very actors 
who often claim to be providing ‘protection’ for them against predatory 
government forces.  
Claimed differences in use and production of landmines compared to 
government forces 
A number of points of difference have been made by NSAGs themselves, 
and by some external observers, about landmine use and production by 
the NSAGs compared to that of the Tatmadaw. According to reports in the 
1990s, the KNU/KNLA, one of the largest NSAGs, was still deploying 
some military standard, manufactured landmines purchased from supplies 
left over from the conflicts in Cambodia and Vietnam.382 Other sources of 
mines were captured, dug up and reused, or some even purchased from 
the government forces. Mostly, however, the opposition NSAGs have 
been making their own.383 These landmines are often made from cans, 
bottles, pipes or bamboo with battery operated detonators.  It is claimed by 
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NSAGs that they have a shorter lifespan before they degrade, compared 
to factory manufactured mines.384  
These improvised mines are quite effective at close ranges, but usually 
have a limited life, often no more than six months, as the batteries tend to 
run out of power after that time. Also, they are often susceptible to the 
weather.385 
Members of international organisations working on the landmine problem, 
and an experienced demining expert working with a local CBO, offered 
counter perspectives to this position.386  In particular, the ‘homemade’ 
landmines, it was pointed out, tended to vary greatly compared to factory 
assembled mines in construction and the strength of charges used. This 
could make them more dangerous to remove or dismantle.  Another point 
about mine use by NSAGs, was the use of aboveground ‘stake’ mines 
(essentially a grenade on a stick) with attached trip wires that were 
deployed quickly to target pursuers.387 This type of mine use would clearly 
endanger civilians who might at a later stage use the same paths. 
However, frequent downpours and constant leaf-fall and other debris, as 
well as animals, render tripwires ineffective in a short period, but the mine 
itself remains.388 
Frequent victims of all forms of landmines have been local villagers, 
and the NSAG soldiers themselves, either when deploying them, or 
in efforts to remove their own or the enemy’s mines. 35.1 per cent of 
mine accident victims were engaged in military activity according to 
the 2011 Geneva Call/DCA report.389 As an example of the threat to 
their own soldiers of NSAG landmine use, out of 10 people reported 
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injured by landmines in Kachin state from 2009-2010, nine were from 
the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and one was a civilian.390  
NSAGs, demining and mine risk education (MRE) 
What removal of landmines has been carried out by NSAGs is reported as 
often being for the purpose of reuse rather than for strictly humanitarian 
reasons. This differentiation was pointed out in interviews with staff of 
NGOs involved in mine action. 
They will go in and try to clear the landmines, sometimes their own 
landmines and sometimes enemy landmines.  And it’s just for themselves 
to reuse or to take back to base and stuff like that. It’s not like civilian 
demining.391 
They often remove those mines and relay them. As a military outfit, I don’t 
think you could call anything they do humanitarian demining. They may do 
it in some cases for the benefit of civilians.392 
Therefore, any demining that does occur is generally ad hoc and 
unsystematic.393 Another factor that slows or prevents demining is that the 
NSAGs have not consistently mapped or kept records of where they have 
deployed mines, or the mines they are attempting to remove were laid by 
opposing forces. Despite claims of action on this issue, KHRG in 2012 
reported that, 
No significant mine action has been undertaken and landmine removal by 
armed actors has been incomplete, unsystematic and not necessarily 
motivated by a desire to protect civilians.394 
In terms of providing warnings about the location of their own landmines or 
those of the government forces and allied groups, opposition NSAGs have 
also been patchy in their use of signage or other methods of warnings to 
civilians. Most groups claim they provide warnings for civilians near areas 
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they have mined, but this would depend on the defensive or offensive 
reasons for the mines being laid.  
The controversial issue we had was you should put up a warning sign 
‘danger landmines’ and their argument was we can’t always do that 
tactically.395 
Verbal warnings rather than signage or fencing were the preferred means 
by which NSAGs claimed to warn villagers of the presence of mines they 
had laid. “We know also the KNU inform the villagers and maybe 
sometimes there will be some kind of accident.”396 
Some NSAGs, while being users of landmines, have also been involved in 
MRE initiatives. This has been the case, for example, with the KNU.397  
The MRE was carried out in partnership with a cross-border CBO that had 
access and acceptance from the host NSAG. The Burma government, 
however, was not involved with this activity and did not permit external 
organisations to carry out demining. This also demonstrates the need for 
any effective action to be conducted with the acquiescence of the NSAG.  
As MRE is not officially permitted by the national authorities the activities 
have to be performed discretely and in cooperation with local ethnic 
minority authorities, typically non-ceasefire NSAs.398 
This is significant as some NSAGs, especially those accessible by 
humanitarian actors across the border from Thailand, have been more 
active in allowing and facilitating mine action, especially MRE, in areas 
they control than has the government of Burma.  
Landmine use summary 
The involvement of NSAGs with the use of landmines is clearly a problem 
that has long-term implications for the security of communities exposed to 
them. NSAGs and associated CSOs, have in some instances, also 
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engaged in activities to reduce these threats to the people they claim to 
represent. This has mostly been through facilitating MRE by cross-border 
humanitarian actors. Demining undertaken by NSAGs has been 
unsystematic and ad-hoc, as have attempts to warn civilians of the 
location of these threats. As well as use by armed actors on all sides, 
landmines have been deployed to protect business interests such as land 
or natural resources.  
Child soldiers and the protection of children from 
the effects of armed combat 
Two important aspects to the issue of children and armed conflict that 
need to be considered are direct participation in armed conflict due to the 
recruitment of children (whether forced or by their own volition) and the 
wider impacts on children more generally due to the effects of armed 
conflict. Many of these issues were highlighted in the report compiled by 
Grac’a Machel for the UN in 1996. This drew attention to both the 
recruitment and direct use of child soldiers in conflicts and the impact on 
the vast majority of children who were not participating in conflict, but who 
were affected by it.399 The report identified many threats to children due to 
armed conflict, including living as IDPs or refugees, lack of access to 
health care or education, exploitation and gender based violence, and 
exposure to landmines and other explosive remnants of war.  
The involvement with and use of children in the armed forces of states and 
in armed groups can further be disaggregated.  There are those in 
“supporting roles, as cooks, porters, messengers and spies,” and those 
directly recruited or conscripted into combat roles. Recruitment of children 
as direct combatants has been cited as being “because they are ‘more 
obedient, do not question orders and are easier to manipulate than adult 
soldiers’”.400 
A difficulty presented by attempting to define child soldiers and/or those 
associated with armed forces, is in the variation in the ages at which 
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individuals are considered to be children, youths, or adults. This has been 
the case across different cultural and religious traditions and even 
between different national laws and international treaties.401 For example, 
the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, the 1989 UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
ICC, state 15 years as the age below which military recruitment is 
outlawed. However, the 2002 OPAC402 states the minimum age of 
recruitment is 18 years.403 Equally, the minimum age of recruitment into 
state armed forces varies, for example, from 16 in the UK (with parental 
consent), Jordan, Saudi Arabia and India, through 16 and a half in 
Singapore, to 17 in the US and New Zealand. The majority of states, 
however, have 18 years as the minimum age of recruitment.404  
The problem of children affected by and/or participating in armed conflict 
has received considerable attention over the last 20 years from the UN, 
NGOs, and NGO coalitions, especially the Coalition to Stop the use of 
Child Soldiers.405  A set of principles initially developed in 1997 by 
UNICEF and a coalition of NGOs, was specific to Africa.406 A similar 
document that took into consideration developments since that time, and 
with global application, was then developed in Paris in 2007.407 In 
response to the problem of children and armed conflict, the UN also 
established the office and position of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.408 The definition of 
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children associated with the armed forces of states and of NSAGs used in 
the 2007 Paris Principles will be used in this study as it acknowledges 
both direct participation in hostilities as fighters, and other support 
activities that are associated with armed conflict. It states: 
A child associated with an armed force or armed group refers to any 
person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by 
an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to 
children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, 
spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking 
or has taken a direct part in hostilities.409 
An important aspect of the issues around children affected by armed 
conflict has been the recognition of the agency of children themselves 
rather than them being viewed as uniformly helpless and powerless 
victims.410 This comes to the fore when considering so-called voluntary 
recruitment of children to armed forces or groups. Augustine Park has 
addressed this point by conceptualising “voluntary recruitment of children 
as a child’s deliberate membership in an armed group (usually) under 
‘structurally coercive conditions.’”411  These conditions such as poverty, 
hunger, insecurity and the need for protection are due to wider “conditions 
of possibility” that Park considers  “social, cultural and political-economic 
structures that shape society.”412  
Park’s point about structural conditions echoes the rationale for the 
theoretical approach taken in this study. There are push and pull factors 
influencing behaviour for NSAGs and for the communities affected by 
them. This is the case, it is argued here, for the child soldier issue (and 
also the use of landmines). The factors that influence these activities, 
either making them more likely to occur, or inhibiting them, involve both 
coercive military and economic structures, and socially constructed 
concepts such as identity, legitimacy or belief in a cause. 
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Child soldiers and children affected by armed 
conflict in Burma 
The child soldier issue in Burma, especially as it related to NSAGs, was 
epitomized by ‘God’s Army’, a small splinter group from the KNLA in the 
late 1990s. The group was supposedly led by two twin 10 year old boys, 
Johnny and Luther Htoo, who were believed to be only 13 years old when 
they finally surrendered to Thai forces in 2000.413 The story and image of 
these small children, and others in the group, dwarfed by their oversize 
camouflage uniforms and weapons was relayed internationally through 
newspapers, TV news, and documentaries.414 However, the relative 
isolation of Burma’s ethnic conflicts has meant that the use of child 
soldiers on all sides has received less attention than has been the case in 
conflicts in other regions such as Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East.  
Child soldiers in the Tatmadaw 
There are similarities as well as differences with children involved with the 
armed forces of the Burma government and those with NSAGs. One 
common feature that has been raised by those working to demobilise child 
soldiers is the lack of any ability to verify their ages. The birth registration 
system in Burma is poor, especially in the conflict-affected border regions 
of ethnic states.415 Consequently, the actual ages of the young people 
involved with all armed actors is often unknown, including even to the 
children themselves. 
One of the reasons why that problem is caused is because the birth 
registration in Burma is not good enough. Sometimes it is not bothered 
with, there’s no record of how old people are.416  
The government of Burma has been consistently criticised by the UN and 
human rights NGOs for the presence of large numbers of child soldiers in 
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its armed forces for a long time. This criticism has highlighted both the age 
of the soldiers and their forcible recruitment and brutal treatment in the 
army.417 They are also frequently exposed to injury or death in actual 
armed combat with opposition NSAGs in the ethnic states where they 
were deployed.418  In response to criticism, the Burma government set up 
the Committee for the Prevention of the Recruitment of Underage 
Children, ostensibly to prevent the recruitment of underage soldiers into 
the Tatmadaw and demobilise those already there. The chairman of the 
committee in 2004 was the then general, and later president from 2011 to 
2015, Thein Sein.419 
Forced recruitment of children into the Tatmadaw is often carried out to 
meet quotas for new recruits set by the government and army, and this 
factor has been identified as largely responsible for the presence of child 
soldiers in the government army.420  Another element aiding recruitment of 
child soldiers is the pressure on children in conditions of poverty to provide 
income for their families through being in the army.421 A former Tatmadaw 
child soldier reported:    
I got 8000 a month and that was not enough when I was beginning and 
when I arrived to the national assembly I got like 15000. So I sent almost 
all of my money to my parents.422 
The numbers of child soldiers in the Tatmadaw was believed to have 
increased in the 1990s and early 2000s as part of an attempt by the army 
to increase its strength.  It was also faced with increasing casualties, 
desertions and a lack of volunteers. Commenting on the drive to increase 
                                            
417 See, for example, Karen Human Rights Group, "Forced recruitment, child soldiers and 
abuse in the army: Interviews with SPDC deserters KHRG #2009-F9," (Thailand: KHRG, 
2009); Human Rights Watch, Sold to be Soldiers:The Recruitment and Use of Child 
Soldiers in Burma; Child Soldiers International, Chance for a Change: Ending the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers in Myanmar. 
418 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 
(London, UK: Coalition to Stop the Use of  Child Soldiers, 2004), 186-87. 
419 Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, Despite Promises: Child Soldiers in 
Burma’s SPDC Armed Forces (Chiang Mai, Thailand: HREIB, 2006), 36. 
420 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008 
(London, UK: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008), 241-52. 
421 Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, Despite Promises: Child Soldiers in 
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422 Former Tatmadaw child soldier, interview via translator, Mae Sot, October 19th 2012. 
Note: the pay quoted is in Kyat, the Myanmar currency. 1000 Kyat = approximately 1.2 
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the size of the armed forces after 1988, Human Rights Watch pointed out 
that of child soldiers recruited to the Tatmadaw, “more than half of them 
were recruited after 1997.”423 The poor conditions, brutality and high rate 
of desertion all presented pressures on the Tatmadaw that were met with 
increasing reliance on under age recruits. “The Myanmar army wasn’t 
popular, they didn’t treat their soldiers well, they did everything but not 
fighting, they had people who were permanently running away, and that 
was a way just to fill the ranks.”424 The increase in children in the 
Tatmadaw’s front-line forces was also observed by their opponents at the 
same time. 
We estimated there was about one fifth of the strength of their frontline 
units were made up of these very young soldiers…. From about 1997 
onwards, you noticed more and more child soldiers.425 
Recent moves to demobilise child soldiers from the Tatmadaw through an 
action plan between the government and the UN have achieved some 
discharge of child soldiers.426  However, the continued presence of 
underage soldiers in the Tatmadaw has also been raised by human rights 
reports,427 and recent interviews. 
I was in Rakhine state about six weeks ago and we ran into an enormous 
Burma Army patrol and it was on the side of the road. There were probably 
half a dozen child soldiers in this group.428  
Child soldier recruitment by government allied NSAGs and BGF has also 
been identified as a problem.429 A particular concern now that Burma has 
                                            
423 Human Rights Watch, My Gun was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma (New York, 
NY: Human Rights Watch, 2002), 8. 
424 Senior staff member of an international humanitarian NGO working with child soldier 
issues in Burma, interview, Yangon, September 12th, 2014 
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interview via skype from Paris, January 4th 2013 
426 376 children were released from the Tatmadaw from the start of 2014, see, United 
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427 Child Soldiers International, Under the Radar: Ongoing recruitment and use of children 
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428 International consultant advisor working with NSAGs on ceasefire negotiations, 
interview, July 23, 2014. 
429 Child Soldiers International, Under the Radar: Ongoing recruitment and use of children 
by the Myanmar army, 14. 
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agreed to a joint action plan on child soldiers with UNICEF is the 
movement to and recruitment of child soldiers into BGF units rather than 
into the Tatmadaw. Former NSAGs with ceasefires who have now been 
absorbed into the BGF such as the Karenni National People’s Liberation 
Front (KNPLF)430 and sections of the DKBA431 were known to have 
recruited child soldiers. Therefore, the problem is that even if the 
government reduces or ends the presence of child soldiers in the regular 
army, it may have just shifted or disguised the problem within the BGF.432  
Children in NSAGs in Burma 
There are some differences between the Tatmadaw and NSAGs in the 
numbers, methods of recruitment and reasons for involvement of children 
with them. Some NSAGs have also assisted the desertion of child soldiers 
from the Tatmadaw. Ceasefire agreements, state opposition to 
humanitarian engagement with them, and the concerns of some NSAGs 
about their legitimacy locally and internationally are also identified as 
having influenced their policies and practices on this issue. These are 
explored further in relation to specific NSAGs in chapters eight and nine. 
Ceasefire NSAGs 
Some NSAGs have, or have had, large numbers of child soldiers in their 
ranks and have actively recruited them. The CSCS in both its 2008 Global 
Report433 and 2011 shadow report to the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child on Myanmar434 makes a differentiation when outlining children 
involved with NSAGs in Burma. This distinction is between ‘ceasefire 
groups’, and what were then (until 2012) ‘non-ceasefire groups.’435 The 
                                            
430 Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, Forgotten Future: Childen Affected by 
Armed Conflict in Burma (Chiang Mai, Thailand: HREIB, 2008), 59. 
431 Human Rights Watch, Sold to be Soldiers:The Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers 
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432 Child Soldiers International, Chance for a Change: Ending the recruitment and use of 
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Methodology, chapter five, and the background to the ceasefires of the 1990s in chapter 
6. See, also, regarding ceasefire groups in the 1990s, the DKBA and NMSP profiles in 
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ceasefire groups mostly reached agreements with the government in the 
1990s which allowed them to maintain arms and control of territory in parts 
of ethnic states. Some of the ceasefire groups have continued with the 
recruitment of children to keep up numbers in their ranks so as to give 
them leverage in future negotiations with the government and in the event 
of the ceasefires breaking down.436 NSAGs using ceasefire periods to 
increase numbers, and potentially recruit more children, was also raised in 
interviews.437 Resumption of conflict with former ceasefire groups has 
occurred with the MNDAA in northeast Shan state in 2009 and again in 
2015, and with the KIO/KIA since June 2011.  
Children and non-ceasefire NSAGs (prior to 2012) 
There is little accurate data on the numbers of children that are, or have 
been, involved with opposition or ‘non-ceasefire’ NSAGs in Burma. A 2002 
report by HRW interviewed a KNPP General who estimated that up to 20 
percent of the Karenni Army’s 1200 soldiers were under 18 at the time.438 
The KIA, in 2015, was believed by CSI to have at least 1000 soldiers aged 
under 18 in its ranks out of an army estimated to be 10,000 strong.439 
These two very rough estimates, indicate between 10 and 20 percent of 
soldiers in opposition NSAGs may be, or have been, under 18. However, 
CSI also acknowledges the difficulty of gaining accurate data on the 
numbers of children in Burma NSAGs. 
The 2012 Annual Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Children and Armed Conflict still included the KNU/KNLA, 
KNPP/KA, DKBA, UWSA, SSA-S, and KIA as NSAGs that “recruit and use 
children” in Burma. It also identified the Tatmadaw and BGF for these 
violations.440  However, the report also noted that the KNU and KNPP had 
                                            
436 Human Rights Watch, Sold to be Soldiers:The Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers 
in Burma, 95. 
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attempted in 2007 to “conclude an action plan with the United Nations”441 
in response to UNSC resolutions 1529 (2004) and 1612 (2005) on children 
and armed conflict. The UN had been prevented by the government from 
further engagement with these NSAGs after 2007. A 2013 report from CSI 
also mentions the continued lack of access due to government restrictions 
for independent observers to monitor KNU and KNPP compliance with the 
age of recruitment.442  This point clearly highlights the difficulties posed by 
state-based opposition for some NSAGs that attempt to demonstrate a 
willingness to comply with international humanitarian standards and for the 
agencies that attempt to engage with them towards this end. It also 
provides an excuse for some NSAGs in avoiding international scrutiny 
regarding the age of those in their ranks.443 
Another issue relevant to territorially dispersed NSAGs with relatively 
autonomous local commanders is the effectiveness of implementation and 
compliance with any NSAG internal regulations applying to age of 
recruitment. This was raised, for example, in regard to the KNU. 
I don’t think cohesive is a word that you could ever use about the 
KNU…It’s very difficult to quantify simply because the KNU is pretty much 
every brigade for itself right now. So if the brigadier is a good person and 
an educated person and sticks to the rules then they won’t have any child 
soldiers in their ranks. If the brigadier doesn’t care about international law, 
for example, then they’ve probably got some child soldiers in their ranks.444 
Recruitment and motivations 
How children become involved in NSAGs is complex and less 
straightforward than is the case of the usually forcible recruitment 
practised by the Tatmadaw. Nonetheless, some children are recruited for 
similar reasons, especially to make up numbers, or due to desertion or 
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losses. NSAGs often require recruitment quotas from villages in areas they 
claim to protect or represent.445   
Another motivating factor for recruitment to NSAGs, including those under 
age, is as a response to the extreme counter-insurgency measures of 
government forces that have been carried out for decades against ethnic 
groups. As a consequence, many under age recruits to the NSAGs have 
volunteered rather than been forcibly recruited.  Recruits, including those 
under 18, to opposition NSAGs frequently have personal experience of 
violence from government forces. Others have family members who have 
been killed, maimed, raped, displaced or forcibly recruited for labour by 
the Tatmadaw and/or allied groups. These types of motivations were 
raised in interviews and have also been identified in reports on children in 
NSAGs.446 
During the 2010 elections in Burma I was in Nu Po camp and I started to 
think about, you know, fighting back. So I decided ‘I would rather risk 
fighting against the military government instead of staying in the refugee 
camp for nothing.’447 
I asked what is your future goal? What would you like to become, a doctor, 
a teacher, or an engineer? They said ‘I want to become a soldier, a soldier 
of KIO, and I then will shoot the government and the army.’448 
Sometimes, children are sent by families to meet obligations or quotas for 
NSAGs because adults are needed for work at home, or because 
supplying a recruit to a NSAG will bring about better treatment from the 
group for the family as it has met its requirements to the group. 
The issue really is can the father be spared? If not, then who’s going to 
go? Because they feel an obligation to go and so quite regularly what you’d 
find is one of their sons will go.449 
                                            
445 See, for example, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global 
Report 2008, 242. 
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Some armed groups impose recruit quotas on villages, and families called 
upon to supply a recruit often send a child under 18—either to retain the 
older, more productive family members needed for family survival, or 
because they have no children over 18.450 
The motivation to join an NSAG may not always be forced. Pride, identity 
or affinity, felt by families and individuals to their particular ethno-
nationalist cause, may be a motivating factor. This is especially the case if 
a parent or older sibling has previously been involved with an NSAG, and 
this can prompt those underage to volunteer.  
It’s a pride thing I think.  For some kids that’s all they want to do is be like 
their dad. If they have got child soldiers, they have probably got quite a lot 
that way.451 
Walking through villages the kids would come up and it’s just the most 
glamorous thing they’d ever seen and they just wanted to join the ABSDF 
and fight these bastards, and the ABSDF have to go like ‘no go away, go 
back, go back to school.’452 
In some cases, children are present in NSAGs’ camps but the NSAGs 
claim they are not present as soldiers. The reasons presented are that 
they are unable to be looked after by their parents, or that they are 
orphans of parents killed by government forces, or they want to volunteer 
but are under age. Some NSAGs have claimed rebellious or difficult to 
manage teenagers from communities or refugee camps have been sent to 
non-combat roles with the NSAG as a means of punishment and to 
prevent further misbehaviour.453 In other cases children are located in 
training or educational facilities associated with NSAGs.454  
Children can apply to and attend one of several KIA-funded military 
educational establishments, such as the Htoi Ningshawng or "Shining at 
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the Front" and “Serve and Study” where they receive training in weaponry 
and are stationed in a military training environment. Schools established by 
the KIA provide incentives for enlistment such as no school fees.455 
HREIB researchers interviewed six children between the ages of 13 and 15 
who tried to join the KIA between November 2007 and January 2008. All 
six aspiring soldiers were rejected entry into the KIA, but allowed to stay in 
Laiza (KIA headquarters) to continue schooling.456 
But one thing under the KNU condition, the situation is sometimes difficult 
to understand about the child soldiers, because some children they have 
no parents. So the KNU leaders, they have to accommodate them.457 
There are also relative differences in the treatment of underage recruits in 
NSAGs compared to that of the Tatmadaw. Most of the information 
available on this comes via human rights sources that have investigated 
the dire treatment of children in the government army and have conducted 
extensive interviews with former child soldiers outlining extreme brutality in 
training and conditions in the army.458 This list of brutalities does by 
comparison make the hard and potentially dangerous life in insurgent 
forces seem a better option. However, it does not excuse the requirements 
of international humanitarian law for NSAGs as much as for states.  
One difference that holds veracity, though, is in the often limited capacity 
in terms of material and human resources for NSAGs and their associated 
welfare or social services to provide for demobilised child soldiers or other 
children associated with them. Such shortcomings were mentioned in 
interviews discussing NSAG projects for former child soldiers. 
They deposited him in a house, a leaky house, with no electricity, a drunk 
old man just there, supposed to be taking care but not really. No food, no 
money, no work, no nothing. The boy had to then run away again.459 
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When the groups know that we are working on the child soldier issue, they 
always report to us like ‘oh we have a child soldier here, what are we going 
to do?’ But we also have no capacity to do to take care of them. We try to 
find a shelter and an aid group for them. But no one is really doing this.460 
Protection of children from the effects of armed conflict 
Beyond direct recruitment as under age soldiers, children in areas 
contested or controlled by NSAGs and the Tatmadaw also face other 
threats to their safety, security and well-being. Displacement due to 
conflict, malnutrition, inadequate access to health care and education, and 
exposure to conflict related dangers such as landmines and unexploded 
munitions are examples of the potential dangers for children in conflict and 
post-conflict areas. 
That also seems to happen a lot with the children where they see 
unexploded ordinance they go and play with them, pick them up, put in the 
fire, throw them, kick them.461 
The conflicts in themselves are the root cause of many of these other 
dangers to children’s safety. However, short of comprehensive political 
settlements that address the concerns of the affected populations, armed 
political conflict actors, and the government, more immediate measures 
have been and still are required. The lack of state provision of services 
such as healthcare and education inside Burma, coupled with active 
targeting of parts of the civilian populations in ethnic areas, have had a 
severe impact on the lives of children, physically and mentally. The 
consequences for children living under such conditions of militarisation 
have been extensively documented by KHRG in the words and the 
perspectives of children affected in Karen state.462   
The ethnic NSAGs have, to varying degrees, provided basic education 
services to children in areas they control. For example, the KNU, NMSP 
and KNPP education departments have developed school systems. The 
KNU in refugee camps in Thailand and inside areas of Karen state 
                                            
460 A senior staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
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462 Karen Human Rights Group, Growing up under militarisation: Abuse and agency of 
children in Karen State (Thailand: KHRG, 2008). 
 146 
 
controlled by them, the NMSP in their areas in Mon state,463 and the 
KNPP mainly in two Karenni refugee camps in Thailand.464 It is significant 
that education is valued by these armed groups. However, while it is 
certainly beneficial, it is not unproblematic in terms of the politicisation of 
education. Education in these circumstances has also reflected ethno-
nationalist agendas and reinforced a separate ethnic identity as defined by 
the armed group. This may, therefore, maintain some children’s support 
and future potential recruitment.465  
Summary 
Claimed military necessity (proposition 1) 
The two issues outlined in this chapter are complex and vary within 
different contexts as the NSAGs provide some protective functions while 
also being a source of some of the threats. Landmines present the NSAGs 
with one of the few weapons that allow them to still hold territory inside 
Burma, or with which to delay attacking forces. This is significant when 
they are at a greater disadvantage in terms of numbers and equipment. 
While rarely acknowledged as militarily necessary, children have been 
recruited by all sides in the conflicts. The Tatmadaw’s use of child soldiers 
was believed to have increased in the late 1990s due to it struggling with 
desertions and finding fighting age volunteers. For NSAGs, children have 
also been recruited as part of attempts to bolster numbers, notably in 
ceasefire periods. 
Access to resources and funding (proposition 3) 
As well as their use for military purposes to defend frontlines and bases, 
the use of landmines to protect economic resources was raised. This has 
become an increasing concern given the importance placed on access to 
resources by NSAGs, and also sometimes through their cooperation with 
external business interests. Various forms of structural coercion such as 
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recruitment quotas imposed by an armed group on a family or village, are 
also significant in maintaining the presence of child soldiers in non-state 
armed forces. The consequent economic pressure to maintain working 
age adults and pressures on families to meet NSAG recruitment quotas 
have been identified as contributing to children being sent in lieu of older 
siblings or parents. 
Variation and extent of landmine use and recruitment 
The differences in landmine use for NSAGs compared to the government 
forces are in the frequent home-made manufacture of NSAG landmines. In 
particular, there are contested claims of a shorter active lifetime for these 
mines compared to the factory manufactured ones used by the Tatmadaw. 
In terms of protection activity, the role of NSAGs in some ad hoc demining 
and their willingness to assist MRE in areas they control or have access 
to, have been acknowledged. However, NSAGs have not been consistent 
about providing warnings or signage about landmine placement, or 
methodical in mapping and removal of landmines that have been 
deployed. 
According to human rights reporters and practitioners who engage with 
NSAGs, overall the numbers of children under 18 in NSAGs are 
considerably less than those recruited by the Tatmadaw.466 However, this 
does not excuse the continuing presence of some under age recruits in 
NSAGs. “There’s a big difference in the number used by both sides, but 
still there’s some groups use the child soldiers and we cannot deny it.”467 
The reasons for the presence of children in, or associated with, NSAGs 
also differs in some respects to that of state armed forces. The motivations 
for some children to join NSAGs includes revenge or a wish to fight 
against those who have attacked their families or villages. It has also 
included a sense of obligation to families or to wider ethnic or political 
causes. NSAG associated training and education facilities also provide a 
pathway for some underage recruits into NSAGs. Significant factors 
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identified for children becoming involved with armed forces on all sides 
were poverty and lack of age verification. Some NSAGs have claimed a 
necessity to provide shelter and education for orphaned children under 
their care, however, they are still in a militarised environment, and are 
essentially associated with armed conflict. 
NSAG policies and actions on landmines and underage recruitment 
A variety of policies and plans addressing these issues have been 
developed with the NSAGs over the last decade, and especially recently, 
including unilateral declarations and statements, deeds of commitment 
(DoC), action plans, and potentially as part of the NCA with the 
government.468 The KNPP, NMSP, KNU and CNF have all, from 2012 to 
2014, agreed to the Geneva Call DoC for the protection of children from 
the effects of armed conflict. This raises further questions about 
implementation, capacity, and monitoring of the agreements, and who will 
or can do this.469 This indicates the NSAGs can potentially be part of the 
solution as well as part of the problem. Humanitarian engagement 
processes on these issues and the local and international actors working 
with NSAGs on them are dealt with in chapter nine. In the following 
chapter eight, the KNPP, NMSP, ABSDF, and DKBA will be outlined for 
their involvement as sources of both threat and of protection in the case of 
landmines and children affected by armed conflict.
                                            
468 Sections pertaining to landmine use and recruitment in the NCA and the 
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Chapter Eight 
NSAG case studies 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is on the development of ethno-nationalist and 
political NSAGs that have evolved from the numerous and diverse ethnic 
communities at various stages since the establishment of the Union of 
Burma in 1948. It is, however, far beyond the scope of the present study to 
provide comprehensive historical and anthropological backgrounds of 
each individual ethnic group. This has been done elsewhere by those 
more qualified to do so.470 This chapter outlines the background of four 
NSAGs in Burma, and the range of economic, political and social factors 
that have influenced their behaviour towards civilian communities. It 
examines, in particular, their involvement with the issues of landmine use, 
and children affected by armed conflict, as indicators of the extent of their 
compliance, or actions towards compliance, with humanitarian norms. 
The four NSAGs selected for the study present a range of conflict 
circumstances, both ceasefire and non-ceasefire (prior to 2012), and 
behaviours in relation to civilian protection. Their inclusion also enables 
analysis of a range of policy instruments and practices, dealt with in detail 
in the following chapter, that have been undertaken to address landmine 
use and children affected by conflict. The four NSAGs considered in this 
chapter are: the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/ 
KA); the New Mon State Party/Mon National Liberation Army (NMSP/ 
MNLA); the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), and the 
Democratic Karen Buddhist/Benevolent Army (DKBA). These four NSAGs 
have all been active in southeast Burma in areas close, to or bordering, 
with Thailand. The time period is from 1949 through to 2015. However, 
most documentary information and interview data regarding the issues of 
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landmines and children affected by armed conflict, covers the period from 
the 1990s to the present day. Each group’s historical background, political, 
economic, and social dimensions are first outlined. The NSAGs’ 
involvement with landmines and children affected by armed conflict, 
especially threats they pose themselves through these issues to 
constituent populations, is then examined. This chapter concludes with an 
assessment of the factors identified as influencing the NSAGs in regard to 
these two issues.  
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The Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni 
Army (KNPP/KA)  
Karenni or Kayah state,471 located to the north of Karen state and to the 
south of Shan state on the Thai-Burma border, is the geographically 
smallest of the ethnic states in Myanmar. It has an estimated population of 
250,000,472 with Christianity being the dominant religion although 
Buddhism is also present.473 The small state has a series of mountain 
ranges and rivers running north-south through it. The two major rivers are 
the Salween to the east and the Pon to the west running north-south 
through the state.474 Karenni state’s most significant natural resources are 
teak forests that have been heavily logged and depleted over decades by 
all parties to the conflict, as well as by external Thai business interests. 
The logging of these forests has been a major economic activity the profits 
of which have helped fund the KNPP insurgency and other NSAGs as well 
as the Burma government itself.475  Tin is also mined at Mawchi in a 
government controlled part of the state.476 Hydro-electric power from the 
Lawpita Dam on the Belauchaung river (a tributary of the Pon) near 
Loikaw supplies 20 per cent of Burma’s electricity.477 It has been 
“providing electricity for the national grid for half a century and yet local 
villages remain dependent on candlelight.”478 The natural resources of the 
state have, therefore, benefitted external actors, armed groups and the 
central Burmese government, but rarely the local civilian population and 
have been a major factor in the conflicts there. Karenni remains one of the 
poorest states in Burma with an ongoing lack of health care services, high 
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levels of displacement, and resource depletion. Villagers have often been 
called upon for taxation, recruitment and forced labour from multiple 
armed actors. These have included the Tatmadaw, government-aligned 
ceasefire groups, and the main NSAG opposed to the government in 
Karenni state, the KNPP. Consequently, Karenni has been one of the 
most badly affected areas in Burma by over 60 years of civil war.479  
Karenni state was left as a separate state by the British during the era of 
colonial administration and the Karenni assumed, especially following their 
support for the British against the Japanese in the Second World War, that 
it would be an independent state after Burma gained independence in 
1948.480 However, it was occupied by the Burma army in August of 1948. 
The larger Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) and the KNU 
based in Karen state to the south helped to develop armed resistance in 
Karenni in the late 1940s.481 This was part of the wider wave of ethnic and 
communist insurgencies that faced the Union of Burma government 
immediately after independence in 1948. Initially, the independent Karenni 
state and army led by Sao Wunna, with surplus weapons left-over from the 
Second World War, was able to hold parts of the state including the 
copper mines at Mawchi.482 However, by the mid-1950s the government 
army controlled the main towns such as Loikaw, Shadaw, and Mawchi.  
                                            
479 See for example, Carl Grundy-Warr and Elaine Wong Siew Yin, "Geographies of 
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The KNPP was formed in 1957 to oppose this occupation.483  However, 
during the following decades, the Tatmadaw steadily increased its 
numbers in the state to contain insurgency and to protect the government 
controlled mines and hydro-power resources. The KNPP maintained an 
armed resistance to the Burma army up to 2012, and, although 
considerably weakened, it is still able to operate in parts of the north and 
southwest (adjacent to KNU areas) of Karenni state.484 “You know that 
when you go to Shadaw, when you go beyond this area this is the area of 
the KNPP. Only the town is controlled by the government. Beyond the 
town is KNPP.”485 
Shadaw township is their area. To the north, the northern part of Loikaw. 
This area was always under control by the KNPP…Another area is in 
Mawchi region, maybe the western part of Pruhso township is also, and the 
eastern part of Demoso township. They operate and they control and 
influence previously, but now, the government deploy their troops, many 
troops.486 
The KNPP, like the KNU and other NSAGs operating adjacent to the Thai 
border, has also made use of the proximity of Thailand across the border 
as a safe area and source of financial support, supplies and arms.487  
The KNPP split during the late 1970s and early 1980s along the then Cold 
War ideological divide, with the leftward leaning and Communist Party of 
Burma (CPB)-influenced Karenni State Nationalities Liberation Front 
(KSNLF)488 eventually breaking away and fighting the more ethno-
nationalist focused KNPP. This conflict seriously damaged the strength 
and cohesion of the KNPP which had previously enjoyed broad popular 
support.489 From its formation in 1957, the KNPP was led for the next 
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twenty years by Saw Maw Reh, a former soldier who had fought with the 
British against the Japanese during the Second World War. He was 
eventually replaced in 1977 by Htae Buphe who led the KNPP until his 
death in 2011.490 It has since been led by Abel Tweed. 
Following the 1988 upheavals in Burma’s urban centres and the 1989 
ceasefires with the former CPB groups in northern Burma, the SLORC and 
the Tatmadaw was able to refocus its attention on the remaining non-
ceasefire NSAGs along its eastern borders with Thailand. The KNPP (as 
well as the KNU and NMSP) faced Tatmadaw offensives in 1989-1991, 
with the KNPP losing its main base on the Pai river in1989.491 A short-lived 
ceasefire in 1995 broke down within a few months. Major relocations of 
the civilian population were carried out by government forces during 
further offensives in 1996. The relocations and displacement present an 
example of the Tatmadaw’s ‘four cuts’ counter-insurgency strategy, to 
clear contested territory of populations that could potentially offer support 
to rebel NSAGs. In Karenni, this resulted in considerable internal 
displacement and movement of refugees across the border into 
Thailand.492  
In 1994, other NSAGs active in Karenni state, the Karenni Nationalities 
People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF, formerly the KSNLF), Kayan New Land 
Party (KNLP), and the Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organisation 
(SSNLO) agreed to ceasefires with the government.493 The KNPLF also 
took control of the lucrative border crossings that had previously been in 
the hands of the KNPP and that had supplied much of the KNPP’s 
revenue.494  This further marginalised the KNPP politically and 
economically. It remained the only non-ceasefire group active in Karenni 
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state, while parts of the state remained under the control of the Tatmadaw 
and ceasefire groups.  
The KNPP continued to wage a low intensity guerrilla war against the 
government495 until a ceasefire agreement was finally reached in March 
2012.496  The KNPLF and some smaller ceasefire groups,497 meanwhile, 
agreed to become part of the BGF under Tatmadaw control in 2009.498 
The reduction politically of the role of the ceasefire NSAGs to BGF units 
may have also assisted the KNPP in again presenting itself to the Karenni 
population as a more representative or legitimate opposition NSAG in the 
post-2012 ceasefire era. 
As a result of the breakaway factions and sustained government 
offensives, the KNPP leadership, as well as refugees, have been largely 
forced into exile in Thailand since the mid-1990s. In 2012, there were still 
approximately 13,000 refugees from Karenni state in two refugee camps 
near the Thai-Burma border in Mae Hong Son province and another 
34,600 IDPs inside Karenni state.499 The numbers have previously been 
higher, especially following the 1990s offensives in Karenni state, with an 
estimated 17,000 refugees from Karenni state500 in Thai refugee camps in 
2002.501   
The KNPP, since the March 2012 ceasefire, has also been involved in 
some initial civilian protection related peace-building activities (as have the 
KNU and NMSP) that involve consultations with civilian populations. 
These have been undertaken with assistance from the Myanmar Peace 
Support Initiative (MPSI) with local communities and CBOs inside Karenni 
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state.502 The 2012 ceasefire agreement also enabled the KNPP to 
establish companies and conduct limited business activities to support the 
organisation, including exploration for lead mining and the timber trade.503 
KNPP and civilian protection issues 
KNPP and landmines 
The armed wing of the KNPP, the Karenni Army (KA), was listed as a 
landmine user in the 2005 Geneva Call report on landmines and non-state 
actors in Burma,504 and was still mentioned as a producer of landmines on 
the 2012 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor Myanmar/Burma country 
profile.505 The KA has used landmines as part of its strategy against the 
government forces, often to defend positions. Most of its landmines, 
according to the present leadership, are home-made. The claims made by 
other NSAGs about the supposed short life of such landmines, were also 
repeated. 
For the Karenni Army, we have limited landmines, we cannot buy them 
easily…we can make a handmade landmine for a short period for use. It 
can only last 2 or 3 months or 6 months no more beyond that.506 
The use of home-made landmines by the KA against the Tatmadaw was 
also mentioned by observers with access to the front lines from the KA 
side who witnessed the 1995-97 fighting during the Tatmadaw offensives 
in Karenni state.507  The KNPP has also used landmines to protect 
resources on which it relied to sustain itself through trade. For example, 
the KNPP laid landmines around a mountain in eastern Karenni state 
where valuable minerals were located in order protect their business and 
resource interests.508  
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A protection role that KNPP soldiers have been identified with, related to 
the landmine issue, was in assisting some Karenni refugees to move 
across eastern Karenni state and over the border into Thailand. This was 
a consequence of the Tatmadaw policy of creating a ‘free-fire zone’ from 
east of the Salween river up to the Thai border, with the intention in the 
1990s of emptying the area of civilians and any potential support to the 
KNPP. This area was “heavily mined by both the Tatmadaw and by the 
KA.”509 Consequently, KNPP assistance to civilians through the difficult 
terrain to avoid government forces, and avoid Tatmadaw and KA 
landmines, would have been valuable for those attempting to flee to the 
border.  
The KNPP issued a unilateral statement in 2006 about its use of 
landmines. According to the KNPP, regarding landmines and MRE, and 
potential future landmine clearance, 
The KNPP are willing to cooperate with legitimate individuals or 
organizations that engage in landmine education or lobby to ban the 
production of landmines in order to reduce their use. This cooperation 
would help ensure the clearance of landmines when peace finally comes to 
our country.510 
Since the government at the time would not allow any external MRE, 
clearance, or monitoring activity inside the country, the KNPP was unlikely 
to have been visited by international organisations to monitor its claims. 
The KNPP could have been reasonably sure of no external organisations 
being allowed to monitor inside Burma (and in areas where the KNPP/KA 
were active) at this time, so it was unlikely to be tested on the statements it 
made. However, this was reiterated more recently in an interview with the 
leadership regarding their openness to external organisations being 
allowed access to KNPP areas. “If it is part of their work, they will come. 
                                            
509 Grundy-Warr and Wong Siew Yin, "Geographies of Displacement: The Karenni and 
The Shan Across The Myanmar-Thailand Border," 105. 
510 Karenni National Progressive Party, "Statement No. 02/06: Statement on the use of 
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We have no reason to say no to anybody or any organisation if they are 
allowed by the government to do so.”511 
The KNPP’s 2006 statement about landmines makes the point, also made 
by some other NSAGs, about their use for defensive purposes and makes 
the claim that they attempt to avoid their use in civilian areas.  
However, in certain circumstances we use them to defend our troops as 
we lack alternative means of defence. Our use of landmines is extremely 
limited and steps are taken to avoid civilian casualties.512 
Significantly, the KNPP acknowledges the claimed military necessity for 
the continued use of landmines in this statement.  
The question of whether the KA warned civilians about the location of 
mined areas, or if they marked them, was also raised in an interview with a 
KNPP leader. 
 If we intentionally have to plant the landmines for some reason, that will be 
the place where no civilians can access, or if we think that there can be 
danger to civilians we will not do that.513 
Interview respondents confirmed the use, in the past, of verbal warnings, 
but not signs, by the KNPP (and KNPLF) regarding the location of 
landmines to villagers. “Long ago if they know about mines are there they 
inform people ‘don’t go there.’ They don’t set up signs. KNPLF also inform 
the people.”514 
The KNPP leadership also indicated that they retained a supply of 
landmines and the potential to use them should current negotiations or 
ceasefires not hold. This was given as a reason for why they had not yet 
agreed to a unilateral declaration and renunciation of landmine use and 
accompanying practical measures to achieve this.  
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Without a concrete ceasefire agreement with the government we cannot 
ensure there is peace and no more need to plant landmines and that’s the 
challenge that we have.515 
In 2012, all seven township areas in Karenni state still had serious 
landmine contamination problems due to decades of landmine deployment 
by government and NSAG forces. 516 KA soldiers have been involved in 
some limited attempts at mine clearance which is evidenced by a report 
from the FBR that two KA soldiers and an FBR medic were killed during 
demining operations in 2011.517 Villagers interviewed by CBOs for the 
TBC indicated continued landmine contamination, the KA’s role in 
landmine use, and acknowledged the need for government or KNPP 
soldiers to undertake clearance. “In the south of our village, there used to 
be a Karenni soldiers’ camp, so we have to be worried about landmines 
around that place.”518 
Our villagers do not know how to clean the landmines, so it is better for 
those who know how to clean the landmines. We also do not know what 
type of mine it is and we do not know what kind of shape the landmines are 
too. So, it will be better that the government or the Karenni troops can 
check and clean the landmines.519 
Interview respondents indicated the KNPP has also been involved, more 
systematically, in MRE. “Especially like MRE activities we try to discuss 
with the KNPP, because in the KNPP they have a group who is doing 
MRE activities.”520 
There is a group who work for the community to educate the people in 
terms of the mine risk education under control of the KNPP… Since 2003, 
they did the mine risk education low profile. So they organised the people 
and bring the people to the forest or where no one can see. They educate 
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the people. I used to be one of the participants of the training. What they 
educate people was about the various kinds of mines and also how to 
avoid the mined areas.521   
KNPP and children affected by armed conflict 
The KNPP has been listed by the UN as a NSAG that uses child soldiers. 
The Karenni Army was identified in a 2010 report that identified states and 
groups using child soldiers as having used them in the five years prior to 
2010.522 The presence of child soldiers in the KA was documented in print 
and in photos by a photojournalist who documented life in the front lines 
with the KA during intense fighting in 1996-7. The account mentions, at 
different times, a 13-year-old combatant and a 15-year-old trainee in the 
KA. The 13 year old additionally stated that revenge for the Burma Army’s 
forced relocations and its abuses to his own family were his motivations for 
joining the KA.523 This resonates with other accounts both in secondary 
sources and in interviews conducted for this study about the motivations 
for some, but certainly not for all, children joining ethnic NSAGs.  A 2002 
HRW report identified the KA as having potentially 20 per cent of its 
forces, claimed by the KA itself to be around 1200 in total, under the age 
of 18. This estimate was supplied to HRW by a KA general at the time.524 
“General Aung Mya estimates that 20 per cent of the soldiers in his army 
are under eighteen years old, which implies 200 to 250 child soldiers in 
total.”525  
The HRW report from 2002, however, identified the KNPP/KA as being the 
most open of the Burma NSAGs it had interviewed about the child soldier 
issue regarding the presence of children in its ranks, and the most willing 
to take action to address the problem.526 The KA General further 
highlighted the difficulties that confront the KNPP (and potentially other 
NSAGs, should they be willing) to adhere to international standards on the 
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age of recruitment.  These are to do with resources, education and 
recognition.  
We’d like to abide by the international protocol [on children in armed 
conflict] and have these rules within our Karenni Army too, but it is hard to 
get support because no one recognizes us as a legal organization…No 
resources means no skills. Not only for our boy soldiers, but also for the 
young [Burma army] deserters.527 
This comment touches on the economic difficulties for the KNPP in taking 
action on this protection issue and this is acknowledged in the lack of 
resources and capacity. The question of legitimacy is also raised in the 
mention of the group’s lack of legality and international recognition. 
It is interesting to note that General Aung Mya mentions Burma army child 
soldier deserters as well as the KA’s own children. This infers the role that 
some NSAGs have taken in the defection of child soldiers from the 
Tatmadaw and which has also been mentioned in other interviews with 
NSAG leaders, and local and international NGOs. However, the HRW 
report also pointed out that the KA could have released remaining under 
age soldiers in its ranks at the time to allow them to return to school.528  
The KNPP/KA has taken active measures between 2002 and 2014 to 
remove children from its army and has attempted to make this known 
internationally. It has issued unilateral statements, agreed to a deed of 
commitment and action plan with the UN, engaged in training and 
workshops with local human rights NGOs, and has invited external 
monitoring and verification of its implementation of these measures.  The 
KNPP initially made a public statement on the issue of child soldiers in 
2006, acknowledging the presence of child soldiers previously in the 
Karenni Army in the 1970s and 1980s (although clearly they were still 
present in the 1990s and into the early 2000s). It claims they were not 
forcibly recruited and that the KNPP constitution prohibits such 
recruitment. 
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However, during the 1970-1980 period of the resistance movement, a 
number of young people under the age of 18 voluntarily joined the Karenni 
Army. In view of the fact that our Constitution clearly prohibits the 
recruitment of child soldiers, we, the KNPP, would publicly like to reiterate 
our stance that we do not conscript underage youths, or even adults, to be 
soldiers in the movement against the Burmese regime.529 
The KNPP’s 2006 statement on non-recruitment of child soldiers was 
followed by a deed of commitment (DoC) it signed with UNICEF in May 
2007 stating that it did not recruit children into its armed forces and 
agreeing to undertake an action plan to remove any that were still 
present.530  Despite this commitment, the KNPP continued to be included 
on subsequent UN lists of NSAGs that used child soldiers in Burma. The 
KNPP consequently issued a statement regarding this inclusion and 
refuting the UN report’s inclusion of them as “based on hearsay and old 
reports.”531  
The KNPP followed this with further calls to be removed from the list in 
2008 and 2009.532 In its 2007 report on Burma NSAGs and child soldiers, 
HRW stated that it had corroborated through interviews with local NGOs, 
CSOs and health agencies that the KA no longer had children in its 
ranks533 and recommended that the KNPP be removed from the UN list.534 
However, the UN was unable to verify the situation and the KNPP 
remained on the list. The 2012 UN Report of the Special Representative to 
the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict still included the 
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KNPP.535 The problem of the KNPP remaining on the UN list despite 
having taken active measures to remove children from its army was also 
highlighted by a CBO that works with former child soldiers: 
I thought the UN didn’t contact the KNPP or whoever about their use of 
child soldiers but it’s because they’re not allowed to contact. The KNPP 
has to contact them. So they’ve just gone ahead and put together this list 
based on rumour basically, they haven’t checked with any of the non-state 
actors whether they actually use child soldiers or not. They got on the list 
by default.536 
While engagement with the KNPP conducted at the level of the UN was 
unable to be continued due to state resistance, smaller, independent and 
less sovereignty-bound NGOs have managed to continue dialogue with 
the group on the child soldier issue. The Human Rights Institute of Burma 
(HREIB) conducted child rights training with KA commanders in 2008, who 
also reiterated the policy of non-recruitment under the age of 18.537 An 
issue noted by the HREIB at this stage was the definition of what 
constituted a child soldier. The norm HREIB advocated was that all 
children under 18 should not be involved in military activities. The 
continuing presence of children under 18 in KNPP camps, or in non-
combat duties, indicated this was not as well understood by the KA 
commanders who attended the training and who were interviewed by 
HREIB.538 A local CBO working with former child soldiers also raised the 
problem of children in KNPP camps or in non-combat duties, and of these 
children’s own wishes sometimes to join the army while they were still 
under age. 
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KNPP last time I visited them had six kids who they were desperately 
trying to keep in school who desperately wanted to go into the army and 
they were struggling with keeping them in school.539 
A 2015 interview by the Open History Project with a Karenni male now 
aged 22 mentions not being permitted to join the KA at age 14 (this would 
have been approximately 2007) when he first tried. He eventually joined a 
CBO. 
I made the decision to leave home to join the Karenni army. At that time, I 
was fourteen years old. When I got there, they did not allow me to be a 
soldier as I was very young for the Karenni army. I was sent to a refugee 
camp by the commander and went to school in grade nine. I went to school 
for two years until I graduated grade ten. After I had graduated from grade 
ten, I continued studying at the Social Development Center an NGO 
providing education on college level for refugees training course for ten 
months. But in the end, I joined an organisation and work as a community 
worker until now.540 
The KNPP has, therefore, made attempts to have its non-use of children in 
its army known and has been willing to have this monitored and verified by 
independent external observers. The opposition of the host state and 
sometimes of a neighbouring state has inhibited such action. This was 
how the leadership of the KNPP viewed the situation in December 2012.  
I wonder very much whether the Burmese government would agree to 
allowing the international observers to come into the country and access to 
the area where we are, to survey or to explore a situation on the ground.541 
The UN and HREIB engagement with the KNPP was also at the outset of 
engagement with the KNPP by the INGO, Geneva Call. The Geneva Call 
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Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of 
Armed Conflict was eventually signed by the KNPP in August of 2012.542  
The New Mon State Party/Mon National Liberation 
Army (NMSP/MNLA) 
Mon state consists of a narrow strip running northwest to southeast with a 
coastline on the Gulf of Martaban and the Andaman Sea, with Karen state 
and Bago (Pegu) division to its north, the Tanintharyi (Tenasserim) 
division of Myanmar to the south, and a mountainous border with Karen 
state to its east. It has a small border area with Thailand in the southeast. 
The Mon language is distinctly separate from Burmese and comes from 
the Mon-Khmer group of languages; however, the Mon religion is 
predominantly Buddhist like that of the majority of ethnic Burmans in 
Burma. Due to conflict and incomplete government census data the Mon 
population can only be roughly estimated at one and a half million, 
although not all of those people necessarily speak the Mon language.543  
                                            
542 Geneva Call, "Karenni National Progressive Party: Declaration on the Deed of 
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543 South, Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake, 19-23. 
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Mon nationalism found expression in the All Rammonya Mon Association 
formed in 1937, and the Mon Youth Organisation in 1941.544 Unlike the 
Karen, the Buddhist Mon were not recruited into colonial forces or very 
involved in the British led resistance to Japanese occupation during the 
Second World War.545 Mon nationalist leaders, however, opposed the 
Burman dominated government of U Nu from the time of Burma’s 
independence in 1948 as did the Karen and many other ethnic groups. 
Consequently, some Mon went ‘underground’ and took up arms in unity 
with the Karen rebellion. The Mon National Defence Organisation and Mon 
United Front, were developed with the assistance of the KNDO in 1949.546 
From 1953 the Mon People’s Front (MPF) fought the government forces of 
U Nu. In 1958 the MPF agreed a ceasefire in return for limited 
concessions and a role inside government.547  The NMSP was established 
at this time by Nai Shwe Kyin,548 a leading figure in the MPF who was 
opposed to the 1958 settlement and who consequently formed the NMSP 
to continue the armed struggle.549 The goals of the NMSP were for either a 
separate Mon state, or an autonomous Mon state within a genuinely 
federal Burma state structure that would allow sufficient self-
determination.550  
Since Mon state shared a border area with Thailand, the NMSP 
throughout the 1960s to late 1980s was able to control lucrative border 
trade routes (particularly at Three Pagodas Pass near the Thai town of 
Sangkhlaburi) as did the larger KNU to its north. As a result of the 
disastrous economic policies of military dictator Ne Win’s Burma Socialist 
Programme Party (BSPP) government after he took power in a coup in 
1962 through until 1988, a thriving illicit trade in goods across the border 
from Thailand developed. The NMSP and KNU were, therefore, able to 
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derive tax revenue to finance their armed struggle and the running of the 
administration of their micro-states.551 The 1960s and 1970s were the 
most fertile period for the NMSP and many other ethnic NSAGs in terms of 
income from taxes and control over border toll gates and black market 
economies that grew as a result of the breakdown of Ne Win’s BSPP 
economic policies.552  Politically, at the state level, the NMSP also 
received some covert assistance from Thailand at this time as it guarded 
the border as a proxy for the Thai military.553  
By 1971 the NMSP had formed a separate military wing, the Mon National 
Liberation Army (MNLA), in keeping with other ethnic NSAGs like the 
KNU, KNPP, or KIO, with corresponding political and armed wings. At this 
time it had over 1000 troops operating in “small mobile columns and 
guerrilla units” in Mon state. 554  At the height of its powers during this 
period in the 1970s the NMSP/MNLA was able to conduct operations in 
southern Mon state as well as in the northern Tenasserim division and into 
southern Karen state.555 Following Ne Win’s coup in 1962, and especially 
from the 1970s onwards, government policies outlawing the use of the 
Mon language and counter-insurgency tactics against the NMSP, drove 
many Mon villagers into the NMSP controlled areas under a parallel NMSP 
state system. This, consequently, contributed to the NMSP’s support, 
legitimacy with their own population, and recruits to its cause.556  
The MNLA established a battalion structure corresponding to NMSP 
geographic regions in Mon state in much the same way as the KNLA 
brigade structure corresponds to KNU administered districts in Karen 
state. The NMSP and KNU coordinated operations against the Burma 
Army throughout most of the period from the 1960s up to the NMSP-
SLORC 1995 ceasefire, with the larger KNU providing support to the 
smaller Mon NSAG.557 Indeed, in many respects “the history of Nai Shwe 
                                            
551 South, Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake, 125-26. 
552 Sherman, "Burma: Lessons from the Cease-Fires," 232. 
553 South, Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake, 126. 
554 Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 222. 
555 Human Rights Watch, My Gun was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma, 144. 
556 South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 32. 
557 Ibid., 31. 
 171 
 
Kyin’s NMSP mirrored that of the KNU.”558  However, there was a short 
armed conflict between the two groups in 1988 over control of the lucrative 
Three Pagodas Pass toll gate on the Thailand/ Burma border.559  
The MNLA was estimated to have 8000 soldiers in the early 1990s but, by 
the time of the 1995 ceasefire, the group’s strength was estimated to be 
about 2000,560 to 2500.561 A potential economic explanation for this was 
the reduction in ammunition and supplies due to its loss of control over the 
Thai-border black market trade. Nonetheless, an NSAG of 2500 soldiers is 
still a significant force on the scale of NSAGs operating in Burma, many of 
whom (the KNPP for example), have even fewer troops. A 2005 report 
described the group in its post-ceasefire incarnation as “a small but well 
equipped armed force.”562 However, a lack of central control had also 
been identified. “The Mon army was not noted for the effectiveness of its 
command structure….troops were as likely to be loyal to local 
commanders as to Central.”563 The problem of involvement in economic 
activities such as logging leading to local commanders behaving 
autonomously in warlord-type activity independent of central control (also 
a feature of local Tatmadaw and allied NSAG commanders) is a potential 
fracture line that has led to splinter groups breaking away from the NMSP 
following the 1995 ceasefire. The NMSP’s fear of factionalism resulting in 
breakaway armed groups has also been identified as a contributing factor 
in it agreeing to the 1995 ceasefire.564 This was likely to have also been 
influenced by the NMSP having witnessed the disastrous consequences 
for the KNU of its split with the DKBA in 1994-1995.  
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At the start of the 1990s, having established ceasefires with former CPB 
groups in northern Shan state, and then with the KIO in 1994 in northern 
Burma, the Tatmadaw was able to concentrate on the remaining non-
ceasefire groups, the KNU, KNPP, and NMSP, along its eastern border 
with Thailand. At this time, relations between Thailand and Burma also 
improved due to the growth of Thai government and business interests in 
Burma. These interests included logging concessions from the SLORC 
government in Burma, the development of a gas pipeline from the Gulf of 
Martaban across Mon state to Thailand, the development of a deep sea 
port on the Mon state coast, and a road from it across Mon state into 
Thailand.565 These developments meant the Thai government was less 
well disposed towards the insurgent groups operating from its territory and 
blocking potentially lucrative development projects on its border.566  
The Tatmadaw offensives against the NMSP in the early 1990s drove 
thousands of Mon refugees up to, and across, the borders with 
Thailand.567 The NMSP’s closest and strongest ally, the KNU, then came 
under sustained attack and lost its main base at Mannerplaw and much of 
its remaining territory in Karen state in1995 due to the internal KNU split 
with the breakaway government-allied DKBA faction. At the same time, the 
Tatmadaw attacked NMSP outposts in Mon state where the NMSP was 
increasingly hard pressed. The NMSP suffered from a shortage of 
ammunition, and increasing internal pressure from pro-ceasefire 
advocates from within the group, and from within the civilian population, 
for an agreement to halt the fighting.568 Faced with being overrun by 
Burma government forces, and threats from the Thai government to 
forcibly repatriate the thousands of Mon refugees, the NMSP agreed to a 
ceasefire in June 1995.569 
                                            
565 Kramer, Neither War nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-fire Agreements in Burma, 
26. 
566 Ibid., 10-11. 
567 Human Rights Foundation of Monland, Destination Unknown: Hope and Doubt 
Regarding IDP Resettlement in Mon State (Thailand: Human Rights Foundation of 
Monland, 2012), 17-18. 
568 Zaw Oo and Win Min, Assessing Burma's Ceasefire Accords (Washington, DC: East-
West Centre, 2007), 21. 
569 Ibid., 27. 
 173 
 
The NMSP ceasefire differed in some respects to the ceasefires in 1989 
with the former CPB NSAGs. The early ceasefire groups managed to 
negotiate better deals in terms of territory and economic development 
opportunities, while the later ones had to negotiate from a weaker position 
militarily.570 The 1994 KIO and 1995 NMSP ceasefires, and the short-lived 
one with the KNPP in 1995, were also negotiated as part of the 
government’s attempts to isolate the strongest remaining non-ceasefire 
NSAG, the KNU, from its National Democratic Front (NDF) allies. 
Under the ceasefire agreement, the NMSP was able to retain its arms and 
keep some of the territory it controlled. It was also allowed to establish 
businesses although these proved, initially, to be not very successful.571 
The NMSP businesses, however, have continued and now include 
construction, farming and transport.572 Other significant incentives for the 
NMSP to agree to a ceasefire included the offer of development projects, 
the ability to teach Mon language in their schools, and the possibility of 
international aid agencies in Mon state as potential monitors for the 
ceasefire.573 The NMSP enclaves consisted of an area bordering Thailand 
in the southeast of Mon state (the largest), an area in northeast Mon state 
bordering Karen state and a couple of smaller areas. The NMSP had to 
move out of some other areas that it still held.574 Significantly, the NMSP 
was not granted any areas that would be near to the planned gas pipeline 
from the Gulf of Martaban to Thailand and rail projects across Mon state. 
Following the ceasefire, the Tatmadaw was able to reinforce its positions 
closer to the NMSP areas and build roads for better access and 
resupply.575 For the Mon population the most relevant consequence of the 
agreement was both an end to direct conflict between the government and 
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the NMSP, and the Mon refugees were able to return from Thailand into 
NMSP controlled areas inside Mon state. However, other abuses related 
to the Burma Army presence and development projects also worsened 
after 1995.576  
A feature of the post-1995 ceasefire situation in Mon state was the 
development of splinter groups (which had not existed prior to the 
ceasefire) that have broken away from the NMSP.577 Land confiscations 
and continued abuses by the Tatmadaw as well as local economic 
motivations led to the formation of small splinter groups, dissatisfied with 
the ceasefire agreement, that have reverted to armed struggle.578 The 
most significant has been the Monland Restoration Party (MRP), also 
known as the Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP) which broke away 
from the NMSP in 2001. The MRP was led by former MNLA second in 
command Nai Pan Nyunt. There are also some smaller groups that often 
join forces with the MRP which have fought intermittently with the 
Tatmadaw, and sometimes also with the NMSP.579  
The NMSP is believed, by external observers, to still have a relatively 
good level of popular support among the Mon population.580 Some of its 
constituency, however, are unhappy about the group’s inability, due to its 
ceasefire agreement, to resist abuses from the government forces in non 
NMSP-controlled areas of Mon state. This is compounded as well by the 
absence of development in NMSP areas that had been hoped for with the 
1995 ceasefire agreement.581 The MNLA also struggled to maintain troop 
numbers, which is significant as most NSAGs have used ceasefire periods 
to increase their numbers.582 
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Right now they are struggling to maintain their force, to be honest…. When 
I first arrived, I found a lot of troops with a lot of ammunition and a lot of 
support, but after 1995 they were linked with the business activities and 
also maybe the capacity of the military is a little weakened... So nowadays, 
let me say like 40 percent left from 1995 to here.583 
In 2012, it was believed to be able to call upon a total strength of 2000 
including reservists, but with about 800 regular troops.584 
When the government attempted to get ceasefire groups to agree to 
become a BGF under Tatmadaw control in 2009/10, the NMSP refused to 
comply which led to fears of renewed conflict.585 However, with the new 
government and new peace initiatives, the NMSP eventually renewed its 
ceasefire with the government in 2012. Isolated clashes have occurred 
between the NMSP and the Tatmadaw, for example, in July 2013.586 
Tensions have also continued over forced displacement, land confiscation, 
and other ongoing abuses in Mon areas.587 
NMSP and civilian protection issues 
NMSP and landmines 
The NMSP used landmines during its armed struggle with the Burma Army 
up to 1995. It was also reported to have used anti-vehicle as well as anti-
personnel mines in 1993,588 but has claimed to have not used landmines 
since the 1995 ceasefire.589  It has been alleged, though, that the NMSP 
used landmines again from around 2001 in its conflict with the breakaway 
MRP.590 The Landmine Monitor (LM) in 2000 listed the NMSP as a former 
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landmine user and producer, but still in possession of stockpiles and 
mines within its territory.591 The NMSP would likely still have had 
landmines for the purpose of defending its remaining territory following the 
1995 ceasefire.  
The NMSP was then relisted as a landmine user by the LM in 2002/03 due 
to its conflict with the MRP at that time.592 By comparison, other NSAGs, 
including the KNU/KNLA, KNPP/KA and DKBA are consistently 
highlighted in the LM reports from 2000 to 2012 for their production and 
use of mines, whereas the NMSP is only really believed to have 
maintained a stockpile and is not mentioned as a landmine producer, or a 
current user, apart from the MRP conflict. The NMSP-MRP conflict was 
largely over after 2003 when the MRP dwindled in numbers and 
support.593 The NMSP leadership acknowledged they still have a landmine 
stockpile should the 2012 ceasefire with the government breakdown. 
We are like Shan North and Shan South, they have signed the ceasefire 
agreement, but up to now and from time to time they are fighting…What 
will happen in our territory we don’t know. That’s why we have to keep our 
stockpile.594 
Asked about whether the NMSP would sign the Geneva Call DoC on 
landmines, the point about the uncertainly of the future of the ceasefire 
and the government was reiterated. “We consider about [whether] the 
government might go back and fight again. We consider about this. So, 
no, we have not signed this yet.”595 
NMSP and children affected by armed conflict 
Significantly, the NMSP/MNLA has not been considered as a frequent 
recruiter of child soldiers. According to a HRW report in 2002, children 
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were observed working at MNLA checkpoints in NMSP controlled areas. 
The presence of children in the MNLA may have risen following the 
ceasefire in an attempt to increase numbers.596 Attempts to boost 
numbers by other ceasefire NSAGs following the 1990s ceasefires had 
also been noted.  According to the leadership, the MNLA has a code of 
conduct that does not permit recruitment under the age of 18.597 The 54 
articles of the MNLA code of conduct also include protection of civilians, 
media and medical facilities. This code was reiterated in an interview with 
the NMSP leadership. 
In MNLA we have how we act during the war and how to protect the 
civilians during the conflict and targeting. So you have to avoid the media 
and hospital and like that. Effectively there are 54 articles. The MNLA 
soldiers have to obey the code of conduct, and it’s very strict in the New 
Mon State Party.598 
In 2007, HRW identified the main child protection issue with the 
NMSP/MNLA as the presence of children at military bases engaged in 
non-combat activities, but not officially recruited into the army.599 This 
raises the problem where the children present are not in the regular 
fighting forces or even carrying arms, but are still in a military base and 
consequently potentially in harm’s way. It is an area that falls within the 
scope of the wider definition in the Paris Principles of children associated 
with armed forces or groups.600 This is also acknowledged, for example, in 
the Geneva Call DoC addressing NSAGs and children affected by armed 
conflict.601 
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Tensions between the NMSP and the government over its refusal to 
convert to a BGF, which contributed to clashes in Kokang in northern 
Shan state in 2009, with a faction in the DKBA in 2010, and with the KIO in 
2011, are likely to have motivated the NMSP to try to increase its strength 
again. Use of ceasefire periods by NSAGs to increase recruitment have 
been documented previously in regard to the NMSP.602 The drive to do 
this was implied in the NMSP leadership’s concerns about the 
government’s resumption of fighting with other ceasefire groups, and also 
by observers to NMSP areas. 
The leadership are trying to focus to maintain their force and also trying to 
do another like military basic training with the young people in the 
community. So they are trying to maintain their armed force by giving the 
training to other people. …This is because in other parts they have 
challenge, they see in the north and in the east, you know, Wa and Shan 
they have some conflict, so this kind of fighting also awakens them, 
reminds them of this.603 
Following approaches from the HREIB on the child soldier issue, the 
NMSP initially made a unilateral statement that it no longer recruited 
children.604 From 2011, Geneva Call approached the NMSP about its DoC 
on the protection of children via the HREIB working as a local partner 
organisation.605  The NMSP formally signed the DoC addressing this in 
August 2012. The NMSP constitution, as was pointed out by the 
leadership, already contained the basic concepts of protection of children. 
“In the NMSP constitution, the child protection is included, but in detail not 
explained.”606 This pre-existing recognition of protection of children, even if 
not in formal international legal terms, alongside the current low level of 
children in the group and non-combat roles of any that are present, would 
likely have made getting the NMSP agreement to the Geneva Call DoC 
easier to achieve. The NMSP has also maintained a long-standing and 
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effective Mon National Schools system, which has also garnered it 
legitimacy with its constituency, making its position on child protection 
more credible.607 The process of negotiation leading up to the signing of 
the DoC involved the NMSP/MNLA in many workshops with Geneva Call 
on child rights and IHL.608 
The All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) 
The ABSDF, unlike its ethnic NSAG allies, does not have separate political 
and armed wings, or represent any specific ethno-nationalist cause. The 
student army, as it is also known, was originally formed in November 1988 
in KNU held territory in Karen state. It was formed by students who had 
fled to the ethnic border regions following the bloody army crackdown in 
the cities of Burma against the student pro-democracy movement of 
August and September 1988. As an ally of the ethnic NSAGs, the ABSDF 
joined the National Democratic Front ethnic NSAG alliance to form the 
Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), a coalition that included both ethnic 
NSAGs and ethnic Burman groups. 
The National Democratic Front, announced on the radio they welcome 
people oppressed by the military regime. If we want to come to their area, 
we are welcome to come to their areas to fight against the military regime. 
So when the ABSDF was formed by the representatives from different 
student camps, the NDF supported that a lot.609 
About 10,000 students fled to the ethnic borderlands of Burma in 
1988/89.610 They formed a number of camps in areas controlled by the 
existing ethnic resistance armies. These were in ethnic NSAG areas on 
the borders of Thailand, China and India. There, the newly arrived 
students and their fledgling army received some initial support in getting 
established. By 1990, the ABSDF had approximately 5000 soldiers, plus 
many other members engaged in education, health and other support 
activities in KNU, KNPP, NMSP, KIO and other smaller Pa’O and Arakan 
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ethnic NSAG controlled areas.611 For example, the KNU supplied the 
ABSDF units in its areas with some food and also provided basic military 
training although this assistance was limited as the ethnic NSAGs were 
barely able to feed and equip their own forces from the taxation of border 
toll gates.612 “In the Karen area, the Karen gave military training and also 
other kinds of stuff, such as food and clothes, also in Kachin, Pa-O, 
Mon...”613 
The ABSDF’s early leaders developed the fundamental objectives of the 
group which were liberation of the people of Burma, democracy, human 
rights, peace and federalism.614 The federal aspect of the group’s aims 
reflected the interests of ABSDF’s ethnic NSAG allies for whom federalism 
was a central goal. The ABSDF constitution reflects these central 
objectives. It initially also attempted to develop a military code of conduct 
for its soldiers, but this met with less success. 
We have how to treat civilians in our constitution, not a code of conduct. 
We wrote a military code of conduct before 1994 and we discussed it in the 
conference but also some of the parts are difficult to get agreement on, so 
it faded out. We used some of the points in the code of conduct - how to 
treat civilians, how to organise- we wrote down some of these points in our 
constitution.615 
The ABSDF’s fortunes, like that of other NSAGs, were affected by the 
KNU’s loss of its bases in 1995-97. Accounts of fighting, especially during 
the 1990s of ethnic NSAGs such as the KNU, KNPP, and NMSP often 
also mention the presence of ABSDF soldiers fighting alongside the ethnic 
NSAGs.616  Tensions were still present, such as regarding an early failed 
joint ABSDF-NMSP offensive in 1990.617 The ABSDF also suffered 
internal leadership struggles which divided it into two factions in the period 
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1991 to 1996 before reunification under a new generation of leadership.618 
The leadership struggle was largely personality based,619 rather than 
being along ethnic, religious or ideological lines. Therefore, it did not lead 
to a permanent split or direct armed conflict between factions, as has been 
the case in some other ethnic NSAGs.  
The most damaging and still controversial incident for the ABSDF was its 
own trial and execution of approximately 35 members of the ABSDF 
northern battalion, suspected of being government spies. This occurred in 
Kachin state in 1992.620 This was due to a concern from ethnic NSAGs 
allied with the ABSDF about the presence of Burmese government spies 
within the ABSDF. “One problem the ABSDF has always had is the 
perception that they contain lots of spies.”621 This increased pressure on 
the group to conduct internal investigations that culminated in the trials 
and executions in Kachin state. Following its ceasefire with the 
government in 2013, the ABSDF has conducted an investigation into the 
killings of its own members in the early 1990s in Kachin state. Of note was 
the group’s own findings that stated: “the Karen State-based headquarters 
‘had little to no effective control over the ABSDF-Northern camp at the 
time of the incidents due to geographic distance, communication 
challenges,’ and a loosely defined command structure.”622 While directed 
towards its own members, this incident is also revealing of the issues for 
other NSAGs with geographically dispersed units and diffuse lines of 
communication and control. 
The ABSDF, however, also had an internal justice system that followed 
the group’s laws and procedures, especially after outrage at the northern 
battalion killings, and this reduced further excesses. Consequently, “the 
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organization’s leadership saw the urgent need to reassert proper legal 
checks and balances over its operations.”623 
The ABSDF, they had what they called the ‘student law.’ They had a body 
of law, how they would govern it. That had a legal commission of three 
judges who would travel from unit to unit to hear cases.624 
Unlike most of the ethnic NSAGs, the ABSDF did not develop separate 
political and armed wings. Instead, those who wished to do so left the 
ABSDF to form completely separate political parties or civil society 
organisations.625  The Network for Democracy and Development (NDD) 
was the separate political organisation that evolved out of the ABSDF. 
Since the ABSDF was originally formed by students, education became an 
important part of the group’s role within the refugee and migrant 
communities on the Thai-Burma border. This was reiterated in an interview 
by the director of a CBO that has worked closely with the ABSDF. 
That’s the one thing to understand about the ABSDF, that it came from a 
student base, almost a student union type base. They are the students 
they love education they immerse themselves in education. They believe 
education to be the way forward, that’s why they’ve done what they’ve 
done and that’s why they’ve incorporated it all into the same 
organisation.626 
 In terms of broad civilian protection activities, ABSDF members and 
former members have been involved in a variety of local education, health, 
human rights and welfare organisations.627  For example, members and 
former members of the ABSDF have been involved in projects such as the 
Back Pack Health Worker Team (BPHWT), the HREIB, the Mae Tao 
Clinic, and schools in refugee camps.628  
                                            
623 Aung Naing Oo, "Justice Has a Place in the Law of the Jungle," The Irrawaddy August 
1, 2008. 
624 Former ABSDF associate and trainer in Geneva Conventions and child soldier 
demobilisation, interview via skype from Paris, January 4th 2013. 
625 Senior member of leadership, ABSDF, interview, Mae Sot, December 4th, 2012. 
626 Director of a CBO working with former child soldiers, interview, Mae Sot, August 30th, 
2012. 
627 Ko Yeni, "Soldiers of Misfortune," The Irrawaddy February, 2006. 
628 Personal communication with former and current ABSDF members who work for 
education and medical organisations on the Thai-Burma border, Mae Sot, Chiang Mai, 
Mae Hong Son, 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
 183 
 
By 2006, the ABSDF’s numbers as an armed force were estimated at only 
a few hundred,629 and today new recruits for the greatly reduced army 
mostly come from local ethnic villages. The current strength of the ABSDF 
is estimated at 600.630 
It’s gotten smaller. Most of the people who came out in 1988 have left for 
third countries. The private soldiers now are not 88 generation, they’re 
village lads from Karen villages.631   
The reduction of international donor funding to groups that were involved 
in armed struggle and the temporary listing of the ABSDF on the US list of 
proscribed terrorist organisations further weakened and isolated the group 
in the first decade of the 21st century. The ABSDF’s education and health 
activities as well as its military were especially affected by the 
consequences of the reduction in funds from USAID. 
It’s IRC who distributes the money for USAID here. A new staffer came in 
who didn’t approve of armed resistance around 2001or 2002. It wasn’t 
specifically the ABSDF they didn’t want to fund it was anything cross-
border... anything to schools or refugee camps across the border.632 
Yeah, in the American government, ABSDF is one of the terrorist groups 
on the list at the time. Most of the NGOs who support us are from the US, 
so most of the NGOs cut off support, they disagree with armed struggle.633 
The ABSDF northern battalion has been involved in fighting alongside the 
KIA and Arakan Army against the Tatmadaw in Kachin state since the 
resumption of fighting there in June 2011.634  The ABSDF eventually 
signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement with the government in August 
2013 and was one of eight NSAGs that signed the NCA in October 2015.  
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The ABSDF and civilian protection issues 
ABSDF and landmines  
The ABSDF, like its ethnic NSAG allies, has used landmines. Given that it 
operates in alliance with other NSAGs that also rely on the use of 
landmines, it would be strategically and politically unlikely the group could 
avoid using them. To do so would undermine its own positions and that of 
larger allied ethnic NSAGs. Reliance on the use of landmines for 
defensive purposes was acknowledged by an ABSDF leader in a 2005 
Geneva Call report.635 This was also reiterated in recent interviews as well. 
“We use [landmines] in the front line for our self-defence. We do not want 
to use them. We do not want to plant them inside, just to protect our 
post.”636 
There was a lot of passive defensive techniques being adopted by getting 
more seriously into landmines, you know, landmine laying, and also 
landmine clearance.637 
An aspect of landmine use by the ABSDF with its declining numbers, 
support and finances, has been the use of homemade landmines, rather 
than factory manufactured ones. They also claim that they inform local 
residents about the whereabouts of landmines. 
Our landmines are most of them handmade, not too long lasting under the 
ground, about three months to six months…We inform the villagers around 
us not to go there where we put landmines. We say like that but we do not 
know.638 
The ABSDF, as a member of the DAB, was approached by Geneva Call 
on the landmine issue in 2006 or 2007.639 However, as confirmed in 
interviews in 2012, it still retained the option to use them.640 
                                            
635 Geneva Call, Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines: Volume One: A Global Report 
Profiling NSAs and their Use, Aquisition, Production, Transfer and Stockpiling of 
Landmines, 69. 
636 Senior member of leadership, ABSDF, interview, Mae Sot, December 4th, 2012. 
637 Former ABSDF associate and trainer in Geneva Conventions and child soldier 
demobilisation, interview via skype from Paris, January 4th 2013. 
638 Senior member of ABSDF leadership, interview, Mae Sot, December 4th, 2012 
639 Former ABSDF associate and trainer in Geneva Conventions and child soldier 
demobilisation, interview via skype from Paris, January 4th 2013. 
640 Senior member of leadership, ABSDF, interview, Mae Sot, December 4th, 2012. 
 185 
 
ABSDF and children affected by armed conflict 
There were under age soldiers in the early ABSDF as the ‘student army’ 
included former high school students who were under the age of 18 when 
they fled the military crackdown in 1988. However, it has not been 
identified with child soldiers in its ranks since the early 1990s.  A 
significant feature of the ABSDF, in terms of the protection of children from 
the effects of armed conflict, has been its involvement in facilitating the 
defection of child soldiers from the Tatmadaw.641 The Burmese-speaking 
ABSDF were best placed to deal with child soldiers from the Tatmadaw 
who defected to, or were captured by, other ethnic NSAGs.  
In Fifth brigade area of the KNLA there were so many child soldiers they 
didn’t know what to do with them.  So rather than just shooting them, the 
ABSDF said ‘ok bring them to our headquarters’ and then we made a base 
and that’s still across the border. We made a base in Fifth brigade area, 
which we don’t use anymore, which is why I can talk about it.642 
They’d come in twos, threes, sometimes six or eight and so that was 
challenging enough and it didn’t work as well as I wanted, but it did work 
well enough that in 2008 when I went back I was informed that the Burma 
Army had withdrawn underage soldiers from the Brigade Five area which 
was the focal point.643 
This activity is an interesting example of the meeting of realpolitik military 
and political concerns with ostensibly humanitarian motivations. The 
ABSDF role in supporting the defection and demobilisation of child 
soldiers was clearly preferable to the captured child soldiers potentially 
becoming POWs, or worse, being executed. Execution of captured 
Tatmadaw soldiers by the ethnic NSAGs has been documented, and was 
also mentioned to the author by medics associated with NSAGs and 
former NSAG members.644  
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The defection of child soldiers from the Tatmadaw, and the role the 
Burmese-speaking ABSDF could take within that project, had a clear 
political and military agenda according to the co-founder of an ABSDF-
associated organisation working with former child soldiers. 
I saw this as a unique opportunity for ABSDF, being a Burman speaking 
organisation, to make itself useful in ethnic controlled territory and the way 
in which it could really strike a disproportional blow against the military 
capabilities of the Tatmadaw.645 
Engagement with the ABSDF on humanitarian norms and civilian 
protection initially came from local or Burmese CBOs and NGOs.  A 
potential explanation for this engagement from fellow exile Burmese 
human rights and legal organisations is the ABSDF’s pro-education 
stance, involvement in civil society organisations on the Thai-Burma 
border from the early 1990s, and its Burmese-speaking constituency. 
Yes, some of the human rights group came to our military post and gave 
human rights trainings... HREIB, one of the guys, and BLC, you know, 
Burma Lawyers’ Council, and some of the BWU, Burma Women’s 
Union.646 
External international advocacy on IHL with the ABSDF initially came from 
the ICRC. An interesting point about ICRC information that had been 
translated into Burmese was the relevance of the examples that were 
given. The state-centred view of armed conflict, even in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, had not in this case recognised that NSAGs may have 
different needs and perceptions. 
We were provided with some small handbooks [by the ICRC] about the 
Geneva Conventions in simplified form in Burmese script.... The problem 
was it had all been written from the point of view that it was the 
government army.... All the soldiers [in illustrations in the handbook] wore 
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helmets and they all had heavy gear... it wasn’t written for guerrilla 
soldiers.647  
The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) 
In a KNU area in eastern Karen state during 1994, a Buddhist monk, U 
Thuzana, become a spiritual focus for a group of approximately three 
hundred battle hardened, mostly Buddhist, KNLA soldiers. They were 
dissatisfied with the largely Christian KNU leadership, and pointed to 
discrimination and abuses perpetrated against the soldiers at the front 
lines.648 They believed that the KNU leadership had become out of touch 
with the Buddhist Karen majority, and corrupted by personal economic 
interests. During the long period of the KNU leadership of General Bo Mya 
(who was a Seventh Day Adventist) since 1976, disaffected Buddhists 
also believed they had been marginalised and had been allowed less say 
in the KNU’s policies and direction compared to those close to the 
Christian leadership elite.649 It was the belief that Buddhist soldiers in the 
KNLA were doing the most fighting and had the worst conditions that 
helped precipitate the breakaway group from the KNU.650  However, 
despite the Buddhist label, the DKBA, which rapidly grew in size in 1994-
95, also had Christian and animist members.  
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The defection to the government side of the DKBA with valuable 
knowledge of KNU positions, quickly brought about the loss of the last 
major KNU bases inside Karen state.651 This included the loss of the 
headquarters of the KNU, ABSDF and the exiled National Coalition 
Government of the Union of Burma at Mannerplaw in January 1995. This 
major military setback resulted in the KNU being forced to adopt guerrilla 
tactics in contested areas inside Karen state, with its leadership now 
exiled across the border in Thailand.652  The DKBA, meanwhile, now 
controlled large parts of Karen state and most of the taxation of trade 
across the Thai-Burma border.653 
The DKBA, which operated in many parts of Karen state between 1995 
and 2010, was notable for having a loose command and control structure. 
DKBA units enjoyed considerable operational autonomy, while answering 
in general terms both to local Tatmadaw commanders and to the DKBA 
leadership at Myaing Gyi Ngu.654 
The DKBA’s membership changed after 1996, as former KNLA soldiers 
who had originally defected from the KNU to it in 1994-5 left, disillusioned 
with its subordination to the Tatmadaw. New members, according to 
KHRG interviews with DKBA deserters, were motivated by better 
conditions for themselves and treatment for their families, and/or by 
opportunities for personal economic gain.655 Additionally, some soldiers 
who had been in low ranking positions in the KNU/KNLA and not well 
educated were now promoted as high-ranking officers within the DKBA.656 
After initially supporting the DKBA, the government later reduced its 
material support to it and the armed group had to become largely self-
sustaining.657 This set of circumstances for the DKBA “encouraged the 
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decentralization of operations, self-seeking activity, and general 
disintegration.”658 
The decentralised nature of the DKBA, plus the need for individual units to 
support themselves, enabled local commanders to engage in various 
business activities. These involved logging, mining, and cross-border trade 
activities that were believed to include the production and trafficking of 
drugs, especially methamphetamines.659 These ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ 
with a focus on local economic agendas have tended to be less accessible 
or receptive to external humanitarian engagement, either international or 
local, when compared to other NSAGs examined in this study. For 
example, an attempt by the ICRC to go to DKBA controlled areas to visit 
hospitals there was stopped by a local DKBA commander.660 The DKBA 
also threatened the presence and activities of local CSOs. KHRG, while 
documenting human rights abuses in Karen state in 2009 found that the 
DKBA was not willing to facilitate their research, indeed along with the 
Tatmadaw, the DKBA presented a threat to the researchers’ lives.661 The 
BPHWT has also noted the difficulties it has faced in accessing DKBA-
controlled areas.662 
The DKBA focus on economic or business activity in areas it controls has 
not been matched by a corresponding development of civil society 
organisations or services in its areas attending to health or education. Due 
to its alliance with the government from 1994 to 2010, DKBA areas did 
receive some support from central government, further lessening the need 
for it to develop associated welfare services or CSOs. “Services in the 
DKBA areas are basically government services, they’re not provided by 
groups affiliated to the DKBA.”663 The lack of established welfare services 
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along with prioritisation of economic agendas by individual commanders 
within the DKBA (and sometimes the KNU as well) were a frequent theme 
in interviews and secondary sources on the group. Former DKBA 
commanders who have either retired or transferred to the BGF, and their 
families, for example, have often profited from activities such as logging, 
mining, plantations, and cross-border trade.664 “Rural communities in 
DKBA and BGF controlled areas, however, remain for the most part in 
deep poverty.”665 
DKBA areas are accessible a little bit. The problem is the lack of CBOs, 
civil society, in DKBA areas... They only have the military they don’t really 
have the administrative part...they only know how to fight and there is 
some kind of business.666 
Reflecting the disparate nature of the DKBA units, some individual leaders 
within the DKBA have also espoused a pan-Karen nationalist agenda.667 
However, the group’s abuses and predation against the local population 
have prevented it from gaining widespread legitimacy with its 
constituency.668 It has attempted localised development and some schools 
have been set up in DKBA controlled areas, but since the government has 
ultimate control, the schools have taught in Burmese not the Karen 
language.669 Support for the DKBA has been affected by the lack of 
tangible political progress the group has made in terms of the Karen 
cause, and its subordinate position to the government and Tatmadaw, 
despite its claims to represent the Karen people.670 Coming under 
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Tatmadaw control was formalised by conversion of much of the DKBA to 
BGF in 2010. 
Up to 2010, despite a lack of much external engagement, other than from 
the Burma government, the DKBA was “the militarily and economically 
most powerful Karen non-state actor,”671 with an estimated strength of 3 to 
4000.672 Interestingly, from 2004 onwards there was speculation about 
how much support the DKBA was still receiving from the government,673 
and about developing tensions over government plans to disarm the 
DKBA.674 This tension increased with the arrest and removal from power in 
October 2004 of Burma Army military intelligence chief, (and at the time) 
prime minister, General Khin Nyunt. It was Khin Nyunt who had 
orchestrated the ceasefires with many ethnic NSAGs in the 1990s, and 
who had originally moved quickly to exploit the DKBA/KNU split in 1994. 
The DKBA has attempted since 2010 to establish a new credibility after 
some sections of it rejected inclusion in the government controlled BGF 
and fought government forces following the 2010 elections. The DKBA’s 
previous reputation was also reiterated by a former soldier in it, who joined 
after the split with the BGF faction. “The DKBA before 2010 was shit 
because they are asking money, intimidating people and taxing, you know 
everything. So people really didn’t like the DKBA up until the 2010 
elections.”675 This focus on economic agendas and self-enrichment of 
individual DKBA commanders has reduced the DKBA’s popular support 
over time.676 
The DKBA has been identified with an array of human rights abuses 
including forced displacement, forced labour, extensive use of landmines 
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and recruitment of child soldiers.677  The DKBA has a verbal code of 
conduct of 36 rules for its soldiers to follow which includes recognition of 
the protection of civilians and non-discrimination towards other religious 
groups. 
They have like 36 rules to follow. About 10 of them are for the civilians. 
Another strict rule is religious discrimination and intimidation against others 
based on their race and religion because the DKBA is basically about a 
Buddhist army so they don’t want their image to be ruined for doing 
discrimination against others. So these are strict rules for them to follow.678 
The informant for this interview also pointed out that he did not receive any 
military training after joining the DKBA (although he did have some 
previous military experience). This then suggests that at the time of the 
2010 fighting between the DKBA and the government, when he joined, the 
rebel DKBA Brigade 5 with 500 soldiers at that time, was in desperate 
need of more recruits. The DKBA’s approach to recruitment, and the 
quality and motivation of recruits, has also been identified as causing 
problems for the group’s cohesion and discipline, and consequently its 
reputation and legitimacy.  
The problem is so many people come to DKBA… For the DKBA, they 
cannot divide. So whoever comes, because they also need their force, so 
whoever comes and joins the DKBA, they will accept. As a result, there 
can be some problem. If someone works as the DKBA but he does 
something wrong, that is not good for DKBA.679 
The post-2010 DKBA now renamed the Democratic Karen Benevolent 
Army under the leadership of General Saw Ler Pwe (also known as Na 
                                            
677 See, for example, Human Rights Foundation of Monland, "When Frogs Eat Frogs: 
Systematic Abuses by DKBA Forces Against Karen Communities," The Mon Forum, no. 4 
(April, 2010); Human Rights Watch, "“They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again": The 
Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State," Human Rights Watch 17, no. 4(c) 
(2005); Karen Human Rights Group, "Abuses since the DKBA and KNLA ceasefires: 
Forced labour and arbitrary detention in Dooplaya KHRG #2012-F2," (Thailand: KHRG, 
May 7, 2012). 
678 Former DKBA soldier via translator, interview, Mae Sot, October 21st, 2012. This 
interview participant who had been in the DKBA was himself a Muslim. The DKBA had 
members and even commanders who were Christian or Muslim as well as Buddhist. 
679 Director of a local NGO that conducted peace-building and civil society development in 
DKBA areas, interview, Yangon, September 11th, 2013. 
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Khan M’way or ‘Mr Moustache’)680 attempted to establish welfare services, 
development and political wings. This was also confirmed in interviews.  
For DKBA also, now I think they have expanded their services…They don’t 
have a formal set of organisations like KORD [Karen Office for Relief and 
Development, a humanitarian arm of the KNU], they only train some 
people as community workers. They are posted in the villages.681 
So in the DKBA they have the development group. There are three 
sectors. One is for the military affairs, and one is for the political issue, and 
one is for the development issue. So I participated in the development 
issue programme.682 
The DKBA’s new political wing was the Kalo Htoo Baw Karen Organisation 
(KKO), under the leadership of Mahn Robert Bazan, son of former KNU 
Chairman Mahn Bazan. However, Mahn Robert Bazan quickly fell out with 
Saw Ler Pwe in September 2012.683  The new DKBA has attempted to 
realign itself with the remaining Karen NSAGs, specifically the KNU/KNLA 
and the KNU/KNLA-Peace Council.684 This has included membership, 
along with the KNU/KNLA, in a united coalition of Karen armed groups, the 
“Kawthoolei Armed Forces.”685 It re-established a bilateral ceasefire with 
the government in November 2011 and signed the NCA in October 2015. 
The DKBA also started to develop medic training, child rights training and 
to acknowledge its previous use of child soldiers and a willingness to take 
action on the issue. A part of this approach, acknowledged in interviews, 
has been establishing contact with international and local organisations on 
the Thai-Burma border, and more recently inside Burma, that they had 
previously shunned during the time of the DKBA alliance with the 
government. 
                                            
680 General Saw Ler Pwe eventually died from cancer in March, 2016. 
681 Local staff member of an international humanitarian agency, interview, Hpa-an, August 
26th, 2014. 
682 Director of a local NGO that conducted peace-building and civil society development in 
DKBA areas, interview, Yangon, September 11th, 2013. 
683 Nan Thoo Lei, "Gunshots and resignations disrupt militia elections," Karen News 
September 13, 2012. 
684 Taw Win Pan, "Karen armed groups united in their political struggle," Karen News July 
30, 2013. The KNU/KNLA-Peace Council is a small NSAG (with as few as 60 soldiers) 
that broke away from the KNU to establish a separate ceasefire in 2007. 
685 "Karen Armed Groups to Form United ‘Kawthoolei Armed Forces,’ but Questions 
Remain," Karen News October 16, 2014. 
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The main idea for sending me for the training is to educate the local people 
what the children’s rights are and what is their limit. And then I had to meet 
a lot of people in Mae Sot for setting up the medic camp and the main 
office.686 
They welcome the international organisations but they don’t know how to 
contact them so that is why they are seeking the person, their contact 
person.687 
The DKBA and civilian protection issues 
DKBA and landmines 
The DKBA has been consistently identified for widespread use of 
landmines.688 This has been noted in clear violations of humanitarian 
norms by placing landmines around villages and pathways to fields 
causing many injuries and deaths to villagers. There has also been a lack 
of warning to villagers about the presence of newly laid mines.689 
Landmine use has occurred since its formation in 1994, and during more 
recent fighting in 2010-2011 between the government, the BGF 
(government controlled, former DKBA), the KNLA and the non-BGF 
remainder of the DKBA.  The consequence of this was a further increase 
in landmine use and consequent threats to the safety of civilians. 690 A 
former DKBA soldier who had been involved in the 2010-2011 DKBA 
conflict with the government, however, indicated the group’s concerns with 
improving its local legitimacy with its new anti-government-stance had led 
to more efforts to provide warnings to villagers of the location of mined 
areas. “Only the DKBA let the civilians know, ‘you can’t go there.’ They 
need to protect their name because people support them as of right 
now.”691  The use of verbal warnings, and posting of warning signs about 
                                            
686 Former DKBA soldier via translator, interview, Mae Sot, October 21st, 2012. 
687 Director of a local NGO that conducted peace-building and civil society development in 
DKBA areas, interview, Yangon, September 11th, 2013. 
688 See, for example, Selth, "Landmines in Burma: Forgotten Weapons in a Forgotten 
War," 22; Geneva Call, Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines: Volume One: A Global 
Report Profiling NSAs and their Use, Aquisition, Production, Transfer and Stockpiling of 
Landmines, 71-72. 
689 See, for example, Karen Human Rights Group, "Insecurity amidst the DKBA-KNLA 
conflict in Dooplaya and Pa'an districts KHRG #2009-F3," (Thailand: KHRG, February 6, 
2009), 5-7; Selth, "Landmines in Burma: Forgotten Weapons in a Forgotten War," 27. 
690 Karen Human Rights Group, Truce or Transition? Trends in human rights abuse and 
local response in Southeast Myanmar since the 2012 ceasefire. (Thailand: KHRG, 2014), 
61-63. 
691 Former DKBA soldier via translator, interview, Mae Sot, October 21st, 2012. 
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landmines, by the DKBA after 2010 were also documented in the reports 
of villagers by KHRG.692  
During the period of its alliance with the government, the pre 2010 DKBA 
was supplied with some factory made mines as used by the Tatmadaw, 
and it also deployed home-made mines similar to those used by other 
ethnic NSAGs.693 As well as for the purposes of attacking opposing forces 
(especially the KNLA before 2010), DKBA landmine deployment, and its 
conflicts with the KNLA, often had an economic dimension. Control of 
resources and taxation in particular often fuelled such conflicts, and land 
mines were then used by all armed actors for the purposes of securing 
resource rich areas, such as for logging or mining.694  
NSAGs in Karen state have undertaken some limited demining activity 
since the 2012 ceasefires. The DKBA, along with the KNLA and BGF have 
been documented as conducting some limited clearance.695 “Some parts 
of DKBA and some parts of KNU are undertaking demining activity, but I 
don’t know what kind of method or what kind of standard or approach.”696 
However, this was halted by a lack of capacity and skills for demining on 
the part of the armed groups, and resulting casualties.697 There has also 
been some cooperation between the KNLA and DKBA in the demining of 
small areas for external business interests.698 A problem for the DKBA, 
likely to be echoed in the case of other NSAGs and their landmine use, is 
that there is little record of where landmines were in fact placed. The 
                                            
692 Karen Human Rights Group, "Abuses since the DKBA and KNLA ceasefires: Forced 
labour and arbitrary detention in Dooplaya KHRG #2012-F2," 5-8. 
693 Geneva Call, Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines: Volume One: A Global Report 
Profiling NSAs and their Use, Aquisition, Production, Transfer and Stockpiling of 
Landmines, 72. 
694 Ibid., 71; Karen Human Rights Group, Uncertain Ground: Landmines in eastern 
Burma, 34,41,185, & 251. 
695 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Landmine Monitor Report: Myanmar/Burma 
2013, 9. 
696 Local member of an international mine action NGO, interview, Yangon, September 
12th, 2014 
697 Karen Human Rights Group, Truce or Transition? Trends in human rights abuse and 
local response in Southeast Myanmar since the 2012 ceasefire., 59-60. See, also, 
"Landmine clearance in Myaing Gyi Ngu nearing completion: Karen groups," Mizzima 
News April 27, 2013. 
698 For example, in 2011, the KNLA are reported to have informed the DKBA of the 
location of landmines in an area for the DKBA to remove. This activity was paid for by a 
businessman with logging interests. Karen Human Rights Group, Uncertain Ground: 
Landmines in eastern Burma, 47. 
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Tatmadaw and NSAGs still will not share this information with each other 
increasing the difficulty and risk when removing landmines laid by military 
opponents. In the case of the groups themselves, those who laid the 
mines may not recall where they were laid, have moved on, retired, or 
have subsequently died. 
What they promised is to find the remaining landmines in their areas. The 
problem is the people who laid the landmines died, the soldiers, so it is 
difficult to know where these landmines are now. 699 
Organisations that undertake MRE had also been less able to go into 
DKBA areas. More recently, the DKBA has established contact with 
external organisations about this issue. “What they mention is they also 
attend the landmine campaign, some programme. What they say is, ‘they 
never come to our area.’”700 
The DKBA and children affected by armed conflict 
The DKBA has been consistently identified with the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers by human rights organisations and the UN. 701 This was also 
reiterated in interviews with people who had directly engaged with the 
DKBA on this issue. “They [the DKBA] had child soldiers, at the time 
around April last year they started opening up.”702  
The DKBA have been using child soldiers… I’ve been over there into their 
headquarters… I’ve seen a lot of young DKBA soldiers, however, they 
could be sixteen or seventeen, but they all say that they’re… one girl that I 
was really convinced she’s got to be fifteen, she’s like 22. You know? 
Normally if a kid is lying about their age in that kind of situation what they 
would do is say they are 18, no not this lot, 22, 21, I was like how can you 
be?703  
                                            
699 Director of a local NGO that conducted peace-building and civil society development in 
DKBA areas, interview, Yangon, September 11th, 2013. 
700 Ibid. 
701 United Nations Human Rights Council, " A/HRC/21/38, Annual report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika 
Coomaraswamy," 20. 
702 Consultant and researcher working on child soldier and IDP issues, who had accessed 
DKBA areas in 2013, interview, December 6th, 2013. 
703 Director of a CBO working with former child soldiers, interview, Mae Sot, August 30th, 
2012. 
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Out of the NSAGs examined in this study, the DKBA has been, between 
1995 and 2010, the most often cited by human rights organisations for 
systematic recruitment of underage soldiers. This is not to excuse the 
involvement of children with the other NSAGs considered in this study, but 
the scale indicated in reports by HRW, CSI, KHRG and HURFOM of 
DKBA recruitment has been of a different order again. This has especially 
been in regard to systematic and coercive recruitment.704 It should be 
acknowledged, though, that the media and human rights reporting 
organisations that have highlighted the DKBA on these issues have often 
been closer to the KNU and other cross-border actors working from 
Thailand that are generally opposed to the government and the pre-2010 
DKBA. 
The decentralised and self-supporting nature of the DKBA and the reliance 
of local commanders on forced or under age recruits has demonstrated 
the lack of cohesion within the organisation as a whole. “With many child 
soldiers and other coerced recruits, and low provisioning of its soldiers, 
cohesion in the DKBA is low.”705 The DKBA’s previous conscription 
practices meant villagers in DKBA areas were required to provide a son 
for military service, or pay enormous fines if they failed to do so or if the 
recruit deserted. A consequence of this was that families struggling to 
support themselves, especially if they did not have DKBA ‘connections,’ 
were faced with losing a valuable worker, so rather than send an adult, a 
younger (under 18) son was often sent instead.706 This was also outlined 
in a 2007 interview with HRW, by a DKBA officer. 
People have to take turns sending a recruit, so some parents send boys 
under 18. They need to fulfil this obligation. If they don’t fulfil it, the DKBA 
can make lots of trouble for them. They don’t accept crazy or sick people, 
                                            
704 See, for example, Karen Human Rights Group, Growing up under militarisation: Abuse 
and agency of children in Karen State; Human Rights Watch, Sold to be Soldiers:The 
Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in Burma; Karen Human Rights Group, "Insecurity 
amidst the DKBA-KNLA conflict in Dooplaya and Pa'an districts KHRG #2009-F3," 4. 
705 Kenny, "Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: Evidence from 
Protracted Conflicts in Ireland and Burma," 548. 
706 Karen Human Rights Group, "Forced recruitment by DKBA forces in Pa’an District 
KHRG #2008-B8," (Thailand: KHRG, September 24th 2008).  
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but if you’re normal you have to go whether you’re under 18 or over 18. 
They don’t care how old you are.… This policy began in 2006.707 
The 2010 DKBA/BGF split saw some of the most notorious DKBA leaders 
involved in child soldier recruitment, shift to the BGF and be under 
complete Tatmadaw control.708 Continuing pressure for under age 
recruitment by the ex-DKBA BGF has remained an issue.709 This was also 
mentioned by a former DKBA soldier. 
I think the idea of forming BGF is even worse because when the army says 
‘no we don’t have child soldiers’ at the same time they let them recruit child 
soldiers.They order the BGF ‘hey we need soldiers.’710 
The DKBA had paid little heed to international humanitarian standards, 
such as the minimum age of 18 for recruitment, prior to the 2010 split with 
the BGF. However, the constitution of the KKO, the political wing of the 
post-2010 DKBA, stipulated 18 as the minimum age for joining the KKO. It 
further stated that all KKO members were either to be in the political or 
military wing, thereby implying 18 was also the minimum age for 
recruitment to the DKBA.711 A 2013 report by CSI, however, cited 
evidence that children were still being associated with the DKBA in camps, 
and, in some instances, manning DKBA check-points.712 
The DKBA, even if it is attempting to develop a rights and democracy 
based, liberal and humanitarian-friendly approach, is likely to take some 
time to implement the removal of all soldiers under the age of 18. Its 
leadership claimed to researchers for CSI in 2012 that they have issued 
verbal orders to halt under age recruitment. There was little evidence, 
though, of how these orders were followed up or enforced.713 It has 
attempted to create associated medical programmes that under 18 year 
                                            
707 Human Rights Watch, Sold to be Soldiers:The Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers 
in Burma, 110. 
708 Director of a CBO working with former child soldiers, interview, Mae Sot, August 30th, 
2012 
709 Child Soldiers International, Chance for a Change: Ending the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers in Myanmar, 23-27. 
710 Former DKBA soldier via translator, interview Mae Sot, October 21st, 2012. 
711 The Kalo Htoo Baw Karen Organisation (KKO), constitution, sections 9 (A), and 15 (D) 
and (F). Copy on file with the author. 
712 Child Soldiers International, Chance for a Change: Ending the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers in Myanmar, 32-33. 
713 Ibid., 2 & 32. 
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olds can work for, rather than being child soldiers.714 It has also opened 
more schools its areas since 2011. “They also built a school, the training 
centre. Now, this month, they will open the computer training, English 
speaking school.”715 
The influence of the leadership in the post-2010 DKBA, in its attempts to 
improve its reputation, was also acknowledged in interviews with people 
who had engaged with them on the child soldier issue.  
Their leaders are not the same type of western-friendly educated people, 
and they are not in those sorts of same mind sets. But I think they’re also 
not as exploitative as the DKBA generally sort of got its reputation for 
being.716 
With the recent (July 2013) signing by the KNU of the Geneva Call DoC on 
the protection of children from the effects of armed conflict,717 and moves 
to realign with the KNU and improve its legitimacy, the DKBA may now 
feel more need or pressure to implement similar policies within its own 
ranks.718 Reasons for the DKBA’s attempts to change its policies and 
practices regarding under age recruits have a pragmatic military and 
economic rationale, as well as a focus on increasing legitimacy. 
I had to meet a lot of people in Mae Sot for setting up the medic camp and 
the main office.  The reason they want me to do all these things is because 
I have a connection with the NGOs…. That’s why I can mingle and talk 
about what they can get or have from these organisations.719 
They took a general policy they don’t have a need in the ceasefire time for 
any young soldiers. They want to spend time taking them away from the 
                                            
714 Consultant and researcher working on child soldier and IDP issues, who had accessed 
DKBA areas in 2013, interview, December 6th, 2013. 
715 Director of a local NGO that conducted peace-building and civil society development in 
DKBA areas, interview, Yangon, September 11th, 2013. 
716 Consultant and researcher working on child soldier and IDP issues, who had accessed 
DKBA areas in 2013, interview, December 6th, 2013. 
717 "KNU to sign Geneva Call agreement to protect children and women," Karen News 
July 20, 2013. 
718 There were attempts to start education on IHL including about child soldiers with the 
DKBA by a local organisation in mid-2012, but the split with the KKO has put that on hold 
as of late 2012. 
719 Former DKBA soldier via translator, interview Mae Sot, October 21st, 2012. 
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military and training them in computer skills, sending them to various 
courses in the camps or in Mae Sot, doing medical training.720 
I’m not convinced that they still completely understand why you shouldn’t 
use child soldiers. I think they understand now that it’s against the law to 
use child soldiers so they want to stop using them, but I think to really 
effectively put in that policy, the commanders need to know more about 
exactly why.721 
Summary: NSAGs and civilian protection issues 
The brief outline of these four NSAGs and their involvement, positive 
and/or negative, with civilian protection issues focused on landmine use 
and children affected by armed conflict, has highlighted some recurring 
themes.  
Military necessity (proposition 1)  
Military necessity is implicit in the statements of NSAG leaders and 
members, in interviews and in secondary reports about the groups’ 
continued use, or stockpiling, of landmines. It was also present in the 
pressures, identified in secondary sources, for NSAGs to maintain 
numbers leading to underage conscription and recruitment quotas. The 
rationalisation often presented by NSAGs for the continued presence of 
children has been that while associated with the NSAGs by being in their 
camps, the children are not engaged in actual front line fighting or duties. 
Documentary evidence is clear that, despite claims to the contrary, all 
NSAGs in the 1990s had children in their ranks and certainly they were 
engaged in armed conflict. This was most clear for the KNPP and the 
DKBA case studies.  
Social and material resources at formation (proposition 2) 
The KNPP and NMSP (similar to other established NSAGs like the KNU 
and KIO) had a basis in pre-independence social and political movements. 
For example, Mon youth and cultural movements had developed in the 
1930s. In the case of the KNPP in the 1950s, its early leaders also had 
                                            
720 Consultant and researcher working on child soldier and IDP issues, who had accessed 
DKBA areas in 2013, interview, December 6th, 2013. 
721 Director of a CBO working with former child soldiers, interview, Mae Sot, August 30th, 
2012. 
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Second World War military experience and the organisation had access to 
weapons left over from that conflict. As also outlined in the Burma context 
chapter, both the NMSP and KNPP received assistance from the KNU in 
their early development. The ABSDF which formed in 1988 came from a 
pro-democracy uprising student base and also received initial support and 
training from ethnic NSAGs with which it became allied. The DKBA, 
however, in its pro-government stance between 1994 and 2010 while 
having some initial government support later become largely self-funding. 
As indicated in its case, economic motivations later dominated over the 
original Buddhist Karen political objectives for its leadership and later 
recruits.  
Access to resources and funding (proposition 3) 
Economic forces were also raised as contributing to both landmine use 
and children involved with NSAGs. The use of landmines was associated 
with defence of resources for organisational funding by NSAGs in some 
instances, and for individual or business interests, especially in the case of 
geographically dispersed or fragmented groups. Both purposes contribute 
to the problem, especially as use of landmines to defend resources leads 
to their deployment in contested areas and/or behind the front lines of 
conflicts, increasing danger to civilians and their livelihoods.  
This is because to protect ourselves, we have to be careful and avoid the 
landmines which were set up by our armed ethnic groups, and those 
landmines sometime exploded when our animals step on them…. There 
are so many places where we think we can grow food, but we cannot go 
back and work because of landmines.722 
We still have landmines as well in our old village, especially on the place 
between Daw Khu Soe and Dae ka Lee villages. Very recently, some 
villagers from Htee Soe Kuu village went back to their old village and try to 
clear the land to grow plant, and the fire reached the landmines and 
exploded and they got injured.723 
                                            
722 Villager (a), Papun Township, Karen state, 2013 (interviewed by a CBO for TBC “What 
villagers say”). 
723 Villager (a), Yae Ni Pouk village, Bawlake Township, Karenni State, 2013 (interviewed 
by a CBO for TBC “What villagers say”). 
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As will be outlined in the following chapter, external actors have engaged 
with NSAGs on this issue, but in terms of removal or prohibition of 
landmine use, the situation remains largely intractable. Concerted action 
by the NSAGs, the government, and external demining actors, is claimed 
to rest on the nationwide ceasefire agreement and political settlements 
following it. Such action, when it does occur, will have major implications 
for land and resource use, refugee and IDP returns, and the political 
legitimacy and authority of the actors facilitating and undertaking landmine 
clearance. 
Economic forces also influence recruitment patterns for NSAGs and the 
effect this has had on children affected by armed conflict. Where individual 
families are expected to provide a fighting age soldier for NSAGs, there is 
also an economic incentive to send a younger son (or daughter) and keep 
the more productive older ones. Ceasefire periods for NSAGs have been 
opportunities to also increase membership with a higher likelihood of 
recruitment under 18.724   
Geographical dispersion and organisational fragmentation 
(proposition 4) 
The above case studies reveal greater attempts at compliance and some 
external assessment of its effectiveness for the NMSP and the KNPP. 
Both organisations are smaller politically and militarily, with the NMSP, in 
particular, geographically concentrated in its controlled areas in Mon state 
This raises the issues of the geographic spread and organisational 
cohesion of these NSAGs and their ability to implement policies on 
children and on landmines. The ABSDF, while small, was also 
geographically spread across Burma’s borderlands as an ally of larger 
ethnic NSAGs. Its command and control, as the group acknowledged itself 
in its investigation of executions of some members in the 1990s, was not 
strong. While clearly a threat to the security of its own members in the 
early 1990s, the ABSDF has been more focused on health and education 
and other services to populations within the counter-state civil society of 
                                            
724 Human Rights Watch, Sold to be Soldiers:The Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers 
in Burma, 97-98. 
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resistance organisations. The smaller and more concentrated groups 
have, generally, been able to administer and implement policies more 
effectively. The DKBA, especially prior to 2010, on the other hand, was 
more geographically spread out across Karen state (as are the brigades of 
the KNU/KNLA), more decentralised, and more focused on economic 
incentives 
Perceptions of NSAG legitimacy (proposition 7) 
Another factor (also related to propositions 5-8) examined further in the 
next chapter is the role of external organisations, local and international, in 
engagement with the NSAGs, on the issues of landmine use and children 
affected by armed conflict. The four NSAGs outlined in this chapter now 
need, or wish, to be seen as legitimate locally and internationally and this 
may have dissuaded them from reliance on under-18 year olds for 
increasing numbers since the 2012 ceasefires. It may also have increased 
their efforts to be seen to be dealing with the issue, such as through 
making statements and instituting policies to that effect. An alternative 
explanation for prohibition on under age recruitment, or removal of 
remaining children from their ranks, may be more pragmatic in that they 
are not of significant military value as indicated in the case of the DKBA. 
The KNPP and NMSP have also previously declared, prior to 2012, that 
they no longer recruit children, although the effectiveness of the 
implementation of such policies has been questioned.  
The influence of external organisations as outlined above, has been more 
evident with the KNPP, NMSP, and ABSDF, but less so with the DKBA. 
The processes of humanitarian engagement, policy instruments, and 
actions undertaken with the four NSAGs outlined in this chapter, as well as 
with three other similar NSAGs, the KNU, KIO and CNF, will be explored in 
the next chapter.725
                                            
725 See chapters five and six regarding the rationale for inclusion of these extra NSAGs in 
discussion of humanitarian engagement organisations and their activities and policies. 
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Chapter Nine 
Humanitarian engagement with NSAGs in 
Burma 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the forms of engagement undertaken by local and 
international organisations with NSAGs in Burma to improve civilian 
protection and NSAG compliance with international humanitarian norms. 
Engagement with NSAGs on the humanitarian norm issues of landmine 
use and children affected by armed conflict is here disaggregated into 
indirect and direct engagement. Indirect engagement with NSAGs refers to 
circumstances where humanitarian concerns are raised by local and 
international organisations with NSAGs and their associated welfare wings 
as an adjunct to their other activities. Direct engagement is where the 
issues (landmines and/or children affected by armed conflict) are 
specifically addressed with NSAGs through advocacy, training, capacity 
building, and monitoring and reporting. In some instances, this also 
involves working with, or providing assistance to, NSAGs in the 
development of policy instruments and/or practical measures to ameliorate 
these threats to their constituent populations. Practical measures 
facilitated by this engagement may include assistance with demobilisation, 
rehabilitation and education for children from NSAGs, mine risk education, 
mapping and surveys of mined areas, and landmine clearance. 
In what follows, the situation for humanitarian and civil society activity 
inside and on the borders of Burma is first sketched out. Indirect 
engagement activities are situated within these spheres of activity. The 
processes and actors involved in direct forms of engagement are then 
explored. This chapter concludes with an assessment of the factors that 
have enabled or inhibited humanitarian engagement with NSAGs in 
Burma. 
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Indirect engagement on humanitarian issues 
The context for humanitarian engagement with NSAGs 
from inside Burma 
Until 2011, access to conflict affected areas for humanitarian INGOs and 
UN agencies inside Burma was very limited.726 Even with the considerable 
opening to international actors since 2011 and improvements in access for 
them, there are still restrictions for international agencies wanting to 
access NSAG areas. These were frequently mentioned in interviews. “But 
for the non-government controlled areas, the INGOs and UN agencies are 
not officially allowed to work in these areas.”727 “The fact is the 
government, I think they really don’t want us to go to there.”728 “The 
restrictions have mainly come from the government at this point.”729 
Access for international actors is also complicated through having to 
negotiate with the bureaucracies of the union and state level governments, 
their respective line ministries, the Tatmadaw, and NSAGs in order to 
reach conflict affected communities. 
You have to go to Naypyidaw, find your line ministry, get an MoU, get 
registration from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Attorney General’s Office, and finally the President’s Office, and line 
ministry, which for us is the Department of Social Welfare, and the MPC 
[Myanmar Peace Centre]. Once you get past that level, there’s the state 
level authorities, the chief minister and the line ministry departments at the 
state level. Then you have the non-state actors. And finally, you have the 
communities.730  
 
                                            
726 Restrictions on access were often mentioned by CBO, UN and INGO staff interviewed 
for this study. For an overview of restrictions pre 2011, and instances of limited access for 
UN and INGOs into conflict affected areas, see, Human Rights Watch, "“They Came and 
Destroyed Our Village Again": The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State," 
58-64. 
727 Local member of an NGO that worked with CBOs in KIO controlled areas, interview, 
Yangon, August 22, 2013. 
728 Local member of an UN humanitarian agency, interview, Myitkyina, August 29th 2013. 
729 Senior staff member of an international humanitarian agency, interview, Hpa-an, 
August 26th, 2014. 
730 Country director of an international mine action NGO, interview, Yangon, September 
6th, 2013. 
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INGOs operating inside the country have to work with government 
ministries. Consequently, assistance into ethnic areas delivered in 
conjunction with government actors and initiatives has often been viewed 
by local populations, and by NSAGs, as an extension of government 
control into their areas. This is also of concern as there are often pre-
existing welfare services associated with NSAGs already operating in 
those same areas.731 This was reiterated in interviews. “MRC [Myanmar 
Red Cross] is a humanitarian organisation but since it’s under the 
government, they [NSAGs] don’t want.”732   
There’s a huge fear that any service delivery, mine action, health, 
education, whatever, is going to come with an extension of the government 
institutional structure.733 
Another aspect for local civil society and NGOs in Burma wishing to 
engage with NSAGs is the prohibition of contact with them in the Unlawful 
Associations Act. This has been used specifically to prosecute individuals 
suspected of contact with NSAGs that are still in conflict with the 
government such as the KIA or TNLA.734 
Despite government repression, low profile local civil society networks able 
to work between government and NSAG controlled areas were operating 
inside Burma during the pre-2011 era.735 These organisations have been 
to the fore in the response to the renewed conflict in Kachin state since 
June 2011. The conflict resulted in total displacement of up to 120,000 
people by 2013. Of the 85,000 registered IDPS, 50,000 were in NSAG-
controlled areas and outside the reach of regular assistance from 
                                            
731 See regarding discussion of these concerns, Jolliffe, Ethnic Conflict and Social 
Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions. Ashley South, "Update on the peace 
process," in Burma/Myanmar: Where Now?, ed. Mikael Gravers and Flemming Ytzen 
(Copenhagen, Denmark: NIAS Press, 2014). 
732 Local member of an UN humanitarian agency (a), interview, Myitkyina, August 29th 
2013. 
733 Country director of an international mine action NGO, interview, Yangon, September 
6th, 2013. 
734 See, for example, Hlaing Kyaw Soe, "Calls grow for end to Unlawful Association Act," 
Myanmar Times November 27, 2014; Zarni Mann, "Interfaith Activist Detained for 
Unlawful Association," The Irrawaddy July 17, 2015. 
735 South, Perhult, and Carstensen, "Asia Programme Paper: ASP PP 2010/04: Conflict 
and Survival: Self-protection in South-east Burma," 53-55. 
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international agencies.736  Local partner organisations working with UN 
agencies such as Shalom (Nyein) Foundation, Karuna Myanmar Social 
Services (KMSS), and the Kachin Baptist Convention, have been central 
to the assistance response to the crisis.737  They are staffed by local 
people and often have informal contacts with NSAGs and access to non-
state areas.   
Shalom, as well as another national NGO, the Metta Foundation, grew out 
of faith-based civil society in Kachin during the KIO ceasefire period from 
1994 to 2011.738 Smaller CBOs such as Wunpawng Ningthoi (WPN) 
(Kachin Light) who have closer relations and acceptance with the KIO 
have also been involved as partner organisations to international agencies 
that cannot themselves access those areas.739 This was identified by a 
local member of an NGO that accessed KIO areas. “WPN and KMSS have 
good connections with the KIO and the KIO also helps them to deliver their 
activities very smoothly in those camps."740  
As a part of the assistance mission to IDPs in KIO areas, the UNOCHA 
has been able to extend some training to partner organisations working 
with the KIO administration. This has included aspects of humanitarian 
principles and norms. “We are going to have the second mission to Laiza 
very soon. We’re preparing for protection, all the basics to humanitarian 
law, like conflict and civilian, combatant and non-combatant, distinct 
separation.”741 The imparting of humanitarian norms via the local partner 
NGOs to NSAG-associated welfare actors was also mentioned by 
international agency staff. 
                                            
736 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Kachin Response 
Plan (Myanmar): March 2013-December 2013 (Yangon, Myanmar: UNOCHA, 2013), 3 & 
5. 
737 Ibid., 12. 
738 Lois Desaine, The Politics of Silence: Myanmar NGOs' Ethnic, Political and Religious 
Agendas (Bangkok, Thailand: Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
2011), 81-87. 
739 Seamus Martov, "Local Kachin Aid Group Goes Where Others Can’t," The Irrawaddy 
September 21st, 2012. 
740 Local member of an NGO that worked with Kachin CBOs in KIO controlled areas, 
interview, Yangon, August 22, 2013. 
741 Local member of an UN humanitarian agency (b), interview, Myitkyina, August 30th 
2013. 
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One of the requests we’re getting from a lot of the national NGOs who are 
operating across the line is ‘help us strengthen our capacity, not just to 
deliver assistance, but to understand how international humanitarian action 
works to train our staff on humanitarian principles.’ So we’re getting 
increasing numbers of requests from local NGOs to build their capacity… 
presumably, they’re talking to their interlocutors on the other side of the 
line on what those norms look like and why they need to be respected.742 
National actors inside Burma 
National NGOs such as Shalom and KMSS have been able to work in 
conflict affected areas with some acceptance from government and NSAG 
authorities. They have both been established as national NGOs since the 
1990s, and KMSS, for example, was able to work with IDPs during the 
height of the conflict between the government and KNPP in Karenni state 
in 1996.743 More recently, both Shalom and KMSS have been involved 
with MRE, as well as peacebuilding in Karenni state. They have 
undertaken this activity as local implementing partners to INGOs, which 
have been able to extend their activities through local partners since the 
2012 ceasefires.  
Such activities require these national NGOs to sometimes work in NSAG 
areas, such as those where the KNPP is active, and to work with both sets 
of authorities. “Now we [Shalom] have two main activities or projects. The 
first one is the mine risk education, the second one is consultation for 
peace.”744 “We [KMSS] work with the government through the Department 
of Social Welfare and with the KNPP.”745 In these roles, they are working 
as partners to INGOs engaged in mine action. The national NGOs in 
Karenni state have used participation in community events and activities 
such as performance and sports events to engage with and involve 
communities in MRE. 
                                            
742 Country director of an international humanitarian agency, interview, Yangon, 
September 6th, 2013. 
743 Member (a) of a focus group of staff from local NGOs involved in MRE in Karenni 
state, Loikaw, September 4th, 2014. 
744 Member of a local NGO (b) involved in MRE in Karenni state, interview, Loikaw, 
September 4th, 2014. 
745 Member of a local NGO (a) involved in MRE in Karenni state, interview, Loikaw, 
September 3rd, 2014 
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We use a play. A drama, to get people interested and involved and to raise 
awareness of the mine issue. Also through quizzes and question and 
answer. We work at the township level.746 
Firstly, we organise the activities in sports events…. Meanwhile we 
educate the people in terms of the mine risk…so we put mine risk 
education in the sports events.747 
This requires permission and cooperation from the KNPP, as was 
acknowledged in interviews. However, as national NGOs, they were 
initially viewed with suspicion by the KNPP as being an arm of government 
control. Shalom, for example, had earlier initiated an educational 
fellowship programme in 2008 that included people from areas controlled 
by the KNPP.748 
Local NGOs engaging with NSAGs, as demonstrated in the case of KMSS 
and Shalom in Karenni state, had an indirect influence on NSAGs in 
relation to the landmine issue. The KNPP, as well as the KNPLF749 have 
been willing to allow MRE in their areas.750  MRE is also significant as a 
means of building trust and practical coordination, and as an entry point 
for further discussion about clearance of mines, preventing under age 
recruitment, or monitoring of ceasefires. To this end, Shalom, KMSS and 
other national NGOs and CBOs in Karenni (Kayah) state have formed the 
Kayah state Peace Monitoring Network.751 A similar process has also 
been initiated in Mon state to monitor the NMSP-government ceasefire 
there through a group of local CBOs, the Mon State Civil Ceasefire Watch 
Committee.752 In both cases, these ceasefire monitoring committees 
                                            
746 Member of a local NGO (a) involved in MRE in Karenni state, interview, Loikaw, 
September 3rd, 2014 
747 Member of a local NGO (b) involved in MRE in Karenni state, interview, Loikaw, 
September 4th, 2014 
748 Member of a local NGO (b) involved in MRE in Karenni state, interview, Loikaw, 
September 4th, 2014 
749 The Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front. Originally a leftist faction that split 
from the KNPP in the 1970s, it agreed a ceasefire with the government in 1994, and 
became a BGF in 2009. 
750 Local staff member of an international mine action NGO, interview, Loikaw, September 
2nd, 2014 
751 Members of the KSPMN attended a focus group with the author of staff from local 
NGOs involved in MRE in Karenni state, Loikaw, September 4th, 2014 
752 Focus group discussion with members of CBOs involved in the MSCMC, Mawlamyine, 
August 28th, 2014 
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consist of local CBOs and NGOs accepted by, but remaining independent 
of, the government and NSAGs. 
They have some contact but armed group controlled CSOs are not 
accepted to participate in the committee because they are already on the 
side of the NMSP. The ceasefire monitoring committee is formed by the 
CSOs and other non-profit organisations that are independent.753 
Another, mostly under the radar, engagement activity undertaken by some 
smaller NGOs, has been informal peace-building through visits to NSAG 
areas.754 These initiatives have attempted to connect some of the more 
marginalised NSAGs in the borderlands to social and political 
developments in the centre. The DKBA, for example, has received less 
attention from western INGOs from inside Burma or from across borders, 
due both to restrictions on access, and to less trust or willingness towards 
engagement with international actors.755 Dialogue with the DKBA from 
small low profile Burmese NGOs has shown they have considered their 
future post-conflict role in light of developments since 2011.  
What they want, according to Colonel San Aung, he mentioned when the 
day comes they also need to sacrifice their arms. At that time, they will go 
back and be farmers because they will become the public. At that time they 
need to build some trust between the DKBA and their public.756  
This low-key engagement has the potential for establishing future contacts 
with NSAGs for international actors that do have a specific focus on 
humanitarian issues such as landmine use or protection of children. 
                                            
753 Member (a) of focus group of CBOs engaged in ceasefire monitoring in Mon state, 
Mawlamyine, 28 August, 2014. 
754 Director of a local NGO that conducted peace-building and civil society development in 
DKBA areas, interview, Yangon, September 11th, 2013; A former member of a local NGO 
that conducted peace-building and civil society development in DKBA areas, personal 
communication, Yangon, August 13th, 2013. 
755 Most international actors acknowledged in interviews that they had no contact with the 
UWSA in northeast Burma, which has close cross-border relations with China. The DKBA 
in Karen state, as outlined in the previous chapter, had shown some interest in opening to 
external engagement, but there are also members of its leadership that wish to maintain 
a closer political and economic relationship with the central Burma government. 
756 Director of a local NGO that conducted peace-building and civil society development in 
DKBA areas, interview, Yangon, September 11th, 2013. Colonel San Aung was a central 
leader in the post-2010 DKBA. His faction was later ousted from the DKBA in July 2015 
following renewed fighting with government forces over control of taxation on the new 
Asia Highway linking Hpa-an in Karen state to Myawaddy and Mae Sot on the Thai-
Burma border.  
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International actors inside Burma 
In 2015, the extent of access for international agencies to NSAG areas 
varies across different ethnic states and remains limited and dependent on 
tightly controlled government permission.757 NSAG interest in international 
assistance coming into their areas was acknowledged by the country 
director of an INGO. 
When we were granted authorisation to set up an office there [Hpa-an] and 
start working with the MOIP [Ministry of Immigration and Population], we 
started receiving faxes from the KNU, from the DKBA and the NMSP to 
bring our services down to their areas.758 
Following ceasefires in 2011 and 2012 with most major NSAGs, some 
INGOs and UN agencies, usually working through local partner 
organisations, are now able to undertake activities with government 
supervision in former conflict areas. Where this has interfaced with the 
issues addressed by this study in relation to NSAGs has mostly been in 
cooperation on MRE and victim assistance, as mentioned above. 
Regarding action on landmines, some pilot non-technical surveys (NTS)759 
have been carried out by INGOs with government and NMSP permission 
in NMSP areas.760 The circumstances of this action were explained by a 
member of an international mine action NGO. 
The Mon NTS project took a lot to get underway. We had buy in from the 
NMSP but it was difficult getting government permission. However, we 
were only allowed to work in NMSP controlled villages where we were 
allowed to by the government, and there were no mines. In NMSP 
                                            
757 For example, state-level ministries have been more amenable to international 
organisations and their local partners working in or adjacent to NSAG areas in Mon and 
Karenni states, than has been the case in Karen state. 
758 Country director of an INGO, interview, Yangon, September 16th, 2014. 
759 “The term non-technical survey encompasses all non-technical means, including desk 
assessments, analysis of historical records and a wide range of other information 
gathering and analysis functions, as well as physical visits to field locations. All elements 
of the nontechnical process revolve around identifying, accessing, collecting, reporting 
and using information to help define where mines/ERW are to be found, as well as where 
they are not, and to support land cancellation, reduction and clearance decision making 
processes.” United Nations Mine Action Service, International Mine Action Standard: 
Non-technical survey (New York, NY: UNMAS, 2013), 1. 
760 There are NMSP controlled areas in neighbouring Karen state as well as in Mon state. 
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controlled areas in Kayin state, the state level government would not allow 
us to work there.761 
This demonstrates the limitations for mine action INGOs, outlined earlier, 
due to bureaucracy, union-level and state-level administrations, and 
government controls exerted on any such activities.   
Some NSAGs have also started to develop parallel policies that echo the 
government’s attempts to control international agencies. Their documents 
deploy the language of international humanitarian norms and human 
rights, as also espoused by the international organisations they engage 
with.  
One thing I think we’ve seen over the last couple of years, particularly the 
KNU and KNPP are springing to mind, they have issued policies on their 
engagement with humanitarian organisations…So you had the KNPP 
saying ‘we want to issue ID for your staff, we want to see your work plans, 
if you want to go to our area you have to put in a written request and we’ll 
give you a pass.’ The KNU was also kind of saying things along the same 
lines as well, but they’ve kind of pulled back a bit. In both cases we are 
able to go to KNPP and KNU areas without this being required. But there 
were moves in that direction. 762 
The KNU’s 2013 policy document on humanitarian operations in their 
areas of control presents an example of the indirect influence of 
engagement by humanitarian actors on NSAG policies. It states: “the KNU 
respects and promotes the implementation of International Humanitarian 
Law, Refuge Law, and Human Rights Law as they relate to both the 
delivery and the receipt of humanitarian aid.”763 The KNU’s 2014 update to 
this policy relaxed the requirements for MoUs and registration and 
reduced the reference to IHL, while requiring that “the delivery of 
                                            
761 Representative of an international mine action NGO, interview, Yangon, September 
15th, 2014. 
762 Senior staff member of an international humanitarian agency, interview, Hpa-an, 
August 26th, 2014. 
763 Karen National Union Office of the Supreme Headquarters, "Policy on Humanitarian 
Operation in Ceasefire Zone," (March 25th, 2013), Guiding Principle IV. See this 
document in appendix 3. 
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humanitarian assistance, in accordance with the international norms and 
standards, shall respect human rights.”764  
This issuing of humanitarian policy by NSAGs recalls the socialisation 
process by which norms become accepted as appropriate, as outlined by 
Johnston, Checkel and others in chapter two. Whether it is done for 
instrumental purposes, or for deeper held beliefs, the significance is that 
the KNU wishes to demonstrate awareness of these norms in its dealings 
with international actors. In this instance, the KNU’s standards and 
procedures for humanitarian action in their areas echo humanitarian and 
human rights norms as advocated for, and in the language of, international 
actors. It also demonstrates the wish to increase legitimacy through a role 
in governance and facilitating assistance to populations in areas controlled 
or contested by that NSAG. This also reflects the significance of rebel 
administrations as a means to maintain legitimacy as suggested by 
Podder and by Mampilly in chapters two and four. 
Indirect engagement with NSAGs on Burma’s borders 
A significant influence on humanitarian engagement with NSAGs in 
Burma, has been the relationship between international organisations and 
NSAGs on Burma’s borders. Most of this has occurred on the long Thai-
Burma border. China has not permitted international actors to work from its 
borders with northern Burma, whilst the Indian military has periodically 
cooperated against NSAGs on its shared border with Burma since the 
1990s.765 The short border with Bangladesh is tightly guarded and 
patrolled by both countries. 
International actors on the Thai-Burma border 
Conflict affected populations in eastern Burma, along with NSAGs, were 
increasingly forced across the border into Thailand from the mid-1980s by 
Tatmadaw offensives. Contact with international organisations in Thailand 
has consequently influenced the policies, and in some instances, the 
                                            
764 Karen National Union Office of the Supreme Headquarters, Kawthoolei,, "Karen 
National Union (KNU) Policy for Humanitarian Assistance," (June 11, 2014), (1). See this 
document in appendix 3. 
765 Lawrence E. Cline, "Insurgency in Amber: Ethnic Opposition Groups in Myanmar," 
Small Wars and Insurgencies 20, no. 3 (2009): 585-86. 
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practices of these NSAGs. This is important, since NSAGs on the Thai-
Burma border have often sought to present themselves as better 
international citizens in comparison to the central Burma state and its 
armed forces. The KNU, KNPP and NMSP that operate in areas adjacent 
to the Thai border have had the most contact with external international 
organisations. Promotion by international organisations of humanitarian 
norms, education and civil society development with communities 
associated with these NSAGs has since been influential. Furthermore, the 
NSAGs themselves often had well established governance structures in 
place prior to the refugee situation developing on the Thai border in the 
1990s.766 For example, when Karen refugees started crossing the border 
into Thailand in the mid to late 1980s, an existing level of organisation and 
self-sufficiency was noted by the few international aid workers present at 
that time.767  
The Thai government, which is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, had previously hosted refugees from conflicts in Indochina on 
its borders with Cambodia and Laos since the 1970s. The refugee camps 
on the border with Cambodia had also provided rear bases for the Khmer 
Rouge-led insurgency against the Vietnamese backed government in 
Cambodia in the 1980s.768  Thailand wished to retain control and avoid UN 
involvement with refugee camps on its border with Burma and instead 
permitted a group of mostly Christian INGOs to deliver assistance there. 
From the late 1980s onwards, the INGOs operating along the Thai-Burma 
border worked closely with the NSAG administrations in the running of 
refugee camps.769  
The role of international assistance to the refugee camps along the Thai-
Burma border, and their relationship to the role of NSAGs still operating in 
                                            
766 McConnachie, "Rethinking the ‘Refugee Warrior’: The Karen National Union and 
Refugee Protection on the Thai–Burma Border," 40-41,& 46. 
767 The Burmese Border Consortium, Twenty Years on the Border (Bangkok, Thailand: 
Burmese Border Consortium, 2004), 19. 
768 See, for a detailed account of the role of the Thai border based refugee camps in the 
Khmer Rouge insurgency in Cambodia during the 1980s, Terry, Condemned to Repeat?: 
The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, 114-54. 
769 These INGOs formed the Burma Border Consortium (BBC), which later became the 
Thai-Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), and since 2012 has been The Border 
Consortium (TBC). 
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Burma, has received some critical attention. This is due to the role of the 
camps in Thailand as “refuge for the victims of the civil war, and unofficial 
base areas for the KNU and other armed groups.”770 Some argue the 
international assistance has prolonged the conflict inside Burma by 
enabling NSAGs, especially the KNU and KNPP, to continue armed 
conflict due to diversion of material assistance and the legitimacy they 
have gained through association with cross-border assistance and 
administration of the refugee camps.771 Moreover, that support came at a 
time when these NSAGs were almost militarily defeated inside Burma.772 
Others have pointed to the effective role these NSAGs have played as 
partners to international actors in the running of the refugee camps. This 
perspective further suggests engagement can encourage those NSAGs 
that have been active in providing civilian welfare towards “a more 
representative, accountable, and democratic approach to governance.”773 
The integral role of the NSAGs in facilitating the delivery of assistance and 
provision of services to their areas has also been acknowledged.774 Much 
of this activity has been conducted cross-border with support from INGOs 
on the Thai side. 
There were benefits for the NSAGs derived from their relationships with 
the Thai border-based INGOs and donors. The situation provided some 
limited material support through diversion to NSAGs of (mostly) food aid 
provided by INGOs to refugee camps. There have also been concerns 
about NSAG soldiers and their families residing in the refugee camps, and 
their use as sites of recruitment (including some underage).775 These 
issues were mentioned in interviews with people who had long-term 
                                            
770 South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 94. 
771 See, for example, Horstmann, "Sacred Spaces of Karen Refugees and Humanitarian 
Aid Across the Thailand-Burma Border."; Jelmer Brouwer and Joris van Wijk, "Helping 
hands: external support for the KNU insurgency in Burma," Small Wars & Insurgencies 24 
no. 5 (2013). 
772 South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 95. 
773 McConnachie, "Rethinking the ‘Refugee Warrior’: The Karen National Union and 
Refugee Protection on the Thai–Burma Border," 30. 
774 Steven Lanjouw and Nwe Nwe Aye, SDC Health Assessment in Southeast Region of 
Myanmar (Yangon, Myanmar: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2013), 
20-21. Jolliffe, Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions. 
775 Brouwer and Wijk, "Helping hands: external support for the KNU insurgency in 
Burma," 842-45.  
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experience of working with humanitarian organisations on the Thai-Burma 
border.776 
From the early 2000s, material assistance from INGOs going across the 
border, some of which was diverted to NSAGs, was at least officially 
reduced or stopped by international agencies.777 This also coincided with 
improved relations between Thailand and Burma, where the NSAGs were 
no longer as useful militarily to Thailand, and instead were becoming an 
impediment to improving inter-state and economic relations.778 The role of 
humanitarian assistance has been more significant through providing 
perceptions of legitimacy for the NSAGs, especially the KNU, KNPP, and 
NMSP. This has come through their association with international aid 
agencies, administration of refugee camps and facilitation of aid and 
welfare services to populations they can access inside Burma.779 
Additionally, being associated with the delivery of assistance has further 
enhanced their ability to present themselves internationally as 
representative and accountable actors.780  They have also maintained a 
sense of identity around their respective ethno-nationalist causes through 
their own education systems in refugee camps and in the areas they 
control inside Burma.781  
Assistance to IDPs in conflict-affected areas has been provided by welfare 
wings of the armed groups and by other, more independent, cross-border 
assistance groups. These assistance organisations, out of necessity for 
access and security, often have a good relationship with NSAGs. In some 
                                            
776 Former humanitarian worker and long-term researcher and consultant on ethnic issues 
in Burma, interview, Chiang Mai, July 21, 2014; Long-term researcher and consultant on 
humanitarian issues in Burma, interview via Skype from Chiang Mai, 4th January, 2013. 
777 Henry, "Civil Society amid Civil War: Political Violence and Non-violence in the 
Burmese Democracy Movement," 104-05. 
778 Brouwer and Wijk, "Helping hands: external support for the KNU insurgency in 
Burma," 841. 
779 See, regarding the role of refugees and humanitarian aid as significant forms of 
support for the KNU, ibid.; Horstmann, "Sacred Spaces of Karen Refugees and 
Humanitarian Aid Across the Thailand-Burma Border." 
780 Sandra Dudley, 'External’ Aspects of Self-Determination Movements in Burma, QEH 
Working Paper Series Working Paper Number 94 (Oxford, UK: Oxford Department of 
International Development, 2003); Dudley, "Reshaping Karenni-ness in Exile: Education, 
Nationalism and Being in the Wider World." 
781 Lall and South, "Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-state ethnic education regimes 
in Burma." 
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instances they work with or have been accompanied by NSAGs for 
security.782 
They [the KNLA] do provide security, yeah, security for the organisations, 
for transportation, for IDPs. If you want to go on a relief mission, whatever, 
you want to go and provide this, you have to check with the KNLA first 
whether the area is safe or not. You have to rely like that for security and 
information on KNLA troops.783 
When we travel in the New Mon State Party or KNU controlled area it’s 
good, but when people have to cross the motorway to the western 
[government controlled] area they have to worry about their security.784 
The Free Burma Rangers, for example, work closely with ethnic NSAGs. 
FBR combines the provision of medical assistance to villagers in conflict-
affected areas, a close relationship with the NSAGs and Christian ideals, 
and claims to provide assistance to conflict affected communities 
regardless of ethnicity or religious belief.785  The Back Pack Health Worker 
Team (BPHWT) claims to be able to work on both sides with armed 
groups that have sometimes been in conflict with each other, such as the 
KNPP and KNPLF in Karenni state prior to the recent ceasefires. “In the 
past, in Karenni state, KNPP and KNPLF they are fighting with each other, 
they are in conflict, but we had backpack teams on both sides in this area.” 
786 
A developing civil society within the sphere of border-based NSAGs 
The relationship between the humanitarian INGOs and the NSAGs, 
usually via their political and welfare arms, has provided a significant 
degree of engagement on rights-based issues and the promotion of 
broadly western, liberal and democratic principles. This has also been 
supported, in the case of the Christian-led NSAGs, such as the KNPP and 
                                            
782 South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 96-99. 
783 KNU member, interview, Chiang Mai, October 18, 2013. 
784 Local member of a cross-border CBO, interview, Sangkhlaburi, September 24th, 2013. 
A representative of an international humanitarian NGO involved in engagement with 
NSAGs, also acknowledged this relationship. “I think that partly it’s been the nature of the 
conflict because the assistance can only get into those areas with the acquiescence and 
active role of the armed groups, military escorts etc.” Interview, September 19th, 2013 
785 Director of FBR, interview by email, November 14th, 2013. 
786 Director of a cross-border assistance CBO, interview, Mae Sot, November 24th, 2012. 
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KNU, by international Christian organisations.787 Flowing on from this, with 
the involvement of some highly motivated local and international 
individuals over the last twenty years, has been the development of 
organisations that are more independent of the NSAGs. This nascent civil 
society within the sphere of the NSAGs, has focused on human, women’s 
and child rights, health, education, social and environmental issues.788 It 
has meant for some organisations that there has been lengthy 
engagement and the members of welfare organisations, whether NSAG-
aligned or independent, have had a close relationship with NSAGs. The 
nature and value of these relationships was highlighted by respondents 
from local civil society organisations that have worked with NSAGs. 
I used to go with them [KNLA]. I went to their area with them and they met 
the government groups and they were going to shoot but they saw some 
porter who is Karen, so they say ‘no, now is not a good time to 
shoot’…They saw their enemy in their area but they didn’t shoot because 
they saw some evidence that normal people were working in forced 
labour.789 
I’m thinking long term, I don’t know the best word, but respect building. 
We’ve been operating in this area for 15 years now, through thick and 
thin, … and the ethnic leaders see that and get respect for FBR, or another 
organisation, and then they will listen to you if you say, ‘oh you know 
landmines really don’t work that well for defence.’ They won’t just write it 
off automatically.790 
Rights focused organisations that have developed out of this environment 
include the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), the Human Rights 
Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), and the Human Rights Education 
Institute of Burma (HREIB). Women’s issues and rights have been 
addressed by organisations such as the Karen Women’s Organisation 
(KWO) and Mon Women’s Organisation (MWO). Other organisations have 
                                            
787 Alexander Horstmann, "Ethical Dilemmas and Identifications of Faith-Based 
Humanitarian Organizations in the Karen Refugee Crisis," Journal of Refugee Studies 24, 
no. 3 (2011). 
788 See, for an outline of some of these organisations and their development, Christina 
Fink, "Militarization in Burma's ethnic states: causes and consequences," Contemporary 
Politics 14, no. 4 (2008): 456-59. 
789 A local member of a CBO, interview, Sangkhlaburi, September 24, 2013. 
790 A senior staff member of a cross-border humanitarian assistance organisation, 
interview, Chiang Mai, November 26th, 2012. 
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taken on environmental concerns, for example, the Karen Environmental 
and Social Action Network (KESAN).  While border-based rights groups 
have largely focused in the past on the abuses committed by the 
Tatmadaw and its allies, they have more recently reported on or 
challenged some aspects of NSAG behaviour, and issues such as 
landmine use and children affected by armed conflict.791 Consequently, 
relationships with NSAGs have not always been easy for some of the 
CSOs that have drawn attention to the abuses committed by NSAGs, or to 
issues NSAGs are implicated with. 
In every area the human rights worker and the politician or the armed 
groups always have conflict because when the human rights activist says 
the truth about that force or that group, they may not be happy.792 
With the land issue who are the main actors who cause the problem? The 
KNU are a part of the problem as well. So I raised it with them. We need to 
find out solutions to solve the problem and help the villagers.793 
The significance of the border-based NSAGs and aid actors 
The role of refugee camps and of humanitarian assistance in supporting 
NSAGs was raised in the literature by Terry, by Pugh et al in chapter four, 
and also by Anderson, Polman, and De Waal, in chapter three. The 
humanitarian and refugee situation on the Thai-Burma border and its 
influence on NSAGs has differed in some respects to the examples, such 
as on the Cambodia border in the 1980s, examined by Terry.  While the 
refugee camps and NSAG administrations on the Burma border were 
tolerated by the Thai government, the conflicts across the border in Mon, 
Karen, or Karenni states were not of significant interest to major powers, 
unlike the Cold War era conflict in Cambodia. Consequently, there was no 
significant external state support to the military dimension of the NSAGs 
on the border. Individuals in the Thai government and army maintained 
relations with NSAGs, but they were not allowed to seriously disrupt 
                                            
791 See, for example, Karen Human Rights Group, "Abuses since the DKBA and KNLA 
ceasefires: Forced labour and arbitrary detention in Dooplaya KHRG #2012-F2."; Human 
Rights Foundation of Monland, "Biting the hand that feeds: Armed extortion in Karen 
State," The Mon Forum 8(2011); Karen Human Rights Group, "Notes on Landmine Use: 
SLORC and KNLA."; Karen Human Rights Group, Growing up under militarisation: Abuse 
and agency of children in Karen State. 
792 A local member of a CBO, interview, Sangkhlaburi, September 24, 2013. 
793 A local member of a CBO, interview, Mae Sot, October 19, 2013. 
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economic relations with Burma from the 1990s onwards.794 The low profile 
support to the refugee camps and cross-border assistance to IDPs by 
humanitarian actors was of little material and military value to the NSAGs, 
but association with it was significant for their legitimacy, as outlined 
above.  
Another feature of the border-based INGOs and promotion of liberal rights-
based issues with NSAGs and their constituencies, has been the gradual 
development of some increasingly independent civil society organisations 
within the socio-political sphere of the NSAGs. An explanation for the 
ability of some civil society organisations to be able to have more 
independence and a voice in these matters (albeit sometimes quietly 
behind the scenes) is the weakening of the power of the ethnic NSAGs 
themselves since the military reversals of the mid-1990s. The grassroots 
focused development approach of the INGOs to NSAG constituencies 
may also have contributed to the reduced power of elites within the armed 
groups on the Thai-Burma border. 795 This point was reiterated by a long-
term observer of the Thai border NSAGs. 
When I first came to the border in the early 1990s, I don’t think General Bo 
Mya’s KNU would, in those days when the KNU and other armed groups 
were stronger, have been willing to allow autonomous community 
organisations the degree of space and freedom that has since become the 
norm.796  
These more autonomous CSOs have been involved in documentation, 
reporting, training and direct advocacy with NSAGs on humanitarian 
norms around landmine use and children affected by armed conflict. They 
have also been partners and interlocutors with access to NSAGs for 
INGOs wishing to directly engage with the armed groups on humanitarian 
norm issues. 
                                            
794 In the 1990s the Thai government increasingly pressured these NSAGs to reach 
ceasefires with the Burma government. The NMSP did so in 1995, partly due to the threat 
of the forced repatriation of 10,000 Mon refugees from Thailand. South, Mon Nationalism 
and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake. 
795 Cline, "Insurgency in Amber: Ethnic Opposition Groups in Myanmar," 582. 
796 Long-term researcher and consultant on humanitarian issues in Burma, interview via 
Skype from Chiang Mai, 4th January, 2013. 
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Direct engagement addressing NSAGs on landmine 
use and contamination 
Practical measures 
Survey of mined areas 
Until 2011, “the Burma/Myanmar Government has refused to allow mine 
action activities by the UN, INGOs or any other outside actors.” 797   
Previous to the new ceasefires in 2012, surveys and mapping of 
suspected mine contaminated areas had been carried out by local CBOs 
and NGOs, frequently working cross-border in conflict-affected areas as 
partners to a few INGOs. This collected data gave a partial picture of the 
situation countrywide, due to limited access and ongoing conflict. Some of 
the local organisations undertaking these surveys were close to NSAGs, 
given the need for security and access.798  Demonstrating the value of that 
relationship for humanitarian engagement purposes, Danish Church Aid 
(DCA) and Geneva Call were able to access this ‘CBO Database’ for a 
report on the landmine situation in southeast Burma in 2011.799  
Currently (2015) there has been no action by international organisations 
on the clearance of landmines in Burma.800 A couple of mine action INGOs 
inside Burma have been involved in some limited NTS with government 
permission in NMSP areas, but with no landmines being located.801 This 
outcome also concurs with the analysis of the NMSP in the last chapter as 
not being a currently active user of landmines. An issue for even these 
tentative steps towards surveying possible mine-affected areas is 
presented by the role of external organisations operating inside the 
country with government permission and direction for where they can 
conduct surveys. As mentioned earlier, there have been perceptions from 
villagers in NSAG areas of external organisations being aligned with 
government expansion. There is sometimes a reluctance on the part of 
                                            
797 Geneva Call and DCA Mine Action, Humanitarian Impact of Landmines in 
Burma/Myanmar, 16. 
798 Ibid., 8. 
799 Ibid. 
800 Guy Dinmore, "Three years, zero landmines cleared," Myanmar Times July 14, 2015. 
801 A representative of an international mine action NGO, interview, Yangon, September 
15th, 2014. 
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community leaders to speak up about the whereabouts of mines, or mine 
incidents, for fear of being seen as collaborating with, or informing, the 
government. This was pointed out by mine action NGOs in several 
interviews.802  “If they give their information it could have repercussions on 
protection issues on the community, that’s certainly an issue we’re facing 
in mine action.”803 
MRE and NSAGs 
Since 2012, more mine action INGOs have entered Burma, and, while 
demining is unable to proceed, they have been able to work on MRE.804 
MRE in Burma’s border areas has, however, in some instances involved 
INGOs based outside the country, usually working from Thailand, 
supporting MRE carried out by the humanitarian wings of NSAGs and 
some other semi-independent CBOs. The 2011 Geneva Call/DCA report 
identified 15 CBOs that were able to conduct mine risk education in 
conflict-affected areas, as well as victim assistance, area surveys and 
providing prosthetic limbs. Ten out of 15 of the CBOs in the report had 
cross-border access facilitated by NSAGs.805 
The Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP), for 
example, a humanitarian arm of the KNU, has included MRE as part of its 
activities, working as a partner to INGOs supporting cross-border 
assistance. It also undertakes mapping and non-technical surveys of 
mined areas and warns villagers of the location of mined areas.806  The 
Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre (KSWDC), the 
humanitarian arm of the KNPP, has also conducted MRE in conjunction 
with the KNPP. The KSWDC has claimed this activity includes MRE, 
                                            
802 A representative of an international mine action NGO, interview, Yangon, September 
15th, 2014; A local member of an international NGO involved in mine action and 
education, interview, Chiang Mai, November 28th, 2012; Focus group of staff from local 
NGOs involved in MRE in Karenni state, Loikaw, September 4th, 2014. 
803 Country director of an international mine action NGO, interview, Yangon, September 
6th, 2013. 
804 See, for example, a video of the INGO the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducting 
MRE in Karenni state in 2014, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), "Mine Risk Education in 
Myanmar,"  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hjmDOqdS7n4.  
805 Geneva Call and DCA Mine Action, Humanitarian Impact of Landmines in 
Burma/Myanmar, 19. 
806 Senior member of a Karen cross- border CBO involved in MRE, interview, Chiang Mai, 
October 12, 2014. 
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mapping and signage.807 The role of the KNPP in MRE was also 
mentioned in interviews.808 The relationship of INGOs, especially DCA, 
working on MRE and mine survey through local partner organisations with 
NSAGs, such as the KNPP, was also acknowledged by the KNPP 
leadership.  
The Danish [DCA] are also working on the landmines as well.  They are 
now working with the KSWDC. Yeah they are based in Chiang Mai or Mae 
Sot. I just met with the guy in Chiang Mai last week.809  
An instance of the role of cross-border CBOs conducting MRE with the 
support of an NSAG, in this case the KNU, was documented by a member 
of the ICBL. As well as engaging with the KNU to provide MRE for its 
constituency in areas it controlled, the project also had the longer term 
objective of “advocating a halt in mine use by the KNU.”810  It also provides 
a useful inside view of the processes involved. Initially, a local partner 
organisation, the BPHWT, and a common issue area as an entry point (in 
this case public health) were identified. The involvement of a CBO known 
to and accepted by the NSAG, and the framing of the landmine problem 
as a public health issue, “reassured the political leadership of the KNU that 
the MRE was a humanitarian rather than a political project.”811 The project 
combined four years of previous data on Burma mine victims in relation to 
behaviours that had led to deaths and injuries from mines, and local 
knowledge from the trainees, to develop teaching materials and posters. 
These resources helped raise awareness of the problem and provided 
practical measures for people to stay safe in mine affected 
communities.812 
                                            
807 Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre, "Karenni Mine Risk Education,"  
http://karenniswdc.blogspot.co.nz/2009/06/karenni-mine-risk-education_25.html. 
808 Member of a local NGO (a) involved in MRE in Karenni state, interview, Loikaw, 
September 3rd; 2014; Member of a local NGO (b) involved in MRE in Karenni state, 
interview, Loikaw, September 4th, 2014; Local staff member of an international mine 
action NGO, interview, Loikaw, September 2nd, 2014 
809 Senior member of leadership, KNPP, interview, Mae Hong Son, December 23rd, 2012 
810 Moser-Puangsuwan, "Mine Risk Education in Kawthoolei Liberated Area: An 
Experiment in Creating a Program of MRE in a Non-State-Controlled Area of Burma." 
811 Ibid. 
812 Ibid. 
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From the perspective of NSAG-civilian relations and perceptions of 
legitimacy, it was noted that there was a concern from the KNU that the 
program may have been “a covert attempt to create opposition to their 
policies within their own constituency.”813  Indeed, as is acknowledged in 
that article, part of the intention of the activity at the time was to convince 
the KNU to stop using landmines. Ten years later, the KNU and other 
NSAGs still deploy landmines and the provision of MRE by CBOs, 
including CIDKP, KSWDC or BPHWT and others in NSAG controlled 
areas is still ongoing.  
MRE remains the principal activity addressing the landmine issue in lieu of 
any systematic clearance. NSAGs in eastern Burma have facilitated this 
activity for external actors and undertaken it themselves through their 
welfare arms and other associated actors. A caveat about MRE and 
engagement with NSAGs is in the need for information about the 
whereabouts of landmines to be relevant to specific local programs. 
Information for this is gathered from local villagers, CBOs and NSAGs. 
The extent of what is provided, especially from armed groups, or from 
others who may have vested interests in keeping certain areas mined, is 
therefore not complete. “Many of these groups are saying absolutely no 
clearance of landmines or even marking of landmines until some of these 
larger issues are sorted out.”814  
I think you can say they are supportive of what we are doing. But they are 
also very conscious they don’t want to tell you everything, especially in the 
area where they’re protective of their own security. They will only tell you 
where there are landmines where it is not important for them anymore.815 
A difficulty for MRE or surveys of mined areas, and a direct threat to those 
living in proximity to them, is the overlap between multiple NSAGs, as well 
as the Tatmadaw and groups aligned with it. Areas of control and 
demarcation between these armed actors are unclear and shifting. This is 
                                            
813 Ibid. 
814 Country director of an international mine action NGO, interview, Yangon, September 
6th, 2013. 
815 A local member of an international NGO involved in mine action and education, 
interview, Chiang Mai, November 28th, 2012. 
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further exacerbated by a frequent focus on the control of resources and 
the use of landmines to secure them. 
It’s territorial control, there’s not marks, there’s not clear boundaries of 
who’s involved in what territory. It’s the resources really that they’re 
controlling. In the same area you may have timber, gold, animal trade, 
drugs, multiple different business interests in any given area.816 
Since the 2012 ceasefires, the continued build-up of Tatmadaw forces in 
ethnic areas, land grabbing, and demands on resources, have meant not 
all actors will support a blanket marking and clearance of all landmines. 
Military necessity, and increasingly economic motives, mean NSAGs, 
business interests, and some communities continue to place landmines, or 
to not want mined areas surveyed or cleared. 
Local initiatives for mine clearance 
As noted in the previous chapter, there were some ad hoc clearance 
activities undertaken by the KNLA, DKBA, and BGF in Karen state in 
2013. However, casualties, lack of coordination, lack of confidence in the 
peace process, and sporadic outbreaks of fighting have prevented any 
systematic and concerted action. Indeed, recent fighting may have led to 
more deployment of landmines in areas contested between the DKBA and 
the government, as they caused casualties during fighting along the Asia 
Highway near Kawkareik in Karen state in July 2015.817 
One mine clearance initiative has developed since 2013 from the Thai side 
of the border involving a local organisation working with Karen CBOs and 
assisted by at least one international demining professional. The 
organisation conducted pilot projects in two small areas in Karen state with 
the permission of the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO).818 It 
used rice tractors, modified with spiked rollers and protective armour 
plates, to clear suspected hazardous areas. The mechanical clearance 
                                            
816 Country director of an international mine action NGO, interview, Yangon, September 
6th, 2013. 
817 Lawi Weng, "Casualties on Both Sides as Conflict Between DKBA, Govt Drags On," 
The Irrawaddy July 13, 2015. 
818 The KNDO was the original KNU armed force formed in 1947. The KNLA has long 
since been the regular army of the KNU, but the KNDO still organises local village militias 
or ‘home guards.’ 
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process was then followed by hand raking using long-handled rakes over 
cleared areas.819  While demonstrating some success in clearance, the 
initiative remains small and underfunded. Concerns have also been raised 
by Yangon-based mine action INGOs about the lack of conformity of the 
clearance methods with international mine action standards. “They hardly 
conform to safety standards. It would be great to get permission to go and 
help these ethnic groups, but neither the groups nor the government trust 
us.”820  The organisation also met with INGO staff in Karen state, who 
expressed similar concerns.821 Clearly, safety is a significant concern, 
especially as the organisation includes people from the villages being 
cleared in the demining process. 
A feature of this project was its focus on “humanitarian demining”; the 
clearance of nuisance mines left behind in villages, fields, or pathways, 
and other areas that are no longer of any strategic value. These are areas 
where, in the past, land has changed hands many times between multiple 
armed actors, where the Tatmadaw has laid mines in villages to deter 
return of IDPs, or where mines have been laid by armed groups to deter 
pursuit. 822 This organisation did not directly address the issue of clearance 
of business mines, or mines laid by villagers for ‘protection’, as was raised 
in chapter seven. As a Karen-led organisation, known to the Karen armed 
groups and CBOs, that may have been less of a concern for villagers than 
would have been the case of a government-mandated international mine 
agency arriving from Yangon with less understanding of the local situation. 
There are military and political, as well as practical, considerations 
attached to the development of an organisation like this. KNLA brigade 
commanders,823 for example, were varied in their enthusiasm for the 
                                            
819 Personal communication with members of this organisation, June to October, 2014. A 
video of this activity is also in the possession of the author. 
820 An international mine action NGO representative in Yangon, quoted in Dinmore, 
"Three years, zero landmines cleared." 
821 Senior staff member of an international humanitarian agency, interview, Hpa-an, 
August 26th, 2014. 
822 These ‘non-strategic’ areas of landmine contamination and potential clearance were 
identified in documents, in possession of the author, that outline the organisation’s 
methods and objectives. 
823 The KNLA and KNU is divided into seven corresponding brigade/administrative district 
divisions across parts of KNU controlled/contested Karen state. 
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project, despite assurances of the non-strategic focus of any clearance 
activities. Some, consequently, agreed to allow MRE in their areas but not 
clearance.824 The project, therefore, expanded plans to include MRE, as 
well as clearance, in conjunction with other CBOs already undertaking it. 
An important political aspect of this organisation were its future plans to 
become a central focal point for international mine action NGOs wishing to 
operate in Karen state. It would potentially act as a hub for INGOs to liaise 
with communities, NSAGs, and CBOs, and to coordinate surveys and 
clearance through permission of the relevant NSAG authorities. It would 
also coordinate with the Burma government-based mine action centre.825 
The issue of coordination was also raised by international humanitarian 
agency staff who had met this organisation. 
How do you link that kind of work to the work that is being done on the 
Yangon and Myanmar side and how do you make sure over time that you 
have a coordinated consistent approach that is in line with international 
standards?826 
The Burma government, with support from international donors, has 
prepared the Myanmar Mine Action Centre (MMAC) as an adjunct to the 
Myanmar Peace Centre. It is also intended to coordinate mine action and 
those undertaking it throughout the country. However, little progress on its 
development, or connection to the non-state actors or border based CBOs 
has been made, as was indicated in interviews. “We have not had very 
good contact with the Mine Action Centre, it was founded by the 
government.”827 
NPA [Norwegian People’s Aid] have a 3 and half million grant to build the 
Myanmar Mine Action Centre, but the non-state actors aren’t on board with 
that centre and the government is moving incredibly slowly.828 
As with attempts to regulate humanitarian INGOs by the parallel non-state 
administrations noted earlier, there is likely to also be difficulty between 
                                            
824 Personal communication with a member of this organisation, September, 2014. 
825 Documents, in the possession of the author, outlining this organisation’s structure and 
objectives. 
826 Senior staff member of an international humanitarian agency, interview, Hpa-an, 
August 26th, 2014. 
827 A local member of a CBO, interview, Mae Sot, October 19, 2013. 
828 Country director of an international mine action NGO, interview, Yangon, September 
6th, 2013. 
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the government and NSAG coordination of mine action INGOs. Landmines 
and action on them have also been addressed in the nationwide ceasefire 
agreement and code of conduct under negotiation between the 
government and the NSAG UNFC alliance which is outlined later in this 
chapter.  
Advocacy 
Engagement with NSAGs on the landmine issue from a few international 
actors, especially the ICRC, ICBL, and by Geneva Call, has resulted in 
NSAGs claiming they have taken action to reduce the harm caused to 
civilians by their landmine use. Persistent engagement over a long period, 
and presenting counter arguments to NSAG leadership on landmine use, 
were identified as means by which a long-term interlocutor with NSAGs on 
this issue had worked with the groups.  
I could have discussions like ‘how many of your mines kill your own 
soldiers?’ I could have franker discussions with them as time went 
by…They were wedded to armed struggle and they didn’t see a way out 
from using it. Their political legitimacy to a certain extent depended on 
landmine use.829 
A significant point raised by this respondent, was the maintenance of 
perceived NSAG legitimacy as armed actors through the use of 
landmines. Landmine use enabled the NSAGs to hold territory inside 
Burma. Being able to hold territory is seen as a prerequisite to greater 
international and local legitimacy. Indeed, holding of territory is considered 
a precondition for an organised armed group to be recognised in IHL.830 
This indicates that, in the case of landmines, claimed military necessity 
and need for local legitimacy have both contributed to their continued use. 
                                            
829 Senior member of an INGO network engaging with NSAGs in Burma on the landmine 
issue, interview, Bangkok, October 12th, 2014. 
830 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 
1977.Article 1 (1) 
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Policies, statements and deeds of commitment on 
landmine use 
Facilitating MRE is one of the few ways NSAGs have taken action on the 
landmine issue. However, a few smaller NSAGs have agreed to give up 
landmine use. Unilateral declarations, in the form of deeds of commitment 
(DoC) facilitated by the NGO Geneva Call, have been made by six smaller 
Burma NSAGs to ban landmines.831 In the early stages of Geneva Call’s 
global promotion of the DoC (after 2000) on landmines, the Arakan 
Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) and National Unity Party of 
Arakan (NUPA) made initial approaches to Geneva Call to sign the 
DoC.832 This raises the issue of the potential legitimacy associated with 
joining such agreements for NSAGs. These two groups were the first to 
sign the DoC in Burma, in 2003, but are now no longer militarily active. 
While this was a hopeful sign for setting an example and socialising other 
NSAGs in Burma to accept the landmine ban norm, it also implies that 
groups with a small political and military impact or presence, may view 
such an agreement as a way to bolster their perceived legitimacy. This 
legitimacy, however, may not be matched by their real military presence 
on the ground. 
Geneva Call began an active programme of engaging with NSAGs on the 
landmine issue in Burma from 2006.833 The six NSAGs that joined the 
DoC were based in western Burma or in Shan state in northeast Burma.834 
They were small groups likely to have not been heavy users of landmines, 
making it easier for them to have agreed to the commitment. 
                                            
831 See the full list of Burma NSAGs engaged with and /or signatories to Geneva Call’s 
deeds of commitment, Geneva Call, "Burma/Myanmar." 
832 Representative of Geneva Call, interview by Skype from London to Chiang Mai, 
August 16th 2013. 
833 Geneva Call and DCA Mine Action, Humanitarian Impact of Landmines in 
Burma/Myanmar, 6.; Representative of Geneva Call, interview by Skype from London to 
Chiang Mai, August 16th 2013. 
834 The six NSAGs in Burma to sign the Geneva Call DoC on landmines were the ARNO, 
NUPA, Lahu Democratic Front (LDF), Pao Peoples Liberation Organisation (PPLO) all no 
longer militarily active, and the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation 
Army (PSLF/TNLA) and Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA), who are still 
militarily active, and also members of the UNFC. 
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One currently active NSAG signatory to Geneva Call’s DoC on landmines 
is the Chin National Front (CNF) which had approached Geneva Call in 
2005 about the DoC.835 It claimed to have already been recording where 
mines were laid, removing them after use, and having an internal code of 
conduct compliant with IHL since 1997.836 The CNF, however, is militarily 
small, with only an estimated 200 soldiers in 2012.837  
Geneva Call’s engagement approach on NSAGs and landmines in Burma 
has involved long-term dialogue with NSAG leaders, conducting 
workshops with NSAGs and civil society groups, working with NSAGs 
through local and international partner NGOs, and maintaining a neutral 
humanitarian stance. Its focus, therefore, is as an advocacy rather than an 
assistance providing organisation. Initial dialogue with NSAG leaders has 
focused on introducing the organisation, the norms it is promoting, and 
what it can and cannot provide.  
I’d say that mostly the methods for the initial dialogue are very much to 
explain what Geneva Call is, where we fit in, what is the approach we 
have, looking at issues of incentives of cooperation with us, and also being 
very frank about limitations of cooperation.838 
As a non-assistance delivery actor it needs to outline the advantages and 
limitations that come with the engagement process. While Geneva Call is 
an advocacy INGO, partner organisations working with it can bring real 
material or technical assistance and training.  
One of the things that we aren’t, is we’re not an assistance provider, which 
in some ways is positive in terms of focusing on the advocacy aspect. But 
sometimes in terms of issues as I’ve mentioned, in terms of incentives, that 
can be quite limiting. So it’s good to have organisations that maybe are 
able to provide that kind of assistance and or incentives.839 
                                            
835 See the CNF 2006 DoC on landmine use with Geneva Call in appendix 5. 
836 Geneva Call, Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines: Volume Two: A Global Report 
of NSA Mine Action (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Call, 2006), 59-60. 
837 Keenan, By Force of Arms: Armed Ethnic Groups in Burma, 240. 
838 Representative of Geneva Call, interview by Skype from London to Chiang Mai, 
August 16th 2013. 
839 Representative of Geneva Call, interview by Skype from London to Chiang Mai, 
August 16th 2013. 
 232 
 
The INGO DanChurchAid (DCA) has worked as a partner to Geneva Call. 
DCA, in turn, works through local partner civil society organisations, and 
some of these have close relationships with NSAGs, or are the welfare or 
humanitarian wings of the NSAGs themselves. This international partner 
to Geneva Call can then provide real technical assistance on MRE, 
mapping and survey techniques through its local partners working with 
NSAGs. 
The Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) and the National Democratic 
Front (NDF), as NSAG alliances accessible to organisations on the Thai 
border, were also engaged by Geneva Call on the landmine issue.840 This 
was acknowledged by a senior member of an NSAG. “Yeah, they spoke to 
the DAB, the alliance, ABSDF is one of the members of DAB we went to 
attend that training.”841 The Geneva Call and the DAB “joint project 
organised three workshops that targeted mid-level political and military 
leaders.”842 Brochures for distribution to the DAB member NSAGs 
addressing aspects of the landmine issue were developed and translated 
into Burmese, Mon, Karen, and Shan languages. These outlined, 
 …the humanitarian norms governing mine use including the ban on AP 
mines, what landmines are banned, what impact landmines have on 
human security and development, and what is humanitarian mine action.843  
While this raised awareness within the NSAGs about the threats their 
landmine use posed to their own people, the DAB member groups did not 
relinquish landmine use. The DAB issued a statement that claimed its 
member groups “must temporarily continue to use landmines for defending 
their peoples”. 844 This statement, therefore, presents the NSAGs in the 
DAB in an ostensibly protective role towards their people in line with their 
claims to representativeness and legitimacy. The statement also reiterates 
the claim of military necessity. A senior member of the KNU leadership 
                                            
840 Geneva Call, "National Democratic Front of Burma Issues Position Statement on 
Landmines,"  http://www.genevacall.org/national-democratic-front-burma-issues-position-
statement-landmines/. 
841 Senior member of leadership, ABSDF, interview, Mae Sot, December 4th, 2012 
842 See the text of the joint Geneva Call/DAB statement, ‘Raising awareness of the 
landmine issue,’ in appendix 4. 
843 Ibid 
844 Geneva Call, "Democratic Alliance of Burma Issues its Position on Landmines,"  
http://www.genevacall.org/democratic-alliance-burma-issues-position-landmines/.  
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stated that due to the advocacy from Geneva Call, it provides warnings to 
people in order to reduce the danger it presents itself through its use of 
landmines. 
The use of landmines by the KNU/KNLA has been reduced since Geneva 
Call has urged the KNU to do so. The KNLA plants landmines on tracks 
and in areas, which are usually used by the enemy.  Markers, warning 
signs and verbal warning are used by the KNLA to prevent the civilians 
from the danger.845  
An early statement on policy on landmine use by a NSAG in Burma, was 
that made by a DAB member, the KNPP, in mid-2006. It acknowledged 
the threat landmines posed to civilians, but pointed to the military 
necessity of their continued use.  
We abhor the use of landmines in warfare and understand the international 
condemnation of the use of landmines because of the high risk to 
civilians… They are used for defensive purposes and we have no intention 
of placing them in war-free-zones.846  
The argument frequently made by NSAGs, as demonstrated above, is that 
they rely on the landmines for defensive purposes, and they may require 
them again in the future should current ceasefire negotiations break 
down.847 While these NSAGs have allowed, facilitated, and sometimes 
conducted MRE in their areas, available evidence from other reports and 
interviews suggests warnings, marking, or signage of mined areas by 
them has remained inconsistent.848 When warnings are provided, verbal 
ones predominate over the use of signs. 849 
                                            
845 Senior member of the KNU leadership, email correspondence, November 8, 2013. 
846 Karenni National Progressive Party, "Statement No. 02/06: Statement on the use of 
landmines." See in appendix 2. 
847 This was directly confirmed to the author in interviews with members of the leadership 
of three Burma NSAGs in 2012. 
848 See, for example, Karen Human Rights Group, "Abuses since the DKBA and KNLA 
ceasefires: Forced labour and arbitrary detention in Dooplaya KHRG #2012-F2," 5-8; 
Geneva Call and DCA Mine Action, Humanitarian Impact of Landmines in 
Burma/Myanmar, 24. 
849 The Border Consortium, Poverty, dsiplacement and local governance in Southeast 
Burma/Myanmar, 22. 
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With armed groups usually it’s not very systematic it’s not documented. 
They will say ‘oh we plant the landmine, don’t go.’ They don’t really inform 
people properly, so some people will know, some people will not know.850 
A significant means of early warning is verbal warnings from the armed 
groups to village leaders saying ‘ok, we’ve mined this path or this area 
going up that hill or that valley.’ Physical signs for demarcation are pretty 
limited.851  
The military logic for lack of marking or warning about landmines was also 
made starkly clear by a former DKBA soldier. “If you let people know, 
people will tell the enemy, you know, where the mines are. That doesn’t 
make any sense!” 852 
Direct engagement addressing children involved 
with, or affected by, armed conflict 
Compared to the difficulties presented by the intractable issue of landmine 
use by NSAGs, advocacy and practical measures to improve the 
protection of children from armed conflict have been more readily received 
by NSAGs. As outlined in chapter eight, the KNPP and NMSP claimed to 
have implemented policies and undertaken processes since the late 1990s 
to remove children from their ranks. Even in these cases, the presence of 
children in non-combat or support roles, or simply present in military bases 
or camps, has remained an issue. Added to this, access for INGOs and 
UN agencies to conflict or former conflict areas and, therefore, to NSAGs 
to verify claims of not using child soldiers, continues to be limited. 
Practical measures 
Reporting and documentation of children involved with armed 
conflict 
Since publicity on the child soldier issue has a potential to negatively 
influence a group’s perceived legitimacy, especially internationally, 
reporting and documentation of it is significant and is considered by this 
                                            
850 A local member of an international NGO involved in mine action and education, 
interview, Chiang Mai, November 28th, 2012. 
851 Senior staff member of an INGO working with NSAGs and associated welfare 
organisations on the Thai-Burma border, interview, Chiang Mai, October 3rd, 2014. 
852 Former DKBA soldier via translator, interview, Mae Sot, October 21st, 2012. 
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study as a form of engagement with NSAGs on the issue. Reports by 
international and local organisations concerned with children’s rights have 
frequently included interviews with NSAGs. This indicates that those 
NSAGs have an awareness and potential concern about the issue, at least 
at an international level, for legitimacy and public relations reasons. 
The child soldier problem on the government side has received 
considerable attention. This can be attributed partly to the greater 
numbers of children forcibly recruited into the Tatmadaw, and by 
documentation and advocacy of those abuses by NGOs and CBOs, some 
associated with opposition NSAGs. 
It’s very obvious why we have such successes in gathering data on grave 
violations being committed by the Tatmadaw, but less so by the ethnic 
armed groups. Because in that sense it’s a political tool as well, they can 
say ‘the Tatmadaw came and took so and so,’…and we get those reported 
up. Now we have an extensive network, that’s happening quite well. 
Whereas the data on ethnic armed organisations is much more limited.853 
Children involved with NSAGs have been documented in reports since the 
early 2000s by HRW, HREIB, KHRG, and CSI.854 These reports often 
involved interviews about the issue conducted with the political leadership, 
officers, regular soldiers, and some former child soldiers from these 
groups. They also revealed awareness among some of the then ‘non-
ceasefire’ NSAGs, such as the KNPP and KNU, of the issue and how and 
why it was a problem. Since the 2012 ceasefires, the DKBA and 
KNU/KNLA have been subjected to further research by CSI on the issue, 
indicating some children are still present in these groups.855 The 
involvement of children within the KIO/KIA which is in a resumed conflict 
                                            
853 Senior member of an INGO involved in child protection, interview, Yangon, September 
16th, 2014. 
854 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, My Gun was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in 
Burma, 110-59; Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, Forgotten Future: Childen 
Affected by Armed Conflict in Burma, 57-61; Karen Human Rights Group, "Forced 
recruitment by DKBA forces in Pa’an District KHRG #2008-B8."; Coalition to Stop the Use 
of Child Soldiers, Report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in advance of the 
examination of Myanmar’s report on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 10-12. 
855 See, for example, Child Soldiers International, Chance for a Change: Ending the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers in Myanmar, 28-33. 
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with the government since 2011 has also had recent attention drawn to 
it.856  
There are clear difficulties with proving or disproving the claims of NSAGs 
to have ended under age recruitment, or the presence of children in non-
combat roles. Access is limited by the government, in particular, as well as 
by geographic isolation, and accurate data on the problem remains 
elusive. This point has been made in the past in reports on the child 
soldier issue,857 and in interviews for this study with staff of INGOs and UN 
agencies working on child protection based inside Burma. “The ability to 
monitor in areas to get concrete information on the grave violations of 
ethnic armed organisations is quite challenging.”858 “We have no access to 
those non-government controlled areas. We didn’t know how many 
children are trafficked through there.”859  
Services and programmes to assist present and former child soldiers 
In 2012, the UN and the government agreed on an action plan to end the 
recruitment of child soldiers in the country.  Local CSOs inside Burma 
have now been able to raise awareness about it and to advocate for the 
release and reintegration of children from the Tatmadaw.860 These 
developments had led to the release of more than 500 former or current 
child soldiers from the Tatmadaw by 2014,861 but under age recruitment 
has still been documented.862 The UN action plan also applies to NSAGs 
in Burma. However, access from inside the country to NSAG areas 
remains limited, and there are questions about the potential bias of any 
                                            
856 Child Soldiers International, A Dangerous Refuge: Ongoing Child Recruitment by the 
Kachin Indepedence Army. 
857 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, No More Denial: Children Affected by 
Armed Conflict in Myanmar (Burma) (New York, NY: Watchlist, 2009), 15. 
858 Senior member of an INGO involved in child protection, interview, Yangon, September 
16th, 2014. 
859 Local member of an UN humanitarian agency (a), interview, Myitkyina, August 29th 
2013. 
860 See, for example, Sai Thiha Soe, "Community Vanguards: Civil Society as Child 
Rights Defenders," (Save the Children, Myanmar, 2012). 
861 United States Department of State  Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor, 
"Burma 2014 Human Rights Report," (Washington, DC: United States Department of 
State, 2014), 18. 
862 Child Soldiers International, Under the Radar: Ongoing recruitment and use of children 
by the Myanmar army. 
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reporting on the levels of children present in NSAGs from NSAG–
associated organisations working from the Thai-Burma border. 
On the Thai side of the border there have been few organisations and a 
scarcity of funding, or coordination, to support reintegration into 
communities of former child soldiers from either the Tatmadaw or NSAGs. 
Education, health, or faith-based organisations dealt with them if they 
came to their attention, but this was not those organisations’ primary 
focus. One small, independent organisation that does do this has been 
working over the last decade along the Thai-Burma border. It has 
attempted to support former child soldiers through providing 
accommodation, access to education, training, and employment.  It has 
also been willing to accept former child soldiers from other organisations 
that have been involved in child protection but not in a position to care for 
them long-term. In some instances, they have been passed on by NGOs 
and, in others, from NSAGs.  
I’d say over half the boys we’ve had haven’t come to us directly across the 
border, they’ve been around and other organisations were referring them 
to us, like JRS [Jesuit Refuge Services]. When they had a programme here 
for newcomers they would refer all their child soldiers to us….Mae Tao 
clinic, or ABSDF people at Mae Tao clinic.863 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the ABSDF, an NSAG, had also 
previously facilitated a programme that encouraged the defection, and 
assisted the reintegration through this organisation, of former child soldiers 
from the Tatmadaw as a part of its military strategy.864 The KNPP and 
KNU have also both made reference to assisting Tatmadaw child soldiers 
who have defected to them in the past.865 While some were passed to the 
ABSDF child soldier project, others were dealt with in a more ad hoc 
fashion. 
Some might come to [KNLA] Brigade 5 some might have defected to other 
areas. I was with Padoh Mahn Sha [Former General Secretary of the KNU, 
                                            
863 Director of a CBO working with former child soldiers, interview, Mae Sot, August 30th, 
2012. 
864 See the section on the ABSDF in chapter 8, and also, Human Rights Watch, My Gun 
was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma, 152-53. 
865 See, regarding defections including of child soldiers to the KNPP/KA, ibid., 154 -55. 
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assassinated in Mae Sot in 2008] for several months. Some child soldiers 
defected so he brought them to his office and kept them there and later he 
also arranged for their resettlement.866 
A flow on effect of the trauma of the child soldiers’ experiences has been 
social problems such as theft, involvement with gangs, or drug abuse. This 
may also partly explain the lack of formal organisations or processes, or 
willingness, to assist them in the past on the Thai border. “There’s a 
stigmatism that’s arisen about former child soldiers and them being a 
problem in the community.”867 The 2012 ceasefires with most ethnic 
NSAGs, and the Tatmadaw’s action plan with the UN, have ended the 
incidences of child soldiers from the Tatmadaw fleeing across the border 
from Burma into Thailand. “We haven’t had any new guys run away from 
the Tatmadaw since last December that we know about.”868 
Advocacy and training with NSAGs on the child soldier 
issue 
ICRC 
Due to security and legal constraints, advocacy, education and training 
conducted with NSAGs that addresses children affected by armed conflict, 
has been conducted cross-border in NSAG controlled areas, or in third 
party states. Most often this has been in, or from, Thailand. Some NSAGs 
operating in western Burma have been accessed in India, or in exile in 
Thailand, and those in northern Burma, covertly across the border from 
China.869 The ICRC has raised the issue of underage recruitment with 
NSAGs, especially through its advocacy with them in Thailand, but, unlike 
Geneva Call or HREIB, it does not extend to seeking a written commitment 
not to do so. “The underage recruitment we tell them that they shouldn’t 
do, basically. But we, as I said, we are not somebody who requests any 
                                            
866 KNU member, interview, Chiang Mai, October 18, 2013. 
867 Director of a CBO working with former child soldiers, interview, Mae Sot, August 30th, 
2012. 
868 Director of a CBO working with former child soldiers, interview, Mae Sot, August 30th, 
2012. 
869 A senior staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview, Chiang Mai, October 23rd, 2012. This engagement also 
included meeting NSAGs in Manipur in India, and crossing from China into KIO areas. 
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group to sign the paper, but to make them aware and to put it in their 
mind.”870 
HREIB 
The most concerted efforts on child soldiers by a local Thailand-based, but 
Burmese-led and focused NGO, were conducted by the HREIB between 
2005 and 2010. The HREIB was able to work with the KNU, KNPP, 
NMSP, KIO, and CNF. It therefore worked with the then major ‘opposition’ 
or non-ceasefire NSAGs on children affected by armed conflict, prior to 
becoming a partner to similar efforts by the INGO Geneva Call from 
around 2010 onwards. HREIB undertook a focus on child rights and child 
soldiers within the ethnic NSAGs. Its engagement with NSAGs involved, 
first, meeting with the leadership of the NSAGs to advocate for, and 
convince them of, the value of complying with the norms to protect and not 
recruit children, and to allow HREIB to undertake training with the NSAG. 
This approach initially met with defensive responses, or denial, as 
indicated by a member of the engagement team. The responses also raise 
the issue of the pathways by which children became involved with NSAGs. 
These rationalisations included commanders not following orders and 
children being present in camps ostensibly being offered protection by the 
NSAG. 
                                            
870 Staff member of a humanitarian INGO, interview, Yangon, September 12th, 2014. 
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They invited us to have conversations. But, yes, their stance was defensive 
at the time. Some outright denied. Some acknowledged that there were 
children in their ranks, and that they were sort of recruited by some rogue 
elements within their army. Or they were volunteers, and that they had 
come to them looking for shelter and or other social services, and were 
subsequently put into these units that were training, and eventually 
became soldiers.871 
Having gained the support and permission of the NSAG leadership, it then 
arranged training workshops with officers and regular soldiers in NSAG 
controlled areas.872 
We had a series of meetings with the KNU, the KNPP, Mon and Kachin, so 
this is for the top level. At the same time we use the human rights 
education programme in their community and within their army ranks and 
file.873 
So basically we first do advocacy to the NSAG leaders to get permission to 
do a training with their soldiers. After we get permission we arrange for the 
training and travel to their headquarters or wherever they allow us to do it. 
Then we have a training for 5 days with the soldiers from the non-state 
armed groups.874 
The training processes with the NSAGs was described as ‘participatory.’ 
The NSAG soldiers’ own experiences of childhood, and the value and 
importance of children for their future and cause, were raised first. 
Following that, the relevance of international law and norms applying to 
the protection of children from armed conflict were introduced. 
We have our own unique methods leading a training which is the 
participatory learning methods. For example, in child rights, we ask them to 
sing a song, the song to remember their childhood… So it is really good for 
them to link their local life, their private life, to the international. Because 
                                            
871 A former staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview from New York via skype, June 2nd, 2015. 
872 “It depends on the armed groups, for example the KNU and the KIA most of them are 
from higher ranks, leaders, commanders… in some places it’s kind of mixed it’s the 
commanders and the private level of soldiers and they all mix together. In one training 
even the child soldiers participated. They all discussed and heard about what rights they 
have.”  A senior staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on 
the child soldier issue, interview, Chiang Mai, October 23rd, 2012. 
873 Director of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the child soldier 
issue interview, Mae Sot, September 15th, 2012. 
874 A senior staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview, Chiang Mai, October 23rd, 2012. 
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we worry that many people just think ‘oh this international stuff, it’s just 
there, it’s far away from us.’ Ideally, they think ‘oh this system is already in 
place in our place as well, not only for international, our children also need 
this kind of right for their future and for our future.’875 
As well as working directly on training on child rights and international 
humanitarian norms with the NSAGs, HREIB also worked with community 
groups and civil society actors independent from the NSAGs. This 
approach, therefore, attempted to raise awareness in the affected 
communities about the issues and the rights of children to not be recruited 
into armed groups. 
We have two target groups. One is the soldiers, the non-state armed group 
soldier, and one is the community, like teacher, the community, the youth 
and the villager. The idea is it’s not enough just only to know the leaders 
on this issue. The soldier who implements all these things in the front lines 
they need to know, and the community who are affected, they also need to 
know.876 
Whenever we would do a training with a non-state armed group, we would 
also do a training with some community members in that area. Those 
targeted, again, these non-GONGO, whatever [NSAG associated civil 
society groups]. But also other civil society groups that were more I think, 
closely aligned with our definition of civil society, really separate from these 
actors. And so yeah, we would try to be inclusive. The trainings were on 
basic child rights, on community organising.877 
An issue HREIB faced, as it was principally an advocacy and training 
organisation, was the lack of resources or support from other actors to 
deal with situations where NSAGs wished to remove children from their 
ranks. The limited capacity of the engagement actor, the NSAGs, local civil 
society and communities, coupled with restricted access for INGOs, all 
impacted on this problem. This was explained by a former member of the 
HREIB engagement team. 
                                            
875 A senior staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview, Chiang Mai, October 23rd, 2012. 
876 A senior staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview, Chiang Mai, October 23rd, 2012. 
877 A former staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview from New York via skype, June 2nd, 2015 
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At one point in discussions with leaders of the KIA, they had expressed an 
interest to demobilise some of the children in their ranks, and we couldn’t 
find partners that would help them do that... there was definitely a verbal 
expressed desire to demobilise about 50 kids, I recall, who were in the KIA. 
We couldn’t get anybody from the international community on board to 
help, or at least conceptualise what this would look like.878  
HRIEB developed materials on child rights and the child soldier issue for 
distribution to NSAGs, civil society, and communities. These included 
booklets, brochures, cartoon depictions, and posters in Burmese script. 
The use of cartoon graphics was also recognition of the likely low literacy 
rates of some NSAG soldiers, and also of the multiple ethnic languages 
aside from Burmese used across so many groups. One example uses 
cartoon-style graphics and narrative to explain the child soldier issue, and 
the DDR process for children released from armed forces.879 
Existing regulations on the non-recruitment of children were acknowledged 
by the NSAGs to HREIB staff. The consistent implementation of these 
within the NSAGs at all levels and along chains of command was 
identified, however, as an issue. 
Both the KIA and the KNLA pointed to regulations that they had, but it was 
unclear how they were enforced, and the consequences for breaching any 
of the codes. It was unclear. It seemed to be fluid. Some people who may 
have been caught were given...there were certain consequences for them, 
and there were certain consequences for others depending maybe on their 
rank or sort of association with the group.880 
Geneva Call 
From 2010, Geneva Call started a programme of engagement on the 
protection of children from armed conflict with Burma NSAGs. It worked 
with HREIB as a local partner, as well as other civil society groups with a 
role in child protection. Since 2007, Geneva Call had been developing a 
new DoC for NSAGs on the protection of children from the effects of 
                                            
878 A former staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview from New York via skype, June 2nd, 2015. 
879 See extracts from this booklet in appendix 7. 
880 Former staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview from New York via skype, June 2nd, 2015. 
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armed conflict, following on from its DoC for NSAGs on landmines.881 It 
conducted a survey of existing potential civil society partners on the Thai-
Burma border to assist with the implementation of its DoC on children with 
the NSAGs it was approaching.  This was an important aspect of 
preparing the groundwork for future implementation of a DoC by NSAGs 
and the need for support organisations to assist former child soldiers, an 
issue HREIB had already encountered, as noted earlier. Such 
organisations included those involved in child protection, education, child 
health and welfare, and those already providing support or 
accommodation to former child soldiers.882 Given HREIB’s prior work on 
child rights and child soldiers with NSAGs, they were approached to work 
with Geneva Call on this project.883 HREIB, as outlined below, also 
developed a deed of commitment on the protection of children, to which 
the CNF had become a signatory in 2009. 
The engagement process working with Geneva Call covered some of the 
same ground in terms of raising the issues and arguments such as the 
importance of children for the future as had been initially undertaken by 
HREIB. The leadership and militaries of the same groups, the KNU, 
NMSP, KNPP, KIO, and CNF were approached about these issues as 
they had been previously by HREIB.884 However, there was more formality 
and focus on international norms and law in the Geneva Call approach, 
compared to the initial HREIB engagement.  
There was this, ah, sense that signing this commitment held more weight, 
that they were bringing some legitimacy...There is a sense that you have 
these foreigners come, they’re based in Geneva, they’re more closely 
                                            
881 See, regarding the legal background and development of this DoC, Somer, "Engaging 
Armed Non-State Actors to Protect Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict: When the 
Stick Doesn’t Cut the Mustard." 
882 Director of a CBO working with former child soldiers, interview, Mae Sot, August 30th, 
2012. 
883 Former staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview from New York via skype, June 2nd, 2015; See also, Somer, 
"Engaging Armed Non-State Actors to Protect Children from the Effects of Armed 
Conflict: When the Stick Doesn’t Cut the Mustard," 120. 
884 Director of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the child soldier 
issue, interview, Mae Sot, September 15th, 2012. 
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associated with some of the UN agencies, potentially, and there was just a 
different aura around them.885  
The Geneva Call process consisted, initially, of dialogue with the 
leadership of NSAGs on the child protection issue, sometimes facilitated 
by the partner organisations. This was followed by training workshops with 
NSAG officers and soldiers on child protection, often involving its partner 
HREIB, and then Geneva Call presenting on the relevant international law. 
These workshops were carried out numerous times over an extended time 
prior to the actual signing by any of the NSAGs of the DoC. This was 
acknowledged by NSAG leadership as well as local staff involved with the 
workshops. 
Perhaps we understand only a little different, this is already included, so 
we found the Geneva Call to negotiate for the signing of child protection. 
Later we discuss about the clear understanding in international law like this 
and made workshops many times, and then we agree to sign.886 
We are talking on the main, on the child rights issue I have been studying 
and working on this child rights issue, so this is my expertise. I have good 
relationships with these non-state armed groups’ leaders and other 
departments….After the child rights section, Geneva Call continues on the 
deed of commitment on children affected by armed conflict which helps 
them to understand more and sometimes I help them in the translation.887  
Geneva Call also provided training on child rights and the DoC to local civil 
society organisations to provide wider awareness raising and education on 
these same issues in the community.888 In particular, the role of local 
rights-based CBOs was valuable for spreading this awareness, and for 
potential recognition, reporting and documentation of any NSAG violations 
of the DoC provisions. This was acknowledged by members of rights-
based CBOs. 
                                            
885 Former staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview from New York via Skype, June 2nd, 2015. 
886 Senior member of leadership of the NMSP (a), interview, Sangkhlaburi, November 
13th, 2012. 
887 A senior staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview, Chiang Mai, October 23rd, 2012. 
888 See, for example, Geneva Call, "Burma/Myanmar: workshop on child protection and 
gender issues with the Karen Human Rights Group,"  
http://www.genevacall.org/burmamyanmar-workshop-child-protection-gender-issues-
karen-human-rights-group/. 
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We have been closely involved before they have signed the Deed of 
Commitment. Before that they have training for how to monitor about that 
issue and how to promote about the rights of the children, especially in the 
insurgency area, in the conflict area, for the non-state army. Also training 
for other CBOs and groups and those living in the area of the New Mon 
State Party…. In order to monitor the agreement we should have some 
capacity, this is their aim.889   
We’re not saying we monitor or something like that, but on the ground if 
anything happens we report that, we document everything. If it is related to 
this commitment we can contact Geneva Call and say this kind of thing has 
happened.890 
For example, in 2015 KHRG identified an instance of forced under age 
recruitment by the KNLA, and highlighted the KNU/KNLA’s previous 
commitments with the UN in 2007 and Geneva Call in 2013 (see below) to 
end the recruitment of children.891 
Statements and deeds of commitment on children 
affected by armed conflict 
In the last decade, some Burma NSAGs have issued statements, made 
unilateral declarations and, in some instances, agreed to implement action 
on the issue of children affected by armed conflict. 
Following its inclusion on the UN list of groups using child soldiers, the 
KNPP made a statement on its claimed non-recruitment of child soldiers in 
mid-2006. It does not refer specifically to a minimum age of recruitment or 
to international law or treaties addressing the issue, as later statements 
and DoCs do. It does, however, make claims to attempting to encourage 
children associated with or wanting to join the group to continue education 
rather than join the Karenni Army.892  
                                            
889 A local member of a CBO with access to NMSP areas, interview, Sangkhlaburi, 
September 24th, 2013. 
890 A local member of a CBO, interview, Mae Sot, October 19, 2013. 
891 Karen Human Rights Group, "Forced recruitment of a child soldier by KNLA in 
Kyainseikgyi Township, Dooplaya District,  KHRG #15-17-NB1," (Thailand: KHRG, 
October 23, 2015). 
892 Karenni National Progressive Party, "Statement No. 01/06: Statement on the use of 
child soldiers." See appendix 2. 
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At this time Geneva Call was just starting its work with Burma NSAGs. 
However, the KNPP would have been in dialogue with HREIB which was 
also involved with a UN project through UNICEF to engage NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue. In the following year, the KNPP and KNU signed a UN 
formulated DoC addressing children in armed conflict. 
The 2007 KNU and KNPP Deed of Commitment with the UN on the 
use of child soldiers 
Through discussions and engagement from HREIB and UNICEF in 2006 
and 2007, the KNU and KNPP signed a DoC in 2007 on the prohibition of 
the use of child soldiers. This UN DoC explicitly acknowledged 18 as the 
minimum age of recruitment, and made reference to relevant international 
treaties including the OPAC, ILO Convention 182 on Forced Labour, and 
the Rome Statute of the ICC. It also refers to UNSC Resolution 1612 on 
establishing a monitoring and reporting mechanism on the use of child 
soldiers.893 This DoC incorporated the undertaking of an action plan by 
these NSAGs to demobilise any child soldiers in their ranks. Significantly, 
it not only included children in active combat roles, but also auxiliary roles 
such as cooks, porters, messengers, spies, or use for sexual purposes. 
Further progress on the UNICEF DoC with the KNPP and KNU in 2007 
was hindered by the Burma government’s opposition to outside agencies 
talking to these groups. The KNPP stated again in 2008 and 2009 that it 
would welcome external monitoring and verification for its compliance with 
the 2007 agreement.894 The Burma government, however, would not allow 
further engagement with the groups by the UN or other external 
organisations.895 This government resistance to engagement with the 
KNPP and KNU initially meant both groups were not able to attend a 
formal signing of the DoC in 2007 with UN officials. Instead, they had to 
                                            
893 See the full text of these 2007 UN deeds of commitment signed by the KNU and 
KNPP in the appendices to this thesis. 
894 See, Karenni National Progressive Party, "Press Release No. 1/08: Call for the 
Karenni Army’s name to be removed from the list of non-state armed groups making use 
of child soldiers in armed conflict "; Karenni National Progressive Party, "Press Release 
No. 02/09: Appeal for the Karenni Army’s name to be removed from the list of non-state 
armed groups making use of child soldiers in armed conflict." See these statements in 
appendix 2. 
895 United Nations Security Council, "S/2009/278: Report of the Secretary-General on 
children and armed conflict in Myanmar," (2009), 7. 
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sign the documents and send them to the UN in Bangkok.896 It also meant 
they were not able to agree to, sign and implement an action plan for the 
removal of remaining children from their armies, and to monitoring of 
this.897 
Pressure was also exerted on the Thai government by Burma to prevent 
this engagement occurring.898 Consequently, Thailand also prevented 
UNICEF’s engagement with the KNPP in 2007, instructing UNICEF’s 
Thailand Office in Bangkok to stop dialogue with the group shortly before 
the signing of the UNICEF DoC in April 2007.899 The potential legitimacy, 
both locally and internationally, that such engagement might confer upon 
these groups was suggested by an interlocutor close to these 
negotiations, as a likely motive for this state-led resistance to engagement 
with them. 
The deed of commitment [with the KNPP and KNU] after UNICEF was a bit 
interrupted because they are given pressure by the Burmese government 
not to engage with the non-state armed groups and they did not like 
UNICEF in Burma to get involved because they think that it gives 
legitimacy to the armed groups, so it stopped.900 
The situation since 2007 regarding the UN DoC has remained frozen, with 
no independent monitoring or verification able to take place, and both 
groups remaining, despite protests, on the UN list of groups using child 
soldiers. The lack of access was still mentioned in the 2014 UN report on 
Children and Armed Conflict as preventing verification of these NSAGs’ 
claims to have stopped recruiting children. The KNLA was still identified as 
having instances of children in its ranks in the report, and the KNPP was 
mentioned as having approached the UN to resume engagement to be 
                                            
896 A representative of an international humanitarian NGO involved in engagement with 
NSAGs, interview, September 19th, 2013. 
897 United Nations Security Council, "S/2009/278: Report of the Secretary-General on 
children and armed conflict in Myanmar," 2. 
898 Representative of an international humanitarian NGO involved in engagement with 
NSAGs, interview, September 19th, 2013; Former staff member of a local human rights 
NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the child soldier issue, interview from New York via 
Skype, June 2nd, 2015. 
899 Human Rights Watch, Sold to be Soldiers:The Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers 
in Burma, 101. 
900 Director of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the child soldier 
issue interview, Mae Sot, September 15th, 2012. 
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delisted.901 The ability for international agencies to monitor and identify 
instances of child soldiers in NSAGs has improved to some extent, as 
indicated by a senior member of an international agency in Hpa-an in 
2014. “We had one case last year we came across, but that was a one off. 
It was a young teenager, I think 15 years old, in KNU brigade two or 
brigade five.”902  
The UN CTFMR and Joint Action Plan 
The UN Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR), in 
Burma, reports on recruitment of children by both the state armed forces 
and NSAGs.903 To be removed from the UN list, all armed actors, state 
and non-state, need to enter into time-bound action plans that are 
monitored and verified by the CTFMR. 
If they are on the Secretary General’s Working Group list, then there is a 
formal process that has to be kicked in in order to delist from that… In 
terms of the formal processes, if they want to become delisted, they have 
to enter into negotiations for an action plan with the CTFMR. And it’s a UN 
verified process.904 
A significant point noted by a member of an international agency involved 
in these processes, was the current shift in focus of child protection 
agencies inside the country towards the ceasefires and peace process. 
The NCA process has provided an entry point for advancing the protection 
of children. This is through UN and INGO advocacy for the inclusion of the 
child soldier and child protection issues within the NCA and its 
accompanying code of conduct. 
We are expecting to step into a peace process. So there are more effective 
ways of ensuring that demobilisation of children gets written into the 
                                            
901 United Nations Security Council, A/68/878–S/2014/339 Children and armed conflict: 
Report of the Secretary-General, 121-25.  
902 Senior staff member of an international humanitarian agency, interview, Hpa-an, 
August 26th, 2014. 
903 UN resolution 1612 (2005) established monitoring and reporting mechanisms in 
countries where there were grave violations regarding children involved in armed conflict. 
As UN mandated bodies, the CTFMRs in respective countries have to work with the 
national governments of those countries.  
904 Senior member of an INGO involved in child protection, interview, Yangon, September 
16th, 2014. 
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national ceasefire agreement or part of the peace process steps, and that 
those kinds of items are on the agenda.905 
We have been suggesting that in fact part of the ceasefire should be a 
commitment of both parties to actually undertake a full exercise of the 
removal of underage recruits.906 
HREIB Deed of Commitment on protection of children 
Due to the prevention of further engagement by international actors on the 
UN DoC with the KNU and KNPP, and prior to its involvement with the 
Geneva Call process, the HRIEB developed a DoC similar to the UN one. 
Following on HREIB’s advocacy from 2006 onwards with the NSAGs 
outlined above, the CNF became a signatory to the HREIB DoC in 2009. 
This DoC was based on the template of the UN DoC signed by the KNU 
and KNPP and included the same references to the OPAC, ILO 
Convention 182, and the Rome Statute of the ICC, and recognition of both 
direct combat and support roles for children involved with NSAGs. The 
main point of difference was the absence of any reference to a formal plan 
of action developed through the UN Country Team as mandated by UN 
Resolution 1612.  The HREIB DoC instead mentioned the development of 
“a time-bound plan of action together with various stakeholders” in order to 
“specify the objectives and specific measures to implement this deed of 
commitment.”907 For the CNF, as a small NSAG, the legitimacy gained 
through publicly stating it did not use child soldiers was identified as a 
significant motivation for it joining the DoC. “I think CNF in particular was 
eager to be the first group to sign on and say ‘hey, we’re not doing 
this.’”908 The potential threat of being added to the UN child soldiers list 
was also mentioned as a factor in the HREIB’s persuasion of the CNF on 
this issue.  
The strategy we used with CNF, in the annual reports of the Secretary 
General they have a list of the non-state armed groups, 8 or 9, so I said to 
the CNF ‘see, you know it could happen to you, you could be on the list 
                                            
905 Senior member of an INGO involved in child protection, interview, Yangon, September 
16th, 2014. 
906 Senior member of a UN agency working on child soldier issues, interview, December 
13th 2012, Yangon. 
907 See the text of the HREIB DoC with the CNF in appendix 5. 
908 Former staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview from New York via skype, June 2nd, 2015. 
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and it’s very difficult to delist once you are in the list.’ …so they are very 
nervous about their image.909 
The Geneva Call DoC 
The engagement by Geneva Call with Burma NSAGs on the protection of 
children was initiated in 2010. Geneva Call’s DoC on protection of children 
from the effects of armed conflict has been joined by five Burma NSAGs. 
The NMSP/MNLA and KNPP/KA were its first signatories in Burma in 
2012. The KNU/KNLA agreed to it in 2013, and the CNF/CNA and Pa’O 
National Liberation Organisation/Pa’O National Liberation Army 
(PNLO/PNLA) joined it in 2014.910  The Geneva Call DoC is a more 
extensive DoC than either of those developed by the UN or HREIB. The 
Geneva Call DoC has a broader scope employing legal language across 
16 articles. For example, it makes reference to the NSAGs’ legal status, 
the DoC’s role in complementing or superseding previous unilateral 
declarations, and the potential for reservations to be made to it. The DoC 
is also considered as a step by the NSAG towards recognition and respect 
for the wider scope of humanitarian norms. The NSAGs agree to 
implement the DoC through issuing orders and taking action in cases of 
non-compliance. The monitoring and verification process of the Geneva 
Call DoC includes that done by the NSAG itself, and third party monitoring 
via local and international civil society.911 Geneva Call also conducts visits 
to the NSAG, and can undertake formal verification missions “in the event 
of credible and serious allegations of non-compliance.”912 
The measures to be implemented in the DoC included the issuing of 
orders to all ranks for prevention of underage recruitment, dissemination of 
these orders, training, and the investigation and enforcement of sanctions 
for cases of non-compliance. It also requires the NSAG to provide children 
                                            
909 Director of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the child soldier 
issue interview, Mae Sot, September 15th, 2012. 
910 The KNU/KNLA and CNF/CNA have also signed the Geneva Call Deed of 
Commitment for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict and 
towards the Elimination of Gender Discrimination, in 2013 and 2014 respectively. 
911 See for the full text of the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment for the Protection of 
Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict, the copy of this DoC with the NMSP in 
appendix 6. 
912 Somer, "Engaging Armed Non-State Actors to Protect Children from the Effects of 
Armed Conflict: When the Stick Doesn’t Cut the Mustard," 119. 
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in areas it controls with a range of assistance including food, health care, 
and education. The processes for the NSAGs on implementation of the 
DoC are at an early stage, with the NSAGs issuing orders for compliance 
and undertaking an internal review for it. The role of NSAG liaison offices, 
established following the 2012 ceasefires, were also mentioned by KNPP 
leadership, in ongoing engagement with Geneva Call on the DoC.913 
For example, we distribute this deed of commitment to our soldiers and 
also our staff within our organisation, they have to know. Then on from 
there they display it and talk with the people on the ground, letting them 
know that we have signed the deed of commitment…we make more copies 
and hand out to the people. That is the first step we agree to do. The next 
step is to come up with the short training for our commanders. Also, now 
we assign our liaison officer to work with Geneva Call to report on our daily 
activities.914 
The issue of funding and support for NSAGs to undertake the 
implementation of the DoC was also raised by NSAG leadership. 
We don’t have any support. Also in there you see [shows the signed copy 
of the DoC with Geneva Call] there’s implementation. There’s a plan with a 
timeframe for New Mon State Party with Geneva Call. From a quick visit 
here we have a plan, working plan, many, many things. Now suddenly we 
are looking for funding. If we had funds, we can do more we can work 
more. So we think, ‘oh Geneva Call it’s only a little funding,’ but yes.915 
The Geneva Call DoC process, while supporting similar ends to the 
CTFMR approach, does not have the authority to delist NSAGs from the 
formal UN list.916 According to the Office of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, only the Tatmadaw 
                                            
913 Most NSAGs with ceasefires with the government since 2011/12 have established 
liaison offices in major centres in the states in Burma where they operate. The liaison 
offices are intended to be points for communication and coordination between NSAGs 
with government agencies and local and international NGOs. For example, in 2012 the 
KNPP opened liaison offices in Loikaw, Shadaw and Hpa-saung townships in Karenni 
state. Burma News International, Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference 
Guide, 2014, 129. 
914 Senior member of leadership, KNPP, interview, Mae Hong Son, December 23rd, 
2012. 
915 Senior member of leadership of the NMSP (a), interview, Sangkhlaburi, November 
13th, 2012. 
916 Senior member of an INGO involved in child protection, interview, Yangon, September 
16th, 2014. In Burma, the KNU/KNLA, KIO/KIA, KNPP/KA, DKBA, UWSA, SSA-S, and 
KNU/KNLA-Peace Council remain on the UN list, as well as the Tatmadaw. 
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is (as of 2015) in a formally recognised action plan with the UN to 
demobilise child soldiers from its ranks.917 
Training and assistance with developing codes of 
conduct compliant with humanitarian norms 
The ICRC has worked with these same NSAGs to raise awareness of IHL. 
The ICRC inside Burma, due to restrictions on its activities, was unable to 
directly engage with ethnic NSAGS in border regions. However, the ICRC 
in Thailand has been involved in the past with training on IHL and, more 
recently, with assisting NSAGs in developing, or improving, their internal 
regulations. The ICRC’s engagement with NSAGs on the Thai-Burma 
border has included dissemination of materials outlining IHL and 
maintaining regular contact with the border-based NSAGs.  This activity 
was reiterated by interview respondents from NSAGs and by external 
observers. “The KNU clearly have had a lot of interface on IHL issues.”918 
I do know that ICRC have given training to armed ethnic groups in relation 
to this kind of issue. I was working with ICRC in Mae Sot, so it was with the 
Karen. But knowing them, they’ve probably gone to other armed ethnic 
organisations as well, giving instructions on humanitarian actions in 
relation to conflict.919 
The ICRC do have a regular contact, they used to visit us.  I very recently 
visited their Chiang Mai office as well. Sometimes they visited from 
Rangoon as well. The last time was 4 months I think. Yeah the 
representative from Rangoon office occasionally came with them, at least 
once a year.920  
The more recent era of ceasefires since 2012 has allowed space for the 
former opposition NSAGs, for example, the Shan State Army–South (SSA-
S), to update their internal regulations to bring them into line with IHL.   
SSA have just gone through a process with the ICRC in fact, where they 
have revised their code of conduct…. It’s not just on paper, there’s been 
                                            
917 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed 
Conflict, "Myanmar,"  https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries/myanmar/. 
918 A representative of an international humanitarian NGO involved in engagement with 
NSAGs, interview, September 19th, 2013. 
919 Long term researcher and consultant on ethnic issues in Burma, interview, Chiang 
Mai, July 21, 2014. 
920 Senior member of leadership, KNPP, interview, Mae Hong Son, December 23rd, 
2012. 
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some education and awareness raising, and it’s facilitated together with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. They can’t be accused of being 
a lackey of the ethnic armed groups.921  
A significant reason for the NSAGs’ interest in compliance with IHL for 
their internal regulations and engagement with the ICRC is the broader 
ceasefire code of conduct (CoC) that has been under negotiation 
alongside the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA). “The ICRC had I 
think, not so much now, but a few years ago, had quite a pivotal role in 
engaging them on that, on their code of conduct.”922 
These groups have requested some background information to incorporate 
into their draft code of conduct, but we did not play a direct role to pinpoint 
in the negotiations.923 
Some individuals and small local organisations have also undertaken 
independent training initiatives on IHL with NSAGs. While eschewing the 
labels of neutral or humanitarian, these actors have contributed to 
awareness of international norms through training in the ‘laws of war.’ The 
military utility of such training was outlined by an individual who had 
undertaken repeated training sessions prior to 2010 with officers and 
soldiers from the ABSDF and KNLA on these matters. 
…they had just gotten used to being like ‘yeah, Geneva Conventions, law 
of armed combat, it’s just some foreigner who comes around and we pay 
lip service and they go.’ I had to tell them it’s not actually about lawyers, it’s 
not about being nice to people, it’s about being systematic and 
professional soldiers. This is your guide to more professional thinking 
man’s way of doing war.924 
The Ceasefire Code of Conduct (CoC) and 
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)  
As outlined in chapter three, aside from statements, unilateral declarations 
(for example DoC), or internal regulations, another way that compliance 
                                            
921 Senior staff member of an INGO working with NSAGs and associated welfare 
organisations on the Thai-Burma border, interview, Chiang Mai, October 3rd, 2014. 
922 A representative of an international humanitarian NGO involved in engagement with 
NSAGs, interview, September 19th, 2013. 
923 Staff member of a humanitarian INGO, interview, Yangon, September 12th, 2014. 
924 Former ABSDF associate involved in IHL training and child soldier demobilisation, 
interview via skype from Paris, January 4th 2013. 
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with humanitarian norms can be expressed by NSAGs is through their 
inclusion in ceasefire or peace agreements. Specific issues such as 
landmine use and recruitment, alongside other issues such as respective 
demarcation of forces, have been incorporated into various drafts of a 
ceasefire CoC under negotiation between NSAGs and the government in 
Burma since 2012. 
The initial CoC was developed by the KNU following its bilateral ceasefire 
with the government in 2012, and a draft of it was presented to the 
government at further negotiations in Hpa-an in September 2012. That 
meeting included discussion of the text of the CoC which prohibited either 
side from taking actions during the ceasefire that would harm civilians. The 
KNU also requested a reduction in the number of Tatmadaw bases in 
Karen areas. The government ceasefire negotiator, Aung Min, stated at 
that meeting that the document would need to be sent to “higher officials” 
to be checked and analysed.925  The CoC has undergone numerous 
changes over two years of drafting and negotiations. 
The original draft was developed by the KNU with assistance from a Karen 
legal scholar who had been working on international human rights law at 
an overseas university, and input from other international legal and policy 
advisors.926 While the first draft of the CoC applied only to the KNU-
government ceasefire in 2012, the development of a united NSAG 
ceasefire negotiating bloc, the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team 
(NCCT) in 2013, led to the CoC becoming a part of the NCA.  
The government was quite firm that they would not be negotiating 
individual codes of conduct with all of the armed groups. The KNU, 
whatever was agreed with them that would become universal. We knew 
that going into drafting it. So I think there was a lot of concern about 
making this a very broad, all-encompassing document.927 
                                            
925 The meeting was filmed by local media, however the specific text of the CoC which 
was still under discussion was not publicly released. Kwe Ka Lu Media, "KNU and 
Burmese Government agree in principal on Cease Fire Code of Conduct,," (September 5, 
2012). (Translation from Karen and Burmese to English). 
926 Representative of Geneva Call, interview by Skype from London to Chiang Mai, 
August 16th 2013. 
927 International consultant and advisor working with Burma NSAGs on ceasefire 
negotiations, interview, July 23, 2014. 
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The initial CoC draft from 2012 dealt with humanitarian and protection 
issues including landmines. “Yes, I can confirm, there were definitely 
issues [in the CoC] relating to humanitarian law and humanitarian 
concerns.”928  “There is a very clear section in the code of conduct, at least 
there was in the last version I assisted in drafting, banning the use [of 
landmines] from both sides.”929 
It talks about respect for human rights of civilians and there’s a lot in there 
about landmines, not laying landmines and landmine action and clearance, 
not using forced labour, armed groups should not intimidate civilian 
populations.930 
The original KNU drafted CoC was, however, also considered to be 
‘legalistic’ in its approach to language and to be lengthy. “It’s framed in a 
very legalistic language. So you’ve got a preamble and various…It’s a very 
substantial and comprehensive document.”931 “Even in the beginning it 
started out about 40 pages.”932    
The KNU one [proposed ceasefire code of conduct], to be honest, the one I 
saw was legalistic jargon. It was hard work for me to read through it. To be 
honest, it didn’t look like it was going to be very useful.933 
This criticism of the first CoC was also made by the government which 
responded by then drafting a version of its own. 
At first they asked the KNU to draft the code of conduct. After the KNU 
drafted it the KNU sent it to them and they said it’s too legalistic or it’s not 
for laymen. So they asked the KNU to rewrite it … Then it seems like 
General Min Aung Hlaing [Commander in Chief of Myanmar Armed 
Forces] says something like it’s not necessary…Then later they say they 
have their own version, or they’re working on it.934 
                                            
928 International legal consultant working with Burma NSAGs on ceasefire negotiations, 
interview, Chiang Mai, August 11th, 2014 
929 International consultant and advisor working with Burma NSAGs on ceasefire 
negotiations, interview, July 23, 2014. 
930 Long-term researcher and consultant on humanitarian issues in Burma, interview via 
Skype from Chiang Mai, 4th January, 2013. 
931 Long-term researcher and consultant on humanitarian issues in Burma, interview via 
Skype from Chiang Mai, 4th January, 2013. 
932 International consultant and advisor working with Burma NSAGs on ceasefire 
negotiations, interview, July 23, 2014. 
933 Senior staff member of an INGO working with NSAGs and associated welfare 
organisations on the Thai-Burma border, interview, Chiang Mai, October 3rd, 2014 
934 KNU member, interview, Chiang Mai, October 18, 2013. 
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Over two years of ceasefire negotiations, drafts of the CoC have gone 
between the negotiating parties, as has the NCA itself. “There is a 
constant negotiation going on back and forth in terms of what substance 
matters in terms of different drafts, it’s a delicate balance thing.”935 
Members of the NCCT have previously reiterated the necessity for a 
ceasefire CoC for achieving the NCA.936 This clearly indicates the 
importance attached to the document for them, and also highlights the 
issue of military necessity underlying it. The issue of troop repositioning or 
withdrawal has been a sticking point for the CoC. It has been attached to 
the CoC addressing humanitarian and civilian protection issues such as 
landmine use, portering or forced recruitment which would clearly be 
influenced by the issue of demarcation of armed forces. These concerns 
are significant given that a build-up of Tatmadaw forces and consolidation 
of their positions in post-2012 ceasefire areas has been documented.937 
The government has instead pushed for these issues to be dealt with in a 
later political dialogue phase to commence after the NCA is signed by the 
NCCT member NSAGs. This was raised by Naw Zipporah Sein, vice 
chairperson of the KNU. She pointed out that the draft NCA “does not 
contain all the important issues that we wanted included in it. One 
excluded issue is the role of the military. The draft agreement does not 
include a Ceasefire Code-of-Conduct, this is a military issue but it was 
agreed that it would be discussed later.”938 In July 2015, the CoC was still 
                                            
935 International legal consultant working with Burma NSAGs on ceasefire negotiations, 
interview, Chiang Mai, August 11th, 2014 
936 See, for example, "KNU Leader – Code-Of-Conduct Urgently Needed," Karen News 
October 7, 2013. May Kha and Saw Yan Naing, "Troop Repositioning, Code of Conduct 
Important for Nationwide Ceasefire: Ethnics," The Irrawaddy July 31, 2014; Saw Tun Lin, 
"No Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Signed Until a “Code-of-Conduct” is Discussed," 
Karen News August 27, 2014. 
937 See, for example, Karen Human Rights Group, Truce or Transition? Trends in human 
rights abuse and local response in Southeast Myanmar since the 2012 ceasefire; The 
Border Consortium, Poverty, dsiplacement and local governance in Southeast 
Burma/Myanmar. 
938 "Karen National Union’s Deputy Chairwoman Warns International Community to Read 
the Small Print on Nationwide Ceasefire and not Believe Govt’s ‘Manipulation," Karen 
News April 23, 2015. 
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included among amendments NSAG representatives wanted made to the 
existing NCA draft presented to them by the government side.939  
Underlying the negotiations on the CoC and NCA is that military issues 
relating to troop placement or movement on the government side have not 
been negotiable. The government’s peace-making team, lead negotiator 
Aung Min, and the Myanmar Peace Centre have had a limited mandate on 
how much they can concede in negotiations with the ethnic NSAGs. The 
continued real power in the country and government, enshrined in Burma’s 
military drafted 2008 constitution, remains with the military, and its 
commander in chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. 
The big issue to me that I pulled from the talks, was not the legalistic 
component of it [the CoC], but was actually the government delegation that 
was there, which included Aung Min, said they had full reign to talk about 
political issues but could not discuss military issues…Everything relating to 
the military was off the table because they didn’t have authority to discuss 
military issues, they could only discuss political and associated economic 
issues.940 
While there is uncertainty about the issues included in the CoC, landmine 
use is clearly identified by those who had seen or worked on the 
document, as an area that had been addressed by it. This was the case, 
at least, in earlier drafts. Concerns about the nature of any action 
undertaken on landmines, following a formal NCA and CoC were indicated 
by a respondent close to the negotiations.  
The language on clearance was always very bad. There was no place for 
civil society monitoring of clearance, nor civil society involvement through 
any of the humanitarian mine clearance organisations, nor was there 
mention of the Myanmar Mine Action Centre or the Myanmar Mine Action 
Standards for governing clearance.941 
                                            
939 Sai Oo, "Burma’s Peace Process: Matching Words with Deeds," The Irrawaddy July 
13, 2015. “Political principles, ceasefire codes of conduct and military integration were 
extensively discussed during the dialogue which was extended from the originally 
proposed five days to eight. Some 14 amendments to the NCA were proposed and ethnic 
representatives also formed a new and higher level delegation to negotiate with the 
government on the proposed amendments.” 
940 International legal consultant working with Burma NSAGs on ceasefire negotiations, 
interview, Chiang Mai, August 11th, 2014. 
941 Informant with access to NSAG NCA negotiations, interview, October 21st, 2014. 
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The prohibition of recruitment during the ceasefire was also included in 
drafts of the CoC. CSI, in its 2015 report on the presence of children in the 
KIO/KIA, obtained a document from the KIO, ostensibly a draft ceasefire 
agreement from the government side, entitled “Points that both sides must 
follow,” that included prohibition of underage recruitment. 942 If landmine 
use and under age recruitment issues are addressed by a CoC that comes 
with the NCA, or after, it is significant as an originally NSAG-initiated 
process, and as an agreement that applies to a ceasefire with many 
NSAGs not just one. 
In September 2015, the ethnic NSAG negotiating bloc split over the 
signing of the NCA. Eight NSAGs including the KNU, ABSDF, DKBA, 
SSA-S and CNF eventually signed it in October 2015. Nine others 
including the KIO, NMSP and KNPP elected not to. The reasons given for 
not signing included the government’s exclusion of three NSAGs, the 
TNLA, MNDAA and Arakan Army, from the NCA and ongoing clashes in 
Kachin and Shan states.943 The NCA text makes reference to the CoC 
overseen by a joint monitoring committee, as well as landmines and 
recruitment.  
The Tatmadaw and Ethnic Armed Organizations agree to abide by the 
following troop-related terms and conditions: Cease the following actions in 
ceasefire areas: troop movements for territorial control, reconnaissance, 
recruitment, armed attacks, laying of mines, acts of violence, destruction of 
property, and launching of military offensives. 
Undertake de-mining activities to clear mines laid by troops from all sides 
in accordance with the progress of the peace process and coordinate mine 
action activities in close consultation with the Government of the Republic 
of the Union of Myanmar. 944 
                                            
942 Child Soldiers International, A Dangerous Refuge: Ongoing Child Recruitment by the 
Kachin Indepedence Army, 27 & 38. 
943 Signatory groups were KNU, KNU-KNLA Peace Council, DKBA, ABSDF, CNF, ALP, 
PNO, and SSA-S. Non signatory groups were KIO, NMSP, KNPP, AA, SSPP/SSA-N, 
TNLA, MNDAA, NSCN-K, and UWSA. 
944 The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar and Ethnic Armed Organizations. Chapter Three, 4 & 5 (a) and (e). 
See the full draft text of the NCA in appendix 1. 
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Assessment of factors influencing humanitarian 
engagement with NSAGs in Burma 
The most significant themes that have been highlighted in discussion of 
the humanitarian engagement scenarios outlined in this chapter include 
claims of military and political necessity from NSAGs, concerns from both 
state and non-state actors with perceptions of legitimacy, and the 
development and role of local civil society. The ceasefires since 2012 
have also had a significant impact on the NSAGs and on those working 
with them on protection issues. This has been relevant for the issues dealt 
with in terms of donor funding to support NSAG-associated welfare and 
civil society actors and the ceasefire process. 
Military and political necessity (proposition 1) 
Landmine use has not been abandoned by any significant NSAGs in 
Burma while, on the other hand, there has been a willingness to address 
the problem of children affected by armed conflict. The NSAGs in this 
study have been engaged with by local and international NGOs on the 
child soldier issue, and have released statements and entered into DoC to 
not recruit children. Landmines, however, remain central to the military 
strategies of NSAGs. The problems due to their use are further 
complicated by unsystematic and ad hoc deployment, shifting areas of 
conflict, and use to protect local resources. Geographic dispersion of units, 
fragmented groups with little central oversight, and local economic 
motivations (proposition 5), as indicated in the previous chapter, also 
contribute to this problem. Landmines also enable the NSAGs to claim 
some local legitimacy as defending communities that they claim to 
represent and presenting themselves as credible armed actors to the 
government. NSAGs have made statements individually and through 
alliances about the necessity of landmines for defensive purposes and 
claimed restrictions on them, but not to end their use.  
Military and political necessity is also implicit in the NCA and CoC. It 
contains restrictions on landmine use and recruitment which all armed 
actors are required to adhere to. Such an agreement is potentially to the 
benefit of the NSAGs in terms of stabilising a situation where the 
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Tatmadaw has been increasing its presence in their areas since the 2012 
bilateral ceasefires. Concerns about the post-NCA era and which 
authorities would have oversight and coordination over mine clearance are 
also significant, and symptomatic of the tensions between the parallel 
state and non-state systems of welfare and administration. 
Proximity to borders and external assistance (proposition 4) 
From outside of the country, the role of the international actors and 
promotion of humanitarian and rights-based norms, especially from the 
Thai-Burma border, has contributed some material support, but more 
significantly also, perceptions of legitimacy for the NSAGs and their 
associated welfare organisations based on that border. The influence on 
NSAGs and their welfare wings exposed to these influences has been to 
espouse policies reflecting similar human rights and liberal, democratic 
values. This was exemplified in the language of KNU and KNPP policies 
designed to regulate the operations of international aid organisations, 
working from inside the country into their areas. It also reflects the NSAGs’ 
role in parallel governance to the recognised state, and their claims to 
legitimacy through the provision of cross-border services to people in their 
areas, and in policies that acknowledge international humanitarian norms. 
The role of local civil society actors (proposition 6) 
Inside Burma, local civil society actors have been working with NSAGs in a 
low-profile manner since at least the 1990s. Developments since 2011 
have allowed them to take an increasing role as partners to international 
organisations as restrictions on access have been partially relaxed. 
Examples of this include the role of KMSS, Shalom and other national and 
local NGOs in MRE. This activity involves NSAG constituencies and 
requires acceptance from the government, and from NSAGs, for it to be 
carried out in their areas.  
NSAGs operating from the Thai border have assisted in facilitating access 
for cross-border assistance organisations that have been associated with 
them. Over the last two decades of this interaction a more independent set 
of civil society organisations, reflecting the western liberal and rights-
based policies of the INGOs operating on the border, has also developed. 
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These CSOs have been involved in activities such as MRE, promotion of 
children’s rights, or engagement with NSAGs as partners to INGOs on 
these issues.  
Perceptions of legitimacy (proposition 7) 
Legitimacy is a central concern for the state, evident in its restrictions 
internally on access or contact with NSAGs by external actors. Direct 
engagement on humanitarian norms with Burma NSAGs has largely been 
conducted from outside the country. In some instances, those efforts have 
been opposed by the government, such as in the case of the UN DoC in 
2007. Interlocutors involved in humanitarian engagement in the cases 
above, frequently identified legitimacy as a factor that influenced NSAG 
leaders. However, as indicated in the example of the MRE project with the 
KNU, NSAG legitimacy locally is also predicated on being able to credibly 
defend constituencies or deter enemies, and landmines are still seen as a 
central means for that. 
Shifts in donor support and NSAG capacity (propositions 5 and 8) 
The role of international donors in supporting the ceasefires and peace 
processes would be expected to have a flow on effect to NSAG funding 
and capacity to implement their humanitarian obligations. However, 
funding for the peace processes has been criticised for supporting the 
government’s version of peace and expansion into NSAG areas, while 
ignoring or providing far less to NSAGs and their associated civil society to 
engage with the process. This has been compounded by a suspicion from 
ethnic communities, local civil society and some sectors of NSAG 
leadership, of a government business–first agenda in ceasefire 
negotiations.945 A view which was also expressed in interviews. “Funding 
to NSAs to support IDPs is less since the ceasefires. The donors want to 
move inside to Burma.”946 
                                            
945 See, for example, South, "Update on the peace process."; Francis Wade, "Ceasefire 
Capitalism: Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government 
emissaries talking peace," Foreign Policy Democracy Lab November 29, 2013. 
946 Local member of an INGO working in Mon and Karen state, interview, Yangon, 
September 7th, 2013. 
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But for the Mon NGOs it’s not easy yet. Now Mon CBOs also they have 
plans to register the organisation in Burma like other ethnic NGOs but still 
now we don’t have permission yet. In this it’s very difficult to get funding 
from the INGOs. That is one critical thing.947 
When they have a policy to support cross-border it is more accessible to 
the armed groups’ area…So now Yangon is kind of flexible for the 
international and local NGOs, but for them now even it’s more difficult to 
reach the conflict area to help child soldiers or other children…Before most 
of the non-state armed groups’ headquarters and base were close to the 
border area, so for the international NGOs and local NGOs it was easy to 
cross the border to meet them.948 
Agreements to implement action on protection of children or landmine use 
has some value to NSAGs in terms of political legitimacy, but it still has not 
brought significant funding, training or support for them to do so. As an 
illustration, international actors providing advice and technical support to 
NSAGs to develop ceasefire documents and codes of conduct compliant 
with IHL and IHRL, pointed out the following. 
The actual support to the NCCT and the UNFC and the EAOs [Ethnic 
Armed Organisations] and their efforts to engage has been 
miniscule...We’ve been working on this for years and we’ve talked to many 
actors about getting support for our work and we’ve never received 
funding. We’re doing all this from our own initiated funds. We have no 
funding for this. Because of the political sensitivities of it. Donors do not 
want to fund technical assistance or any sort of direct assistance.949 
 
The ceasefires since 2012 
The wider political and military context of the ceasefires since 2012 also 
needs to be considered for presenting openings for engagement on the 
landmine and child soldier issues. It is noteworthy that in relation to 
                                            
947 Senior member of leadership of NMSP (b), interview, Sangkhlaburi, November 13th, 
2012. 
948 A senior staff member of a local human rights NGO who engaged with NSAGs on the 
child soldier issue, interview, Chiang Mai, October 23rd, 2012. A similar point was also 
made by the director of a cross-border assistance CBO. “Some donors they want to go to 
Rangoon to be based there and then all the civil society, all the institutions from the 
cross-border assistance, they have to go to there. So wait, before you go to get the 
funding from the INGO you must be registered…This is politics, playing a game.” 
Interview, Mae Sot, November 24th, 2012. 
949 International legal consultant working with Burma NSAGs on ceasefire negotiations, 
interview, Chiang Mai, August 11th, 2014. 
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protection of children, the UN and HREIB DoC, and the groundwork for the 
Geneva Call DoC, occurred prior to the 2012 ceasefires. Engagement on 
landmines by INGOs and local actors has been occurring for at least the 
last decade, as was made evident by the 2004 account of MRE conducted 
with the acquiescence of the KNU. The broader indirect promotion of 
international norms to NSAGs, especially on the Thai-Burma border, has 
also been ongoing since at least the 1990s. So the ceasefires, while 
significant for relaxing restrictions on movement and access for 
engagement activity, are not the sole primary cause for the practical 
measures or expressions of compliance with humanitarian norms from 
NSAGs. One development due to the 2011/12 ceasefires for the scope of 
engagement, has been increased contact with previously remote, 
government-aligned or non-western oriented NSAGs. The DKBA in its 
post 2010 guise, for example, has received more attention from 
international and local actors. 
With DKBA, we’ve always wanted to engage them but we had challenges 
in relation to reaching them. I mean when they were in conflict with the 
KNU it was very difficult to be able to meet them. We’ve started to have 
dialogue with them, but it’s at a very early stage.950 
The influence of the ceasefires on access to resources and funding 
and on NSAG capacity (propositions 3 and 8) 
The influence of the political economy of the ceasefires, especially on 
NSAG leaders, has also tended to be away from a locally driven, liberal, 
rights-based or democratic vision, and towards a top-down and large–
scale economic development approach. 
So we went in, and Natala [the Ministry of Border Affairs] and the KNU, 
and they all start talking. ‘We need earth movers, support for mining, long-
term hardwood plantations, so many hundred kilometres of road’.…So I 
started to say, look, this is great, but show me the community participation, 
what impact you hope to have, your prioritisation and then let’s start pilots. 
He said, ‘you’re coming in here with this western development theory, 
upsetting the KNU, talking about pilots, and priorities, and community 
                                            
950 A representative of an international humanitarian NGO involved in engagement with 
NSAGs, interview, September 19th, 2013. 
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based programming. These guys want the money, and we want you to give 
them the money. Let them do it.’951 
While economic motivations have often been ascribed to both government 
and NSAG involvement in the ceasefires since 2012, it should be noted 
that the ceasefires have not yet greatly changed the nature of NSAG-
civilian relations. NSAG sources of funding in southeast Burma continue to 
come largely from resource extraction projects and from taxation of local 
populations. The bilateral ceasefire agreements have also permitted 
NSAGs to start businesses in their areas.952 To date, claims to be 
legitimate representatives of their constituencies remain a fundamental 
aspect of the larger NSAGs, rather than dramatic shifts in policy towards 
an economic development footing. International support in terms of 
funding or training has remained limited in the case of the NSAG liaison 
offices established after the ceasefires of 2012. These offices have often 
been a focus of business interests rather than humanitarian 
coordination.953 As was pointed out above, large development projects 
have often been the focus of funding made available to NSAGs through 
governments and external donors.  
Summary 
Engagement with Burma NSAGs on landmine use and children affected 
by armed conflict has resulted in a range of policy documents, statements, 
declarations, deeds of commitment and action plans. The two issues have 
been received very differently by the NSAGs in southeast Burma 
considered in this study. Landmine production, stockpiling and use has not 
been relinquished by any of the large and long-established NSAGs that 
have in the past been in conflict with the government, such as the KNU, 
KNPP, NMSP, or DKBA. Lack of trust in the stability of ceasefires and 
sporadic clashes with government forces or aligned armed groups also 
serve to reinforce these NSAGs’ stance in retaining landmines. NSAGs 
                                            
951 Senior staff member of an international donor agency, interview, Yangon, September 
12th, 2014. 
952 See, for example, Burma News International, Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: 
A Reference Guide 2015, 66-68. 
953 Saw Greh Moo, "Caught in a Two-Front War in Post-Ceasefire Karen State," Karen 
News July 18, 2013. 
 265 
 
claim to provide warnings or signs, but this is inconsistent, and haphazard 
systems of laying, recording and mapping of mines, have left a deadly 
problem frequently encountered by civilians. NSAG statements in 
response to engagement acknowledge the threat landmines pose, but 
their main attempt to ameliorate the harm caused is through facilitating 
MRE for their constituencies. Landmine use remains central to military 
necessity in the control of territory and, therefore, to perceptions of NSAG 
legitimacy as credible armed actors. 
Recruitment of children, on the other hand, has been recognised as a 
violation of international norms by most NSAGs that have been engaged 
long-term on the issue, and they wish to avoid the negative perceptions 
associated with that. Those perceptions would impact negatively on their 
attempts to maintain international support. Consequently, significant 
NSAGs including the KNU, KNPP and NMSP have issued internal 
regulations, statements and declarations about minimum ages of 
recruitment and reiterating that they do not have children in their armies. 
Deeds of commitment and plans of action on this issue have been made 
by one or other of these NSAGs with the UN, HREIB (in the case of the 
CNF), and most comprehensively by all four with Geneva Call since 2012. 
There is clear evidence, outlined in the previous chapter, as recent as the 
early to mid- 2000s, that these NSAGs still had some children present.  
The KNU, KNPP and DKBA among other NSAGs, remain on the UN list of 
groups using child soldiers in Burma. Therefore, these undertakings are 
significant, but as was mentioned in numerous interviews, there are 
ongoing issues due to lack of access for monitoring, funding, and capacity 
to implement what has been agreed to.  
The ceasefires since 2012 have enabled openings for engagement, but 
the underlying engagement has been ongoing over the last decade. The 
landmine issue in particular is significant within the context of the NCA 
processes and it is likely that “humanitarian mine action will be a key 
component of the ceasefire agreements.”954 Access to cleared land and 
                                            
954 Roger Fasth and Pascal Simon, "Mine Action in Myanmar," Journal of ERW and Mine 
Action 19, no. 2 (2015): 24. 
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resources, competing coordination bodies, and standards used in 
clearance were among concerns raised with inclusion of the landmine 
question in the NCA and CoC.  As identified here, various external actors 
and organisations have had a role in contributing to the text of those 
documents that have attempted to place the CoC within an international 
humanitarian framework. From an economic perspective, the bulk of donor 
funding and resources has gone to the government’s peace-making and 
negotiation organs, with little going to the NSAG coalition to work on these 
documents, participate in the processes and to address these issues 
practically in their areas.955 
The next chapter considers the themes drawn out from the Burma context 
in chapter six, the landmine and children in armed conflict issues in 
chapter seven, the case histories and involvement with those issues of the 
four NSAGs covered in chapter eight, and the humanitarian engagement 
processes with NSAGs outlined in this chapter. It will consider the 
propositions developed from the literature in chapters two, three and four, 
regarding factors influencing the extent of Burma NSAG compliance (or 
not) with humanitarian norms, in light of the material outlined in the 
substantive chapters.   
 
                                            
955 See, regarding increases in post 2011 donor funding to government agencies and a 
corresponding decrease to NSAG-associated civil society actors, Jolliffe, Ethnic Conflict 
and Social Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions, 23-24. 
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Chapter Ten 
Findings and conclusion 
Introduction 
This study has considered situations where NSAGs have not, for the most 
part, been actively engaged in deliberate violence directed towards 
civilians. Instead, the cases outlined here have been in the context of 
periodic armed conflict, shaky ceasefires, and ongoing low level insecurity 
over decades. NSAGs have, in these instances, been involved to varying 
degrees in governance and welfare activities in the areas they control or 
contest. Nonetheless, they have also presented threats to the security of 
those they claim to represent or protect, including through the use of 
landmines or the recruitment and involvement of children with armed 
conflict. The focus of this study has therefore been on the threats NSAGs 
present indirectly to the security of communities exposed to them, factors 
influencing this, and the actions (if any) of NSAGs and of external actors 
engaging with them in this regard. While this research has focused on the 
case of NSAGs in Burma, and mostly those operating in the southeast of 
the country, it is situated within a wider literature considering factors 
influencing NSAG behaviour in relation to civilians, and humanitarian 
engagement with NSAGs for improved protection of those populations. 
The implementation of policies and of practical measures by these NSAGs 
have varied between the two issues (landmine use and children affected 
by armed conflict) which are employed in this study as measures of the 
extent of compliance with humanitarian norms.  
Significant internal factors influencing NSAGs on those issues include 
perceptions of legitimacy, the influence of their associated welfare wings 
and civil society, organisational fragmentation and geographic dispersion, 
and the source and allocation of material resources. A significant external 
influence on NSAGs has centred on the claimed military necessity in 
opposing direct threats presented by the armed forces of the central state. 
The nature of NSAG involvement with humanitarian assistance, and 
dedicated engagement with NSAGs by local and international 
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organisations, are other significant external factors that have influenced 
the extent of their compliance with humanitarian norms. 
In what follows, a brief overview of what has been covered through 
chapters one to nine is provided. The theoretical propositions are then 
evaluated in light of the empirical findings detailed in chapters seven 
through to nine. The central questions driving the thesis are then revisited 
in light of that analysis. Discussion of the wider implications of this study 
for theory and policy, the limitations of the present study, and suggestions 
for future research bring this thesis to its conclusion. 
Overview 
Chapter one introduced the topic of NSAGs and humanitarian norms, the 
significance and contribution of the present study’s focus on Burma, its 
rationale, scope and central research questions. 
Chapter two explored the type of NSAGs operating in Burma that are 
mostly long-established, ethnic/political NSAGs, usually with both armed 
and political wings, varying amounts of territorial control and claimed 
representation of constituencies. The political economy of armed conflict 
and social constructivism were then introduced as theoretical models for 
the analysis of NSAG relations with their constituencies and engagement 
with NSAGs by local and international humanitarian and civil society 
actors.  
Chapter three considered humanitarian practitioner and academic 
literature on NSAGs. It then outlined the relevant IHL and IHRL that 
present the basis for humanitarian norms applicable to NSAGs and civilian 
protection; mechanisms by which NSAGs have attempted to declare their 
adherence to these norms; and the reasons humanitarian authors suggest 
for NSAG compliance with, or violation of, them. These reasons went on to 
inform the literature reviewed in chapter four and the propositions derived 
from it. 
Literature addressing the dynamics of NSAG-civilian relations from the 
perspectives of the political economy of armed conflict and from sociology-
based studies of NSAGs was reviewed in chapter four. The theoretical 
 269 
 
propositions examined in this study were then set out. The NSAG and 
humanitarian focused literature informed the first proposition considering 
the claimed military necessity for NSAG violations of humanitarian norms. 
The political economy literature contributed to propositions about the 
influences of resources at formation, dependence or independence on 
host populations, proximity to borders, and geographic dispersion or 
organisational cohesion of NSAGs. The sociology based literature on 
NSAG-civilian relations, considered the influences of legitimacy, identity, 
and the role of local NSAG-associated or accepted civil society. The 
variables addressed by these propositions related to NSAG-civilian 
relations and, thereby, also to the extent of NSAG adherence to or 
otherwise with humanitarian norms. 
The requirement for consideration of a range of perspectives, a lack of 
reliable statistical data, and the need to understand processes within their 
relevant contexts were central reasons outlined in chapter five for a case 
study research design. The main method for obtaining primary data was 
through semi-structured interviews with a range of respondents with local 
in-depth knowledge of the actors and issues.  Analysis of this data 
involved the disaggregation of interview transcripts and field notes into 
thematic sub-categories and coding into groups relating to the questions 
and propositions. The limitations in the scope of the research process, the 
potential biases of those interviewed and of the available secondary 
material were also acknowledged. Lastly, ethical considerations including 
the researcher’s contribution to local organisations during fieldwork, 
maintaining respondent anonymity, and responsible use of the research 
material were outlined. 
Chapter six provided a brief historical overview of the context within which 
NSAGs have developed in Burma, and the circumstances underlying and 
perpetuating the armed conflicts. Social and political ethnic grievances 
exacerbated by the system of colonial rule and the Second World War 
were identified as the initial drivers of the post-1948 armed conflicts. The 
conflicts have, however, subsequently developed self-sustaining economic 
dimensions in geographically isolated, resource rich, border regions. This 
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is the context in which NSAGs have developed, fragmented, agreed to 
ceasefires or resumed conflict, administered constituent populations, and 
engaged with humanitarian actors. Bilateral ceasefires agreed since 2012 
involving many NSAGs enabled progress towards a NCA (joined by some 
NSAGs in October 2015) and a CoC that addresses landmine and 
recruitment issues, as well as demarcation and movement of military 
forces. 
Chapter seven examined the issues of landmine use and the involvement 
of children in armed conflict in Burma. Both present immediate threats and 
create long-term problems for populations exposed to them. The wider 
context to these issues globally, the role of government forces, and of 
NSAGs, were then examined. NSAG landmine use has been claimed as 
militarily and politically necessary given their relative disadvantage in 
numbers and technology.  A feature of landmine use is that it has started 
to become more diffuse, with business interests and local villagers 
sometimes deploying them, as well as organised and established armed 
actors.  While use of child soldiers has historically been greater on the 
government side, their involvement with NSAGs has been clearly 
documented in the past. There has been more acceptance, policies and 
practical measures from NSAGs on the issue of underage recruitment 
than on the use of landmines, which remains integral to their military and 
defensive strategy. 
Overall, assessment of the four NSAGs (KNPP, NMSP, ABSDF, and 
DKBA), detailed in chapter eight, reveals more attention given by them to 
policies to address under age recruitment than landmine use. The military 
imperative for these groups has been evident in the continued deployment 
or stockpiling of landmines. Military advantage or necessity was also a 
factor for increased recruitment during ceasefire periods resulting in 
children recruited by, or associated with, NSAGs. Economic incentives 
were identified with landmine use to protect resources, and sometimes 
also for children joining NSAGs. All NSAGs, into the late 1990s, had 
children in, or associated with, them. Concerns with legitimacy, especially 
internationally, were evident in attempts by some to end underage 
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recruitment. The KNPP and NMSP had shown concern about this issue 
since the early 2000s, and developed internal regulations, made 
statements, and since signed deeds of commitment addressing it. The 
DKBA, especially prior to 2010 was less accessible on this issue and there 
was clear evidence of persistent under age recruitment. The extent of 
geographic dispersion and organisational integrity also played a part in 
NSAG behaviour. The focus on economic incentives and a decentralised 
command structure were, for example, influential in cases of individual 
commanders’ landmine use in protecting local resources or flouting 
prohibitions on under age recruitment. 
The types of humanitarian focused engagement with NSAGs in Burma 
were outlined in chapter nine. The role of local NGOs that developed 
inside ceasefire areas was exemplified by their work in the renewed 
Kachin conflict and in recent partnerships with INGOs. The interaction of 
international assistance organisations with NSAG-associated welfare 
actors along the Thai-Burma border since the 1980s enabled advocacy to 
be conducted for rights based policies with NSAGs and their welfare 
wings. The ICRC, Geneva Call, HREIB and others have provided practical 
assistance and training to NSAGs regarding humanitarian norms, and 
have helped draft policies and documents addressing these. These 
measures have involved long-term engagement with NSAGs on the 
issues, and the role of NSAG associated welfare actors and civil society 
for implementation. MRE has been the most widespread practical 
measure with regard to landmine use, and has involved local NGOs, 
CBOs, and NSAG welfare wings working as partners to INGOs. These 
actors have also undertaken mapping and survey of mined areas, but 
information remains incomplete and restricted. Clearance initiatives have 
been prevented or tightly restricted by both the government and NSAGs. 
Deeds of commitment to prevent recruitment of children to NSAGs have 
been entered into, and internal orders and regulations issued for their 
implementation by the KNPP, NMSP, KNU and CNF, out of the NSAGs 
considered by this study. 
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The theoretical propositions revisited 
The theoretical approaches to this study, and the corresponding literature, 
were divided broadly into social factors understood from the perspective of 
sociology and social constructivism, and material and economic factors 
understood within a political economy of armed conflict framework. They 
contributed to the theoretical propositions that are now discussed in light 
of the themes raised in the empirical chapters six through to nine.  
Military necessity 
The first proposition drew on the work of humanitarian practitioners and 
academics who have examined the reasons why NSAGs choose to 
comply with, or violate, IHL.  Claimed military and political necessity was 
identified as a primary reason for this. The proposition considers this in 
relation to the threats posed by NSAGs to their own constituencies. 
1. NSAGs will carry out actions that threaten the security of the 
populations they claim to represent or protect, in violation of 
humanitarian norms, out of claimed military and/or political 
necessity. 
Military and political necessity was usually raised by NSAG leadership, 
and others working with them, in relation to the use of landmines. Most 
NSAGs in Burma continue to use landmines or retain the option of using 
them. From a military standpoint they are weapons that allow the 
numerically smaller and technically less well equipped NSAGs to maintain 
resistance to the government’s armed forces.  Bangerter, Bellal and 
Casey-Maslen, and others in chapter three, made this point in considering 
why NSAGs violate humanitarian norms. Another concern held by NSAGs 
has been the lack of trust in the government and the ceasefires and the 
potential for the conflicts to restart. These rationales were reiterated by 
NSAG leaderships in interviews and in NSAG statements on the issue. 
From a political necessity perspective, landmines also enable the NSAGs 
to hold territory inside Burma and be seen as significant for inclusion in 
ceasefire negotiations with the government and in future political dialogue 
and peace processes 
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NSAGs needing to maintain or increase their numbers, especially during 
ceasefires when they have the opportunity, was indicated by some 
respondents and secondary sources as encouraging under age 
recruitment. However, the recruitment of children was not framed by 
respondents or secondary sources as militarily necessary to NSAG 
survival, whereas landmine use was viewed in that way. 
Military necessity may also contribute to NSAGs taking some positive 
actions in relation to humanitarian norms. For example, the ABSDF role in 
encouraging the defection of child soldiers from the Tatmadaw, and the 
provision of some support to them after, had strategic as well as charitable 
dimensions. Bangerter, in chapter three, mentions how respecting 
humanitarian norms can contribute to a military advantage by weakening 
the enemy through making surrender or defection a more attractive option.  
As was outlined in chapter nine, some NSAGs in Burma in the era of the 
post-2012 ceasefires, have sought to bring their training and internal 
regulations for their armed forces into line with international standards. 
Again, there are military and political motivations for this; in particular, the 
need to meet the requirements of the NCA and CoC. As most NSAGs are 
claiming to represent constituencies that need protection, demonstrating 
adherence to the humanitarian components of the NCA and CoC, and 
especially holding the Tatmadaw to it, is in the interests of the NSAGs and 
communities.  
Overall, the proposition that claimed military necessity will lead to non-
compliance with humanitarian norms is clear in the continued use of 
landmines. This strategy continues to harm the constituencies the NSAGs 
claim to represent or protect. Pressures to increase recruitment can also 
contribute to the presence of children in NSAGs, but this was not claimed 
as militarily necessary for the NSAG’s survival or hold on territory. As 
discussed in chapter nine, in the case of the KIO/KIA, the involvement of 
children has increased with the renewed conflict since 2011. This implies 
that during periods of active conflict, the pressure to increase numbers has 
also led to renewed under age recruitment or involvement with NSAGs. 
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Material and social resources at formation  
Jeremy Weinstein’s focus, outlined in chapter four, on the social and 
economic endowments that NSAG leaders have to work with at the start of 
a rebellion, and how that leads to the NSAG being more or less abusive 
towards civilian populations, gave rise to the following proposition. 
2. The extent and nature of material and social resources for an 
NSAG at formation will significantly influence the nature of the 
groups’ future relations with civilian populations and, therefore, the 
extent of NSAG conformity with humanitarian norms. 
As outlined in chapters six and eight, the ethnic NSAGs that developed in 
Burma after 1945 did so within a context of pre-existing political, social 
and cultural organisations and networks. Politicisation of ethnic identities 
had increased during the colonial era. In the aftermath of the Second 
World War in Burma there was a plentiful supply of arms, and large 
numbers of trained and armed former soldiers. 
A legacy of military experience and ethno-nationalism, therefore, informed 
the development, leadership and structure of the ethnic rebel groups. 
Leaders of ethnic NSAGs personally had, or could call on others with, 
military experience and training, and could mobilise causes based on 
grievances around discrimination, denial of self-determination, and 
atrocities committed by government aligned forces. These experiences 
then informed the ways the groups conducted their actions and structured 
themselves.  
The NSAGs considered in this study diverge from the above proposition in 
some important respects. At the establishment of the KNU, KNPP, NMSP, 
and KIO, ethnic identity and political grievances predominated rather than 
economic motivations. The longevity of the NSAGs, and their focus on 
local autonomy rather than seizing power at the centre, are also points of 
difference compared to the groups that were considered in Weinstein’s 
study. Another factor at odds with the model of a single NSAG seeking 
sole control of the state has been inter-NSAG assistance (in the initial role 
 275 
 
of the KNU with the KNPP and NMSP) and cooperation between Burma 
NSAGs in alliances like the NDF, DAB and UNFC. 
In terms of the influence of social resources at formation on the trajectory 
of these NSAGs and their consequent behaviour towards civilians, the 
social endowments part of the proposition is confirmed. At least initially, 
those who joined these insurgencies demonstrated what Weinstein refers 
to as activist rather than opportunist motivations. They would have 
accepted there were high risks and few material rewards in their ethnic 
separatist causes, so looting or self-enrichment were not primary 
motivations. These NSAGs have since not engaged in significant policies 
of violence directed against civilian populations, who are usually their own 
or allied ethnic constituencies. In contrast, predatory economic incentives 
have been identified by respondents and secondary sources, regarding 
the quality of some recruits to the more recently formed DKBA in the mid-
late 1990s. This development, though, also owes much to fragmentation, 
geographic dispersion, and decentralised command (see discussion of the 
proposition regarding this below). 
Regarding material endowments at formation, the proposition is not 
confirmed. Over the decades of conflict, however, material resources have 
become central to NSAGs, and have led to actions that endanger civilians 
in NSAG areas such as the use of landmines to protect resources.  
Extent of independent sources of funding 
Authors employing a political economy approach to understanding the 
actions of NSAGs towards civilians have frequently made a connection 
between the NSAGs’ sources of funding and their behaviour. In particular, 
when NSAGs have access to funding, or resources through which they 
can gain funds, independent of host populations, the causal claim is that 
this leads to behaviour that is more abusive. 
3. Where an NSAG has substantial funding and/or access to 
resources independent of its constituent population, its policies and 
practices will be more abusive towards civilians, and therefore less 
conforming with humanitarian norms. 
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None of the NSAGS in this study have, at least since the 1980s, received 
significant external state-sponsored support, funding, or weapons. The 
means by which they have supported themselves has been principally 
through taxation of people and cross border trade, and the exploitation 
and sale of natural resources. The NMSP’s taxation, for example, of the 
border crossing at Three Pagodas Pass prior to 1990, or similar taxation of 
cross-border trade and logging of forests in Karenni state by the KNPP, 
were significant to these groups’ economic survival. The DKBA after 
breaking away from the KNU in 1994, was associated with a variety of 
economically motivated activities like logging, mining and narcotics. It also 
initially received assistance from the government for its role against the 
KNU. As highlighted in chapter eight, the DKBA, particularly between 1994 
and 2010, was also most associated with predatory behaviour towards 
civilians including extortion, landmine use, forced labour and under age 
recruitment. The other NSAGs assessed in this study, while funding 
themselves through taxation and resource extraction, have channelled 
some of the funds gained back into the organisations, both to military and 
welfare activities. Humanitarian assistance, as outlined in the last chapter, 
has benefitted the Thai border based NSAGs more in terms of legitimacy 
than financial or material support. In contrast, the DKBA’s more extractive 
trajectory and lack of coherent welfare, administration or unified political 
vision, appears to have eroded its popular support over time as individual 
leaders in the group concentrated on personal enrichment.  
Overall, the DKBA most conforms to the proposition’s link between 
predatory or abusive behaviour and sources of funding independent from 
a host population. However, the other NSAGs considered in this study 
have also drawn financial support from taxation of people and exploitation 
of resources. These issues have been more evident in the territorially 
dispersed or fragmented groups as discussed below. This has not, though, 
been to the exclusion of continuing to pursue political objectives and 
maintaining some governance and welfare provision, for which the NSAGs 
assume they have popular support.  
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Geographic dispersion and organisational fragmentation 
The geographical distance between units in an NSAG, the degree of 
cohesion, and the effectiveness of control within it, have implications for 
NSAG behaviour towards civilians. Spatial and organisational factors 
influencing NSAG actions towards civilians are, therefore, considered by 
the next proposition.    
4. Where an NSAG is dispersed over territory, is fragmented, and/or 
has weak command and control over individual units, their 
practices (even if there is policy) will be more abusive or predatory 
towards civilians and therefore less congruent with humanitarian 
norms. 
Three situations relevant to this proposition, with frequently negative 
results for civilians in the case of the NSAGs considered here, are 
breakaway factions, decentralised command, and a lack of monitoring by 
the central leadership of dispersed units. In these instances, there is a 
greater risk of local commanders behaving more autonomously, 
particularly through not following orders from the central leadership, and 
by pursuing localised economic agendas.  
These issues have been present to varying extents in all the NSAGs 
outlined in this study. Following the KNU-DKBA split, the DKBA faced a 
lack of unified leadership, a loss of initial support from the government 
leading to a need to be self-sustaining, and commanders with localised 
economic objectives. The KNU and NMSP when deployed over larger 
areas, prior to 1995, were also associated with instances of commanders 
acting autonomously to follow localised economic interests. Competition 
for control of the lucrative Three Pagodas Pass border crossing, for 
example, led to a short conflict between the NMSP and KNU in 1988.  
After its 1995 ceasefire with the government, the NMSP had conflicts with 
breakaway factions from it which contributed to the temporary resumption 
of landmine use in the early 2000s. The NMSP has not been identified 
with significant landmine use or under age recruitment since this time. It is 
now concentrated within demarcated areas of Mon and southern Karen 
state. The KNPP experienced an ideological split in the 1970s with the left-
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leaning KNPLF. However, the KNPP, as a small NSAG operating in 
contested areas, presented less opportunity for individual commanders to 
act autonomously. The ABSDF, while in an auxiliary role to larger ethnic 
NSAGs, graphically demonstrated the problems of geographic dispersion, 
autonomous local command, and poor communications (in the early 
1990s) in its trial and execution of some of its own members suspected as 
spies by its northern battalion. 
 Since all NSAGs rely on local resource extraction and taxation of trade, 
there is opportunity for field commanders to become involved in such 
activity to the detriment of the parent organisation’s overall military and 
political objectives. Dispersion of NSAG units is especially relevant for the 
DKBA. This is also the case for the KNLA, which has seven brigades (and 
corresponding KNU administrative districts) stretched from northern Karen 
state, through Mon state to Tanintharyi in the south. Those far from the 
centres of NSAG command and political leadership, even when there are 
policies in place, may choose to disregard them. NSAG leadership, in 
chapter nine, acknowledged to those engaging with them the problem of 
‘rogue commanders’ regarding implementation of policies prohibiting 
under age recruitment.  
In the case of the Burma NSAGs considered in this study, the proposition 
is confirmed. Geographic dispersion and organisational attenuation have 
led to self-provisioning, predation and involvement in localised economies, 
and to the ignoring of centralised policies or orders by locally autonomous 
commanders. These conditions lead to threats to civilians due to landmine 
use for local economic agendas or acceptance of underage recruits in 
violation of central policy and, consequently, to less compliance with 
humanitarian norms. 
Proximity to borders 
The role of borders in sustaining NSAGs and the conflicts they are 
involved in has been raised by writers addressing the political economy of 
armed conflict and the role of humanitarian aid. This literature gave rise to 
the following proposition.  
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5. NSAGs that control or cross international borders can access or 
co-opt material, financial and/or humanitarian assistance enabling 
less reliance on constituent populations. Therefore, they are more 
likely to be abusive towards civilians and less congruent with 
humanitarian norms. 
Proximity to borders for NSAGs has been identified with influencing the 
economic and humanitarian dimensions of the armed conflicts and the 
groups themselves. Taxation of black market and cross-border trade has 
already been highlighted as a significant factor for the survival of NSAGs 
on the Thai border. Use of refugee camps as rear bases and co-option of 
humanitarian assistance by NSAGs has been raised by scholars as 
significant. The porous nature of this border has enabled NSAG members 
and leaderships to move back and forward and to seek shelter with 
refugees in the camps along the border. They have also been able to 
operate the political wings and associated welfare organisations of the 
NSAGs relatively openly.  
The circumstances of the Thai-border based NSAGs and their relationship 
with humanitarian INGOs have some differences to the standard ‘refugee 
warrior’ model as identified by Terry and others in chapters three and four. 
There has been no international state interest in supporting Burma 
NSAGs, so they have not received weapons or other supplies from any 
state sponsors since the 1980s. However, the role of international 
humanitarian assistance has been significant on the Thai border since that 
time. NSAG-associated welfare actors have developed within the social 
and political sphere of NSAGs that have had the most engagement with 
international humanitarian organisations. This has especially been the 
case for organisations operating within the orbit of the KNU, KNPP and 
NMSP.  
Food and medical aid from humanitarian donors and INGOs has been 
distributed in refugee camps by NSAG-run refugee committees, and to 
IDPs in NSAG areas of control or influence by welfare actors associated 
with NSAGs. In some instances, as Podder indicated in chapter two, 
rather than diverting external humanitarian aid to their armed forces and 
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away from civilians, NSAGs may incorporate it into their welfare activity to 
maintain support and legitimacy with their constituency. It has been the 
perceived legitimacy as protectors and providers to refugee and IDP 
populations that has been the most beneficial aspect of humanitarian 
assistance across borders for the NSAGs in this study. Terry, as indicated 
in chapter four, identified how perceived legitimacy gained in this manner 
enables NSAGs to control civilian populations.  
The proposition outlined above is not confirmed in this case. The proximity 
to borders and to international assistance did not encourage more abusive 
or predatory behaviour by the Thai border based NSAGs towards civilians. 
While it may have provided some material support, the more politically 
significant aspect has been the perceptions of NSAG legitimacy which has 
come from their involvement and association with providing assistance to 
constituencies, rather than through predation upon them. 
Civil society development within the NSAG sphere 
The development of civil society organisations like Shalom or KMSS inside 
Burma, and of others like the CIDKP or BPHWT within the umbrella of the 
Thai-border based INGO-NSAG relationship, has been outlined in chapter 
nine and raised in discussion of the previous proposition. The influence of 
these actors on NSAGs in regard to humanitarian issues is considered in 
the following proposition. 
6. NSAGs that have developed, work alongside, or are amenable to, 
local welfare, advocacy, or service provision organisations, are 
more likely to take action to conform to humanitarian norms. 
 
NSAG-associated, and other more independent local civil society actors, 
have played a significant part in promotion of the humanitarian norms 
considered by this study. They have been involved in independent 
advocacy and in practical measures such as MRE in the case of 
landmines. These actors have developed through two mechanisms. Those 
inside Burma have evolved most clearly in some ceasefire NSAG areas. A 
significant example is in KIO areas during the 1994-2011 ceasefire, with 
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faith-based organisations like the Kachin Baptist Convention, Shalom or 
Metta becoming nation-wide entities.  
Thai border based organisations like CIDKP and KSWDC, the respective 
welfare wings of the KNU and KNPP, have carried out MRE, often working 
as local partners to INGOs. Similarly, the BPHWT as a more independent 
medical-focused organisation has also carried out MRE as a part of its 
work. Local rights-based organisations like KHRG, HURFOM, and HREIB 
equally have engaged, reported and advocated for action on the landmine 
and child soldier issues. Significantly, the KNU, KNPP, ABSDF and NMSP 
claim to be fighting for democracy, human rights and ethnic autonomy. 
Consequently, their relationship with local civil society actors close to them 
has reinforced promotion of humanitarian norms advocated by those 
actors that are broadly congruent with the NSAGs’ own claimed 
objectives. The work of people who staff local civil society organisations 
associated with NSAGs, this study argues, demonstrate how their 
identification with NSAG causes and their own communities have helped 
shape the NSAGs towards improved compliance. Petrasek, in chapter 
three, indicated that CSOs that see themselves as sharing objectives with 
an NSAG they are associated with may endeavour to change or reform 
behaviour that is harming the NSAG’s reputation, or undermining its 
cause. 
Constructivist theories are useful here in considering the relationship 
between NSAG-associated civil society and welfare actors with the armed 
groups whose causes they may share or sympathise with. Theories about 
how norms are diffused see them as often initially being ignored or 
rejected. Over time, there is instrumental and strategic calculation seen in 
the value of conforming to them. Eventually, internalisation and 
acceptance occurs, where the ‘rightness’ of the norms are no longer 
questioned. Members of human rights and welfare organisations are likely 
to have internalised to some extent the norms they promote to 
communities and to NSAGs. Respondents from local assistance and 
human rights groups, whether close to or more independent from NSAGs, 
demonstrated a genuinely held belief in the value of the work they do. 
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Whether in conducting MRE or promoting of children’s rights, many risk 
very real personal danger in doing so. This strongly implies that, for them, 
the norms are closer to being internalised.  
Referring to constructivist theories of state behaviour in chapter two, 
Johnston, Checkel and others, described socialisation of states to accept 
a new norm as being due to factors such as legitimacy or pressure to 
conform. When the norm has become accepted and compliance is 
automatic, it is then considered to have become internalised. This is the 
phase where the actors comply because they no longer question the 
norm, they see it as a naturally correct or right action. This study contends 
that civil society and welfare actors associated with Burma NSAGs exhibit 
internalisation of the norms they promote or that apply to the issues they 
seek to ameliorate. Leadership of NSAGs, in some instances, may share 
this taken for granted view of the norms, while for others there is strategic 
calculation for political advantage in being seen to comply.  
In chapter two, reference was made to Capie’s adaptation of Johnston and 
Checkel’s socialisation theories in relation to NSAGs. He referred to the 
role of respected members, or former members, of NSAGs in influencing 
NSAGs. The role of authoritative or influential actors with shared identity, 
outlook or cause, fit the description of many of the welfare and civil society 
actors associated with border based NSAGs outlined in chapter nine. 
Their ability to have some limited influence with NSAGs lies in credibility 
due to mutually shared identities, political causes, experiences, long-term 
engagement, and empathy for those in need. It was confirmed in 
interviews that there is, or previously has been, some cross over in roles, 
or even members, between these organisations. Members of civil society 
and welfare organisations working with NSAGs also share risks in 
providing assistance to constituencies in conflict areas. In some instances, 
they have been accompanied, or have had access facilitated, by NSAGs.  
The evidence, therefore, indicates there has been a mutually reinforcing 
relationship between these sets of actors around welfare, rights and 
humanitarian norms. The proposition that NSAGs that work with 
associated welfare or civil society actors are more likely to comply with 
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humanitarian norms is confirmed in the examples of the NSAGs examined 
in the Burma context.  
Perceptions of NSAG legitimacy 
International and local legitimacy as a motivation for NSAGs improving 
compliance with humanitarian norms was raised in much of the literature 
on NSAGs, from humanitarian, legal, and sociology perspectives. It leads 
to the following proposition. 
7. NSAGs will pursue policies that contribute to civilian protection, 
and therefore conform more closely to humanitarian norms, out of 
concerns with local and/or international legitimacy. 
 
In chapter four it was indicated that perceived legitimacy, as a socially 
constructed concept, is difficult to measure. However, that it matters in the 
calculations of states and of NSAGs is evident in their reactions to factors 
that may influence it. One indicator of the significance of perceived 
legitimacy in the present study is the opposition shown by governments to 
humanitarian engagement with NSAGs. For the NSAGs, international 
attention and legitimacy were identified by respondents who had engaged 
with them as a factor motivating them to make statements, or implement 
agreements, on landmine or child soldier issues. International 
engagement, however, was seen by the government as conferring 
legitimacy in the case of the KNU and KNPP in 2007, hence its resistance 
to the UN DoC. International attention on the issues and the legitimacy it 
may provide clearly does matter in the calculations of the government and 
of NSAGs. This reflects the point made by Steinhoff, Santos and others in 
chapter three about state legitimacy concerns over engagement with 
NSAGs.  
As identified above, the norm prohibiting recruitment of children has met 
with more NSAG will to develop policies and actions to address it than has 
been the case for landmine use. This raises the issue of whose 
perceptions of legitimacy are being sought, and by which actors. This may 
differ for legitimacy sought by NSAGs locally from their constituencies and 
from the government, compared to that from international actors. In 
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chapter four, Podder makes this point in relation to international 
engagement with NSAGs. International engagement may confer some 
external legitimacy, whether earned or not, on NSAGs.  However, local 
socio-political legitimacy resides in NSAGs gaining recruits from, and 
providing protection and welfare to, their constituencies, which puts them 
in a better position to maintain popular support. Petrasek mentions (in 
chapter four) that constituencies’ tolerance of NSAG actions that may 
violate international norms will also depend on the extent of that NSAG’s 
local legitimacy. 
The continued build-up of Tatmadaw forces since the 2012 ceasefires in, 
or close to NSAG areas, has prompted Burma NSAGs to present 
themselves as credible protectors to communities they claim to defend 
and to their Tatmadaw opponents. In those instances, local perceptions of 
legitimacy for NSAGs may reside more in their ability to resist the 
Tatmadaw and, therefore, tacit acceptance of their continued use of 
landmines. This was raised by respondents from mine action NGOs who 
have engaged with NSAGs and communities on this issue. The NSAGs 
considered by this study are also involved in ceasefire talks with the 
government and want to be included in future political dialogue. Part of the 
criteria for inclusion is that they are seen by the government and 
Tatmadaw as credible armed actors that have some territorial presence. 
Consequently, landmine use, or retaining stockpiles and the threat to use 
them, adds weight to NSAGs’ claims for inclusion as legitimate participants 
in those negotiations.  
Recruitment of children has been a negative factor for perceived NSAG 
legitimacy internationally. The NSAGs and associated civil society actors 
and media, have often highlighted the recruitment of children by the 
Tatmadaw. Reports by local and international rights groups such as CSI, 
HRW, KHRG or HREIB, have all framed this issue as a violation of human 
rights and humanitarian norms and this has been publicised 
internationally. The NSAGs espousing rights-based and democratic 
causes, therefore, do not want to be implicated with a behaviour they 
criticise their opponents for. The KNU, KNPP, DKBA, and KIO are, 
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however, among seven NSAGs in Burma (as well as the Tatmadaw) still 
listed by the UN as armed groups in Burma that recruit children. This is 
clearly a negative factor for their perceived international legitimacy, and as 
has been indicated in chapters eight and nine, the KNU and KNPP, have 
actively sought to be delisted.  
The proposition is confirmed in terms of NSAG actions and policies being 
more compliant with humanitarian norms when NSAGs are concerned 
about their perceived legitimacy. It is important, nonetheless, to recognise 
differences in the ways legitimacy is perceived or earned for NSAGs. 
International legitimacy matters to NSAGs for continued support and 
assistance from INGOs and donors. This also gains NSAGs some local 
legitimacy, especially through involvement with welfare provision and civil 
society actors associated with them. A different form of legitimacy locally, 
which is sometimes at odds with international norms, is also gained by 
NSAG actions and policies that present themselves to their constituencies 
and the government as credible military and political actors. 
NSAG Capacity 
Considering the involvement of NSAGs and their associated welfare 
organisations and civil society with activities that can contribute to 
improved protection for people in NSAG areas, the following proposition 
was raised. 
8. NSAG action to reduce threats to their constituencies may 
contribute to local support and legitimacy. However, even when 
willing to do so, NSAGs are constrained by their capacity in terms 
of the material and human resources available to effect such 
action. 
Beyond securing agreements, policies, or amending internal regulations to 
respect humanitarian norms, there needs to be the human and material 
resources to implement what has been agreed to.  
While the other propositions so far have considered factors that influence 
NSAGs towards or away from compliance, this last proposition considers 
their capacity to undertake measures towards compliance if they have 
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agreed to them. This has significance for the future implementation of 
measures included within the various deeds of commitment and in the 
NCA CoC that have been, or will be, agreed to by NSAGs in Burma. It will 
also depend to a large extent on resource allocation within NSAGs and 
international assistance to enable this.  
Several significant NSAGs have signed the DoC undertaking not to recruit 
children and to demobilise and reintegrate those already in their ranks. As 
indicated in interviews with INGOs and NSAG leaders, such agreements 
require accompanying implementation measures. Of relevance to this 
step, most already have welfare, education and health services 
established as part of their governance structures. As indicated in chapter 
nine, international assistance to assist implementation of measures to 
remove children from NSAGs and provide them with ongoing support has 
been less forthcoming, partly due to state resistance. This resonates with 
the question raised by Bruderlein in chapter three about the extent, if at all, 
of international support that is forthcoming to NSAGs that do agree to 
comply with humanitarian commitments. 
While NSAGs have not yet undertaken to allow or facilitate mine clearance 
in their areas, they are likely to need further training and equipment to do 
so. Given the concerns about external INGOs working from Yangon being 
seen as extensions of government control, NSAGs are likely to want to 
have oversight of, or at least close involvement with, this activity. As 
indicated in interviews and secondary reports, their welfare wings have 
some existing knowledge and maps of mined areas.  
Support for NSAG-associated welfare wings and civil society to maintain 
existing levels of schooling, health care, or MRE, are significant. These 
are activities relevant to the implementation of measures addressing 
landmines or children affected by armed conflict as well as other welfare 
issues. Concerns have been expressed by mine action experts about the 
need for training and specialised equipment required for mine clearance. 
There are also unresolved issues around who will have oversight and 
coordination of future mine action, especially with the land and resource 
issues landmine clearance potentially opens up. 
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The proposition is confirmed given the wider political and economic 
context of the current ceasefire and peace processes. As indicated by 
respondents in chapter nine, international assistance to the peace 
processes since 2012 has been mostly channelled through the 
government side. NSAG capacity to implement mine clearance or 
demobilisation and reintegration of former child soldiers is an area that will 
need increased support, both in terms of NSAG internal allocation of 
resources and from international assistance in the post-ceasefire period. 
Having considered the propositions developed from the theory and 
literature, this study now returns to the central questions. 
The central questions revisited 
The propositions above address a range of potential factors that are raised 
by the primary research question for this research. 
Which factors have facilitated or obstructed compliance and/or action 
towards compliance with humanitarian norms against landmine use and 
the recruitment of children by NSAGs in Burma? 
In terms of the factors identified in this study that prevent NSAG 
compliance with humanitarian norms, the pressure of claimed military and 
political necessity is most evident. Other factors also serve to obstruct any 
measures that have been taken towards greater compliance with these 
norms. NSAG dispersion and lack of central oversight were identified 
above, and it is within these circumstances that economic motivations are 
then also more likely to lead to predatory actions that endanger civilians. 
The third negative, or impeding factor, identified, is where local or national 
perceptions of legitimacy rely on NSAG use of landmines for holding 
territory, or increasing strength in numbers through the recruitment of 
children.  
Conversely, a significant factor that has encouraged civilian protection 
measures by Burma NSAGs has also been perceived legitimacy, locally 
and internationally. Locally, this legitimacy has been reinforced by NSAG 
association with provision of humanitarian assistance. Another factor 
facilitating practical measures such as MRE and moves towards 
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compliance with humanitarian norms has been NSAG relationships with 
associated welfare and civil society actors. These organisations have 
been supported within the international assistance community on the Thai 
border, and/or developed locally, often as faith based organisations, in 
ceasefire areas inside Burma. A sense of shared identity and, sometimes 
also cause, between NSAGs and assistance actors has enabled the later 
to advocate on rights-based and protection issues to those NSAGs. 
Four sub questions were raised following on from the central one. The first 
two considered the NSAGs themselves and their policies and actions in 
relation to the landmine and child soldier issues: a) What are the actions 
NSAGs have themselves taken (if any) to ameliorate the issues of 
landmine use and children affected by armed conflict?  and b) How have 
these been carried out? 
As outlined in chapter eight, the NSAGs in this study have developed 
policies and/or undertaken practical measures to ameliorate the threats 
they present to their own constituencies. Much of this activity has been via 
associated welfare wings or more independent CSOs. The most significant 
activity has been in regard to landmines through MRE to affected 
communities. Warnings, signage and fencing of mined areas, however, 
has been unsystematic or non-existent. Some very limited clearance has 
been undertaken by NSAGs, but whether this is for humanitarian or 
military purposes is unclear. A small humanitarian mine clearance initiative 
was developed within the orbit of Thai-border based NSAGs and civil 
society. There remain, however, restrictions from within NSAGs to where 
this is allowed to operate. NSAG-associated welfare organisations have 
been involved in some mapping and surveys of mined areas, but no 
significant NSAG has relinquished the use, or the option of using, 
landmines. 
 
Most of the NSAGs considered by this study have made internal policies, 
statements, and declarations, such as by DoC, to not recruit children and 
release those still in their ranks. The DKBA that split after 2010 into the 
DKBA/KKO and the government commanded BGF has not so far made 
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official written statements or agreements regarding this issue. The post-
2010 DKBA has taken measures to move children out of combat 
formations into education and medical facilities associated with the 
organisation. The most proactive measures taken on the child soldier 
issue were those initiated by actors working with the ABSDF. That 
organisation has since gone on to also assist some child soldiers from 
ethnic NSAGs as well. The KNPP, NMSP and KNU have developed 
internal policies and regulations prohibiting the recruitment of children, and 
have all signed Geneva Call’s DoC expressing compliance with the norm. 
Dispersion of individual units and lack of central command oversight have 
been factors enabling continued instances of children associated with 
these NSAGs, even where internal orders have been issued to end it. 
 
The third and fourth sub questions related to humanitarian engagement 
with NSAGs in Burma on the protection issues of landmines and children 
affected by armed conflict: c) What are the roles and processes of 
humanitarian actors that have engaged with NSAGs to this end?  and d) 
How effective have they been and why? 
 
As outlined in chapter nine, welfare and civil society organisations close 
to, or able to access, the NSAGs have been influential through indirectly 
promoting humanitarian norms to them. International engagement actors 
have often worked through these local organisations. Socially constructed 
factors, particularly shared identity with civilian populations and common 
cause with NSAG political objectives, have been influential, this study 
concludes, in motivating those working with these organisations. 
International organisations have influenced NSAGs and their related civil 
society through the promotion of humanitarian norms, and by direct 
engagement with the NSAGs on specific issues. Again, a socially 
constructed factor, legitimacy, has played a significant part. This is evident 
in the resistance from the host state government to engagement with 
NSAGs that are in opposition to it. Material support for refugee camps and 
IDPs delivered through NSAG welfare wings from international actors has 
also been an important incentive for NSAGs in terms of maintaining their 
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legitimacy. The relationship between international assistance 
organisations and NSAG welfare wings has been instrumental therefore in 
reinforcing perceptions of NSAG legitimacy as providing for, or being 
protective of, civilian populations. 
NSAGs wishing to bring assistance into their areas will benefit from local 
and international legitimacy gained through facilitating it. Nonetheless, the 
response to the two norms considered in this study has been divergent. 
Assistance and funding from international actors for MRE in NSAG areas 
delivered by local civil society or NSAG welfare actors is an example of 
this. Support is provided in an attempt to reduce harm from landmines 
while the norm against landmine use remains not complied with.  
The norm prohibiting the recruitment of children has met with more 
success, as outlined above, as it does not involve NSAGs relinquishing a 
militarily necessary device in their defence against the enemy. The 
problem for implementation of this norm is the structural and 
organisational dispersion of some NSAGs, and acceptance of children still 
associated with them but not in combat roles. Appeals to NSAG legitimacy 
and alignment of this rights-based norm with the perceived rightness of the 
NSAG cause, as indicated by respondents in chapter nine, have been 
used by external actors in the socialisation of NSAGs, leadership, and 
communities, into awareness and acceptance of this norm. 
The effectiveness of engagement with NSAGs on the two issues has been 
most evident through NSAG involvement with facilitating MRE in the case 
of landmines, and in formal statements, agreements, and issuing of 
internal regulations to end under age recruitment, in the case of child 
soldiers. Long-term engagement, especially by those close to NSAGs, and 
identification by humanitarian organisations of common ground in terms of 
protection issues with NSAGs, have been identified by respondents as 
central to achieving these outcomes. 
Implications for theory 
The use of the two divergent theoretical perspectives deployed in this 
study has been useful in developing the set of propositions applied to the 
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empirical evidence discussed above. The approach allowed consideration 
of a wider range of influences on NSAGs in relation to these issues, and 
also identified areas of interaction between socially constructed and 
material factors. This study has also raised some potential implications for 
the wider application of theory. Some of these points are more relevant 
either to social constructivism or to political economy analysis of armed 
conflict, while others demonstrate the value of the combined use of both 
theories in analysis of humanitarian norms and NSAGs. 
Socially constructed concepts like identity and legitimacy, in particular, 
were identified as influential in this study. However, conceptions of 
legitimacy, status or approval, while identified as important conditions for 
socialisation into norms by Johnston, Checkel and others, can vary across 
different audiences for actors faced with advocacy or pressure to comply 
with norms. As was pointed out in this study, NSAGs were frequently the 
subject of competing expectations from different groups whose approval 
mattered in different ways and to different extents. It was not just to an 
international humanitarian or human rights-focused audience focused on 
particular international norms that leadership of NSAGs in this study 
needed to present their policies and actions. The expectations of local 
constituencies, associated CSOs, allied NSAGs, business actors or 
government opponents also mattered to NSAGs. These expectations from 
other external actors may diverge from those of international rights-based 
organisations. Assumptions about legitimacy or status in norm 
socialisation theory, at least when applied to the complex case of NSAGs 
and humanitarian norms, may need to more effectively account for the 
competing influences of groups with which the actor seeks status or 
acceptance. 
Acceptance of norms by actors was presented in the socialisation 
literature as broadly divided between strategic instrumental calculation and 
genuine internalisation. It was beyond the scope of this study to identify 
the inner psychological motives and extent of internalisation of the norms 
for individuals. However, at a political or group level, strategic or 
instrumental calculations were evident through interviews of NSAG 
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leadership, INGOs, CSOs and others who had engaged with NSAGs on 
the landmine or child soldier issues. These motivations may have been for 
wider strategic or reputational goals for the NSAG as an organisation, 
rather than just for individual leaders’ status or belonging. The transferable 
point to NSAGs from constructivist theorising about states in IR, is that 
behaviour change towards compliance with norms is at least partly due to 
material or social incentives in the calculations of leaders of NSAGs. If the 
outcomes result in better conditions for civilians, then the value of the 
instrumental use of norms is an important area for future research into 
normative theory. 
A contribution this study has made to the political economy of armed 
conflict literature, is its consideration of the constructive role resources and 
funding can have for NSAG-civilian relations. Whereas the influence of 
economic factors on NSAGs has generally been viewed negatively (see 
Weinstein, Beardsley and McQuinn, Hovil and Werker, and others) this 
study has highlighted examples where economic resources have been 
used, often over lengthy periods, to develop NSAG administrations in 
parallel to the recognised state. Furthermore, CSOs associated with 
NSAGs have been engaged in activity that has attempted to limit the 
potential harm of landmine use, a weapon which the NSAGs have not 
relinquished. Funding raised through international assistance has also 
been valuable to those CSOs and to other CSOs involved in advocacy 
with NSAGs, including on child soldiers.  
Combining the two theoretical perspectives proved valuable for this study 
in both the development of the propositions and assessment of them in 
light of the empirical material. Doing so avoided a focus solely on 
economic variables like resources and funding, or an entirely social 
constructivist preoccupation with internalisation of norms by individuals in 
isolation from wider economic or political concerns of the group for which 
they were making decisions. The concept of legitimacy presents an 
example of the rationale for this combination. Legitimacy is a socially 
constructed concept. Most of the NSAGs in this study needed to maintain 
or build their legitimacy with constituent populations. Material factors such 
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as resources, funding and humanitarian aid are often identified as 
significant variables within the political economy literature, but here they 
were important for NSAGs building legitimacy. For NSAGs, as for 
governments of states, providing administration or welfare requires 
material resources and funding. They are also mutually reinforcing, since a 
NSAG demonstrating its legitimacy through provision of welfare may be 
able to attract further international assistance to do so. The case of the 
NSAGs and associated CSOs operating from the Thai-Burma border and 
their relationship with the international community provides an example of 
this. 
Another factor obstructing compliance with humanitarian norms, identified 
through combining normative socialisation and political economy theory 
was the difficulties in some instances for NSAGs to implement actions in 
line with the norms they may have agreed to. Reasons for lack of 
compliance may not have been due to either failed persuasion or 
instrumental calculation at the leadership level. Instead, lack of 
compliance was indicated as due to a lack of capacity, or to organisational 
fragmentation and geographic dispersion of the NSAG leading to localised 
economic agendas at odds with organisation-wide policies or 
commitments to compliance. While at a very tentative stage, these 
innovations in theoretical approach combining social constructivism and 
political economy analysis to the study of NSAGs and humanitarian norms 
have offered a more nuanced understanding of the factors influencing 
NSAGs on these issues.  
Implications for policy 
NSAGs in Burma 
The process towards lasting peace through political dialogue between 
ethnic NSAGs and the government in Burma is still likely to be long. 
Meanwhile, a potential improvement in conditions for civilians in mine-
affected areas could come through NSAGs and the Tatmadaw allowing 
humanitarian-focused mine clearance. Specifically, this entails the removal 
of landmines that no longer have any military or strategic value from 
villages, paths and fields used by civilians. This will require cooperation 
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between mine clearance actors, ethnic NSAGs, CSOs and communities. 
Over the last few years, international mine clearance organisations have 
mostly been based in Yangon awaiting permission from the government, 
Tatmadaw, union and state-level ministries, NSAGs and local communities 
to start surveys and clearance of mined areas. This was frequently 
reiterated in interviews conducted for this study. Starting with the 
clearance of forgotten, unwanted or ‘nuisance’ landmines (randomly laid to 
prevent civilians returning to villages) in non-strategic areas could have 
the potential to reduce threats to the security of local communities and 
build trust and coordination between the actors involved. It would also 
allow valuable clearance work to get underway in areas of high civilian 
activity. 
Coordination and oversight of surveys and clearance in NSAG areas and 
questions of land ownership are also significant issues that arise from any 
moves to deal with the landmine problem. Many mined areas remain 
within NSAG control or influence. Demining actors will need to work 
carefully with NSAGs and local communities so that there is clear 
understanding about the future use or ownership of land that is cleared to 
avoid further land grabbing and/or potential conflict. Ethnic NSAGs and 
related CSOs also hold some valuable mapping and survey information 
about existing mined areas. Coordination bodies for mine action within 
ethnic NSAG administrations are a potentially valuable future policy 
approach for their work with international actors, rather than the process 
being run completely through central government channels.  
Implications for humanitarian engagement with NSAGs 
generally 
Local and international actors interviewed for this study who engaged with 
NSAGs identified some significant aspects that have some relevance and 
implications beyond the case of NSAGs in Burma. Recognising the kinds 
of armed groups and the nature –  whether protective or predatory in their 
relationships with constituent populations – and whether the groups 
themselves are cohesive or fragmented are important indicators for 
potential engagement. These features identify potential opportunities and 
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entry points for engagement on humanitarian concerns such as landmine 
use or recruitment of children. Not all NSAGs care about or seek 
international legitimacy to the same extent, and the examples in this study 
are in no way directly transferable without context-sensitive modification to 
other NSAGs, regions and situations.  However, the most valuable points 
of entry with NSAGs in Burma identified by NGOs and CSOs in this study, 
were through NSAG-associated civil society, EAG concerns with 
international legitimacy, and a wish to be seen by their constituencies as 
involved with provision of assistance. Use of incentives such as 
humanitarian aid, or non-material assistance such as training or capacity 
building in the areas of child protection or MRE may lead to instrumental 
acceptance of humanitarian norms from NSAG leaders thinking of the 
political and economic benefits to their NSAGs and communities. 
However, if the work of CSOs at the ground level combines their genuine 
belief in the value of these international norms with a belief in the cause of 
the wider struggle (especially if that cause aligns with rights-based values 
in those norms) there is more likelihood of the NSAG moving to at least 
ameliorate harm caused to civilians by its actions. 
Limitations 
As stated earlier in chapter five, the perspectives of those actors working 
with, or associated with, NSAGs are likely to present a more positive 
narrative around their role in protection and the threats they pose to 
populations exposed to them. The present study, however, has not sought 
to make a comparison between government and non-state actors, but 
focused on processes impacting on civilian protection, humanitarian norms 
and engagement specifically with NSAGs. There are other humanitarian 
concerns presented by NSAGs the present study did not cover due to a 
lack of data and space, for example incidences of gender based violence 
or forced labour. Former CPB NSAGs in areas that border China, for 
example, the UWSA, MNDAA (Kokang) and NDAA (Mongla), were also 
not able to be addressed by this study. This was due to a lack of data and 
continued lack of access to these areas or documented interest from those 
groups in engagement from external humanitarian actors. Nonetheless, 
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this is acknowledged as a significant limitation to the scope of the present 
study in the context of Burma. 
Areas for further research 
While the theoretical propositions above have considered many of the 
potential influences on NSAGs and their behaviour as it affects civilians, 
some other less anticipated aspects of the issues considered have 
emerged during the course of this study. They also present topics for 
further research. 
One significant point is the assumption made in this study of central 
responsibility for landmine use resting with NSAGs in their areas of 
operation. As was indicated in chapter seven, landmine use in contested 
ethnic areas has started to become decentralised from NSAG military 
control. Landmines are being used by business interests and even local 
communities for the defence of land and resources, or against predatory 
NSAG or Tatmadaw activities. While NSAGs still have primary 
responsibility in their areas for this activity in many instances, this 
alternative use of landmines needs to be acknowledged. It is also a 
development that has grown following the 2012 ceasefires and concerns 
about land-grabbing and increasing interest from external business 
interests in resources in ethnic areas. How mine action proceeds in the 
post-ceasefire period, who undertakes and oversees it, and how, is an 
area for future research. 
The presence of children in NSAGs is officially becoming a matter for the 
UNCTFMR inside Burma. As the Tatmadaw attempts to remove children 
from its ranks, new pressures are likely to be exerted on the NSAGs to 
comply with these standards as well. The Myanmar parliament in August 
2015 supported ratification of the OPAC. This is a development from 
within the country and the state-based system, as opposed to the mostly 
independent externally based actors and processes engaging with NSAGs 
that were discussed in this regard in chapter nine. How this process works 
in practice taking into consideration both the international framework and 
the NCA is a potential area for further study, as is the potential future 
integration of Tatmadaw and ethnic NSAG forces.  
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The post-2012 ceasefires, the 2015 NCA, and ongoing peace processes 
are likely to increase external economic pressure and incentives for NSAG 
elites to facilitate resource extraction and development projects in their 
areas of control which are not always aligned with the interests of their 
constituencies. The role of civil society actors that have developed in 
conjunction with, and increasingly more independently from, NSAGs, 
present another area for future research. They have been increasingly 
critical of some aspects of the ceasefire processes, such as the lack of 
transparency and underrepresentation of women. How, and the extent to 
which they are able, to hold their non-state authorities to account around 
issues of land grabbing, resource extraction or large-scale development 
projects, would present a valuable addition to research into NSAG 
governance in Burma
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 
THE NATIONWIDE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT  
BETWEEN  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR  
AND  
ETHNIC ARMED ORGANIZATIONS  
Preamble 
This Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, between the Government of the Republic 
of the Union of Myanmar and Ethnic Armed Organizations, recognizes, reinforces, 
and reaffirms all previous agreements between the Government of the Republic of 
the Union of Myanmar and Ethnic Armed Organizations. This agreement also aims 
to secure an enduring peace based on the principles of dignity and justice, through 
an inclusive political dialogue process involving all relevant stakeholders. 
 
In order to achieve lasting and sustainable peace in this country, we, the signatories 
to this Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, pledge to each other to diligently work 
together to implement all provisions contained in this agreement completely and 
successfully in an accountable and transparent manner.    
 
Chapter 1 
Basic Principles 
 
1. In order to achieve lasting and sustainable peace, we agree to implement 
this Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in accordance with the following basic 
principles: 
 
a. Establish a union based on the principles of democracy and federalism 
in accordance with the outcomes of the political dialogue and  in the 
spirit of Panglong which fully guarantees democratic rights, equality 
and self-determination while ensuring liberty, equality and justice and 
upholding the principles of non-disintegration of the union, non-
disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of national 
sovereignty.  
 
b. Reach a negotiated settlement to end protracted armed conflict in the 
Republic of the Union of Myanmar; establish a new political culture of 
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resolving political disagreements through political dialogue instead of 
force of arms; and implement nationwide ceasefire at the outset in order 
to end armed conflict. 
 
c. Discuss in the political dialogue the issue concerning Pyidaungsu 
Tatmadaw that represents all ethnic nationalities. 
 
d. Guarantee equal rights to all citizens who live within the Union and 
ensure no citizen be discriminated against on the basis of ethnicity, 
religion, culture, or gender. 
 
e. Establish a secular state to avoid abuse of religion for political 
interests.   
 
f. Collectively establish a national identity that embraces the diversity of 
history, cultural practices, literature, language and national 
characteristics of all ethnic nationalities living within the Union of the 
Republic of Myanmar. 
 
g. Hold inclusive political dialogue in accordance with the aspirations 
and desires of all ethnic nationalities in order to achieve lasting and 
sustainable peace.  
 
h. Negotiate in good faith any issues that may arise between and among 
the dialogue partners in order to achieve lasting and sustainable peace.  
 
i. Abide by all mutual promises and commitments contained in this 
Agreement and implement the peace process in a transparent and 
accountable manner.  
 
j. Effectively implement the provisions contained in this Agreement 
without each party taking advantage of the positive developments 
arising from the implementation of this Agreement. 
 
k. Undertake efforts to protect lives and property and improve  the 
livelihoods of all persons living within the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar. 
 
Chapter 2 
Aims and Objectives  
 
2. The Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and Ethnic 
Armed Organizations agree to the following aims and objectives: 
 
a. Begin an inclusive political dialogue process based on the agreed 
framework for political dialogue following the acceptance and 
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implementation of the nationwide ceasefire, with an aim of achieving 
just and sustainable peace. 
 
b. Form a “Joint Monitoring Committee” to carry out the following: 
implementing provisions of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement; 
monitoring adherence to the code of conduct; investigating alleged 
violations; and undertaking conflict resolution functions. 
 
c. Reaffirm all promises and previous agreements signed between the 
Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and Ethnic 
Armed Organizations.  
 
d. Include all relevant Ethnic Armed Organizations in the collective 
signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement by recognizing the 
political aspirations behind the resistance movement of Ethnic Armed 
Organizations and aiming to strengthen the Union spirit. 
 
Chapter 3 
Ceasefire Related Matters 
 
3. We agree that within Fourteen (14) days of signing this Agreement, 
responsible authorities from the Tatmadaw and Ethnic Armed Organizations shall 
meet to define the exact timeframes governing ceasefire related matters and their 
implementation. 
 
4. We agree to abide by the mutually binding terms and conditions of the 
ceasefire and military codes of conduct as entered into through this Nationwide 
Ceasefire Agreement, and shall submit to investigation by the different levels of 
the Joint Monitoring Committee. 
 
5. The Tatmadaw and Ethnic Armed Organizations agree to abide by the 
following troop-related terms and conditions: 
 
a. Cease the following actions in ceasefire areas: troop movements for 
territorial control, reconnaissance, recruitment, armed attacks, laying 
of mines, acts of violence, destruction of property, and launching of 
military offensives.  
 
b. Avoid any direct or indirect action that may be regarded as hostile or 
contemptuous.  
 
c. Avoid troop reinforcements, building of new military bases except 
those already agreed by both parties and supplying of ammunition and 
weaponry in all ceasefire areas other than the provision of 
administrative support, emergency medical support, or routine rotation 
of troops. In the event of a threat to national security or to defend 
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against external threats, the aforementioned activities may be 
undertaken after consultation.  
 
d. Avoid using as military outposts or encampments any religious 
buildings, schools, hospitals, clinics and their premises as well as 
culturally important places and public spaces. 
 
e. Undertake de-mining activities to clear mines laid by troops from all 
sides in accordance with the progress of the peace process and 
coordinate mine action activities in close consultation with the 
Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. 
 
f. Avoid hostile propaganda, defamatory, untruthful or derogatory 
statements, both within and outside the country. 
 
g. Cooperate to carry out relief and rescue efforts and provision of 
medical supplies in the case of a natural disaster causing an 
emergency situation in a ceasefire area. 
 
h. Administer rule of law in ceasefire areas and take action against 
perpetrators in accordance with the law in consultation with each 
other. 
 
i. Undertake the administration of military matters in ceasefire areas in 
consultation with each other.    
 
j. Notify the signing of this Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement to all 
levels of the respective command structures within twenty-four (24) 
hours of the signing and explain the provisions contained in this 
Agreement within five (5) days of the signing. 
 
k. Avoid resorting to force to resolve disputes arising at lower levels and 
ranks.     
 
6. We shall negotiate and implement matters regarding troop recruitment by 
Ethnic Armed Organizations in accordance with the implementation of this 
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and the security reintegration process. 
 
Deployment of military forces to prevent confrontations 
 
7. In order to prevent military confrontation, the Tatmadaw and Ethnic 
Armed Organizations shall abide by the following provisions governing the 
deployment of troops:  
 
a. Avoid confrontations in areas where there is direct contact between 
the troops, by acting immediately using radio, ground or other 
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methods of communication. 
 
b. Undertake repositioning of troops in consultation with each other to 
avoid confrontations. 
 
c. In areas where repositioning of troops is still under discussion or 
remains difficult to undertake, commanders should regularly contact 
and consult with each other.    
 
d. Tatmadaw and Ethnic Armed Organizations shall confine their troops 
within the designated areas. 
 
e. Coordinate in consultation with each other on the number of military 
bases in areas of direct contact between the troops to avoid 
confrontation. 
 
f. Consult with each other based on this Agreement to ensure 
communication channels are securely maintained between the 
respective military bases and areas. 
 
Free movement of troops 
 
8. The Tatmadaw and Ethnic Armed Organizations shall abide by the 
following provisions governing the free movement of troops: 
 
a. Free movement of unarmed troops is allowed in all areas except in 
security-restricted areas. 
 
b. Movement of armed troops in the areas controlled by the other is 
allowed only after obtaining prior agreement.  
 
Protection of Civilians 
 
9. The Tatmadaw and Ethnic Armed Organizations shall abide by the 
following provisions regarding the protection of civilians: 
 
a. Provide necessary support in consultation with each other to improve 
livelihoods, health, education, and regional development for the 
people. 
 
b. Avoid acts violating a person’s dignity, violence, extrajudicial 
detention, kidnapping, torture, inhumane treatment, imprisonment, 
killing or otherwise causing the disappearance of the individual.  
 
c. Avoid forcible displacement or relocation of local populations.  
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d. Avoid forcibly taking money, property, food, labor or services from 
civilians. 
 
e. Avoid unlawful and arbitrary arrest, entrapment, prosecution and  
pronouncement of judgment  against civilians.  Any action against 
civilians shall be undertaken in accordance with the law.  
 
f. Avoid forcible confiscation and transfer of land from local 
populations.  
 
g. Avoid the destruction of public property, looting, theft, or the taking 
of property without permission.  
 
h. Avoid restrictions on the right to education; destruction of schools and 
educational buildings, including educational tools; and the disturbance 
and hindrance of students and teachers.  
 
i. Avoid impeding an individual’s right to health or access to healthcare; 
or restricting public health resources and the legal transportation of 
medicines for public use.  
 
j. Avoid impeding the storage of food and supplies as well as the 
transport, sale and trade of goods and produce.   
 
k. Avoid the destruction or actions that would lead to the destruction of 
schools, hospitals, clinics, religious buildings and their premises and 
the use of such places as military bases or outposts.  
 
l. Avoid either directly or indirectly interfering in public activities to 
protect religion, literature and cultural and traditional practices.  
 
m. Avoid any form of sexual attack on women, including sexual 
molestation, sexual assault or violence, rape and sex slavery.  
 
n. Avoid killing or maiming, forced conscription, rape or other forms of 
sexual assault or violence, or abduction of children. 
 
o. Avoid enslavement or forced labor of civilians.  
 
p. Ensure the security and development of civilians living in ceasefire 
areas.  
 
q. Permit civilians to move freely inside ceasefire areas. 
 
Provision of humanitarian assistance  
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10. The Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and Ethnic 
Armed Organizations shall abide by the following provisions regarding the 
provision of humanitarian assistance: 
 
a. Relevant Government ministries, Ethnic Armed Organizations and 
local organizations shall work in consultation with each other, and 
with the approval of the Government of the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar, coordinate and undertake the administration of 
humanitarian assistance by NGOs and INGOs to assist Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) and conflict victims.  
 
b. Ensure the safety and dignity of the IDPs when undertaking a 
prioritized voluntary return of IDPs to their places of origin or 
resettlement of IDPs into new villages in suitable areas.  
 
c. Cooperate on the resettlement of IDPs and refugees after verification. 
 
Chapter 4 
Maintaining and Strengthening Ceasefire 
 
Ceasefire related rules and regulations and military code of conduct 
 
11. We shall enact, in accordance with the provisions in this agreement, the 
military code of conduct and ceasefire-related rules and regulations within one (1) 
month of the signing of this Agreement.   
 
Joint Monitoring Committee 
 
12. To ensure compliance with this Agreement, the Joint Implementation 
Coordination Meeting shall form the Joint Monitoring Committee as follows:    
 
a. To monitor the parties’ compliance with this Agreement, we shall 
form a Joint Monitoring Committee, comprised of members of the 
Union Peace-Making Work Committee, representatives of Ethnic 
Armed Organizations, and trusted and well-respected individuals.  
 
b. The Joint Monitoring Committee shall comprise a nationwide 
ceasefire monitoring committee, state-level ceasefire monitoring 
committee, region-level ceasefire monitoring committee, and an 
investigation and verification committee.   
    
c. We shall jointly decide on the basis of mutual agreement, the role of 
representatives from foreign governments and international 
organizations that are involved in the ongoing peace process, either as 
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observers, advisors or to provide necessary technical assistance at 
different levels of the ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee.  
 
13. The responsibilities, rights and guiding principles for the respective 
committees are as follows:   
 
a. Determine in the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting, the 
procedures, standards, guidelines and detailed organizational structure 
of the ceasefire implementation mechanism. 
 
b. Carry out ceasefire implementation and monitoring related 
responsibilities, and when necessary, report to the Joint 
Implementation Coordination Meeting.  
 
c. Coordinate humanitarian assistance provided for Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) of both man-made and natural disasters, and victims of 
conflict.   
 
d. Monitor the repositioning of troops as agreed by the parties.  
 
e. Assist the peace process by monitoring compliance with the 
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, the agreed troop-related provisions, 
the military code of conduct, ceasefire related rules and regulations, 
and resolving disputes in a transparent and unbiased manner.   
 
14. The Joint Monitoring Committee shall use its best efforts to reach 
decisions by consensus.  
 
15. To allow the Joint Monitoring Committee to effectively resolve issues, we 
agree to provide all information requested by the Committee, except information 
related to national defense and security matters, in accordance with the terms of 
this Agreement.   
 
Liaison Offices 
 
16. To ensure the smooth functioning of the operations of the Ethnic Armed 
Organizations that are signatories to this agreement, liaison offices shall be 
permitted in mutually agreed areas and in areas specified in existing union-level 
peace agreements.     
 
17. We shall negotiate and determine procedures to enable liaison office staff 
to achieve prompt and efficient resolution of disputes and difficulties.    
 
18. We shall provide protection to liaison office staff and Ethnic Armed 
Organizations as needed.  
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Chapter 5  
Guarantees for Political Dialogue  
 
19. After signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement to end armed conflict 
and resolve political issues through peaceful political means, we shall undertake 
the implementation of all terms and conditions as provided in the Agreement.    
 
The political roadmap 
 
20. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Government and Ethnic Armed 
Organizations shall abide by the following political roadmap: 
 
a. Signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.  
 
b. Drafting and adopting the “Framework for Political Dialogue” by 
representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar and Ethnic Armed Organizations.   
 
c. Holding national political dialogue based on the adopted Framework 
for Political Dialogue, and negotiating security reintegration matters 
and undertaking other necessary tasks that both parties agree can be 
carried out in advance. 
 
d. Holding the Union Peace Conference. 
 
e. Signing the Pyidaungsu Accord.  
 
f. Submitting the Pyidaungsu Accord to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw for 
ratification. 
 
g. Implementing all provisions contained in the Pyidaungsu Accord, and 
carrying out security reintegration matters.  
 
Political dialogue 
 
21. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Government and Ethnic Armed 
Organizations agree to the following provisions with regards to political dialogue: 
 
a. In order to begin political dialogue and jointly undertake the 
implementation of all provisions contained in this Nationwide 
Ceasefire Agreement, we shall undertake the following as soon as the 
Agreement is signed:   
 
(1)  Hold a Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting.    
 
(2)  Form the Nationwide Ceasefire Joint Monitoring 
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Committee, Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee and other 
necessary committees during this meeting, (The Union Peace 
Dialogue Joint Committee is also responsible for drafting a framework 
for political dialogue).             
 
b. Jointly draft and adopt a framework for political dialogue – including 
functions and responsibilities, agendas for discussion, structure of the 
political dialogue - within sixty (60) days of signing this Nationwide 
Ceasefire Agreement in collaboration with all relevant stakeholders.       
 
c. We shall begin political dialogue within ninety (90) days of signing 
this Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. 
 
d.  We shall set the agenda for the framework for political dialogue by 
including basic principles of this Agreement and other topics but 
avoiding issues that violate the three main national causes of non-
disintegration of the union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, 
and perpetuation of national sovereignty. 
 
e. In order to achieve lasting and sustainable peace, we agree to reach a 
mutually acceptable position on all matters within the political 
dialogue framework.  
 
Holding of inclusive political dialogue 
 
22.  
 
a. Representatives from the government, parliament, the Tatmadaw, 
Ethnic Armed Organizations, registered political parties, ethnic 
representatives and other relevant representatives shall participate in 
political dialogue that is based on inclusiveness.   
 
b. The participation of ethnic representatives, civil society organizations, 
scholars, experts, business associations, and other relevant 
stakeholders at different stages of political dialogue will be discussed 
and determined during the drafting of the Framework for Political 
Dialogue. 
 
c. The proportion of representatives participating in political dialogue 
shall be negotiated during discussions on the Framework for Political 
Dialogue. 
 
d. We agree that all decisions adopted by the Union Peace Conference 
shall be the basis for amending, repealing and adding provisions to the 
Constitution and laws, in line with established procedures.   
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23. We shall include a reasonable number of women representatives in the 
political dialogue process.  
 
 
Chapter 6   
Future Tasks and Responsibilities  
 
Confidence building measures: 
 
24.  
 
a. No person (or) organization shall not be subject to arrest or legal 
repercussion due to their involvement in negotiating this Agreement 
or in the peace process, except for otherwise violating the law.  
 
b. It is agreed that the removal of all Ethnic Armed Organizations that 
are signatories to this Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement from the list 
of unlawful associations shall be undertaken. Further, no person (or) 
organization associating with the signatories to this agreement shall be 
subject to prosecution under the Political Parties Registration Law or 
Unlawful Associations Act.   
 
c. After the signing of this Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, any person 
charged or detained for alleged association with Ethnic Armed 
Organizations under the Unlawful Associations Act, shall be released 
in accordance with the law.  
 
Tasks to be implemented during the interim period 
 
25.  
 
a. The Ethnic Armed Organizations that are signatories to this agreement 
have been responsible for development and security in their respective 
areas. During the interim period of holding peace talks, we shall carry 
out the following programs and projects in consultation with each 
other in said areas.  
 
(1)  Projects concerning the health, education and socio-
economic development of civilians. 
 
(2)  Environmental conservation. 
 
(3)  Efforts to preserve and promote ethnic culture, language, 
and literature. 
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(4)  Matters regarding peace and stability, and the maintenance 
of rule of law in the said areas. 
 
(5)  Receiving aid from donor agencies both inside and outside 
the country for regional development and capacity-building projects. 
 
(6)  Eradication of illicit drugs.  
 
b. Planning and implementation of projects that may have a major 
impact on civilians living in ceasefire areas shall be undertaken in 
consultation with relevant Ethnic Armed Organizations and with local 
communities in accordance with the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) Standard procedures.   
 
c. The government and the individual Ethnic Armed Organizations shall 
coordinate the implementation of tasks that are specific to the areas of 
the respective Ethnic Armed Organization.    
 
Submission to Pyidaungsu Hluttaw for ratification  
 
26. We shall submit this Agreement to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw for ratification 
in accordance with established procedures.  
 
Chapter 7 
Miscellaneous 
 
27. We shall hold separate discussions between the signatories to discuss any 
issues that are beyond the scope of this agreement and the outcome of such 
discussions shall not contradict any provisions of this Agreement.  
 
28. This agreement shall be written in Myanmar and translated into English.  
Each shall be legally valid, however in the event of any dispute or ambiguity over 
the wording and essential meaning of the agreement between the two versions, the 
original meaning and intention of the Myanmar version shall prevail.     
 
29. We shall undertake jointly to ensure the successful implementation of this 
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. Any issues faced during the implementation of 
the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement shall be resolved in the regularly held Joint 
Implementation Coordination Meetings composed of representatives of the 
signatories.  
  
30. We agree that, in consultation with each other, decisions contained in the 
agreed meeting minutes taken during negotiations for the Nationwide Ceasefire 
Agreement shall be referred to in the implementation of the Agreement. 
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Guidelines for dispute resolution  
 
31.  
 
a. We shall resolve through peaceful means any issues that may arise in 
complying with the terms and conditions of this Agreement.   
 
b. We shall submit any issue that cannot be resolved in accordance with 
paragraph 31(a) to the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting for 
resolution.   
 
Entry into force 
 
32. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of the signing by the 
signatories.  If needed, a review of the implementation of this Agreement shall be 
undertaken by the signatories in consultation with each other. 
 
Signing of the Agreement 
 
33. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of the Union of Myanmar and Ethnic Armed Organizations is signed on 
this […..day of ………] by the following representatives.  
 
For the Government of the Republic   For Ethnic Armed 
Organizations 
of the Union of Myanmar 
 
Leaders of the government,      Chairman 
Leader of the armed forces     General Secretaries 
Leaders of parliament     Ethnic army chiefs 
Senior government officials                
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Appendix 2: KNPP Statements and deed of commitment with UNICEF 
(2006-2009) 
 
 
 
 
KARENNI NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY HEADQUARTERS  
Statement No. 01/06  
 
We, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) would like to make clear our 
stance on the use of child soldiers.  
 
According to article 29(5) of the Karenni State Constitution, which was ratified in 
1973 at the National Congress, all underage children shall be free from 
conscription to army service.  
 
However, during the 1970-1980 period of the resistance movement, a number of 
young people under the age of 18 voluntarily joined the Karenni Army, the 
military wing of the KNPP, with the aim of retaliation, motivated by bitter 
resentment caused by seeing family members killed or maltreated by the Burmese 
army. Many were orphans, or had become separated from their families as a result 
of action by the Burmese army. Contrary to claims by outside parties these so-
called ‘child soldiers’ never numbered more than 100 persons. Furthermore these 
young people were encouraged by the KNPP to go to schools run by the 
organization to pursue an education rather than becoming soldiers. These schools 
were not used for military recruitment and the students were not encouraged by 
the KNPP to serve in the army when they finished school. Some of those educated 
by the KNPP did subsequently voluntarily join the army, some as soldiers, but 
other to serve in auxiliary fields, such as medics, schoolteachers or office staff. 
Often this decision was motivated by the lack of alternative employment due to 
the young people’s refugee status.  
 
Since 1980, underage soldiers have gradually decreased and they can rarely be 
seen in the Karenni Army. A significant number have benefited by returning to 
school.  
 
On occasions some local authorities inside Karenni State required locals to join 
the militia for self-defense when the Burmese military were carrying out 
scorched-earth military operations in the area. This recruitment was for the 
purposes of self-defense and recruits were not considered to be soldiers and 
therefore they were not subject to the same terms and conditions as the regular 
army. They were regarded as a temporary defense force.  
 
The KNPP reviews and amends its State Constitution every four-year at the party 
congress to re-affirm its adherence to the provisions of the constitution and make 
changes as necessary in the light of changing circumstances. In view of the fact 
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that our Constitution clearly prohibits the recruitment of child soldiers, we, the 
KNPP, would publicly like to reiterate our stance that we do not conscript 
conscripted underage youths, or even adults, to be soldiers in the movement 
against the Burmese regime.  
 
Executive Committee  
Karenni National Progressive Party  
August 31st, 2006  
 
 
 
 
KARENNI NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY HEADQUARTERS  
Statement No. 02/06  
 
We, the Karenni National Progressive Party, or KNPP, wish to announce our 
stance on the use of landmines during the national struggle movement for self 
determination.  
 
We abhor the use of landmines in warfare and understand the international 
condemnation of the use of landmines because of the high risk to civilians. 
However in certain circumstances we use them to defend our troops as we lack 
alternative means of defence. Our use of landmines is extremely limited and steps 
are taken to avoid civilian casualties. We only use them in military zones, not in 
civilian areas. The Karenni army does not place landmines on roads and in other 
areas used by innocent civilians. They are used for defensive purposes and we 
have no intention of placing them in war-free-zones.  
 
The Karenni Army has not been involved in the manufacture of landmines since 
1989, nor do we procure landmines. Landmines are used extensively by the 
Burmese army and their collaborators and we use landmines which have been 
seized from the Burmese army during confrontations.  
 
We, the KNPP, agree that the use of landmine is immoral, for they carry too high 
a risk, but we are engaged in confrontation with an enemy that has no scruples.  
 
The KNPP are willing to cooperate with legitimate individuals or organizations 
that engage in landmine education or lobby to ban the production of landmines in 
order to reduce their use. This cooperation would help ensure the clearance of 
landmines when peace finally comes to our country.  
 
Executive Committee  
KNPP  
31st August 2006  
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Note: The DoC via UNICEF also signed by the KNU in 2007 has the same 
wording as the KNPP example above. 
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KARENNI NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY  
OFFICE OF HEADQUARTERS  
 
February 12, 2008  
Press Release No. 1/08  
 
Call for the Karenni Army’s name to be removed from the list of non-state armed 
groups making use of child soldiers in armed conflict  
 
We, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), would like to appeal once 
again to Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the name 
of our armed force, the Karenni Army, to be removed from the list of non-state 
armed groups utilizing child soldiers. The Karenni Army has worked hard to 
entirely eliminate the recruitment of young people into its forces and KNPP and 
the KA have issued two statements – in August 2006 and November 2007 - 
clearly stating our commitment to adhere to international conventions against the 
use of child soldiers.  
 
There have been no children in the KA ranks for a few years now. This is in 
accordance with the Karenni State Constitution’s article 29(5) that all underage 
children shall be free from conscription to army service.  
 
As mentioned in previous statements, representatives of both the KNPP and KA 
met with UNICEF, Thailand twice to discuss this matter and in April 2007 we 
signed a Deed of Commitment promising to end child recruitment, demobilize 
children in the force and allow outsiders to independently monitor our 
compliance.  
 
We have on many occasions invited interested parties, including the UN’s country 
representative, UNICEF and Human Rights Watch, to visit the areas where the 
KA operate to verify these facts for themselves. Furthermore the SPDC Prime 
Minister, Thein Sein, announced that he would allow UN representatives to visit 
the areas where ethnic armed groups operate to monitor the situation himself; but 
no one has responded to these invitations.  
 
The KNPP and KA warmly welcome a visit by the UN’s representatives and 
independent agencies to the area where we operate. The KA will offer them 
logistic assistance and open access so they can monitor the situation. We too wish 
to see an end to the involvement of child soldiers in armed conflict and the 
complete demobilization of child soldiers by any armed groups operating in 
Burma and in the ethnic states.  
 
At the same time, we once again, reiterate that there is no justification for the 
inclusion of the Karenni Army in the list of non-state armed groups who include 
child soldiers in their ranks. We ask you to remove the name of the KA from the 
list and issue a statement to this effect.  
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Executive Committee  
Karenni National Progressive Party
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Appendix 3: KNU policy on humanitarian assistance (2013/2014) 
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Appendix 4: The Democratic Alliance of Burma/Geneva Call joint 
statement on raising awareness about the landmine issue (2010) 
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Appendix 5: CNF deed of commitment via Geneva Call on landmine 
use (2006) and on child soldiers via HREIB (2009) 
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Appendix 6: NMSP statement and example of Geneva Call deed of 
commitment on protection of children from the effects of armed 
conflict (2012) 
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Note:  Apart from different names and signatures, the Geneva Call DoC 
signed by KNPP, KNU, CNF and PNLA on the protection of children from 
the effects of armed conflict has the same wording as the NMSP example 
above. 
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Appendix 7: Extracts from HREIB child soldiers cartoon booklet 
(pages 4, 6 and 14) 
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